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GHANA AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS: THE CASE OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2012 set forth the processes to commission the new global development agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a replacement for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that had been in place since 2000. The request for the new initiative was made as a result of the expectations, achievements and challenges of the MDGs (UNDP 2015). Development practitioners have considered the SDGs as an ambitious and boldest initiative by the international community to collectively address sustainable development issues from ecological, social and economic dimensions (Beisheim and Nils 2016; Lucci and Lally 2016). The intergovernmental engagements as well as the participation of different stakeholders in the SDGs' review and agenda development processes that was adopted by 193 world leaders in September 2015, can only mean one thing (UN 2015). That is, the 17 goals and their 169 targets in the SDGs can only be considered as the international community's collective resolve to holistically shape global development efforts by addressing well-documented development challenges of poverty, hunger, inclusion and environmental sustainability (Lucci and Lally 2016; UNDP 2015).

The international community collectively and inclusively agreed on the SDGs. Implications are that Ghana and many other developing countries partnered with their more advanced counterparts from developed economies at global level to agree on and own the SDGs as a common development agenda for all countries of the world. The collaborations between the developed and developing nations were intended to overcome the major development challenges associated with the MDGs. These include the perception that the eight goals were only standards for ensuring that all developing nations had common metrics for evaluating or measuring their progress towards development (UNDP 2016). However, the expectation for the SDGs is that the 17 goals have been carefully agreed upon by all countries (developed and developing) and designed to include all population groups and not leave anyone behind (Beisheim and Nils 2016; Lucci and Lally 2016; Nicolai, Hoy, Berliner and Aedy 2015). Additionally, the coming together of all countries further builds consensus to ensure that the financial commitments needed for the successful implementation of the SDGs by relevant stakeholders in both developed and developing nations is given due consideration during the agenda formulation and implementation stages.

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So, in the case of many developing economies (as well as Ghana), key factors for implementing SDGs seem to depend on the ability and success of leveraging diverse sources and securing sufficient and sustainable funds (Addo 2016).

In addition to the global adoption of the SDGs, Ghana's role and expressed commitments at the national launch, raised citizens' expectations for the implementation of the SDGs. These expectations should be carefully and sustainably scrutinised to ensure the country's preparedness, and to guarantee citizens' awareness of, and participation in, the implementation process. Such scrutiny also has the potential to ensure that plans and programs at national level are appropriate; the necessary consultations and engagements with the relevant stakeholders are secured as part of the processes for moving the country towards effective resource utilisation for the implementation of the SDGs in line with the global expectations (Reddy 2016). Some effort is needed to assess whether Ghana's prior experiences with development agenda implementation would serve in guiding the preparatory activities to effectively implement the new development agenda to improve the wellbeing of citizens. This paper sought to assess the Ghana government's commitment and efforts towards the successful implementation of the SDGs. More specifically, the paper highlights national level structures and initiatives that are useful for sustaining national momentum, while strategizing for ambitious progress on Ghana's implementation of programs and projects for the SDGs agenda. It also explores the opportunities, gaps and projections in terms of Ghana's efforts towards effective implementation of the SDGs, and finally assesses the level of consultation and involvement of relevant stakeholders, including civil society and the corporate sector, for successful implementation. Two questions that guide this study are whether there is an enabling environment for the realisation of the SDGs in Ghana, and whether Ghana will be able to implement the SDGs.

DATA GATHERING AND METHODOLOGY

This study employed social action research techniques and the interpretations of personal experiences and real-life accounts of individuals involved in the implementation of intervention and programs to achieve the SDG objectives in Ghana. This section therefore presents the results of the discussions and interviews with key informants and officials from the following institutions: National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ghana, Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), and the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI). The interviews were conducted between July and September 2016. Interview responses and discussions were combined with reviewed programs and project documents and reports. The respondents were representatives from government agencies, international development organisations, NGOs, and Community Security Organisations (CSOs), whose work and interest relates to the global development agendas of both the MDGs and now the newly ratified SDGs. Each respondents were asked to provide an overview of Ghana's preparedness to implement the SDGs by looking at the national level structures, environmental factors

(political, socio-economic, institutional and environmental), government and citizens' priorities, and accountability mechanisms. They were also asked about the levels of consultation and involvement of stakeholders, potential challenges that could affect implementation, knowledge gaps, and whether Ghana will be able to implement the goals.

The rest of the paper proceeds in the subsequent sections firstly with an overview and context of the SDGs in the sustainable development literature as a way to situate Ghana's approaches to development planning. A review of documents, baseline reports, backgrounds and project objectives also occurred in order to reconcile national and international systems and structures for effective implementation of planned and ongoing programs and projects to address the SDGs in Ghana.

REVIEW: GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Since returning to democratic governance in 1993 under the Fourth Republican Constitution, Ghana has prepared five medium-term (mostly three- and four-year) national development policy frameworks (Tandoh-Offin 2013). Each of the successive frameworks have paid due attention to the successes and opportunities gained from their predecessors, while highlighting challenges and gaps in preparing plans to guide the overall development of the national economy. Overall, it can be argued that the five medium-term development frameworks have enabled Ghana to refine the strategies employed to guide socio-economic, political and institutional development, as well as the environmental management needed to assure human development collectively and collaboratively in all its purposes and intents. In spite of the opportunities offered through the various medium-term development frameworks, the lack of a long-term national development agenda has meant that political parties' manifestoes and agenda have guided national development in Ghana under the Fourth Republic. In light of the above trend, the NDPC tends to suffer from politicisation with the potential to inhibit the long-term vision for national development that will be complied with by successive governments (see the NDPC and other official documents, Ghana 1995; 1998 and 2010).

Any attempt to contextualise the SDGs requires a theoretical justification of the Goals from the perspectives of development planning as practiced in Ghana, since the advent of the Fourth Republican Constitution in 1993. Thus, the meaning of planning as offered by Danso (2014), serves as a useful outline for demarcating all the actions and means for making conscious choices about how to attain a future goal and objectives. This meaning of planning also captures all the necessary events for deciding on the goal and objectives, as well as the appropriate courses of action to attain those objectives. This definition of planning further expands the scope of the concept, and identifies it as a multi-dimensional process calling for a reorganisation and reorientation of the entire economic and social system (Ikeanyibe 2009). It thereby places emphasis on

the improvement of income and output, radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures, as well as in popular attitudes, customs and beliefs (Todaro 1989).

The definition of planning above further calls for conceptualising 'development' as it applies to countries, where it goes beyond just economic development and its fixation on income or its inherent factors like Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and broadly adopts a human focus in terms of quality of life and wellbeing. In this vein, development should be understood as a process and not a product, since societies are in a constant change process (Barbanti 2005) and transcend economic and social divisions. Development planning, on the other hand, presupposes a formally predetermined rather than a sporadic action towards achieving specific developmental results (Killick 2010; Tandoh-Offin 2013). More importantly, it entails direction and control towards achieving planned targets (Moti 2010).

In line with the arguments above, one can safely conclude that the MDGs are the results of a collective desire and search for a more "peaceful, prosperous and just world" (UNDP 2015). Therefore, the MDGs are a global partnership for addressing the myriad of human development challenges that bedevilled the planet towards the end of the twentieth century. The MDGs ratified by the community of nations were a package of specific strategic targets with indicators to measure progress by 2015. Thus, the MDGs were intended to guarantee that communities improve or become more advanced, more mature, more complete, more organised, and more transformed (Danso 2014). The goals that highlighted the stark reality of widespread human deprivation and environmental degradation are credited for halving extreme poverty, improved youth literacy and declines in child mortality across much of the world. Sachs (2012) argues that the MDGs have contributed to a remarkable enhancement of people's wellbeing in developing countries (Vandemoortele 2011).

Correspondingly, various observes suggested that whatever the specific components of wellbeing, development in all societies should at least have similarity in objectives (see Kendie and Martens 2008; Potts and others 2003). These include an increased availability and widened distribution of basic life-sustaining goods like food, shelter, health and protection; as well as raise level of living, including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values. All of these will serve, not only to enhance material wellbeing, but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem. It will also expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence, not only in relation to other people and nation-states, but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery (Todaro and Smith 2009: 22).

The MDGs offered many opportunities in terms of mobilising global efforts to address development challenges. Yet, after close to 15 years of implementation it is evident

that much more support and effort is required to eradicate poverty in all its forms, and to deliver on the unfinished business of the MDGs. In essence, countries were unable to meet most of the goals for a number of reasons. These include the existence of structural errors such as inequality, insecurity, bad governance, wars, lack of decent work; and on the meaning of the relationship between sustainable consumption and production patterns (Lucci and Lally 2016). There is also the perception that the process for selecting the eight goals were devoid of consultations (UNDP 2015a). Furthermore, in most cases, the failure of development partners to follow through on their promise to assist with the funding of proposed programs and projects for achieving the goals also affected successful implementation of the MDGs (Lucci and Lally 2016; Melamed 2015).

The calls for a new development paradigm based on a review and a refocusing of development, according to the World Bank's *Voices of the Poor* (2000) survey, is predicated on the principle that priorities of the poor still consist of jobs, better connections to the rest of the world, reduced threats of violence and ending humiliation and disrespect. To this end, the global community adopted an elaborate consultative and widespread engagement process with all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, to address the challenges associated with the MDGs and its implementation. The post-2015 development agenda consists of 17 carefully selected and reviewed goals (the SDGs), to guide the social, economic and environmental development by both developed and developing countries (see Table 1). Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs adopt a human rights approach to include all population groups and "leave no one behind" in the planning and implementation of programs and projects and in the monitoring and review of progress towards the attainment of the goals.

Table 1: The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

GOAL 1	End poverty in all its forms everywhere
GOAL 2	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
GOAL 3	Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages
GOAL 4	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
GOAL 5	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
GOAL 6	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
GOAL 7	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
GOAL 8	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

GOAL 9	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation
GOAL 10	Reduce inequality within and among countries
GOAL 11	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
GOAL 12	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
GOAL 13	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
GOAL 14	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
GOAL 15	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
GOAL 16	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build elective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
GOAL 17	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

Locally, processes and events were set in motion to prepare and engage citizens in the post-2015 development process through the *My World Survey* (ISODEC 2015) which sought, among other things, to gather voices of Ghanaian citizens on the Post-2015 development process. This was a collaborative initiative between the United Nations (UN) and civil society organisations. It was coordinated by the UNDP, the UN Millennium Campaign as well as the Web Foundation, while it was carried out by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and ISODEC, a local NGO. The proposal for addressing the development challenges in society, as emerged from the survey, included the need for targeted advocacy and public engagement between citizens and government to deal with the low prioritisation accorded to social protection for the vulnerable.

In agreeing on the new goals, serious considerations were given to the need of not only providing for basic human needs, but also ensuring essential human rights and creating enabling conditions to help individuals realise their potentials (Beisheim 2016). The legacies of the worst economic and financial crises in recent history must be addressed (Addo 2016), while the implications of migration and the management of the current refugee crises remain an important consideration. The SDGs also call for sustained focus beyond parochial economic measures of progress to consider all aspects of wellbeing and sustainable development. Furthermore, it is crucial to achieve drastic reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions in order to safeguard the planet for future generations.

There is no doubt that the SDGs and its framework offer a useful strategy for addressing key systemic barriers to sustainable development in terms of inequality, unsustainable consumption patterns, weak institutional capacity, and environmental degradation that were not covered by the MDGs. With its three-pronged focus on social inclusion, economic development and environmental sustainability in development over the next 15 years, the 17 goals of the SDGs with its 169 targets ensure that the global community collectively approaches development of all forms from a holistic and sustainable perspective (Caritas – Ghana 2016).

The SDGs prove their relevance as global development indices by calling for a renewed emphasis on the need to create programs to generate better standards of living through inclusive growth, tackling extreme poverty and hunger through the acceleration of income growth and increased employment especially for the world's poorest 20% (Bhatkal, et al. 2015; Lucci and Lally 2016). It also calls for a focus on achieving goals for education beyond primary schooling towards universal literacy and numeracy and job skills, and similarly for improved or productive life expectancy in terms of health goals for all countries (Shepard, *et al*. 2014). For essential human rights, the new goals are expected to promote civil and political rights, and security in addition to gender equality. Furthermore, the civil and political rights goal should promote public participation, accountability and transparency (Fukuyama 2014; Sivhuoch and Sreang 2015).

The new goals call for the appropriate enabling conditions by promoting universal access to information and communication technology (ICT), transportation and energy infrastructure, environmental sustainability and good global governance. The availability of appropriate indicators to underpin targets for each of the goals is critical. It is important to note that the behaviour of organisations and individuals is influenced by how success will be assessed. Without practical indicators, goals remain purely aspirational and progress cannot be measured. Nevertheless, there are daunting challenges to devising suitable indicators that are both measurable and motivational in order to galvanise public support for development. Serious data limitations exist, especially for the purposes of cross-country comparisons. Metrics must be sophisticated - not too crude, but not too technocratic. Indicators should allow for disaggregation by sex, urban/rural, and identity groups and income bands to unmask the inequalities that hide behind generalised statistics.

Additionally, even the UN accepts the fact that the goals and targets are a highly ambitious effort to address development challenges especially for developing countries where the co-existence of peace and stability with rule of law is a difficult or even an impossible dream. The tensions between high growth that can reduce poverty and the feasibility of sustaining the environment call for a re-look at the goals and targets set by the SDGs. However, it is a worthwhile endeavour to explore how Ghana is preparing to attempt the implementation of the goals and targets as a means to bringing about development that the people so badly need by looking at where the

country has come from with regards to development planning, especially under the current democratic political dispensation.

REVIEW: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Since the inception of the MDGs in 2000, Ghana has prepared four medium-term development frameworks and their associated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans, which have all reflected on the goals, targets, and the indicators to monitor achievements. The first challenge from Ghana's experience of implementing the SDGs is that, at national level, Ghana saw the MDGs and their targets as very relevant, and swiftly adopted and mainstreamed the goals into national planning frameworks through the various medium-term development plans over the period since 2002, and regularly reported on progress. However, the lack of inter-ministerial coordination and reporting made it difficult for the MDGs to reflect on the national context and the prevailing conditions at national level. Thus, for the SDGs, major challenges for successful implementation may include the following:

- How an inter-ministerial coordination can be developed to create the space for integrating the goals into national development frameworks and minimise distractions from the implementation process;
- Ongoing demographic transitions that will not abate any time soon and that have serious implications for planning in terms of the labour force and access to decent jobs, especially for the youth;
- The issue of urbanisation with its attendant challenges in terms of distribution of basic amenities, utility services, sanitation, urban planning and implications for structural transformations in the economy.
- Peculiar conditions of new, lower middle-income countries like Ghana and their struggles with structural transformations and the investments they need to address issues of inequality and access of all forms, particularly, access to energy;
- Additional financial resources beyond current government allocations that will be needed for implementation to be effective if the goals are to be achieved;
- Effects of internal and external migration patterns such as sub-national disparities, spatial inequity and inequality, especially gender-based inequality at sub-national levels and urbanisation, which are rarely included in global and national development planning;
- The need to seek a balance between good governance and sustainable environmental management amidst the increased demand for energy and access to basic amenities resulting from rapid urbanisation and industrialisation in most of the developing world, including Ghana;
- The need for a functional and up-to-date administrative statistics and information management system is of utmost importance for successful implementation, monitoring and reporting on any national and sub-national development and even globally coordinated development endeavours; and

Finally, other challenges with the potential to militate against successful implementation of the SDGs by Ghana include availability of the appropriate capacities in terms of human and technology skills to build the expertise to facilitate implementation. The monitoring of implementation efforts to achieve the targets of the SDGs also call for a sophisticated and elaborate data collection and management system, and the availability of professionals with the requisite expertise to support these efforts. The NDPC acknowledges that the country faces various challenges in this is an area. As a result, it is calling for a realignment of training and education programs at tertiary levels to ensure that there are professionals with the needed skills to support Ghana's implementation of the goals. There is also the issue of international environment and international influence through production commodity and exchange challenges resulting from the unfavourable terms of trade that can affect Ghana's exports and the political will to manage these relationships.

FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Opportunities for Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals

Meanwhile, significant opportunities also exist from Ghana's experiences in implementing the MDG could be useful to the successful implementation of the SDGs. The first opportunity offered by the implementation of the MDGs is the need to integrate the goals and targets into national development plans. According to the MFWA and the NDPC, the existing development frameworks are already addressing many of the targets and goals. All that is needed going forward will be to incorporate the goals that are not yet sufficiently covered into national development frameworks (Interview responses 2016).

The second opportunity is that Ghana used the Annual Progress Reports (APRs) and the specific biennial reports as an M&E tool for tracking progress towards the attainment of the targets and for planning at national and subnational levels (UNDP 2015). The case has been made that processes involved in the drafting of both the APRs and the specific biennial reports, should at least equip the national development planning system with the requisite experience needed to be effective and efficient in compiling relevant information for the reports. These experiences are deemed useful for the processes and activities that were evoked to develop the SDGs, such as creating spaces for consultation with relevant national institutions and other relevant stakeholders, identifying government's and citizen's development priorities, and setting the prerequisites for successful implementation of the SDGs in Ghana.

The third opportunity is that the MDGs did not go far enough to address certain pertinent areas of socio-economic and environmental issues for development (UNDP 2015). These issues include gender-based inequalities and its attendant implications for access to assets, employment opportunities, political participation and representation of women. Other areas include food security, urbanisation, and environmental and

climate change concerns. After reviewing all the sources, the argument is that the SDGs therefore provide renewed energies and spaces for these issues to be critically looked at so that appropriate and specific programs and interventions can be developed to address their impacts on society.

The final opportunity is in terms of the support that civil society, CSOs and NGOs have put in place to ensure that there is widespread public awareness, and that national and sub-national structures are adequately prepared to engage in activities and processes that are necessary for successful implementation of the SDGs. These include the different levels of consultations to ensure that the priorities of government and citizens are in synchronisation through the My World Surveys to identify development issues for Ghana (ISODEC 2015). There are also the government-initiated consultations that have resulted in the creation of three committees to oversee coordination and support for smooth implementation. These committees are the High-Level Inter-ministerial Committee (HLIC), the National Technical Steering Committee (NTSC), and the Committee on Financing for Development (CFfD). The CFfD, for instance, began processes to explore funding opportunities and sources for the various goals and targets of the SDGs. Beyond the government-initiated consultations there is also the civil society-initiated platform and the Civil Society SDGs Platform. All these consultations create and expand the spaces for engagement and awareness about processes and programs developed to address the targets and goals in the SDGs, according to the ISODEC (2015)

On the major issue of national level, structures for a successful implementation, all the key informants and respondents pointed to the NDPC as the national body with the appropriate locus and structure to coordinate plans and programs for implementing the SDGs on behalf of the government. Additionally, a key lesson was that preparatory activities for the implementation of SDGs involved the creation of appropriate national level consultations to support the coordination of activities and efforts for a successful implementation of the new goals and the NDPC. In support of this view, a senior official of the NDPC stated as follows during July 2016:

> *With respect to the structure that will enhance what we are doing, we are setting up a High-Level Steering Committee (HLSC) to be chaired by the President, who has been appointed as one of the Co-Chairs of the Eminent Group of Advocates for the SDGs. We have also identified key Ministries to be part of the HLSC to enhance the implementation of the goals. We also have the Technical Implementation Team (TIT) comprising of the following MDAs: NDPC, MoF, MFA, MESTI (EPA), MLGRD, and TCPD. The TIT will ensure that all issues concerning the SDGs and for that matter the AU Agenda 2063 are taken into consideration. They are to ensure that all our policies and programs reflect on the SDGs and the AU Agenda 2063. The third committee is the Committee on Financing for Development (CFfD) and it is led by the Ministry of Finance and supported by the MFA, MoE, and the NDPC. It is charged with ensuring that critical priority financing issues are factored into the Goals and its implementation* (Interview responses 2016).

Beyond the national level structures, there is also the Civil Society Platform for the implementation of the SDGs. Members of this platform, such as Social Enterprise Development (SEND)-Ghana and the MFWA, have engaged officials of government, other national level institutions and relevant stakeholders in consultations on the post-2015 development agenda and how to ensure successful implementation by Ghana. Additionally, there is consensus among NGOs and CSOs that there has been much broader and wider consultation on the SDGs this time, than was the case with the MDGs (Interview responses 2016). For instance, according to a respondent from the NDPC, Ghana, the government has SDG champions from specific state agencies like the EPA who spearhead government's activities especially from that sector's perspectives with the NDPC as they relate to program planning and implementation towards the attainment of the goals. Still on the national structures to implement the SDGs, the NDPC by its mandate (through the NDPC Act, Act 479, and the NDP Systems Act, Act 480), is well-placed to coordinate government and national efforts with respect to national development planning. To implement the SDGs, the Commission has identified 3 main areas, namely Alignment, Adaptation and Adoption.

Alignment of the Sustainable Development Goals

In terms of the alignment, the NDPC argues that the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II which was implemented from 2014 to 2017, District Medium-Term Development Plans (DMTDPs) and the Sector Medium-Term Development Plans (SMTDPs) implemented by District Assembles and Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) respectively all generate yearly plans which inform the national budget. In fact, at the NDPC, some of the effort focussed on conducting a kind of mapping to establish whether national development policies and strategies actually reflect the SDGs and Agenda 2063. Apparently, the NDPC reports that about 70% of the policies and strategies contained in the GSGDA II reflected in the global development agenda (Interview responses 2016).

In order to ensure consistency with aligning requirements at various levels, namely the national, sub-national (MDA) levels such as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA). The requirement is therefore to ensure that the plans and programs at the sub-national level reflect, or are similar to, those in the national level development plans. This should be done through creating awareness and training for officials at the lower levels about the SDGs and also on the AU Agenda 2063. Thus, the NDPC has developed a revised M&E formats for MMDAs and MDAs to their DMTDPs and SMTDPs program that reflect on the reporting needs of the M&E component of the SDGs to serve the alignment considerations.

Adaptation of plans

The Adaptation of the plans looks at the number of SDG indicators and targets that need to be reorganised or customised to suit Ghana's country needs. This is because the nature and form of some of the targets and indicators as they are crafted in the Goals may make their relevance to Ghana's present conditions too far-fetched and difficult to perceive. A senior official of the NDPC stated as follows during July 2016:

> *So, we will look at the indicators and targets that need work and see if we can actually track and report on them because the NDPC reported on the MDGs on a yearly basis and have been preparing full reports every 2 years. I am sure that the pattern will not change. We will be reporting on the SDGs and the Agenda 2063 every year; preparing a full report on these global development agenda* (Interview responses 2016).

Adoption by the National Development Planning Commission

The adoption as used by the NDPC is the process of picking and choosing the targets and indicators of the SDGs that Ghana should directly focus on. In fact, many of the indicators were already identified, and incorporated, into a number development plans and programs at different levels of government in Ghana. According to a NDPC senior official:

> *With the Adoption, some of the indicators and targets will be adopted as is and we have done some work with the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and have seen that there are over 250 indicators and targets already in our system that we can conveniently track. When I say we have identified them it means they are already there. What we are missing is the administrative data – the routine stuff that we do every day that we don't even capture - something that we need to be doing. How many visitors have come to NDPC today? If you ask, I may not be able to tell you because even though the records say that there is a visitor's logbook, but who actually reported for what? These are some of the things that we need to start taking note of and reporting on so that in our own annual reports, we can say that we had so many visitors who came to NDPC and what they came here for* (Interview responses 2016).

Thus, the NDPC is working with the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) to identify how administrative data, for instance, can be reorganised to help track daily happenings at institutions; how employees utilise their time; and generate better information on some of the issues that take place for long-term planning by individual public agencies. It is envisaged that effective management of administrative data has implications also for reporting on some of the indicators and targets as mentioned in the SDGs.

Government and Citizen's Priorities

The need for the SDGs to reflect on the priorities of both the national government and those of the citizens is useful for several reasons. These reasons were widely captured in the interviews with the various stakeholders for this report presented and analysed below. For Ghana, who was a member of the Open Working Group (OWG) on the SDGs, and has participated in several UN-led national level consultations that helped

to define the post-2015 development agenda, having its own priorities is essentially critical so that it will reflect on the aspirations of the citizens. Additionally, the SDGs with their 169 targets and over 250 indicators tend to cover a vast number of development issues thereby making it necessary for countries to be circumspect and prioritise the targets and issues that affect their people. For instance, Ghana as a developing country is still experiencing significant demographic transitions and structural transformations with its attendant challenges of planning, growth and development, so, prioritising its development issues is critical.

The ISODEC and the UN Millennium Campaign (UNMC), with the support of the GSS, have collaborated to create Ghana's priority development issues for the post-2015 development agenda through the *My World Surveys*. This survey provided the development needs, problems and solutions that Ghanaians considered to be priorities. In all, 16 development priority categories were generated from the *My World Surveys* (ISODEC 2015).

Similarly, the MFWA also captures the development priorities for Ghana under the following nine headings that were put forward by Ghana during the consultative period in the post-2015 development agenda discussions: employment, youth development, education, poverty, health, food security, social protection of women and children, urbanisation and environment and climate change. These priorities and possible targets or solutions are important because of the potential they hold for stemming key development challenges that confront emerging or transition economies, such as Ghana, in terms of decent job opportunities for the teaming youth through enhanced skills development and labour market information, and potential for enterprise and entrepreneurship development, among others.

The need to prioritise development issues and solutions is premised on the argument by Rathod (2010) that a major responsibility of planning authorities involves arranging priorities in order to distribute the needed resources among the objectives based on an order of priority. In light of the above, the assessment by both the NDPC and the ISODEC on whether the government and citizens' priorities are aligned in the SDGs provides some support for Ghana's preparedness to implement the goals. Having initiated the processes for identifying citizen's priorities and the commitment to adopt and integrate these priorities into government's development agenda is a first step and an important signal to demonstrate commitment towards the implementation of appropriate programs to ensure successful attainment of such goals. Perhaps, what may be needed is oversight by civil society organisations to ensure compliance on the part of government and all other key players involved in the implementation of various actions for the attainment of the SDGs in Ghana.

Regarding the environmental (political, socio-economic and institutional) factors that may affect the successful implementation of the SDGs, the case has been made that prevailing socio-economic conditions, such as continuously increasing

inequality levels, have the potential to derail any gains made in the fight for poverty reduction by Ghana under the MDGs. It is critically important to consider the issue of gender-based inequalities that manifest in terms of access to assets, employment opportunities, political participation and representation. Addressing these socio-economic factors is fundamental to creating the enabling environment for successful implementation of the SDGs. Political factors, on the other hand, focus on the political will and political leadership to initiate the needed actions to address identified socio-economic and environmental challenges. Discussions with other stakeholders on political factors that are critical for achieving successful implementation of the SDGs focused on political will. The NGOs' and CSOs' position is that political will in the SDGs adoption and implementation in Ghana is a necessary condition because it can affect development planning in Ghana. According to Rathod (2010), development planning involves setting objectives by policymakers who are political actors, thereby making this whole endeavour a political activity (Ikeanyibe 2009).

Meanwhile, the feeling amongst CSOs and NGOs, like ISODEC, is that not much is being done about planned programs yet. They argue that they are not seeing much activity and that it seems as if after the national launch, the national structure has gone to sleep over the SDGs. In their estimation, there should be specific programs to address specific or particular targets and goals. However, the UNDP office in Ghana holds a contrary view, and as a senior official explained during an interview, the SDGs may not need their own structures for their implementation: The Goals are only going to augment national plans. So, the institutions for implementing the SDGs are going to bring about alignment and a sharp focus on the goals (Interview responses 2016).

Apparently, the NDPC contends that the GSGDA II (2014 – 2017), the framework currently guiding national development, describes in detail the strategies and policy objectives for the key issues that are captured under the seven thematic areas of the framework. These strategies are accompanied by relevant implementing and collaborative agencies to coordinate specific programs developed to address specific key issues. In the estimation of the NDPC, to the extent that the thematic areas and their key issues in the GSGDA II were generated based on the development aspirations of the citizens and the government, the specific programs and interventions that are planned are also more likely to be relevant to addressing the expectations of the SDGs and its targets. What is key, according to both the NDPC and UNDP, is that these documents and their key issues ought to have indicators similar to those prescribed in or for the SDGs.

Another relevant issue related to the discussions on the availability of specific programs and interventions to move Ghana towards achieving the SDGs and their targets by the set date is the issue of accountability. Respondents intimated the paramount need for accountability mechanisms to ensure compliance with the implementation of programs and interventions, and also to track progress towards achieving the targets of the SDGs. From the perspective of the NDPC, the newly created legislative instrument, the National Development Planning Systems Legislation (LI 2232) of 2016, has the

potential to improve the approach to development planning by national and sub-national agencies over the years. Among other things, the LI 2232 affirms provisions in the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) that mandates MMDAs to prepare and submit development plans for approval and certification by the NDPC (Ghana 1993).

With the new LI, opportunities for MMDAs and MDAs to get budget approval from the Ministry of Finance and to source for funding becomes contingent on the certificates of approval from the NDPC for compliance with the provisions and satisfaction of the requirements for developing the plans. Similarly, the LI stipulates sanctions should be initiated against agencies that fail to comply as well. Additionally, the LI clearly provides mechanisms through the NDPC's M&E system for tracking progress, identifying gaps and for generating progress information on on-going development arrangements that feed into the mid-year review report that is presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance (Interview responses 2016). Meanwhile, there is a huge responsibility on civil society and other relevant stakeholders in terms of their interest in ensuring compliance by making sure that appropriate programs and interventions are developed and implemented to make the needed impacts on beneficiaries. In this light, other stakeholders who participated in the study also agree that having appropriate indicators should be of prime importance to guarantee compliance and proper accountability for the implementation of SDGs in Ghana. To this end, the NDPC therefore suggests that more awareness be created among citizens to ensure accountability in terms of knowing what to do when something goes wrong, so they can take action.

On the need of creating awareness among citizens to, among other things, ensure accountability and also be part of the process, stakeholders in the study, such as ISODEC, could not agree more, because in their view, significant knowledge gaps still persist among the majority of citizens on what the SDGs are all about. That also has the potential of preventing citizens from satisfying the accountability requirement. The view is that one needs to be familiar with a program and the processes involved to be able to monitor and assess its effectiveness. Significant effort should be directed towards rallying citizens around the goals and targets of the SDGs especially for the purposes of building their capacity and the attitude to ensure compliance with implementation and attainment of targets and goals. ISODEC's perspective was that specific interventions and programs are yet to be made visible to key stakeholders. In this light, activities and programs by the MFWA and other partners like SEND-Ghana on building the capacity of journalists and media houses to affect citizens and civil society as described below are apt.

Consultations and Engagements for Implementation

The awareness and the space for participation in the processes associated with planning and implementing activities, programs and interventions targeted at achieving the SDGs are critical considerations from the perspective of Civil Society, NGOs and all relevant stakeholders. There seems to be a lot of effort that the various stakeholder

groups are organising to support Ghana's successful and efficient implementation of targets and goals to achieve the SDGs. From the perspective of the UN agencies in Ghana, particularly the UNDP, preparatory activities put in place address four major areas of importance for successful implementation, namely advocacy, domestication or mainstreaming, data and resource mobilisation (Interview responses 2016).

The advocacy leg of their effort is targeted at building the capacity of journalists, media houses and practitioners, civil society, and students to become aware of the goals and targets of the SDGs (according to an interview respondent from the UNDP in 2016). For the journalists and media houses, the UNDP is collaborating with other partners like MFWA to train them on how they can report on the SDGs and development in general, and instituting special awards and prizes for journalists and media houses. The program for students mainly concerns an awareness and capacity development initiative through the UN4U program by the UNDP. Mainstreaming or domesticating the SDGs implies the manner of integrating the goals into national plans, policies and programs. To that end, the UNDP collaborates with the NDPC to mainstream or domesticate the SDGs through training and capacity building for public and non-profit actors, and by employing all necessary media to engage in the massive dissemination of the goals.

The case for the UNDP's data support is that Ghana should be able to monitor progress with implementation, and by extension, be able to have clear indicators that guide the country in terms of determining achievement of specific SDG target or even a Goal. The UNDP in particular is working with the GSS on the data-related issues to ensure that appropriate statistics and data is available on targets. The effort is also geared to strengthening the mechanisms for monitoring or reporting. At the end of the day, the government of Ghana would have to report on achievements annually, and that report will form part of a global report that will be submitted by the UN Secretary General as achievements of the Goals so far.

The resource mobilisation in support of government's implementation of the SDGs is to complement government's own efforts in mobilising resources both internally and externally, representing the most important action currently undertaken by the UNDP. It should be pointed out that the UN Resident Coordinator is actually leading on that effort. The UN agencies in Ghana have all identified specific areas where they can help the government of Ghana as far as implementation is concerned, depending on the mandate of the UN agencies. The UNDP, for instance, identifies with about three areas: namely Poverty, Gender as well as Climate Change. As a UNDP official stated in an interview, different agencies within the UN system, such as UNICEF, have all identified different goals of the SDGs and their work will cut across many. The idea is for the agencies to be strategically positioned so that as and when resources come in, they will be able to offer the requisite support to government and other institutions involved with the implementation of specific programs and interventions towards meeting the goals spheres (Interview responses 2016).

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In light of the discussions presented above, a number of concluding remarks and recommendations could be discussed as a key response to the questions and objectives relating to Ghana's preparedness. The study revealed that the NDPC as the lead agency coordinating national development planning has initiated various national and subnational level consultations with state institutions, civil society, non-profit and nongovernmental organisations and all relevant stakeholders. These engagements have been useful in assuring confidence among the stakeholders in government and for that matter, in Ghana's readiness to implement the targets and goals in the SDGs.

Furthermore, regarding the ongoing favourable development on Ghana's readiness, it is recommended that the structures be fully and continually utilised in information dissemination, public education, advocacy for support and reporting on progress made in the implementation of the SDG targets and goals. Additionally, there is a need to strengthen and improve the capacity of state agencies like the Parliament and accountability institutions (Audit Service, Accountant General's Department, etc.) and other stakeholder institutions including citizens, civil society groups and media practitioners to be effective in their watchdog roles. In terms of the state institutions (national and subnational), capacity building could be directed towards enhancing the potential to raise the needed financial and material resources to support implementation of planned programs and targets; and also, for their data gathering, management and communication needs for the overall benefit of development planning in Ghana.

The space for participation and levels of consultation are important guideposts for the SDGs implementation processes. The survey concluded that the NDPC, as the lead agency for coordinating activities around the implementation of the SDGs for Ghana, has demonstrated awareness and the benefits of these principles. These benefits are well documented in terms of identifying and sourcing finances for the development process, direct involvement of international NGOs, donors and development partners in rolling out programs and interventions for specific targets; data and information organisation, communication and advocacy support, and technical assistance for capacity development in a critical skill set for the overall success of the implementation.

Similarly, the UN country offices in Ghana (UNDP, UNFPA, as well as UNICEF), CSOs, NGOs, corporate institutions, bilateral and multilateral relations serve as useful targets for the kinds of support enumerated above. What is needed now is to find ways of institutionalising and expanding on these processes so that vulnerable social segments are identified, and conscious efforts are made to seek their opinion. The NDPC can devise ways of including the criteria of participation and consultation in their monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that all sectors and especially MMDAs are also compliant. Vayrynen (2005) contends that the implementation as well as the monitoring and evaluation of development goals require an effective and

impartial public administration system that faithfully implements the relevant policy decisions. Thus, the new LI for the NDPC (LI 2232) and relevant provisions of both the Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993 and the NDPC Act (Act 479) of 1994 could be fully employed to ensure compliance from the MMDAs on core issues in development planning and by extension for the implementation of targets for the SDGs (Ghana 1994).

As a final recommendation, accountability and the mechanisms for ensuring that Ghana complies with key deadlines and expectation prescribed in the post-2015 development agenda will be useful in the entire implementation phase in Ghana. It needs to be stressed that despite the voluntary nature of the goals, they offer a useful template to guide national development planning. As a result, national and relevant stakeholders interested in good and effective governance can bring enough pressure to bear on government and the state to ensure compliance with national level structures and frameworks for addressing the development needs of citizens.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the activities undertaken to prepare this paper were not without challenges. Significant among the challenges is the issue of access to institutions and their willingness to share information even on the most useful public interest programs that they are undertaking. Thus, delays in getting scheduled interviews with key informants and accessing needed information contributed to the challenges. This has bigger implications for the coordination and collaborative role that is expected from these institutions to ensure successful and effective implementation of the SDGs in Ghana.

The experience of this research in terms of access to information epitomises the culture of institutional silos. Unless policy integration is backed by practical effort, including participatory and learning processes, the likely threat of Ghana missing the opportunity to deliver the SDGs could become real. Given the lessons learnt from Ghana's experience with the implementation of the MDGs and the processes that have informed the development of the 40-year national development framework, political will and leadership can be considered as necessary ingredients to Ghana's success with its development agenda and hence those of the SDGs.

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African Resistance to Colonial Conquest: The Case of Konkomba Resistance to German Occupation of Northern Togoland, 1896-1901

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ABSTRACT--- ***In spite of the evidence provided by recent studies on armed resistance, it is still widely believed that centralized societies were the only ones that resisted colonialism by the use of arms. In the narratives of local resistance to the German conquest of northern Togoland, it is still believed that only the centralized kingdoms of Nanumba and Dagomba resisted the German occupation of the region. No mention is made of the exploits of the non centralized peoples like the Konkomba. This study shows that the Konkomba, a non-centralized society, did not also choose armed resistance against the German occupation of their territory in northern Togoland, but they also succeeded in resisting the German occupation for a longer period than their centralized neighbours. It further buttresses the argument that it is completely false to assume that only centralized societies chose armed resistance as a reaction to colonialism. The data used in this study was obtained from archival documents and oral information collected by the author between June and July of 2009 and January, 2012.***

Keywords--- Indigenou resistance, Collaboration, Konkomba, German Togoland, non-centralized societies, centralized societies

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of African resistance to colonial imposition has been discussed at length in a number of existing works [1]. But most of these discussions, until recently, tended to focus on Robison and Gallagher's concept of 'collaborators' and 'resisters'. In their work, "The Partition of Africa" R. E. Robison and J. Gallagher distinguished between two categories of African societies, those societies that resisted colonial rule and those that collaborated with the colonizers. According to them, African resistance was a 'romantic reactionary struggle against the fact'. Collaboration and resistance were believed to be a function of a society's social structure and that, societies that depended so much on the 'luxury of slave raiding, plunder and migration' would oppose colonial imposition whilst more urbanized, commercial and bureaucratic societies would collaborate with the colonizers [2].

This hypothesis was easily dismissed by Africanist historians who argued, quite rightly, that resisting societies were not necessarily different from collaborating ones as almost all African societies employed both collaboration and resistance at different times to deal with the threat of losing their sovereignty. But most of these historians, including T. O. Ranger, were still prepared to accept that for a society to either collaborate or resist the colonial imposition, it required a certain level of centralized political organization. In his influential article, "African Reaction to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa", T.O. Ranger, argued that for a society to collaborate or resist colonial imposition it had to "be of a sufficient scale and political organization for decisions to be made" and that resistors or collaborators have common features that are different from those small-scale societies that were capable of neither resistance nor collaboration [3]. The impact of the Ranger theory was that, historians of African resistance came to emphasize centralized societies as those that chose armed resistance against colonial rule while the stateless societies remained indifferent to colonial intrusion.

Over the past few decades, a number of scholars have rejected this emphasis on centralized societies in favour of a more inclusive approach that shows that the non centralized societies were just as capable of putting up a determined armed resistance against European occupation as the centralized ones [4]. In a later work, T. O. Ranger has repudiated his earlier argument that non centralize societies were capable of neither resistance nor collaboration. He admitted that

he was mistaken to have argued that the societies that engaged in either resistance or collaboration had more in common with each other "than with those small-scale societies that could neither resist nor exploit colonial rule" [5]. Shula Marks, in her study of "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch" has demonstrated that the 'Bushmen' of Southern Africa, who were said to have no centralized political organization, resisted the Dutch for nearly two decades. In West Africa, the non centralized peoples such as the Igbo, Baule, Agni have all been shown to have fiercely resisted the European occupation of their territories. The Baule, for instance, put up a strong resistance against the French from 1891 till 1902. In northern Ghana, the only serious armed resistance to British occupation was presented by the so called stateless groups such as the Dagara and the Talensi [6]. Similarly, in northern Togoland it was the so called stateless societies like the Konkomba that presented the stiffest resistance to the German conquest of the region. Unfortunately apart from Robert Corniven's account of the Konkomba encounter with the Germans at Bapure [7], no serious attention has been given to the exploits of the Konkomba during the German conquest and occupation of Northern Togoland. This article examines the Konkomba resistance to the German conquests of the Northern Togoland and explores the nature and mechanics of this resistance. It then re-enforces the argument that it is completely false to suggest that only centralized societies chose armed resistance to colonial imposition.

2. THE EXTENSION OF GERMAN RULE INTO NORTHERN TOGO

The colony referred to as German Togoland was made up of the territories of modern day Togo, the Volta region and parts of the northern region of Ghana including Yendi. The establishment of the colony began in February 1884 when a group of German soldiers kidnapped the chief of Anecho and forced him into negotiations aboard a German warship called 'the Sophie'. Through similar strategies all the coastal areas of the colony were acquired [8]. During the colonial period the German Togoland was often portrayed as a financially self sufficient colony that should serve as a model colony for all German possessions in Africa. But some historians have disputed this view pointing out the harsh treatment of the natives by the German officials in this colony through abominable taxation and labour policies [9]. It is often said that the French used more militant methods in acquiring and administering their territories in West Africa than the British but the Germans were more brutal in this regard. As Hugh Clifford observed, the Germans appeared on the colonial scene "as a roaring lion walketh (sic) about seeking who (sic) to devour" [10]

When Germany entered the colonial contest, she was a latecomer and so she was more aggressive in her acquisition of territories in Africa. By 1884, when the Germans established their control over Lome, the areas adjacent to the Slave Coast were already being annexed by the French and the English, and so Germany felt compelled to extend the authority inland. By1892 Germany had acquired a greater part of the interior of Togoland through treaties with the English. What was left was to extend her authority to those areas. This was done through what the Germans called scientific expeditions [11]. The German occupation of the coastal territories was without resistance and "all that Germany had to do was to distribute German flags to the chiefs of the relevant districts as notice that they were thenceforth under German rule, and to take measures to substantiate the claim of the protectorate over them" [12]. The German occupation of the interior on the other hand, was not without opposition from the local people.

In the face of determined resistance from the local people, the German administration began to create an expeditionary force called *Polizeitruppe* (Police Force). In I886 this force was started with a nucleus of twenty-five Hausas which increased in strength over the years and by 1894, its strength had reached 144. After the contingent had been raised to 500 men, the commander of the police force, von Massow observed that "the time has come to move toward definitive control over the territory" [13]. By the 1890s the German administration began to send this force on expeditionary campaigns as a means of extending their authority to the interior to establish their rule in that part of the colony. This Campaign into the interior started at Kpando in 1894. After subduing Kpando, a coordinated program for occupation was worked out and measures were taken to subdue the northern peoples including the Konkomba all of whom were within the Neutral Zone [14].

In the year 1888 an agreement was reached between England and Germany, by which the whole of East Gonja and Nanumba territory up to the Oti River stretching northwards just outside Sansane Mango had been declared a Neutral Zone [15]. Per this demarcation, Salaga, Bimbilla, Yendi and all Konkomba territories were within the Neutral Zone. By this agreement the area was to remain open to commercial activities of both Britain and Germany but both powers were precluded from signing political treaties within the zone. Thus, only treaties of trade were opened to the two powers in the Neutral Zone. But the French who were advancing from the north were not bound by such a treaty and could sign treaties of protection and therefore acquire the territories within the zone at the expense of both Germany and Britain. Consequently by 1895, treaty had been abandoned in the face of the French threat. It was not only the threat from the French that forced the British and the Germans to throw the neutral zone agreement overboard but also distrust and suspicion soon emerged between the two powers. By September 1894 the Germans were already complaining about the English activities in the neutral Zone. In November 1894 a publication in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, a German newspaper, alleged that Salaga, Gambaga, Wale Wale, Sansane Mango have all been put under English protection together with Wagadugu which violated the neutral zone agreement [16]. The German complains were completely unjustifiable. In fact, all the above mentioned towns in the exception of Salaga fell outside the neutral zone. More importantly, the treaties

of Ferguson did not violate the terms of the neutral zone agreement because Ferguson's treaty with the Kpembewura during his first visit in 1892 was purely commercial. On his second visit during which the treaties of protection were made, they were made on behalf of both Germany and England [17]. In all intent and purpose, Ferguson's treaties were intended only to keep out the French from the neutral zone. But the Germans became suspicious of the content and nature of Ferguson's treaties because they were not privy to the details of Ferguson's activities in the neutral zone. The Germans therefore made preparations to occupy Yendi and all the other territories north of Kete-Krachi which were all in the neutral zone. The first armed confrontation with the German occupation was presented by the Nanumba but it was the Dagomba who gave a serious fight at the battle of Adibo.

3. THE BATTLE OF ADIBO AND THE ROLE OF THE KONKOMBA

The German expedition into northern Togo began from Kete-Krachi on November 23rd 1896. Earlier on in April of the same year, a German expedition under the command of Lt. von Carnap-Quernheimb had subdued the Gonja *en route* to the Mossi country and had established an administrative post at Sansanne Mango [18]. After the German northern headquarters had been firmly established at Mango, the territories between Kete-Krachi in the South and Mango in the North were far from secure. There were fears that the French would advance on Mango from the North and more importantly, the Konkomba and the Dagomba continued to attack German messengers interrupting the free movement of traders in the area. It was to secure a strong hold on the territories between Kete-Krachi and Mango that, Dr. Gruner was appointed Resident of Sansanne Mango in July 1896. Instead of proceeding to Mango through Sokode and Basari from his station at Misahohoe, he was ordered to pass through Kete-Krachi and bring the chiefs of Bimbilla and Yendi under the German rule [19].

Dr. Gruner concluded that his expedition would be met with resistance and began to take every precaution to ensure the success of his campaign. He assembled his expeditionary force at Tariasu, ten miles north of Kete-Krachi which consisted of five Europeans- Dr. Gruner, the political head, von Massow, the military head, Thierry, N.C.O. Heitmann and Pinto da Silveira, a Portuguese, in charge of the medical department but who, it appears, also had the responsibility of keeping the records of the expedition. The others included ninety-one soldiers armed with breech loading rifles, forty-one carriers similarly armed, and 231 unarmed carriers [20]. The expedition arrived at Kpandai on November 27 and was warned that the chief of the next territory intended to attack the white man as soon as he entered his land. Dr. Gruner then sent messengers to the Nanumba town of Wulensi to obtain a safe passage to Yendi but the request was denied [21]. This made Gruner to attack the Nanumba upon entering their territory and some fighting took place at Wulensi and Bimbilla in which the Nanumba were decisively defeated and their king fled in the direction of Chamba [22].

The defeat of the Nanumba was followed on Wednesday, December 4th by the complete defeat of the Dagomba at the battle of Adibo, a village six kilometers south of Yendi. In the Dagomba drum history which serves as the major oral source of the history of local resistance to colonial imposition in northern Togo, the Konkomba presence at Adibo is not mentioned [23]. But according to the Konkomba oral account, they fought alongside the Dagomba at Adibo on the request of the Yana [24]. The account of the battle as recounted by the German source also suggests that the Konkomba were present at Adibo and that the fiercest opposition was presented by the Konkomba and not the Dagomba. According to this source the Dagomba put forward 2,500 gunmen, 130 horsemen, and about 2,000 bowmen [25]. The number of firearms used by the Dagomba in this battle should not be doubted. The Dagomba acquired the use of firearms from Asante in the mid-eighteenth century when the latter invaded Yendi and captured their king, Na Gariba. Even though Asante had imposed a restriction on the distribution of firearms to the northern states before the mid eighteenth century, such a restriction had been lifted by the closing decades of that century and Ashante agreed to establish the Kambose (Gunmen) as the third arm of the Dagomba army [26]. Consequently, by 1780s Dagomba had only a few muskets but by the mid-nineteenth century, all the inhabitants of one Dagomba town, east of Yendi, were said to have guns [27].

It must, however, be pointed out that the possession of firearms alone could not be a sufficient factor for military success. As Fisher and Rowland observes the lack of training in the use of firearm vitiates the advantages of firearms in battles. Firearms 'implied a change in tactics, both if they were to be used effectively and if they were to be effectively withstood' [28]. But the Dagomba seemed to have had little or no training in the use of firearms. The *Kambon' na Kpema*, the commander-in chief of the Dagomba army, was said to have wielded two guns and a sword all by himself. After firing the two guns he could not reload and began to wave his sword. This made him vulnerable to the enemy and it is not surprising that he was among the 500 dead on the battlefield [29]. The Dagomba did not only lack training in the use of firearms, but their war dress was not suitable for free movement in the tall grasses on the battle field. This was what an eye witness had to say:

> On Gruner's left were the Dagombas from Sambu (Miong), many of them mounted and all clothed in the war apparel of their nation. This is loosely (sic) fitting trousers and a jerkin all covered with charms and mascots. It is not the best sort of clothing for mobility in thick grass and standing guinea-corn [30].

But on his right side, Gruner had a different enemy to deal with. These were 'the Konkomba levees who fought stark naked and armed not with guns but with poisoned arrows' [31]. It is unlikely that all Dagomba warriors could have been

clothed in this rather expensive war dress [32]. Only the war chiefs could have been dressed in this war regalia described by the German source. Nevertheless, the big smocks worn by the Dagomba could have made it impossible for them to move freely in the standing guinea corn on the battle field. A more important reason for the Dagomba poor showing was the lack of tact and circumspection. It is reported that after the initial retreat of the Germans during the fighting, the Dagomba began jubilating and chasing their enemy down the hill which generated a kind of pandemonium among them. It was during this pandemonium that bullets began to whistle round them and Kambo'na kpema fell, as bullets pierced through his chest [33]. This lack of tact on the battle field coupled with inferior weaponry brought about the defeat of the Dagomba at Adibo. Whilst the Dagomba used a considerable number of firearms in this battle, (250 as against the German 137) these were muzzle-loading as compared to the breech-loading rifles of the Germans. In addition, a considerable number of the Dagomba gunmen, also deserted at the peak of the battle. Considering all these shortcomings of the Dagomba army, one can guess correctly that a considerable resistance was given by the Konkomba bowmen rather than the Dagomba army. In fact, it is believed that the only white soldier among the four losses of the Germans at Adibo, Heitmann, died from a wound he sustained from a poisoned arrow [34].

What is however not clear is why the Konkomba came to the assistance of the Dagomba at Adibo. The option of the Konkomba warriors being used as mercenaries at Adibo should be dismissed because it is against Konkomba customs to go to war for material gains. At least two plausible explanations can be given as to why the Konkomba went to the assistance of the Dagomba at Adibo. The first possibility, which is quite unlikely, is that the Konkomba were aware of the Germans intend to overrun their country en route to Mango and therefore they found it expedient to help the Dagomba as a defensive measure against the invading German force. As we shall see, the Konkomba did not collaborate among themselves in any significant way against the Germans. There is therefore no reason to think that the Konkomba collaborated with the Dagomba for the purpose of preserving their sovereignty. The second possibility, which is much more likely, is that the Konkomba who went to Adibo were subjects of the Dagomba. In the seventeenth century, when eastern Dagbon was invaded by the Dagomba, some Konkomba tribes where undoubtedly conquered and had come under the rule of the Yana. For instance Chaar was invaded and occupied by the Dagomba and their town became present day Yendi [35]. In the course of time, attempts were made to integrate or assimilate these conquered Konkomba tribes into the Dagbon society and this was done by assigning military titles to the Konkomba. But in most cases these attempts were not successful. Obviously at the battle of Adibo, the Konkomba fought as a distinct group situated at the right side of Dr. Gruner. According to the German sources, they were brought by the chief of Demon as part of his fighting force. Clearly, those Konkomba who went to Adibo were defending their overlords because as subjects of Dagbon, they were obliged to defend the kingdom against outside invasion.

Whatever the reason for Konkomba presence at Adibo, the combined Dagomba and Konkomba force was unable to halt the German advance. The local force was defeated and the German expedition passed through Yendi to Sansanne Mango. The Germans therefore came face to face with the Konkomba on their way to Sansanne Mango. It was at this time that the Konkomba presented a spirited defense of their territory and for the next four years the Konkomba would hold the Germans at bay, preventing any serious implantation of the German rule in their territory.

4. GERMAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE KONKOMBA

The Germans carried out two major expeditions against Konkomba between 1897 and 1898. The first was against the Konkomba east of the Oti River and the second was against those on the western side of the Oti. According to Cornevin, the German military expedition to the Konkomba country in 1897 was to quell an insurrection [36]. It must be pointed out that before 1897 the Konkomba country was neither a protectorate nor a colony of Germany. It would therefore be erroneous to claim that the 1897 invasion into the Konkomba country was to quell an insurrection. Neither was it a tour of inspection as conducted in the Dagara/Dagaba territories by the British colonial officials in the north-west. Properly understood, the German expedition to the Konkomba country in 1897 was for the purpose of conquest and occupation.

After their victory at Adibo, the Germans marched through Yendi and burnt it without any resistance. The Yana himself was smuggled out of town into hiding. Surprisingly the Germans refused to waste any time in Yendi and proceeded to Sekpiego, a village six miles north of Yendi where preparations began for the Konkomba encounter [37]. Robert Cornevin is of the view that the German confrontation with the Konkomba was as a result of the irresponsible behavior of some of Gruner's men. He asserts that when Gruner's forces were passing through the Konkomba country, some of his men fired upon the Konkomba' [38]. It must be noted that in May of 1896 when von Carnap was returning from his mission to Mango he was attacked by the Konkomba even though he encountered no resistance from the Dagomba [39]. It is, therefore, probable that Gruner would have taken a cue from this experience and would not want to be taken by surprise and therefore ordered his troops to fire upon the Konkomba. The action by Grunner's men received an immediate reaction from the Konkomba resulting in the wounding of one of his soldiers. A fierce battle therefore ensued between the German forces and the Konkomba warriors in which 79 Konkomba were reported killed and 20 wounded. Dr. Gruner managed to fight through the Konkomba villages to Mango arriving there only two weeks before the French expedition [40].

On the east of River Oti the Germans had succeeded in establishing their base in Bassar in 1892. For reasons still not known, a Konkomba force attacked the German troops near Bassar station then under the command of von Massow. The Germans responded by attacking and defeating the Konkomba villages of Bangeli, Bapure, Kouni, Katchamba and Nali and establishing German outposts in them. von Massow then left some troops at the outposts and proceeded northwards to Mango [41]. After some time, the Konkomba managed to mobilize their warriors and attacked the outpost at Bapure. While the German post at Bapure was being attacked, the Konkomba laid ambush for any reinforcement that the Germans were likely to send from Mango. A reinforcement of thirty soldiers and several native horsemen and carriers was sent under Dr. Gruner [42]. It must be pointed out that the rank and file of the German forces that invaded the Konkomba country was made up of Chakosi and Kotokoli warriors. The Germans had entered into a military alliance with the Kotokoli in the south and the Chakosi in the north in their quest to conquer the Konkomba. The force under Gruner fell into a Konkomba ambush attack and several of his soldiers were killed with poisoned arrows. Dr. Gruner, however, managed to reach Bapure but no Konkomba was found. They had burned down the German post and deserted the village. The Bapure chief who pretended to be on Gruner's side had also vanished from the town. By this, the Konkomba combined an ambush strategy together with the strategic withdrawal tactic employed by Samori Toure against the French.

After the destruction of Bapure, Dr. Gruner was forced to abandon his post in the town and set up a Camp outside it. But the camp was constantly being attacked by the Konkomba and the strength of his expedition had seriously diminished due to the Konkomba persistent attacks. Dr. Gruner was therefore forced to retreat to Banyeli. During the retreat he was constantly being surrounded by the Konkomba warriors but he managed to arrive at Bassar. At Banyeli Gruner met Assistant Britch who was on his way to Mango from the coast as a result of the Konkomba blockade, the two men marched back to Bassar [43]. At this point, the German military command had begun to accord the Konkomba great respect. At Bassar the two men met Heinrich Klose who offered to put the whole of his expeditionary force which comprised three white men, ten soldiers and another twenty soldiers from Krachi, at the disposal of Gruner. This would have raised the strength of Gruner's troops to fifty soldiers and five white men. But Dr. Gruner still did not feel confident to advance towards Mango, through the strongly occupied Konkomba territories [44]. The Konkomba had succeeded in beating off the German intrusion but this turned out to be just for a brief moment.

Dr. Gruner soon obtained the necessary reinforcement and came to re-open the German outposts among the Konkomba. Almost immediately the Konkomba also resumed their attacks. Initially the Konkomba resorted to guerilla warfare but later they decided to attack the outposts and forced the latter to call for reinforcement for the second time. When Grunner requested for reinforcement, a carefully selected Chakosi fighters, under the leadership of Thierry, headed south for the Konkomba country. For the second time the German reinforcement fell into a Konkomba ambush and was annihilated but Thierry managed to escape and returned to Mango [45]. On July 19, 1897 Gruner, again requested for reinforcement, this time from Lome. The reinforcement started its journey on August 8 and was impeded by heavy rains and only arrived at Bassar on August 26. The troops at Bassar were under the command of von Massow. But von Massow did not mount any attack on the Konkomba until November 20 [46].This delay is difficult to explain but the evidence seem to suggest that the expedition was suspended because another expedition had begun into the Konkomba areas west of Oti. It appears that the Germans could not sustain a two front war against the Konkomba and therefore had to suspend the Bapure Campaign until late November. Such a strategy was most valuable for the Germans because, by November, the long grass and dense forest providing a superb cover for the Konkomba warriors would have been consumed by the perennial wild fires. Without this excellent 'cover', the Konkomba became defenseless and could not withstand the German artillery. Clearly the superiority of the Konkomba in 'bush warfare' has been demonstrated by their earlier victories over the Germans and therefore the Germans had to wait until November, the approach of the dry season, to re-launch their attack on Bapure.

5. THE WESTERN EXPEDITION

In the period between August and 20 November 1897, when the Germans renewed their attack on Bapure, the Germans turned their attention to the Konkomba territories west of Oti. This was the second expedition into the Konkomba country. This expedition began from Sansanne Mango through Chereponi up to Samboli. From the perspective of the Konkomba in this area, it was the Chakosi who directed the Germans to their territory [47]. It appears the Konkomba in this area were completely ignorant of what had happened to their kinsmen at Bapure. They were unaware that the invasion of their country by the Germans was only a matter of time. It is not clear why the Konkomba west of Oti had not anticipated a German invasion of their country. This might be the result of lack of collaboration and coordination in the defense of their country vis-à-vis a foreign threat. The Konkomba did not coordinate and collaborate among themselves against the Germans. As Uzoigwe observes, one of the factors for the defeat of African armies was the serious lack of solidarity and co-operation among African peoples [48]. As will be shown, all the Konkomba villages held out against the Germans without the assistance of the neighbouring villages. The lack of collaboration enabled the Germans to defeat them one after the other. But it also enabled the Konkomba to resist German occupation for a longer period since the defeat and surrender of one village did not imply the surrender of all the Konkomba.

The German onslaught on the western Konkomba began in the village of Sanguli. It is reported that immediately the Germans crossed the Chakosi boundary into the Konkomba territory, they began to fire gun shots. It is not clear why a well trained officer like Thierry will order his men to fire shots without any target. The possibility is that the village of Nambiri which was the first Konkomba village after Chereponi was being attacked [49]. Whatever was the case, the consequence of the gun shots was clear, it warned the Konkomba of Sanguli of an imminent danger. A war alarm was raised and the Konkomba quickly put forward a fighting force of about two hundred warriors. The Konkomba warriors met the German force at a small stream two kilometers north of Sanguli. In the battle that ensued eight Konkomba were killed and several others wounded. Although the Konkomba could not match the German artillery, they held the German force until noon before surrendering. After some negotiation with the elders of Sanguli the Germans agreed to go back to Mango but took along with them six men as hostages. The next day, Labarl, the elder of Sanguli, followed up to Mango to demand the release of his men. The men were only released after he had agreed to pay twelve cows as ransom and also to recognize the German authority over his country [50].

The next day the Germans came to Sanguli and crowned Labarl as the chief of Sanguli in the presence of a large gathering. He was given a German flag and a crown and was instructed to hoist the flag in his compound to signify his acceptance of the German power. He was also given the responsibility of selecting people to carry the white man [51]. Labarl therefore became the first Konkomba chief to be crowned by the Germans. As a representative of the colonial authority, Labarl was required to provide labour for carriers, road repairs and build government rest houses.

From Sanguli the next village that would have come under the German gun fire was Kpeegu. But Labarl averted a German onslaught on Kpeegu by claiming sovereignty over it. The next village, Sobiba was also spared the German assault because a white flag was hoisted at the entrance to the village on the advice of Labarl. Both Kpeegu and Sobiba had friendly relations with Sanguli so Labarl sought to protect the two villages from a German battering. It is said that after the crowning of Labarl the Germans went back to Mango and it took them more than a week for another attack to be launched on Saboba [52]. It seems the German decided to delay an attack on Saboba so that they could catch the Konkomba unaware. It was clear that the Konkomba in Saboba would have gotten hint of the German invading force after their attack on Sanguli and adequate preparation would have been made for war by the Konkomba. The delay was to lure the Konkomba into slumber so that they could be caught unaware. The German adopted surprise and shock tactics in order to avoid any serious battle with the Konkomba. In adopting the surprise attack, the German may have had at the back of their minds the ability of the Konkomba to resist the German gun fire at Bapure. This strategy which the Germans adopted obviously points to the respect they seem to have had for the Konkomba.

With the villages of Kpeegu and Sobiba out of their way, the German forces marched straight to Saboba. At Saboba the Konkomba warriors met the German force at Boagbaln. According to some accounts all the clans around Saboba came to the aid of Boagbaln except the Nalogni people who stayed aloof [53]. The battle was said to have been fierce. Detailed information about the size of the Konkomba army in this battle is hard to find at present, but according to some estimates the Konkomba presented a force of about 2000 men armed with bows and arrows. A force of 2000 warriors in 1897 is obviously an exaggeration, considering that the population of Lome the capital of German administration of the colony of Togoland in 1895 was only a little over 2000 [54]. As late as 1931, the population of Saboba was around 629 and even the largest Konkomba village, Samboli was only 936 [55]. Judging from the population figures, it is very unlikely that the Konkomba of Saboba could have put forward a fighting force of 2,000 men in 1897. As Adu Boahen has observed, African armies were not usually numerically superior; in fact, in many cases they were numerically inferior to the European armies [56]. In this particular case the German expeditionary force in alliance with the Kotokoli and the Chakosi probably outnumbered the Konkomba.

In this battle the Konkomba were said to have lost more than half of their warriors. Only one Chakosi, fighting on the German side, was reported killed. Unlike Sanguli, the people of Saboba did not surrender but rather escaped into the bush. Their homes were set on fire and their cattle and goats taken to Mango. In addition to the animals one man called Findi was captured and sent to Mango [57]. One account relates that Findi was a cripple and was unable to run away. Other accounts maintained that finding was a brave young man who refused to run away. The latter account seems to be more reasonable considering that the German force intended to take the captive to Mango, a cripple could not have been a reasonable target. It is highly probable that Findi was an able bodied man who was captured and taken to Mango. He was sent back to Saboba with the message that the people should choose between war and peace. He was given an iron and a grain, representing war and peace. The people chose the grain and Findi was sent back to Mango to deliver the message. When the Germans heard that the people wanted peace, they were happy and called for a great Durbar in which they decided to crown Findi as the chief of Saboba. But the young man declined and proposed that his uncle, Pejul, who was the most senior Elder of the community, be made the chief. Pejul was therefore crowned by the Germans as the first chief of Saboba and given a 'red cup' [58]. During this expedition, the Germans began to employ the strategy of taking hostages and appointing chiefs among the Konkomba. The hostages were used as bargaining chips to avoid protracted fighting with the Konkomba whilst the chiefs provided the central authority through whom the agreements were made. With their experience with the Konkomba at Bapure, the Germans were well aware of the Konkomba ability in guerilla

warfare and therefore it was for the purpose of avoiding protracted fighting with the Konkomba that the Germans began to appoint chiefs among them.

The next Konkomba village to be attacked by the Germans was Sambuli. When information about the German attack on Saboba got to Samboli,, rather than come to the aid of their kinsmen, the people of Samboli prepared for the defense of their village. When the Germans finally got arrived at Samboli, they people of Samboli gave battle but their war leader, Dana, and several others were killed [59]. The defeat of Sambuli marked the pacification of the western Konkomba. Meanwhile the Konkomba at Bapure had not been subdued. Their conquest had only been suspended. After completing the pacification of the western Konkomba, the Germans then turned their attention to their unfinished business at Bapure. And on November 20 von Massow left one officer and seventeen men at Bassari and headed north. They arrived at Bapure on Novemeber 24. From Samboli, Thierry and his men continued the march to meet von Massow. For the second time Thierry and his forces fell into an ambush and a fierce battle was fought in which Thierry was wounded in the head by an arrow. But his troops managed to proceed towards Bapure. von Massow and his men managed to hold their own against the Konkomba warriors and destroyed the village of Nali on their way to Bapure. The two columns finally met at Kountja and the Konkomba were finally subdued. Surveillance posts were erected at Bapure and Katchamba [60]. And in 1900 the Germans built a fortress at Iboubou, the first in Konkomb country, known to the Europeans as 'Roman Fort'. Built as a symbol of authority and intimidation, the fortress was nothing more than 'a big mud wall, surrounding a huge conglomeration of native huts….' [61] In spite of this fortress the people of Iboubou continue to attack the Germans at their base and other Konkomba villages such as Chare, Paboale and Kuopone continued to make a routine declaration of war on the Germans. The Germans continued to face the threat of poisoned arrows from Konkomba Snipers and Germans continued to live in fear of the prospect of a Konkomba attack. For instance, in 1901, a German soldier was killed by a Konkomba sniper at Sansoegou. This continued resistance of the Konkomba so much angered von Massow that he ordered a rapid military tour of Konkomba country, rounded the Konkomba up and exterminated them mercilessly [62]. This ruthless action of 1901 ended the Konkomba resistance to German occupation of northern Togoland.

The seriousness of the Konkomba armed resistance to the German colonial campaign explains the brutality meted out to the Konkomba by the Germans. The enormity of this brutality has been aptly described by Cliff Maasole:

> Old Konkomba men could show their right hand thumbs severed, a fool-proof method (sic) for limiting their armed resistance as they could no longer use bow and arrow... the left toe of a [the] Konkomba was also usually severed, for the Germans believed that they used the left toe on the ground to gather momentum while the right arm released the dangerous arrow from the bow that caused havoc [63].

After the final pacification of the Konkomba country, they turned to another form of resistance; non co-operation, tax and force labour evasion, and frequent rioting and revolts. Up until the 1930s the British continued to refer to the Konkomba country as 'a festering sore on an otherwise healthy administration' [64]. Colonial writers have explained Konkomba non co-oporation with the colonial administration as a characteristic of a savage and barbaric tribe. But the Konkomba attitude should be seen as a concomitant of their modest military successes against the white man. Unlike the other tribes in northern Togoland, the Konkomba had sufficiently measured their strength against the white man and saw no reason why they should submit to him and hence their inclination to be aggressive towards him.

6. THE KONKOMBA DISADVANTAGE AND THE GERMAN VICTORY

That the Konkomba were finally defeated was not because of inferior tactics or cowardice but it was simply the case of what the British writer sums up as:

> Whatever happens we have got
>
> The maxim-gun and they have not [65].

The Konkomba have been described as skillful at war and saw retreat as a disgraceful act. They fought with enthusiasm and skill but eventually they had to surrender to the machine guns of the German forces. The remains of which can still be found at Iboubou where at one battle the Konkomba were said to have lost more than a thousand warriors [66]. The Konkomba were skillful at war but their bows and arrows were no match for the repeating rifles of the Germans. The Konkomba might have seen or heard of guns before the German invasion of 1896 but no evidence suggests that the Konkomba had any at all. They used mainly bows and poisoned arrows. Its effective range of was said to be about fifty to seventy-five yards [68]. Up to that distance, the arrow was capable of substantial penetration and damage but beyond that range it was practically ineffective. Moreover, there were defenses against the arrows. The Germans were said to have used blankets and other articles to render the Konkomba arrows ineffective [69].The poisoned arrows could only be effective at the exposed parts of the body.

Firearms were certainly more dangerous and effective. The German rifles were capable of doing damage at greater distances than the arrow. The typical West African musket was said to have an effective range of up to two hundred

yards [70]. This was almost three times that of the arrow. It was this inferior weaponry of the Konkomba to the Germans' firearms that brought about the defeat of the Konkomba.

7. CONCLUSION

Unlike the centralized states of Nanumba and Dagomba, who were easily knocked out by the Germans in 1896, the Konkomba were able to resist the German occupation of Northern Togoland for close to five years. Clearly the view that only centralized societies chose armed resistance against European occupation cannot be upheld in the case of Northern Togoland. What has, however, emerged from this study is that whereas the centralized states of Nanumba and Dagomba adopted a direct military engagement and employed large armies, the non centralized societies mounted resistance by using the classical guerilla tactics of hit and run. The Konkomba resisted village by village and managed to frustrate the German expedition to a point where they gave up the hope of a quick victory. The Konkomba knew that they could not win pitched battles against an enemy who was far more powerful and better armed than they were and therefore they resorted to guerilla warfare which was the best tactic under the circumstance. Since each village resisted independently there was no identifiable army to be defeated and this enabled the Konkomba to resist the German occupation for a much longer time than their centralized neighbours. After the Konkomba had frustrated the Germans by the guerilla warfare, the latter resorted to the strategies of capturing hostages and appointing chiefs among the former, which they used as bargaining chips to avoid 'guerrilla warfare'. Clearly the change in the strategy of the Germans demonstrated the extent to which the Konkomba posed as a threat to the German expansion into Northern Togoland.

The Konkomba were however defeated as a result of the superior weapons of the Germans. Indeed the Machine guns won the battles for the Germans. Although in terms of tactics, the Konkomba were very effective, they had to succumb to the German machine guns. No historian of Africa resistance disputes this technological superiority of the Europeans and its importance in the defeat and conquest of African states but an equally important factor in the defeat of the Konkomba was the assistance the Germans received from the Kotokoli and the Chakosi. Indeed, the view that Africa was conquered by 'Africans trained and officered by Europeans' was not more true anywhere than German conquest of Northern Togoland. The rank and file of the German force that invaded the Konkomba country was made up of Chakosi and Kotokoli warriors. In spite of their technological and numerical disadvantage the Konkomba gave a good account of themselves and it took the Germans and their allies more than four years to completely subdue the Konkomba.

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24. Interview with Gabriel Mabe, Saboba, July, 2009
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26. Kea, A. R, "Firearms and Warfare on the Gold and Slave Coasts from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth centuries", *Journal of African History*, pp.185-213, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1971, p. 201. See also Ivor Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century*
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29. Tamakloe E.F., *A Brief History of the Dagbanba people*, Accra, Government Printer, 1931, p.43
30. ADM. 11/1/1895, *op.cit.*, p.15
31. ADM.11/1/1895, *op. cit.* The description of Konkomba war dress by Miss Gehrts as 'made of a calabash, elaborately ornamented with cowries' shells surrounded by a fine pair of roan antelope horns' was not used on the battlefield but for ritual dance.

32. According to Ivor Wilks this kind of war dress cost up to thirty slaves in Asante. See Edward Ronalds, "The Gold Coast and Asante, 1800-1874 ", In Michael Crowder and Ajayi (Ed.) *History of West Africa,* Vol. 2, England, Longman, 1987
33. ADM. 11/1/1895, *op. cit.,* p.15
34. Interview with Mr. Gabriel Mabe, Saboba, July 7 , 2009
35. Until recently there was no unified Konkomba ethnicity but a host of independent states such as Kumurjor, Chaar, Nayile, Kugnani, Kujoni, Lamo, Chagbaan , Kutcha etc, speaking marginally intelligible languages with distinguishing facial marking who never cooperated among themselves against outside threats. In the pre-colonial and the colonial period, these numerous Konkomba states related with their neigbours as independent entities but in recent times there have been conscious efforts to construct a Konkomba ethnic identity to embrace all these tribes with similar socio-cultural and political characteristics. See Peter Skalnik, "On the Inadequacy of the Concept of the Traditional State", 1987, pp. 312-316
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49. The elders of Nambiri insist that they did not fight the Germans, the only heard of what the German expedition did to the people of Sanguli.
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68. Interview with John Maboon, Saboba, January 7, 2012
69. Echenberg, J. M., *op. cit.* p. 253

History of Ghana

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Summary

Taking its name from the medieval West African kingdom of Ghana when it gained political independence in 1957, the former British colony of the Gold Coast is known for its pan-African stance, gold and cocoa production, and national commitment to Western formal education. The Portuguese, the first European nation to arrive on the Costa da Mina (the Gold Coast) in 1471, reported of coastal communities organized under the leadership of chiefs. The position of the chief, with the support of local elders, illustrates the stratified political structures and chains of authority from the small village to the centralized states with whom the early Europeans and other foreign traders conducted commerce.

Attracted by its gold deposits, merchants from several European nations followed the Portuguese to establish competing commercial ports on the 300-mile coastline. They invested in and defended the trading posts as forts and castles. Some of these establishments are now preserved as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in remembrance of the transatlantic slave trade. To the northern fringes of the Akan forest and through the Volta Basin, Mande Muslim traders from the old Western Sudanese empires, as well as Hausa merchants from the northeast, arrived as early as the 15th century to exchange Sahelian products for gold, slaves, and kola nuts. The history of Muslim engagement in the commerce from the north is linked to the spread of Islam in the territories. The European missionary activities on the southern coast introduced Western formal education and Christianity.

The contemporary boundaries of Ghana can be traced to the history of precolonial state formation resulting from local wars of expansion and consolidation of territories by the powerful ethnic kingdoms, especially of the Akan nations. The long Asante resistance to the British presence and the ultimate European territorial delineations led to the consolidation of British rule of the Gold Coast in 1902 to commence the colonial era. Ghana's independence from British rule was historic, as it represented the first Black sub-Saharan African nation to become independent. But, for the first thirty-five years after independence, the rule of law was intermittent, as the military overthrew civil administrations deemed corrupt or incompetent to address ongoing national economic challenges. The return to civilian constitutional rule, a free press, and successive changes of government through the ballot box since 1992, despite economic and development challenges, gave room to grow the nation's democracy.

Keywords: precolonial, Asante kingdom, religious pluralism, colonialism, nationalism, pan-Africanism, military rule, constitutional governments, economic development

Subjects: West Africa

Archaeology and the Study of Ghana Prehistory

Archaeological research confirms middle stone age human habitation sites in Ghana. Stone technology has been linked to the "earliest nomadic inhabitants hunting and processing wild animals and collecting wild plants as food sources."[1] The work of archaeologists at excavated sites and anthropologists and ethnographers via the collection and analysis of oral traditions contributes to our understanding of the heritage that goes as far back as 10000 BCE. Objects retrieved from rock shelters and caves, as well as the analysis of fossilized charcoal at open-air campsites, provide opportunities to assess prehistory cultures. To this population are attributed the technological development of stone-built bows and arrows and pottery that radio carbon dating links to the period from 3500 to 3900 BCE.[2]

Documented archaeological information points to nomadic hunters and gatherers transitioning to engage in intense subsistence activities and a more sedentary lifestyle. Thus, from about 2000 to 500 BCE, a mixed subsistence economy based on raising animals and cultivating food crops occurred even though hunting and foraging continued. Locations spanning different ecological zones at which excavations took place include, but are not limited to, Chukoto, Daboya, Gambaga, Ntereso to the north, Banda, Hani, Buipe, Kintampo and Wenchi to the midwestern part of the country. Other locations included Nungua in the Accra Plains, Kwahu Abetifi, Dawu Akuapem, Legon, as well as Boyase, Buoho, Mampongtin, Ayawaso, and locations near Lake Bosomtwi in the Ashanti Region.[3] Researchers uncovered cultural evidence at a Kintampo rock shelter that included polished stone bracelets, granite boulders with grooved evidence of grinding or pounding, polished beads of stones and bones, microlith arrowheads, bone harpoons, clay vessels impressed with comb decorations, and evidence of sturdy stone-clustered living foundations. Evidence from Kintampo also demonstrates early food production economy in West Africa south of the Sahel—hence, the archaeological adaptation of the term Kintampo Culture for sites with similar contents.[4] Some scholars attribute the source of early prehistoric food production at Kintampo and Banda (see Map 1) to possible links to migrants from the Sahelian zone.[5]



Map 1. Banda early food production site map.

Source: Adapted by Gabrielle Lanier from Ann B. Stahl, "Early food production in West Africa, rethinking the role of Kintampo culture," *Current Anthropology* 27, no. 5 (December 1986): 533.

From the research and excavations in Banda, additional variables include the nature of demographic stresses and indigenous adaptive strategies to account for changes.[6] Furthermore, there is archaeological information to support iron smelting in the area by the early 1st millennium CE. Oral traditions relating to the origins of local communities and their migration narratives provide valid leads for archaeological research such as those associated with Bono-Takyiman, Bono-Manso, and Begho at which trade between the savannah and the forest zone flourished until the mid-18th century.[7] Similarly, evidence resulting from the Peter Shinnie–led

Asante Archaeological Research Project that began in the early 1990s confirmed that settlements that were identified from oral traditions, such as Adansemanso and Asantemanso, had existed at least from the 9th century CE.[8] To the eastern border of the country across the Volta, the Ewe speakers explain their origins in narratives that linked them to migrations from the direction of Benin. Yet, linguistically, the local languages of Ghana are classified as belonging to the Niger-Congo family with specific identification of the Kwa and Gur subfamilies to represent the southern and northern languages, respectively.[9]

Precolonial States and the European Coastal Presence

There is evidence to support the existence of fully formed states on the Gold Coast by the time Europeans arrived on the Guinea Coast. In addition to the people of Elmina that the Portuguese met, early European sources of the 15th–17th centuries reported of the "Akanny" or "Akani" states with whom they traded gold.[10] Though historians have referenced the "Akanny" identifying the general geographical area where the Akan language was spoken, specific designations as "Greater Akanny, Little Akanny and Akan" in the sources were synonymous to the Akyem (Abuakwa and Kotoku states), as well as Assin. Local oral traditions about migrations and settlements—some of which are confirmed from archaeological investigations—point to well-settled communities and polities on the coast and its hinterlands. Local trade and competing alliances defined the period. By the first decade of the 18th century, the confederacy of Asante states had defeated their former overlord, the Denkyira to the southwest of the Gold Coast. Akwamu remained a force in the lower Volta area, and its influence extended to Benin by 1702. The Akyem and their local allies defeated Akwamu in about 1730. Despite earlier setbacks, Asante defeated the Akyem in 1742, and by bringing Gonja and Dagomba to the north under Asante rule as tributaries by the close of the 1740s, the Asante kingdom became the most powerful local force in the Gold Coast interior. Oral traditions of the Fante people placed them at their respective coastal locations by the 15th century, but, unlike the Asante, they did not form any lasting military union—a situation that made them more venerable and ultimately dependent on the European forts and castles when Asante forces turned military attention in the southern direction to open more direct commerce with the British and Dutch coastal forts in 1807. The Ga states of the Accra Plains also developed trade alliance with the Danes.

Slaving and the Transatlantic Slave Trade on the Gold Coast

The institution of slavery in Ghana is as old as the history of state formation. Historians observe that populations of early settled communities were comprised of migrants and slaves. They were the subjects of the chiefs and kings, and they provided labor in agriculture, mining of gold, and for the defense of villages and towns that composed the state. Slave populations were important to the early states in a manner that permitted their integration into families and societies. In fact, genealogical studies for the purpose of exposing one's slave ancestry is not encouraged in Akan societies.[11]

When the subject of slavery and slave trading emerges in the history of Ghana, it is the history of the transatlantic slave trade that dominates. Communities of the Gold Coast interior traded kola nuts, gold, and slaves at the various commercial posts to the northern fringes of the Akan forest that Muslim and Mende merchants frequented by the 15th century. However, slave acquisition from the Slave Coast of West Africa to supply labor to the plantations of the Americas picked up by the mid-17th century. By this time, slave trading was legalized and encouraged by several European nations. The Royal African Company of the United Kingdom received charter in 1672 to trade for slaves from the Guinea Coast. The Dutch conquered the Portuguese posts on the Gold Coast between 1637 and 1642 to become active competitors in slave trading in the region. The Danes settled at their post at Osu-Accra and engaged in the trade.[12] Though the exact number of persons traded across the Atlantic from the Gold Coast cannot be known, at the height of the slave trade, the 300-mile-long coastline of the Gold Coast held over forty well-defended British, Dutch, and Danish fortresses that warehoused and exported slaves. The local wars associated with the era of state formation and consolidation were major sources of slave production in commercial relations with European coastal establishments for the exchange of guns, powder, and other goods. Yet, it would not be until the 1990s that the government of Ghana and its traditional chiefs would acknowledge their historic involvement in the trade. The roads from the northern part of the country to the coast used to traffic slaves are now recognized and preserved under the "National Slave Route Project," and some of the surviving castles are also recognized as UNESCO Heritage Sites in memory of the slave trade.[13]

Asante and the British in the 19th Century

The emergence of Asante as a union of states in the late 17th century to successfully confront its Denkyira overlord by 1702 drastically determined the course of events in the succeeding two centuries. The variables that sustained the union are captured in the work of anthropologist R. S. Rattray.[14] According to local oral traditions, the able leadership of the founding king, Osei Tutu (d. 1717), and the support of his spiritually powerful Komfo Anokye made possible the early military expeditions and the consolidation of the core Asante states. By the mid-1740s, Asante forces conquered the northern territories under the leadership of King Opoku Ware (d. 1750). Successive Asante rulers structured and organized the administration of the territories, increased trade to the north, and even integrated Muslim clerics and recorders into the service corps of the king at the capital of Kumasi. To the southern coastal hinterlands, Asante successfully bought the various Akan states under its domain by the close of the 18th century (see Map 2). Asante forces defeated the Assin and Fante in 1807—developments that secured to Asante direct commercial contacts with the British posts on the coast.[15]



Map 2. Greater Asante.

Source: Adapted by Gabrielle Lanier from Ivor Wilks's *Asante in the Nineteenth Century*, 45.

While the 1807 victory over the Fante was a realization of the wish of Kumasi to eliminate intermediaries in the trade with the Europeans, the stationing of the king's representatives at Cape Coast to monitor Asante interests was challenged. For example, the Royal African Company of Merchants representatives questioned Asante claims over Cape Coast by right of conquest.[16] In 1820, Joseph Dupuis arrived in Kumasi as the first British Consul to negotiate a treaty of friendship and trade with Asantehene Osei Tutu Kwame. Earlier in 1817, a delegation to Kumasi that Thomas Bowdich led on behalf of the African Company of Merchants was not successful.[17] Because Dupuis gained the trust of the palace Muslims, he was able to receive information on the Asante position as discussed in the king's council. In his report, Dupuis succinctly articulated the Asante interest and asked that the claims over Cape Coast be honored. If, however, the British had

a competing agenda, then "it would probably be adviseable in the first instance, to purchase the Dutch and Danish settlements; then, by a very different kind of alliance than that which was effected, carry the war to the neighbourhood of the metropolis [Asante]."[18]

It would be another thirty years from the time of Dupuis's recommendation before the British purchased the Danish Castle in Accra. They bought the Dutch Elmina Castle in 1872, but the immediate result of the nonratification of the 1820 Dupuis Treaty was the first Anglo-Asante War of 1824, in which Governor Charles MacCarthy became a casualty. A second major and almost disastrous war, pitting Asante against the British, the Danes, and their local allies on the Accra Plains, took place in 1826.[19] The peace treaty that followed in 1831 was negotiated under the new governor of the Cape Coast Castle, George Maclean, and Asantehene Osei Yaw. In agreeing to peace, Asante gave up its rights to receiving rents and notes from the British, as well as its rights by conquest over the Fante and its neighbors. This laid grounds for the British to increase their influence with the Fante—justifying their entry into the British jurisdiction of the 1844 "Bond."[20]

Historians of Ghana observe the year 1807 to be important, not only for the Asante defeat of Cape Coast but also for the British abolishing and ending their involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. It was in British interests to regulate Asante control of the coast and to augment their own.[21] That being the case, Dupuis's earlier recommendation was prophetic. The peace treaty with Asante in 1831 and the subsequent arrangement with the Fante states in 1844 gained the British greater influence at the expense of Kumasi. By purchasing both the Danish and Dutch establishments in 1850 and 1872, respectively, Great Britain was left the only European power on the Gold Coast. Irrespective of reasons given for the British invasion of Kumasi in 1873 and again in 1896, these events were consistent with their intentions to have unrestricted access over all of Asante and its northern territories. After all, no other European nation was contesting the British claim to the Gold Coast. Rather, the 1885 Treaty of Berlin on Africa encouraged those present on the coast of the continent to demonstrate "effective occupation" and to pacify those territories that came under their control.[22] It would not have been out of their strategic vision to detain King Prempeh I at Elmina in 1896 and proclaim a protectorate over Asante. The king and his entourage were transferred to the British possession at Sierra Leone to prevent any Asante attempts to free their king. Later in the year, King Prempeh and the detained Asante elders were relocated to the Islands of the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean, where they would remain until 1824. To fully subdue the Asante, Cecil Hamilton Armitage, secretary to Governor Hodgson, arrived in Kumasi in 1900 to unsuccessfully demand the Golden Stool that the Asante believed to contain the spirit of the nation. In the last Anglo-Asante war of 1900, known locally as the Yaa Asantewaa War that the queen-mother of Ejisu led, the British were not able to secure the Golden Stool, but the Asante were defeated militarily.[23] On January 1, 1902, Great Britain declared their former Gold Coast colony, Asante, and its northern territories as the new colony of the Gold Coast.

British Colony of the Gold Coast: January 1902 to March 1957

Britain's successful suppression of the 1900 Asante rebellion in demand for the return of King Prempeh and his elders, now exiled to the Seychelles, effectively commenced the colonial history of Ghana (Gold Coast) in 1902. Boundaries with the French territories of the Ivory Coast (Cote

d'Ivoire) to the west and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to the north were agreed upon by 1899. At the end of World War I, portions of the former German colony of Togoland that the British Gold Coast forces captured were placed under British rule as a League of Nations Mandate territory. Following a successful 1956 plebiscite on union with the Gold Coast, the British-mandated territory of Togo became the Volta region of the independent country of Ghana (see Map 3).



Map 3. Coastal Colony, Asante and the Northern Territories.

Source: Reproduced by Gabrielle Lanier from a Gold Coast Survey Map, Chipp (1922). Original file from the Wikimedia Commons <*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Pre-independence_regions_of_Ghana.svg*>.

The administration of the colony was conducted under the authority of the governor, who was assisted by a European executive council. Also, in 1916, Governor Hugh Clifford appointed a twenty-one-member legislative council that initially included six Africans, of whom three were chiefs, and the remaining were prominent persons from the coastal cities of Accra, Cape Coast, and Sekondi. The framework of the colony and its development and future administration took shape in the 1920s when Frederick Gordon Guggisberg was governor of the Gold Coast (1919–1927).[24] His ten-year development plan included the expansion of roads, the construction of a deep-water harbor and hospitals, and direct government funding for post-elementary schools. Hitherto, Christian missionaries operated all formal schools with little government assistance. Government-funded road construction was minimal, let alone the building of railways, even to open the Akan hinterlands to support European gold prospecting.[25] But under his governorship, Guggisberg allowed the return of the exiled Asantehene as private citizen in 1924. Two years later, Prempeh was installed as king of Kumasi (Kumasihene), and he became Asantehene in 1935. Earlier in his 1925 constitution, the governor approved the formation of provincial councils of chiefs. The decision to include educated Africans in the legislative council was the governor's commitment to the idea that the people needed to be prepared to govern themselves at a future date. However, his preference for engaging local chiefs and thus the creation of provisional councils of chiefs was consistent with the overall British policy of indirect rule that identified chiefs as representing the people at the local level. Native administration through recognized chiefs was also cost-effective, reducing conflict for the colonial government and increasing economic opportunities for the Crown.[26] The role of chiefs and councils in the local administration of the colony would be adjusted over time by a series of colonial ordinances.

With regard to the economy, prior to 1807, gold and the slave trade attracted Europeans to the Gold Coast. By 1927, 82 percent of the colony's foreign earnings came from cocoa exports. In fact, the Gold Coast was the world's leader in cocoa exports by 1911. Experimentation with cocoa cultivation dates back to the 1820s; however, it was not until 1879 that the Tetteh Quashie pods from the island of Fernanda Po that he cultivated at his Akuapem farm produced significant cocoa yield. Governor William Branford Griffith, Sr. (1880–1896) is also credited with efforts to develop cocoa growing as an industry when he imported more cocoa pods from Sao Tome to supplement cocoa farming on the Akuapem Ridge. By the successful Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) lobby of the Crown to ensure local ownership of land earlier in 1898, cocoa cultivation when it became an industry took place on locally owned land and by the labor of local farmers.[27] Thus, protests by farmers in the 1930s and even into the 1940s, about the cost of farm wage labor and the difficulty of finding appropriate remedies for diseases (swollen shoot) affecting cocoa trees beyond simply cutting affected plants, led to the 1937 boycott or "hold-up" to sell beans to European purchasing firms.[28] The suspicion of farmers and their opposition to the colonial government's agricultural policies, and the fact that by the outbreak of World War II, almost all sectors of the import-export trade of the colony were solidly controlled by European, Syrian, and Lebanese merchants and companies, informed the local educated elites' call for self-rule.[29]

Demands for self-determination go back to 1920 when a small but determined group of lawyers and journalists organized the National Congress of British West Africa.[30] Often seen as a precursor to nationalism and pan-Africanism, the movement did not result in its desired goal and

faded. Later, the call for self-determination was motivated by the increasing level of colonial reliance on traditional chiefs to the greater exclusion of the educated elite in the affairs of the Gold Coast. This influential group, which included journalists and lawyers such as J. B. Danquah and members of the ARPS, viewed the engagement of traditional chiefs in native administration as a colonial strategy to maintain the status quo. When Guggisberg included some of their members in the legislative council and even when adjustments made in the Burns Constitution of 1946 provided for Asante representatives in the council and resulted in the first African majority of the legislative council, tensions still remained to inspire the call for change.[31]

No aspect of the history of Ghana is more politicized and contested than the subject of the founding of the modern nation.[32] Historians agree that nation building is a continuous process. In the Gold Coast, the 1946 Constitution and another in 1951 based on the Coussey committee report, recommended that Governor Charles N. Arden-Clarke expand the legislative council to eighty-four members. Thirty-three members of the council were directly elected from rural districts, and another thirty-seven were selected by council of chiefs from the territories. The remaining included elected representatives from municipal areas, members of the chamber of mines and three nominees of the governor. For the first time, the executive council also had an African majority.[33] These developments could be interpreted as signs of responsive colonial governments, but they were also the outcomes of local elite political grievances and pressure that informed the 1947 formation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) as the first political party. The UGCC represented the first nation-wide mass political movement to call for self-rule in the "shortest possible time."

Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Modern State

The Gold Coast became the independent nation of Ghana following attaining its political freedom from British rule on March 6, 1957. Under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the government of Ghana saw itself as the beacon Black Star to support the liberation of the continent still under colonial rule to enable the formation of a "United States of Africa." Nkrumah's anticolonial stands were informed by the experiences of his student days in the United States and during his stay in the United Kingdom. In London, he joined George Padmore and the Black American and Caribbean diaspora community of socialists that attributed the conditions of the underprivileged to capitalist exploitations.[34] Nkrumah was active in the West African Students Union and the West African Nationals Secretariat. In 1945, he joined Padmore to organize the Manchester 5th Pan African Congress. It was these advocacy engagements that gained him notice, and hence, the leaders of the UGCC invited him to become the Gold Coast premier party's general secretary in 1947.

While the idea for a National Congress for British West Africa was tried in the 1920s, a transnational and transcontinental movement for liberating and sustaining an all-African modern nation would not become part of the language and vision of an African political party until Nkrumah became general secretary of the UGCC. But it was this pan-Africanist philosophical thinking that led to his split to form the CPP to seek immediate independence for the Gold Coast. By leading his party to win majority membership of the first elected all-African Legislative

Assembly in 1951 and again in the elections of 1956 that led the nation to independence in 1957, Nkrumah saw Ghana's independence and nationalism as a forerunner to his dream of a united Africa. The 1960 elections that Nkrumah won to become president of the republic paved the way for the ultimate declaration of the CPP as the only official and legitimate party in the country. Opposition to the president and his pan-African agenda continued but was muffled.

Like the Afro-Caribbean socialist community of London in the late 1940s, Nkrumah continued to believe that though the African continent was resource rich, the exploitative forces of imperialism, colonialism and the Cold War environment of the postwar period impeded positive developments. Because colonial rule in Africa divided and weakened the continent, Africa's progress and development could only be achieved through a unitary continental government.[35] The support for liberation movements to resist colonial rule across the continent fueled the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.[36] In fact, starting earlier in 1958, Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs organized the All African People Conference in Ghana to provide the leaders and activists of the liberation movements with inspiration and strategic leadership in the fight against colonial rule. In the early 1960s, greater attention was paid to hosting and providing asylum for exiled activists in the southern African liberation movements. In Ghana, they received free education and learned from the successful political strategies of the CPP.[37] Critics pointed to Nkrumah's passionate commitment to African unity as causing economic and political hardships at home to justify his eventual overthrow by the military in 1966.[38] Yet, Nkrumah's place in the nationalist and pan-Africanist history of Ghana and the continent is beyond doubt.

The Military and Civilian Administrations after Nkrumah: 1966–1992

Nkrumah and Ghana's central role in supporting African liberation movements, his commitment to pan-Africanism, and the formation of the Organization for African Union (AU) were all political in nature, but out of these developments came the seeds for the creation of the various regional economic communities across the continent. In Ghana, Nkrumah focused on universal education, building a second deep-water harbor at Tema, and construction of the Akosombo Dam and the Volta Aluminum Company as part of his long-term agenda for industrialization. His detractors justified the military coup of 1966 as important to redirect attention to Ghana's internal priorities—restoration of multiparty democracy, the end to one-man and one-party dictatorship, and the implementation of economic policies that prioritized the country and ended the austerities of the early 1960s. If these were the goals, the reality was that in the next three decades after the end of the First Republic, civilian administration occurred only intermittently and the economic conditions of the country worsened.

The military governments of the National Liberation Council (1966–1969) handed over power to the elected Dr. Kofi A. Busia government to commence the Second Republic in 1969. On January 13, 1972, the military overthrew the civilian government, and established in its place their regime of the National Redemption Council (1972–1979). During its seven years in power, the National Redemption Council (NRC) military government was reorganized twice, or experienced what observers interpreted as two internal coups—1975 as the Supreme Military Council (SMC) I, and

1975 to 1979 as the SMC II. The administration of the SMC II faced enormous public pressure to return the country to constitutional rule. Even though the government relented and allowed political activities in preparation for the Third Republic, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) violently overthrew the SMC II regime, and arrested eight high-ranking members of the administration, including three military heads of states. They were accused of corrupting and compromising the integrity of the defense forces and were executed publicly just one month prior to swearing in Dr. Hilla Liman as president of the Third Republic.

The Liman government (1979–1981) was also overthrown in a military coup that John Jerry. Rawlings, a former member of the AFRC, led in December 1981 to bring to power his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC).[39] Despite its initial anti-Western stance and strong relations with Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the PNDC regime adopted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) conservative economic reforms by the mid-1980s. Inheriting an inflation rate of 125 percent, a stagnant economy, and a large arrears in debt payments, the PNDC accepted the IMF-Economic Recovery Program (ERP) under the Structural Adjustment Program. The austerity economic policies implemented under the ERP included removal of subsidies, freezing public sector employment, retraining and redeployment of public sector workers, and privatizing former state enterprises. Hardships resulting from the policies associated with the structural adjustment programming contributed to intensifying the call by trade unions, religious leaders, and others for the PNDC government to return the country to civilian rule.[40]

In fact, the PNDC government initiated its own restructuring of the nation's path for the future when it appointed the National Commission for Democracy in 1982 to convince Ghanaians of the administration's commitment to provide viable democratic structures for the nation. Among them was the establishment of new district and municipal assemblies.[41] A report that the National Commission for Democracy presented to the government in March of 1991 laid the grounds for the return to civilian rule. In the next several months, a Consultative Body drafted a new constitution. The ban on party politics was lifted, the PNDC converted itself into a political party of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and selected Rawlings as its candidate for president. The major opposition group to contest for the presidency was the New Patriotic Party (NPP) that selected Professor Adu Boahen as its candidate. However, he lost the November 1992 presidential elections to Rawlings. By claiming irregularities in the voting process, the NPP boycotted the December parliamentary election. The Fourth Republic commenced with Rawlings as president and an overwhelming NDC majority in parliament that critics viewed as a continuation of PNDC rule.

The Fourth Republic: 1992—21st Century

The Fourth Republic is the longest multiparty civilian constitutional rule in the history of Ghana. Electoral Commission–registered voters age eighteen and above use the ballot box to elect the president and members of parliament every four years. An important provision of the Fourth

Republic Constitution includes articles that limit the president to no more than two continuous four-year terms. Members of parliament are not subjected to term limits if they successfully competed in the party primaries and won the respective constituent parliamentary elections.[42]

The most debated section of the constitution is the Indemnity Clause that guarantees immunity and protection from prosecution of participants in former military regimes.[43] Addressing deficiencies in and retaining, as well as enhancing best practices from past governance, the consultative assembly drafted the 1992 Fourth Republic Constitution that rejected the position of prime minister in favor of an executive president and an advisory Council of State. The constitution endorsed an Electoral Commission to conduct, monitor, and protect the integrity of elections, and a Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice to investigate and protect citizens from human rights abuses. Additionally, the constitution authorized a National Media Commission to safeguard press freedom, offered provisions that protected spousal rights and the rights of women and children, and provided for a Supreme Court that serves as the highest judicial body of the land (see Map 4).

Map 4. A more recent administrative map of Ghana.

Source: Reproduced by Gabrielle Lanier. The Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations, "New Regions of Ghana," December 2018.

It is debatable whether these core institutions have performed to the satisfaction of citizens, but developments in the first decade following the promulgation of the constitution helped to ensure the viability of the Fourth Republic. For example, having boycotted the December 1992

parliamentary elections, the NPP composed itself into a strong opposition outside the legislative body and used the courts on several occasions to regulate government decisions. These legal actions also legitimized the court and made its decisions final as the constitution mandates. Subsequently, the court was engaged to determine the validity of election results as decided upon by the Electoral Commission. Such was the situation in 2012 when the NPP challenged the election results that declared NDC candidate John Dramani Mahama as the duly elected president of Ghana.[44]

An important historic moment in the Fourth Republic was when President Rawlings complied with the constitutional two-term limit in 2000. The NPP won both the presidency and parliamentary majority that year to bring them to power in January 2001 when John Agyekum Kufuor became president. The National Reconciliation Bill (Act 611) that Kufuor passed through parliament in 2002 made it possible for a National Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights abuses of previous military governments.[45] Without infringing upon the Indemnity Clause of the constitution, the commission investigated and made recommendations to redress past abuses. The NDC and its presidential candidate Dr. John Atta Mills came to power in 2010 with a parliamentary majority when voters did not return the NPP to power following President Kufuor's two four-year terms. These moments are significant, as they sustained a Fourth Republic tradition in which voters had reasonable evidence of past performances of political parties and candidates to inform electoral choices.[46]

The democratic practices of the Fourth Republic were not sustained only by the strength of its constitution and courts. On several occasions, where the nation faced political and societal crisis, chiefs and religious leaders stepped forward to remind both military- and civilian-led governments of their moral and civic obligations to citizens and the peace of the country. As custodians of culture and practices relating to traditional inheritance, marriages, and ownership of land, chiefs and their elders exercised legitimate authority over local communities to provide alternative avenues for dispute resolution.[47] Under indirect rule, the colonial government engaged chiefs in various designations to oversee native administration. During the First Republic, even when Nkrumah contested the broader and traditional status of chiefs, the institution of chieftaincy survived.[48] Even though the Fourth Republic constitution bars chiefs from engaging in direct political activities, the institution has maintained its legitimacy over time.[49] For example, since colonial rule and through previous republics, political leaders have made courtesy calls on local chiefs and attended their durbars to rally local populations to support national policies. In recognition of the institution of chieftaincy and, therefore, the customs it represents, there are constitutional provisions that, for example, mandate the appointment of National House of Chiefs member(s) to serve on the Council of State, and on Land Commission at regional and national levels. As for religious leaders, even though the constitution grants religious freedom as fundamental rights of citizens, nowhere does it require that the government appoint religious leaders to serve on national bodies. The rise of religious leaders to national prominence, especially as members of the Catholic Secretariat, leaders of the Christian Council of Ghana, and members of the Religious Forum that includes representation from Muslims and Pentecostal Churches, is linked to the long history of interfaith peace of the country. The religious groups also have a history of contributing to the spread of religious and secular

education. These observations notwithstanding, one cannot ignore the moments when chieftaincy dispute threatened community peace such as during the Yendi Skin Affairs of the early 2000s, or when in 2015 Muslim students studying at government-assisted Christian schools protested against the anti-Islamic and discriminatory ban on the wearing of the hijab or head scarf by female Muslim students.[50]

On the economic front, the WB and IMF structural adjustment recommendations of the 1980s not only called for the reduction of state subsidies and the privatization of state corporations, but necessitated domestic resource funding for development. During the decade of the 1990s, governments devised tax regimes for this purpose.[51] Though participation in the American initiated Millennium Challenge Corporation contributed to targeted infrastructural developments of the early 2000s, it was the NPP government's submission to the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) conditions under the Kufuor administration that gave debt relief to the nation.[52] Unlike the structural adjustment conditions of the 1980s, compliance with the conservative economic initiatives and associated democratic policies under HIPC was rewarded with a $3.5 billion debt relief of the then-total national debt of $5.7 billion.[53] It is not far-fetched to observe that external examples and support contributed to enhancing the national commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and economic liberalization. For example, holding general elections in Ghana every fourth year just about the same time as presidential elections in the United States invites comparison of election outcomes. The commitment to effective liberalization of the economic climate since the early 2000s enticed regional and international partners to invest actively in oil and gas exploration in the country. An offshore discovery of a commercial-quantity oil field in 2007 made Ghana a petroleum-exporting nation. Also, hydroelectric resources and thermal energy production from the West African Gas Pipeline contributed to addressing the perennial national energy challenges.[54]

In the course of the Fourth Republic, public assessment of the capacity of the political party in power to implement and sustain policies that advance economic growth appear to influence election outcomes. Therefore, an important characteristic of Ghana's Fourth Republic is the ability of voters to dislodge ruling governments by electing former opposition party candidates to power. Though political parties and candidates have been able to win votes at core constituencies over the years, issues such as youth unemployment, investment in and perceived lack of infrastructural developments, accusation of corruption and the (in)ability of government to provide sustained electricity dominate media coverage and inform voters' choices. Of environmental concern is the subject of illegal mining, known locally as *galamsey*. The use of pollutants in *galamsey* operations contaminates water sources. The involvement of Chinese and other foreigners in the practice and the inability of the government to stamp it out or to regulate it in the context of the Small-Scale Gold Mining Law of 1989 (PNDCL 218) remains a significant source of discontent. These notwithstanding, all governments of the Fourth Republic have demonstrated commitment to membership in regional and continental organizations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU. Of particular concern is the threat posed to the security of the region from the presence of Islamic terrorist organizations in the West Africa Sahelian belt.

Discussion of the Literature

There is no scarcity of published resources for those interested in researching Ghana. The historical writings on the country date back to the accounts of Willem Bosman in 1705 and extend to cover the reports of British commercial negotiations with Asante, as presented in the accounts of Thomas Bowdich and Joseph Dupuis in the second decade of the 19th century.[55] Though several accounts of the Anglo-Asante wars and Christian mission activities were published during the latter part of the century, it was Robert Sutherland Rattary's anthropological volumes on Asante, published in the 1920s, that provided historians with detailed researched evidence of the nature of traditional politics and the associated cultural institutions.[56] However, the more modern historiography of Ghana owes its origins to the scholarly studies associate with African political movements and nationalism that informed the establishment of the Institute of African Studies (IAS) at the University of Ghana in the late 1950s.

As an international research hub for its many affiliates and local scholars, the history of the Institute for African Studies (IAS) is well documented.[57] It was through such connections and collaborations that scholars, such as Ivor Wilks, A. Adu Boahen, Nehemia Levtzion, Ray Kea, Peter Shinnie, James Anquandah, Merrick Posnansky, Kwame Arhin, Jack Goody, Kwabena Nketia, the Institute's first director Thomas Hodgkin, and their many prominent colleagues and graduate students, came to research and publish critical literature for the study of the country.

An important characteristic of research at the institute at the early years was the orientation toward fieldwork. For example, Wilks's fieldnotes that he collected from interviews with local Muslim leaders covered topic that ranged from biographical information, Islamic learning, history of long-distance trade, and the history of Islamic religious services to rulers of the powerful non-Muslim traditional states. The fieldnotes are now deposited at the Herskowitz Africana Library at Northwestern University in the United States, as well as IAS at Legon. Another project that was linked to research at the institute and at Northwestern University was the *Asante Collective Biography Project Bulletin* that Wilks edited with Thomas C. McCaskie. These were important resources, not only for Wilks's seminal *Asante in the Nineteenth Century* (1975), but also for many other scholars.[58]

Wilks's work on Asante was linked to his earlier research on the powerful Akan state of Akwamu.[59] Ray Kea also touched on the subject of the Akwamu kingdom, but it was his writings on the coastal trade that flourished from the 17th century between the Danes and the hinterland that gained him scholarly attention.[60] Kea's two-volume set, titled *A Cultural and Social History of Ghana from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century*, is an excellent source for Danish and Dutch archival documents pertinent to the study of the economic history of the transatlantic slave trade from the Gold Coast.[61]

These seminal works are foundational to the more recent scholarship on the history of slavery and the slave trade on the Guinea Coast in general and the Gold Coast in particular. Included in the list of the more recent scholarship on slavery on the Gold Coast are the publications of Rebecca Shumway and Trevor Getz. But most of these are based on the use of archival documents.

Emmanuel Akyeampong noted in his essay on the Anlo on the eastern shores of the country that Africans (royal houses) choose not to speak to the history of their ancestral associations to the transatlantic slave trade. Also, those families of slave descent equally elected to forget such origins. It is for such reasons that the Ghanaian scholars who are able to conduct oral investigations about the topic to inform their research have made great contributions to the field. Acheampong's essay, and especially Akosua Perbi's book-length *A History of Indigenous Slavery in Ghana from the 15th to the 19th Century*, are impressive productions.[62] These excellently sourced research and writings provide needed information to enrich the conversation about Africa and the African diaspora in general, as well as Ghana's commitment to emancipation remembrance and heritage tourism in particular.

Anthropological research on Ghana reminds readers that long before the transatlantic slave trade, gold and kola trade fueled the economy of the early local kingdoms, the Gold Coast, and its northern hinterlands.[63] From the late precolonial period onward, while the gold trade continued, other commodities such as palm oil and cocoa production sustained the country. Oil and gas discoveries are recent. Literature on topics in Ghana's economic history include, but are not limited to the works of Raymond Dumett, Polly Hill, Kwame Arhin, Edmund Abaka, Gareth Austin, and Ernest Aryeetey. Together, these scholars have covered topics, such as the development of traditional market centers, artisan gold mining prior to the imperial era, the development of the timber industry, cocoa farming, and economic developments in the immediate poststructural adjustment era to the present.[64] These notwithstanding, research on the environmental impact of illegal mining, large scale palm cultivation, emerging urban spatial forms due to population growth, urban migration, waste management, and deforestation still need more scholarly attention, especially in this age of climate change.

There is preponderance of historical scholarship on the early state formation period on the Gold Coast through the colonial era.[65] However, the writings of political scientists dominate research and academic writings of the modern post-independence state. This is partly due to the fact that the country's first head of state, Dr. Nkrumah, authored several ideologically inspired books that, in the era of the Cold War and Africa's anticolonial struggles, set the tone and framed the debate of Ghana's contested post-independence history.[66] A number of Nkrumah-related entries already appear in the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Africa*. Scholars, such as Matteo Grilli, Paul Nugent and Bayo Holsey, have contributed on topics that engage Nkrumah in his nationalist context in the Gold Coast, and respectively in his pan-African and diaspora contexts.[67] Ama Biney's production on *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, as well as the Kwame Arhin–edited *The Life and Works of Kwame Nkrumah*, can further the discourse on policies and economic developments of the nationalist period through the 1960s. The conversations include discourse about labor and unions, education, economic reforms, elections, party politics, the history of military engagement in the history of the modern state, and the critical issue of the freedom of the court. Research on these topics of inquiry can certainly provide frameworks for a comparative analysis of the WB/IMF-implemented structural adjustment policies of the decade of the 1980s and its aftermath. Such research will further expose the debates, disagreements, and discourses that have characterized the Ghanaian political landscape.[68]

A new generation of prolific scholars has engaged topics in gender studies and the socioeconomics of government. These writings include, but are not limited to the contributions of women in pre- and postcolonial Africa to economic growth and national development. Of an earlier generation of writers, Efua Sutherland and Ama Ata Aidoo contributed plays, poetry, and literature that highlighted gender issues and challenges in traditional culture and the modern state. Dzodzi Tsikata's work on the history of the Volta Dam is a critical assessment of the idea of progress as well as the economic and environmental impact of development on local communities.[69] Advocacy for women's rights characterize more recent research.[70] These ongoing conversations about the impact of economic policies on society and the voices for gender equity, broaden the scope for the narrative that was hitherto narrowly defined in the history of the nation-state.

Since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, there has been considerable civil society research and published reports on the challenges and strategies that promote and sustain the country's democracy. Here, the work of political scientists dominates. In a short but relevant overview, Thomas Prehi Botchway discussed how civil society organizations such as the Institution for Economic Affairs, the Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana (CDD), and the Institute for Democratic Governance have contributed to curbing the undemocratic urges of governments.[71] For example, the CDD Afro Barometer Initiative that surveys citizens' attitudes to governance, society and democracy has gained the respect of political scientists globally. Similarly, the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre provides researchers with opportunities and resources for the study of topics on national and regional security. These research resources point scholars in the direction of the emerging national best practices for continental peer review. Included here is the need for investigation into the sources of religious and political extremism, as well as the role of the arts to educate and mitigate tensions in the pluralistic polity. For an ongoing engagement of intellectuals on these wide range of topics that include music, culture, health and the Ghanaian diaspora, see past issues of *Ghana Studies*—the journal of the association of scholars on Ghana.[72]

Primary Sources

The interviews that Ivor Wilks conducted in the 1960s are deposited at the Herskovits Africana Library (Evanston, IL) and at the Institute for African Studies (Legon). These were important local knowledge that sourced the research on Islam in Ghana and linked the learning traditions of the early Muslim clerics to the broader Mande West African community. Also, from 2002 to 2010, a team of scholars conducted field interviews and, in some cases, collected Arabic documents as part of the *Diversity and Tolerance in the Islam in West Africa Project*. With funding from the University of Michigan Digitization Project, the field notes were digitized and preserved at About the Project - *Diversity and Tolerance in the Islam in West Africa* <https://aodl.org/islamictolerance/about.php>. Three scholars of Ghana participated in the project. The themes that comprised the Ghana Galleries are achieved under the titles of "Everyday Islam in Kumasi" (interviews by Gracia Clark), "The Northern Factor in Asante History" by Emmanuel Akyeampong, and the interviews by David Owusu-Ansah on the "Transformations in Islam Education." The Ghana Galleries are available at Galleries - *Diversity and Tolerance in the Islam in West Africa* <https://aodl.org/islamictolerance/>.

On the subject of slavery, Albert van Dantzig's *The Dutch and the Guinea Coast, 1674–1742: A Collection of Documents from the General State Archive* at The Hague provides valuable documentary sources. On the subject of the anthropological prehistory, Ann Stahl's web exhibition on Banda and digital repository of videos and text material is linked to the University of Victoria Libraries (Canada) at Banda Through Time- Digital Exhibits *<https://exhibits.library.uvic.ca/spotlight/iaff>*.

The Public Records and Archives Administration Department in Ghana is the national depository of documents. Abdulai Iddrisu's article of 2000, that was published in *History in Africa*, provides a user guide for those interested in working at Tamale.[73] Available documents, as listed, include District Administration Offices field papers that date back to 1918. No such review of documents at the Kumasi branch has been carried out. The national repository in Accra holds government administrative documents relating to the administration of the regions and on policies. While there could be gaps in the collection due to the challenges of preserving the documents over time, they can be filled with documentary information available at the British National Archives at Kew Gardens that include the colonial office exchanges and colonial reports of the Ghana nationalist period. The George Padmore Research Library in Accra also holds issues of the CPP *Evening News* newspapers from the 1950s and presidential files from all African countries relevant to the early nationalist period. Researchers using the collection at the Padmore Library must be aware of the deteriorating condition of the documents.

Links to Digital Materials

Africa Online Digital Library at the Michigan State University

African Journals Online *<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajol>* (many open access articles)

African Online Digital Library *<http://www.aodl.org/index.php>*

Arabic Manuscripts from West Africa at the Herskovits Library, Northwestern University

Banda Through Time *<https://exhibits.library.uvic.ca/spotlight/iaff>* at University of Victoria

The British Council Digital Library-Ghana (newspapers and book collection)

Ghana National Bibliography *<https://www.library.gov.gh/gnb/>* (just the bibliographies are digitized)

James Koetting Ghana Field Recordings Collection *<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/collections/id_585/>* at Brown University Library

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Nationalism and Decolonization in the Gold Coast

AFRICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY WORKING PAPER SERIES

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The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the Evolution of Political Authority in West Africa

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The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the Evolution of Political Authority in West Africa[1]

Abstract

I trace the impact of the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the evolution of political authority in West Africa. I present econometric evidence showing that the trans-Atlantic slave trade increased absolutism in pre-colonial West Africa by approximately 17% to 35%, while reducing democracy and liberalism. I argue that this slavery-induced absolutism also influenced the structure of African political institutions in the colonial era and beyond. I present aggregate evidence showing that British colonies that exported more slaves in the era of the slave trade were ruled more-indirectly by colonial administrations. I argue that indirect colonial rule relied on sub-national absolutisms to control populations and extract surplus, and in the process transformed absolutist political customs into rule of law. The post-colonial federal authority, like the colonial authority before it, lacked the administrative apparatus and political clout to integrate these local authorities, even when they wanted to. From this perspective, state-failure in West Africa may be rooted in a political and economic history that is unique to Africa in many respects, a history that dates at least as far back as the era of the transatlantic slave trade.

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Since the publication of Douglas North's *Structure and Change in Economic History* (1981) social scientists have accumulated an abundance of new evidence showing how institutions shape the structure and performance of economies as they move through time. African economies are no exception. The term patrimonial (or neo-patrimonial) is controversial, but often used to describe a class of post-colonial African nation-states where a weak federal authority attempts to rule over ethnically-based local authorities. Political stability often rests upon an unstable coalition of patrons and clients who extract large amounts of national income through personal networks, intimidation, corruption and bribes.[2] In these kinds of "failed-states" public policy is influenced more by a political calculation to retain the privileges of power than by the authority's credible commitment to improve growth and welfare. The recent spread of democratic institutions like multi-party politics has improved accountability, but stability and violence are often more-pressing concerns. It is difficult for people to prosper under these conditions, unless of course they have access to a personal network of patrons and clients that defines the resources available to them.

What are the historical origins of this type of political system? The traditional view links it to the era of colonial rule and how it birthed a disjointed and decentralized nation-state. Mamdani (1996) is perhaps the best-known proponent of this view. He sees the most-important political outcome of colonial rule to be a kind of dual legal system – European laws for colonial rulers and a variety of "customary" laws for colonial "subjects." In a very real sense, the post-colonial nation-state is like the colonial state adjusted to new political realities like democratic elections, new global economic forces, stronger internal challenges and mounting international debt.

[2] See Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) for a critical discussion of the term "patrimonial." They argue against the use of the term. I agree with their critique, especially the charge that as a Weberian concept patrimonialism is inappropriately applied. I use the term to characterize a historically-specific solution to a political problem faced by many emerging post-colonial nation-states in Africa. My meaning is similar to the political formations described by van de Walle (2001), Boone (2003), Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Bates (2008), and is similar in many ways to Greif's (1994) description of medieval Genoa before the Podesta, except the clients here are customary local authorities.

In this essay I argue that the historical roots go deeper than colonialism and can be found in the absolutist authority structures that emerged out of the slave trade era. To make my case I link the data on slave exports found in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis, 1999) with data on authority structures found in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967). My purpose is to see if the trans-Atlantic slave trade transformed local political authority in Africa prior to colonial occupation. I find that it did. I then suggest ways in which indirect colonial rule institutionalized these authority structures and transformed them into a kind of local rule of law that continues to extract surplus and challenge federal authority today.

The Search for Origins and Path-Dependence

In his book *States and Power in Africa*, Jeffrey Herbst (2000) advances the idea that a specifically African tradition of political authority is ancient in origin and rooted in Africa's harsh physical environment, an environment that has always constrained population growth and elites' capacity to broadcast political power. Herbst argues that low population density constrained the reach of political authority long before colonial rule. In fact, colonial authorities wrestled with the same physical constraints and failed, leaving behind a state apparatus too weak to govern effectively over its exogenously created political territories.

Herbst is not the only scholar to invoke labor scarcity to explain an African institution. Anthony Hopkins (1973) in his widely-read economic history of Africa uses labor scarcity to explain technological choices and the institution of slavery. John Iliffe (2007), the renowned historian of Africa, uses labor scarcity to explain the institution of polygyny. Gareth Austin (2008) revises and extends the application of the idea, and James Fenske (2010) applies it to property rights.

I believe there is a fundamental truth in this idea. Following the showing of the documentary film *Eve,* which argues that ancient Africans migrated out of Africa and populated the world, I ask my class: "if Africans could populate the world then why couldn't they populate Africa?" If Africa was labor scarce then certainly it was the environment and not the people. The major problem with this view is not the idea but a lack of evidence. There are few census counts of an Africa population prior to the 20th century, and the widely-used estimates for earlier times found

in McEvedy and Jones (1978) are educated guesses and extrapolations of current estimates back in time. These types of exercises rely on a variety of counterfactual assumptions regarding historical rates of population growth and the impact of the slave trades on African populations (see Manning, 1990).

Here I take a different approach. I use the fact that slave exports reduced African population. I then look to see if cross-sectional variations in slave exports can explain cross-sectional variations in institutions often ascribed to environmentally-induced labor scarcity. Thanks to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database some slave exports can be measured with a high degree of precision. In a very real sense, a focus on the slave trade opens the door to an empirically-grounded assessment of the population hypothesis, albeit a door with a slightly different view. Rather than seeing labor scarcity as the result of a steadfast environmental constraint, a focus on the slave trade emphasizes an economic shock to Africa.[3]

This shock certainly reduced population, but it also set off a chain reaction of warfare and raiding among African societies that "changed the way wars were waged at the lowest level (Thornton, 1999, p. 151)." Robin Law, in his study of the Slave Coast concludes that "by the end of the seventeenth century, the European demand for slaves had brought about a profound transformation of African societies of the Slave Coast. Although this was primarily an economic transformation, it had dramatic effects in the political sphere also, in the collapse of political order leading to the rise of the new state of Dahomey" (Law 1991, p. 345). One finds similar conclusions in Barry's (1998) study of the Senegambia region and Daaku's (1970) study of the Gold Coast. Inikori (1982, 2003) argues that the slave trade encouraged the formation and spread of banditry and small militarized states. And in a review of Herbst's *States and Power in Africa,* James Robinson (2002) argues that we should "…hypothesize that slavery-induced predatory institutions had significant adverse influence on development paths not just in the Americas where the slaves were used, but also in Africa where the slaves originated… Nonetheless, this is ultimately an empirical issue (2002, p. 517-518)."

[3] For two estimates of the shock see Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) and Gemery and Hogendorn (1979).

A decade later, and with a few notable exceptions, the idea that the slave trade altered African political institutions remains largely untested. Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) model both effects mentioned above. They treat the slave trade as an increase in the market value of anyone who can be enslaved. The shock alters factor prices in a way that mimics labor scarcity but it also turns political incentives to build states into economic incentives to raid for slaves. The model predicts decentralized and militarized absolutist political authorities more-interested in raiding for slaves than growing citizens. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) present evidence showing that centuries of slaving in Africa fomented mistrust among people and towards their institutions, and that this slavery-induced mistrust persists to today. Whatley and Gillezeau (2011b) present evidence that the slave trade increased ethnic fragmentation in Africa and that this too persists to today. Nunn (2008) finds that slaving hampered long-term economic progress. Among the many possible channels is its impact on economic and political institutions.

In this essay I follow these leads and ask if the slave trade influenced the institutions of authority in Africa and whether or not these influences persist over the long-term. I am not concerned with assessing the relative importance of environment versus shock. It could very-well be the case that the slave trade merely tightened a labor constraint that had been binding for millennia. I do not offer a way to distinguish between these two views, nor am I particularly concerned to. My goal is more limited -- to trace the long-term effects of the slave trade on the evolution of political authority in Africa.

As such, the effects, if any, must pass through colonialism. Did slavery-induced pre-colonial authority structures survive colonial occupation? The literature is surprisingly silent on this question. Herbst (2000) devotes an entire chapter of *States and Power* to a discussion of authority in pre-colonial Africa but he never mentions the trans-Atlantic slave trade (2000, pp. 35-57). Recent econometric studies of African political economy show how remnants of pre-colonial authority continue to influence local outcomes in Africa, but none of these studies consider the possibility that the pre-colonial legacies they identify are traditions of authority that date back to the slave trade era (Englebert, 2000; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papailoannou, 2010, 2011). Historians consider the link between the slave trade and African politics, but with the exception of a few radical historians like Walter Rodney (1972) and Basil

Davidson (1992) they are not particularly interested in the long-term impact on development.

Causal history is. It is an empirical project expressly designed to statistically identify and estimate causal relationships between past events and subsequent outcomes (see Nunn (2009) and Fenske (2010) for recent reviews). This line of research often produces the first salvo in the search for historical legacies, and institutions often take center stage as carriers of legacies.[4] Like a pulling guard on the gridiron, causal history suggests that some paths forward are more likely than others. The actual play, however, unfolds on the ground. As Paul David (1975) put it in his classic article on the economics of QWERTY, "... it is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or illogic) of the world around us except by understanding *how* it got that way (page 332)." Avner Grief (2006) has theorized on the concept "path of play" in historical settings and has focused attention on how self-enforcing institutions of social cooperation (the shared playbook in our football analogy) can order how the play unfolds.

In the remainder of this essay I follow the leads of this causal history of Africa and trace the impact of societal participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the evolution of political authority. I present econometric evidence showing how the trans-Atlantic slave trade caused absolutism to spread in sub-Saharan West Africa. I argue that slavery-induced absolutism also influenced the way politics were played in the colonial era and beyond. I present aggregate evidence that British colonies that exported more slaves were ruled more indirectly by colonial administrations. I argue that the implementation of indirect colonial rule institutionalized African absolutisms and transformed them into a kind of rule of law at the local level. The post-colonial nation-state, like the colonial state before it, lacks the administrative apparatus or the political clout to integrate these local authorities, even when they want to. From this perspective, the political structure of many post-colonial nation-states in Africa is rooted in a political history that is unique to Africa in many respects, a history that stretches at least as far back as the era of the transatlantic slave trade.

The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and Political Authority in Africa

[4] On path-dependence as legacy in competitive equilibrium, see Arrow (2004).

Slave trading in Africa has a long and nuanced history. How are we to think of it as a shock to Africa? It is best to begin with the position of Africa in medieval Mediterranean civilization. Italian city-states, Arab caliphates and European kingdoms all used conquest and trade to obtain treasure, land and slaves. Muslim and Christian armies fought "just" wars that justified the enslavement of non-believers. Roman and Islamic law contained well-developed civil codes regulating the legal status of slaves (Patterson, 1982).

The southern frontier of this system was Africa, down its east coast by sea and across the Sahara desert by camel. By the middle of the 15th century lateen sails enabled Portuguese caravels to sail down the west coast of Africa as well. Then the discovery of the Americas, the decimation of American populations and the transplantation of slave codes across the Atlantic. In the hands of the emerging capitalist nations of Europe, the proximity of cheap African labor was an opportunity to profit from and defend their American colonies. By the beginning of the 18th century, an old and sporadic long-distance African trade in slaves had become *the* export engine of growth (Eltis, 1994; Eltis and Jennings, 1994; Bean, 1974; Gemery and Hogendorn, 1990). The real price of slave exports rose 500% in the 18th century (Richardson, 1991; Eltis and Richardson, 2004). Slave exports increased by 1000% (Eltis, 2009).

Asking about the effects of these slave trades on the evolution of political authority in Africa might seem far-fetch, but we can focus the question and break it down into stages. Nunn (2008) asks if there is a correlation between the numbers of slaves coming out of different regions of Africa and the economic performance of those regions today. His is an ambitious attempt to locate and count up all of the slaves taken by the trans-Saharan, Indian Ocean, Red Sea and trans-Atlantic trades. He then looks to see if slave exports in the past correlate with GDP levels today. After controlling for a variety of other factors that might explain the correlation, including reverse-causality, he concludes that slaving and slave trading depressed long-term economic growth. His estimates of slave exports have been used by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Whatley and Gillezeau (2011b) and others, with similar results.

Here I adopt a slightly different empirical approach, one designed to better isolate the slave trade as a shock to Africa. First, I limit the analysis to the trans-Atlantic slave trade because these data

are much more reliable than data on the trans-Saharan, Red Sea or Indian Ocean trades. The trans-Atlantic slave trade evolved as a core component of European mercantile systems operating in the Atlantic. Records of ship manifests, government agencies, insurance companies and newspapers have been digitized into the widely-used Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Estimates of the Muslim-based trades are much less reliable in terms of volume, dates and places (Austen, 1979, 1987).

Second, I confine the analysis to the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the west coast of Africa. After 1807 the trans-Atlantic slave trade expanded on the east coast of Africa to avoid British efforts to suppress the trade on the west coast. I exclude the east coast extension because East African societies had previously been influenced by the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trades, for which slave export data are much less precise.

Third, there is little evidence of much slave trading along the west coast of Africa prior to the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Evidence on West African slave trading in the 15th and early 16th centuries is very thin (Fage, 1980). Most of the slave-trading along the Upper Guinea Coast and in the Western Sudan were southern extensions of the Muslim-based Mediterranean system, and were centered on Lake Chad and the interior delta of the Niger River (Lovejoy, 2004; Fisher, 2001). Rodney (1966) surveys evidence for the Upper Guinea Coast and finds slaves as servants in the households of elites, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean world, but little evidence of the kind of systematic slave raiding and slave marketing that would become the norm centuries later.

True, by the time the Portuguese arrived on the Lower Guinea Coast in the late-15th century the Muslim-based network had extended as far south as the Gold Coast of present-day Ghana. Wilks (1993) documents how Muslim traders from the north supplied the gold-mining Akan of Ghana with the slave workforce they needed to clear their rainforests for agriculture. Not to be outdone, Portuguese traders stimulated a second slave trade into the Akan gold fields. They sailed yachts back and forth along the Lower Guinea Coast, purchasing war captives from Benin's political expansion further down the coast and selling them to the Akan for their gold. (Graham, 1965; Wilks 1982; Ryder, 1969). These are certainly slave trades and they certainly predate the 18th century explosion in the trans-Atlantic trade, but they are long-distance slave trades and precisely

because societies along the west coast of Africa were much less predatory than they would become by the 18th century (Law, 1991; Thornton, 1999; Daaku, 1970).

Finally, not only is the magnitude of the shock and its timing better-measured on the west coast of Africa, so too is its location. Most of the 34,000 voyages found in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database have some information on the location of slave purchases. Sometimes location is by port. I use GIS software to merge the locations of slave ports with the locations of African societies found in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. Murdock's goal was to code the ethnographic features of societies prior to substantial European influence. I look to see if slaving influenced the authority structures of these societies, so in a sense I am testing Murdock as well.

Figure 1 depicts how I merged the two data sets. The mapping of sub-national societies comes from the digitized version of the map found in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas (1967). I overlay on top of this the locations of the slave ports found in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database. These are denoted by the stars along the coast. I then construct 200 observations from the merged spatial data. I divide the west coast of Africa into 200 evenly-spaced points, each 50 km apart, running from Tunis, Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The dependent and independent variables are constructed from spatial data that fall within predefined buffers around these points. These are depicted by the circles in Figure 1.

The treatment variable is the numbers of slaves exported from the ports in these buffers (SLAVES). Environmental controls are the average values of environmental features inside these buffers (X): forest and desert coverage, elevation, local agricultural suitability as measured by climate and terrain slope, and population density in 1960 (UNESCO, 2010; USGS, 2010; IIASA, 2010). The dependent variables are three authority types derived from variable V72 in the Ethnographic Atlas called "Succession to the Office of Local Headman." This variable is dichotomized three different ways. ABSOLUTIST = 1 for Murdock's code 1 = "patrilineal heir," and code 2 = "matrilineal heir;" ABSOLUTIST = 0 otherwise. LIBERAL = 1 for Murdock's code 5 = "influence, wealth or social status, nonhereditary;" LIBERAL = 0 otherwise. DEMOCRATIC = 1 for Murdock's code 6 = "election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary;" DEMOCRATIC = 0 otherwise.

Table 1 reports un-weighted means. The first three columns report means for the Western sample -- the entire 200 buffer sample covering the western half of the continent of Africa from Tunis, Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The top panel is for buffers with a 250km radius. The bottom panel is for buffers with a 500 km radius. On average, 316,050 slaves were exported from each of the 200 buffers with a 250km radius.[5] 117 of the 200 buffers have at least one ethnic group with information on authority type. The un-weighted averages show 62 percent of these societies being governed by absolutist authority, 16 percent being governed by democratic authority and only 3 percent having liberal or wealth-based rules of ascension to headship. 180 of the 500km buffers have information on authority type. The number of hits is larger because the larger buffers cover more territory and have a higher probability of containing at least one ethnic group with information on authority type.

The next three columns report means for the Atlantic sample, a sample of observations that begins at approximately Gibraltar and run to Cape Town. This sample covers the African coastline that faces the Atlantic Ocean and the Americas. It excludes the African coastline that faces the Mediterranean. The number of observations falls to 169. The average number of slave per observation increases to 374,020. Absolutism increases to 84 percent.

The third sample is the Sub-Saharan sample, and begins near Cape Blanc on the southern edge of the Sahara desert. The number of observations declines to 131, slave exports increase to 482,520 and absolutism increases to 88 percent. All of the slaves in all of the samples were captured and exported from sub-Saharan Africa. The sample on authority type gets small (48 observations), but it serves as a check on the others by making sure an estimated impact of exports on authority-type is not being identified off of unobserved regional heterogeneity.

[5] This implies over 100 million slave exports, but the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database contains information on approximately 13 million slave exports. The discrepancy is due to the overlap of buffers causing each port's slave exports to be recorded more than once. The center of each buffer is 50kms away from the next center. With a radius of 250 km (or a diameter of 500km) the coast is canvased once if we take the average exports of every 10^{th} buffer. 200/10=20, which yields 20x316,050=6,321,000 slave exports. The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database has specific port information for approximately 6,494,200 West African slave exports, so our ports pick up almost all of the slave exports that have information on port.

The null hypothesis is loosely derived from Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a), where slaving is modeled as a violent production process -- what Patterson (1982) calls "social death." The increased violence increases individuals' demands for protection -- a public good best provided by political authorities who have the power to authorize and co-ordinate a defense (or offense). Like all individuals in times of war, individuals subject to slave capture will pay more for protection, including relinquishing freedoms and rights that might otherwise be cherished in times of peace. It is not inconceivable that centuries of slaving created an environment where peace had become a distant memory -- where a state of war seemed like a natural state of affairs. A rough calculation reported in Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) estimates that between 1700 and 1850 a West African person faced a one-in-five chance of being swept up in the trans-Atlantic slave trade sometime in their life. Under these conditions it is not inconceivable that individuals will relinquish political rights and accept absolute rule (Bates, Grief and Singh, 2002). It is not inconceivable for political authority to become more absolutist in nature where previously there had been some semblance of democratic or liberal influence on authority.

I look for evidence of this by performing the following OLS regressions:

$$\text{AUTHORITY TYPE}_{ji} = \alpha + \beta\ \text{SLAVES}_i + \Omega\ X_i + v_i$$

Observations are buffers. AUTHORITY TYPE_{ji} is the average value of AUTHORITY TYPE_j (ABSOLUTE, LIBERAL or DEMOCRATIC) for ethnic groups whose centroids fall in buffer *i*. SLAVES_i is the total number of slaves exported from the slave ports in buffer *i*. Environmental variables are mean values for territories in the buffers. X_i is the vector of environmental control variables. v_i is the error term. The larger circular buffers reach farther inland, but they overlap more along the coast. I calculate Conley standard errors to account for spatial correlation in errors across observations.

OLS results are reported in the columns labeled OLS in Table 2. In the 250 km samples, slave exports are positively and statistically significantly correlated with absolutist authority. All of the estimated coefficients are positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The correlation is also large. Mean slave exports explain between 16 and 40 percent of the absolutism

recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. In the sub-Saharan sample the correlation is also significant and large.

I interpret these correlations as if the direction of causality ran from slaving to absolutism, but there could be some reverse causation. Absolutist authority, for example, could have been a more-efficient way to organize slave raids, giving rise to a reverse correlation running from absolutism to slave exports. Also, Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) discuss conditions under which absolutist rulers might authorize half-hearted defenses of their people. Coalition-building across ethnic groups required some degree of power-sharing among elites, but if elites could insulate themselves from capture, and if they cared little about the welfare of their people, then they might prefer to leave their people exposed to capture so long as they themselves were safe. This outcome may be more-likely where authority is inherited and absolute, and less likely in democratic systems where leaders are held accountable.

In an effort to identify a causal relationship that runs from slaving to absolutism I perform a two-stage instrumental variables estimation of the relationship between slaving and absolutism. In the first stage I seek a set of exogenous predictors of slave exports that are uncorrelated with the error terms $v_{i.}$ Here I make use of the instruments developed by Nunn (2008), which in this case are the distances between the center of each buffer and the nearest destination in the Americas and North Africa.[6] These distances, plus the environmental controls, capture variations in slave exports that are not likely to be correlated with authority type. In the second stage I look for correlations between these estimated slave exports and absolutism. In the second stage I also control for the impact of environment on the adoption of absolutist authority. I rely on Hansen-Sargan tests of over-identification restrictions to test for the absence of correlations between first-stage estimates of slave exports and the error terms $v_{i.}$

In Table 3 I report first-stage regressions of slave exports on distance and environmental controls. These are reduced form equations so it is difficult to interpret coefficients, but the

[6] The American destinations are Virginia, Havana, Haiti, Kingston, Dominica, Guyana, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and the North African destinations are Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Bengahzi, Cairo.

F-statistics and the R-squares show that the exogenous regressors capture a significant amount of the variation in slave exports. In general, distance to the Americas offered some protection against capture. Also, fewer slaves were exported from desert regions and from higher elevations. This could be due to fewer people living in these regions, but some of the population effect is already captured by the variables measuring agricultural suitability and 1960 population, so desert and elevated regions may have also provided some refuge from slavers (Nunn and Puga, 2012).

The second-stage results are reported in the columns labeled IV in Table 2. In the Western sample of 250 km buffers, the coefficient on slave exports loses statistical significance, but as we move towards sub-Saharan Africa the estimated coefficients get larger and tighter. In the sub-Saharan sample, 16.9-34.8 percent of average observed absolutism is explained by average slave exports. The relationship between slave exports and absolutism is less apparent in the 500 km samples. All of the coefficients are still positive but they fail to achieve significance, except in the Western sample. It is not clear why this is the case. One possibility is that the impact of slaving is less direct farther inland. Most of the slaves pulled into the orbit of the trans-Atlantic slave trade originated within 250-300 kilometers of the coast, although after the late 18^{th} century higher slave prices covered longer treks to the coast. There are 48 observations in the sub-Saharan sample that have both 250 km and 500 km buffers. Absolutism is 88 percent in the smaller buffer but declines to 72 percent in the larger buffers that reach farther inland. The student-t statistic on difference in means is 3.46.

Not finding significant effects farther inland does not necessarily mean the impact of the slave trade was limited to the coast, although it does mean the issue deserves further investigation. The relationship could have becomes less direct and more complex as the process moved inland. Also, the inland areas were subject to slave raiding for shorter periods of time, so inland peasants might have been more successful at resisting extreme revolutions in authority. The empirical strategy in this essay captures only revolutionary changes across categories of authority, from non-absolutist to absolutist. It does not capture increases in the degree of absolutism within authority types, something that was undoubtedly occurring as well.

This interpretation finds some support in the regression for democracy and liberalism. These are reported in Tables 4 and 5. First note that all of the estimated coefficients have negative signs. Slaving tended to reduce liberalism and democracy. There are no liberal societies in the 250 km sub-Saharan sample, but there are some in the sample that reaches 500 km inland. Slaving reduced liberalism, even in the interior of sub-Saharan Africa. The results for democracy are also negative but they never achieve statistical significance in the sub-Saharan sample. Perhaps the designation "democratic" is flexible enough to absorb elements of absolutism while retaining some degree of accountability, like in the case of the Asante kingdom situated inland from the Gold Coast (Wilks, 1975; Rattray, 1929)

Patriarchy is another form of authority, and George Murdock (1949, 1967) claims to have theoretically proven that much of the patriliny in pre-colonial West Africa was of recent historical origin. His proof is based on the observation that many pre-colonial West African societies with patrilineal rules of descent retained legacy kinship terms more appropriate for other lineage systems. Not being a historian, and having never set foot in Africa, Murdock never claimed that the slave trade transformed lineage rules, but his list of possible causes could have easily included it. Basil Davidson (1992), the preeminent historian of Africa who chronicled Africa's history from slavery to the present, does highlight slaving. He states, "As the slaving state became increasingly a predator, kinship systems were strengthened and elaborated as a means of providing protection against the dangers of the violence created by the slave trade (p. 266)." Predation not only shifted more power onto already-powerful men but it may have also, as Ekeh argues, increased the "entrenchment of kinship corporation (1990, p. 660)."

From Predation to Rule of Law

What about colonialism? How did colonialism interact with these new slavery-induced predatory political customs? Over the past decade a series of influential articles has laid the empirical foundation for approaching this type of question. One strand of this literature searches for the long-term impact of the legal customs transplanted around the world by European colonizing authorities, contrasting primarily the experiences of common law countries and civil law countries (La Porta, 2008; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Another series of articles by Acemoglu,

Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) emphasizes the long-run impact of colonial property rights laws laid down by European colonial authorities. In colonies where the colonizer's strategy (or capability) was to settle and produce, one tends to find property rights systems that constrain states' rights to expropriate surplus from producers. Where incentives to settle and produce were not so great, the colonial authority tended to establish institutions that facilitated resource extraction, and often by force. Over the long-term, settler institutions encouraged economic development while extractive institutions did not.

These are useful perspectives, but one needs to be careful when applying them to Africa. Incorporating the trans-Atlantic slave trade can help. First, David Albouy (forthcoming) argues that thus far the settler data are not good enough to test for the long-term effects of extraction vs. settlement in Africa. The slave trade was definitely an extractive institution, and the numbers on export volumes are good measure of how extractive it was across time and place.

Second, it is important to note that prior to the Berlin Conference of 1885 the official colonization of Africa was confined to a few coastal protectorates. Most of Africa was officially colonized for less than 75 years, contrasting sharply with other areas of the world like the Americas, the Caribbean, India and many parts of Asia. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, footnote 1) interpret the slave trade as an extractive colonial institution, but others do not. Olsson (2009), for example, presents evidence that the length of colonial rule encouraged the development of democratic institutions over the long-term, but he defines colonialism in Africa as formal colonial occupation. Given the impact of the slave trade on political customs in Africa, incorporating the slave trade as a phase of colonialism might help explain why African democracy differs from democracy in other former-colonies around the world.

Finally, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that property rights institutions have had a greater impact on structure and performance than have legal origins because inefficient legal rules can be circumvented by the private ordering of contracts (Grief, 1989). There are a number of studies, however, documenting the lasting impact of legal origin in Africa, although the channels are not always clear. Colonies under British rule, and therefore administered by common law traditions, tend to exhibit higher post-colonial incomes per capita, more investments in education

and higher rates of school enrollment than do colonies administered by French civil codes (Grier, 1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; and Price, 2003).

One possible explanation has to do with the way the legal customs of colonizer and colonized interacted to shape the institutions of colonial rule. Sir Frederick Lugard, 1st Governor-General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, is generally considered to be the architect of the British policy of indirect rule, but Mamdani and Herbst argue that the policy evolved on the ground, as a solution to the problem of controlling colonial subjects. Mamdani (1996) argues that indirect colonial rule grew out of a recognition that direct rule, a single legal system encompassing colonizer and colonized but peppered with racial distinctions, was untenable in the long-term because it encouraged class-based and race-based protests against injustices. Gradually colonial authorities moved toward a sharing of power with real or imagined local chiefs who controlled real or imagined "customary" lands. Herbst (2000), in contrast, argues that indirect rule evolved out of a colonial recognition that broadcasting centralized authority over African territory was too costly to be effective.

Here the legal customs of colonizers can matter in reshaping the political landscape. Firmin-Sellers (2000), for example, compares the institutions of French and English indirect colonial rule among the ethnically-similar Akan peoples who straddled the colonial border between the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Consistent with civil law tradition, the French colonial system was designed to achieve a clear directive from above: maximize tax collection. They undermined the authority of paramount chiefs, chose lower-order divisional chiefs as their agents, took periodic censuses of the population to estimate potential tax revenue, paid chiefs a share of the taxes they collected, and monitored chiefs' performance by comparing collected taxes against expected taxes.

The British, on the other hand, careful not to undermine local custom (read common law), chose the higher-order paramount chiefs as their agents and allowed them to rule over the divisional chiefs and lineages below them. They paid chiefs a fixed salary and deposited tax collections in a public treasury for the development of public works. The British did not monitor chiefs' tax collection like the French did but instead monitored chiefs' performance as public servants and

administrators of justice. Based on this case study one would conclude that the French system was a more efficient system of resource extraction but perhaps less developmental than the British system.

One would also conclude that the colonial authorities, both French and British, empowered slavery-induced absolutist power structures. Figure 2 presents aggregate evidence which suggests that indirect colonial rule relied on the kind of absolutism I estimated in the previous section. The figure graphs the relationship between slave exports and the degree of indirect rule among British colonies in Africa. The unit of analysis is the post-colonial nation-state. The measure of indirect rule is taken from Lange (2004, 2009) and is the percentage of legal cases adjudicated in customary African courts. Slave exports per acre are taken from Nunn (2008). The Figure shows that indirect rule is positively and significantly correlated with past slave exports.

This is understandable. The colonial goal is to control population and extract surplus. The political objective of indirect colonial rule is to take the overlapping authorities that kin, clans, patriarchs and elders previously used to adjudicate local conflict and invests them in a chief who now has the authority to rule over his people on behalf of the colonizer. Enlisting a powerful local authority was probably easier where the slave trade had already entrenched absolutist authority structures.

Bates (2010) contains a concise discussion of how the integration of kinship systems like these into formal state structures transforms local customs into rule of law. In pre-state systems the heads of kin and clan met out justice (also see Murdock, 1960). Crimes are crimes against persons, and crimes by a member of one group against a member of another get settled by inter-group exchange of some kind. This is what elders and lineage heads do. A reasonable indicator of the incorporation of these types of authority structures into formal states is the appearance of crimes, not against persons, but against the state, signaling a public monopoly on violence -- or rule of law. Indirect colonial rule legitimized slavery-induced predatory political

customs and institutionalized them as part of the colonial state.[7]

Customary Authority and the Post-Colonial Nation-State

What about the post-colonial era? In this section I argue that predatory political customs passed through colonialism into the post-colonial era and continue to influence the structure and performance of African political economies today. At the federal level is the disjointed post-colonial nation-state facing difficulty broadcasting power. At the local level is absolutist customary authority. The poor governance, ethnic conflict and corruption observed in many post-colonial African states are unstable equilibrium outcomes on the path of play among these parties (Herbst, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bates 2008; Lange, 2009; van de Walle, 2001).

At the federal level, the path begins with the Berlin Conference of 1885 where European powers agreed to cooperate in carving Africa into the territories that would become post-colonial nation-states. The process was swift, surgical and haphazard, with colonial powers often drawing straight-line borders inland from the coast, and taking possession of real estate as quickly and as easily as they would eventually relinquish it. Davidson (1992) recounts the random and haphazard nature of colonial occupation on the Gold Coast. Noting that in the 1880s the King of Asante offered the British authorities monopoly control of all Asante trade, Davidson writes, "Now one might think that the British government, eager to acquire a monopoly of commercial control over West African lands, but far less eager to meet the almost certain high cost of conquest, would have jumped at this offer. But the British ministers in charge at home now wanted more than monopolistic commercial control; they wanted territorial ownership. Partly in order to keep out the French..., but even more, as most evidence seems to show, because a demand for territorial ownership had become an imperial obsession and even a popular cause... (p. 70-71)." But "no more than 60 years or so after preferring to invade … British imperial government found that it had little to gain, after all, from territorial possession and reverted to the policy of withdrawal... (p. 72)."

[7] Contrast these legal origins with the legal origins of common law in England, where custom came to rely on a judiciary independent of the king and lords, and based on trial by juries of peers. See Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) for an insightful discussion.

Lange (2004, 2009) tracks among the former British colonies the evolution of federal authority from colonialism to the present. He focuses on the disjointed post-colonial nation-state that emerged out of the dual legal systems of indirect rule. Lange shows how country-level measures of indirect rule (measured by the percent of legal cases adjudicated in customary courts) are highly correlated with poor governance structures today. Indirect colonial rule produced a post-colonial nation-state crippled by ineffective bureaucracy, restrictions on private contracting, weak rule of law and widespread corruption.

Of course, indirect colonial rule could be correlated with poor post-colonial outcomes for other reasons. Iyer (2010), for example, shows how in British India colonial authorities indirectly ruled the poorer regions and directly ruled the richer ones. This kind of occupation strategy could produce the same correlation between indirect colonial rule and poor post-colonial governance that Lange finds in British Africa. As a preliminary check on this, I take country-level population density in 1900 (from Nunn, 2008) as a proxy for country income in 1900. A simple regression of indirect rule on population density has an insignificant and positive coefficient, not the significantly negative coefficient one would expected if indirect rule chased poor lands in Africa too.[8]

Given weak federal authority in post-colonial Africa, one should expect pre-colonial authorities to continue to assert themselves. Michalopoulos and Papailoannou (2010) use satellite light density at night to proxy for local economic development and find that the borders of pre-colonial authorities explain more cross-sectional variations in economic activity than do the borders of post-colonial nation-states. Gennailoa and Rainer (2007) show that regions in Africa that had concentrated authority structures in the pre-colonial era are better-able to secure public goods for their constituents today.

Patron-clientism is the glue that holds this system of authority together. It need not be deadly, but the cost in terms of political stability can be extremely high. Greif (1994) attributes the civil wars

[8] Indirect Rule = 0.9092 * ln(POP DENSITY 1900) + 47.024, SE = .802, R^2 = 0.1429.

of medieval Genoa to this kind of political gamesmanship. Van de Walle (2001) argues that the fiscal crises of the post-colonial nation-state in Africa is not due to excessive government spending, but to states' inability to collect revenues from local authorities. Michalopoulos and Papailoannou (2011) find that much of the post-colonial political violence and civil war in Africa is located near pre-colonial ethnic homelands that were divided by the haphazard drawing of colonial borders. Divided ethnicities need not lead to conflict, but a history of slaving and the mistrust it engenders might be a fuel that feeds the flame (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).

Conclusion

I have argued in this essay that the lens of the trans-Atlantic slave trade provides a useful perspective on contemporary politics in Africa. My main point is that the pre-colonial authority structures of West Africa that are recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas are not traditional in the sense of being old, but are more-recent in origins and closely tied to the ways African societies responded to the shock of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The image of a decentralized, absolutist, isolated village exploiting women is not an image of ancient African. It is a modern one.

Second, I have nothing invested in the term "patrimonial" but I do want to suggest that the post-colonial nation-state in Africa is rooted in African history -- a history that has been fundamentally altered by the slave trades and by colonialism. This path dependence is seen in all of the empirical studies linking pre-colonial authority structures to post-colonial political and economic outcomes. My contribution to this literature is a re-interpretation of what it means to be "pre-colonial" in the African context.

Finally, I do not mean to suggest that history determined post-colonial political outcomes in Africa, or that the political problem to be solved was as simple as I suggest. I do, however, want to suggest that viewing customary authority as something of recent origin can encourage change. "You sometimes cannot understand the logic (or illogic) of the world without knowing how it got that way." Radelet (2010) identifies 17 emerging countries in Africa. Four of the five reasons he cites for their success have to do with improvements in policy and governance. What Ekeh (1975) calls the "two publics" in Africa, and what van de Walle (2001) calls "permanent crisis,"

and what Chabal and Daloz (1999) call “disorder as political instrument” need not be permanent nor disorderly. The first order of business, however, is to understand how it got that way. Sankofa!

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Table 1. Sample Means

	Western sample			Atlantic sample			Sub-Saharan sample		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
	250 km radius buffers								
Slave exports (000)	200	316.05	225.62	169	374.02	238.34	131	482.52	255.32
Absolute Authority	117	0.62	0.41	86	0.84	0.20	48	0.88	0.18
Democratic Authority	117	0.16	0.30	86	0.07	0.17	48	0.04	0.13
Liberal Authority	117	0.03	0.13	86	0.03	0.10	48	0.00	0.00
Agricultural Suitability	200	2.89	1.10	169	2.99	1.11	131	2.83	0.99
Population in 1960	200	10.73	15.36	169	9.36	15.81	131	9.91	16.74
Elevation	200	12.56	6.58	169	11.95	6.31	131	12.12	6.18
Forest	200	0.15	0.24	169	0.16	0.26	131	0.19	0.28
Desert	200	0.54	0.65	169	0.53	0.69	131	0.34	0.59
	500 km radius buffers								
Slave exports (000)	200	632.1	392.70	169	748.05	407.97	131	965.04	424.58
Absolute Authority	180	0.59	0.39	149	0.71	0.31	111	0.80	0.21
Democratic Authority	180	0.17	0.26	149	0.13	0.24	111	0.06	0.09
Liberal Authority	180	0.03	0.11	149	0.04	0.12	111	0.02	0.03
Agricultural Suitability	200	2.89	1.30	169	2.90	1.29	131	2.71	1.17
Population in 1960	200	7.00	8.66	169	6.20	8.56	131	6.56	9.04
Elevation	200	13.09	7.64	169	12.80	7.37	131	12.87	7.54
Forest	200	0.27	0.47	169	0.30	0.50	131	0.36	0.55
Desert	200	1.10	1.45	169	1.02	1.51	131	0.60	1.34

Sources: I divide the west coast of Africa into 200 evenly spaced points starting at the northernmost point of Tunisia and ending at the middle of South Africa. Variables are constructed from spatial data falling within a radius of 250 km or 500 km around these points. The Western sample contains all 200 buffers, from Tunis, Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The Atlantic sample runs from Gibraltar to Cape Town. The Sub-Saharan sample runs from Cape Blanc to Cape Town. SLAVES are in thousands (0,000) of slaves exported from ports that fall within a buffer (Eltis, 2009). Environmental controls are forest and desert coverage, elevation, local agricultural suitability as measured by climate and terrain slope, and population density in 1960 (UNESCO, 2010; USGS, 2010; IIASA, 2010). Authority codes variable V72 in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) called "Succession to the Office of Local Headman." V72 is dichotomized three different ways. ABSOLUTIST = 1 for Murdock's code 1 = "patrilineal heir," and category 2 = "matrilineal heir;" ABSOLUTIST = 0 otherwise. LIBERAL = 1 for Murdock's code 5 = "influence, wealth or social status, nonhereditary;" LIBERAL = 0 otherwise. DEMOCRATIC = 1 for Murdock's category 6 = "election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary;" DEMOCRATIC = 0 otherwise.

Notes: N is the number of observations or buffers with non-missing data. Means are the un-weighted averages of observations in the sample. SD is sample standard deviation.

Table 2. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on absolutist authority in West Africa

(Dependent variable = Pct. of societies with ABSOLUTIST authority)

	Western sample		**Atlantic sample**		**Sub-Saharan sample**	
	OLS	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**
	250 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	0.0779***	0.0590	0.0380***	0.0755***	0.0412***	0.0636***
Conley standard errors	0.0230	0.1367	0.0116	0.0197	0.0133	0.0156
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	117	117	86	86	48	48
Adjusted R-squared	0.4393		0.1833		0.4236	
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		4.07		0.01		4.76
$(\bar{X})$ Mean slave exports (000,000)	3.260	3.260	3.740	3.740	4.825	4.825
$(\bar{Y})$ Mean pct. with Absolute Authority	62.19	62.19	84.02	84.02	88.1	88.1
$\hat{\beta}*\bar{X}*100$	25.40	19.23	14.20	28.24	19.87	30.67
Pct. of Absolutism $(\bar{Y})$ explained by $(\bar{X})$	40.84	30.92	16.90	**33.61**	22.56	**34.81**
	500 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	0.0225*	0.177***	0.0040	0.0342	0.0080	0.0134
Conley standard errors	0.0157	0.0079	0.0105	0.0431	0.0082	0.0129
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	180	180	149	149	111	111
Adjusted R-squared	0.2234		0.0535		0.3781	
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		10.03		6.16		1.91
$(\bar{X})$ Mean slave exports (000,000)	6.321	6.321	7.480	7.480	9.650	9.650
$(\bar{Y})$ Mean pct. with Absolute Authority	58.72	58.72	70.94	70.94	79.78	79.78
$\hat{\beta}*\bar{X}*100$	14.21	11.2	3.00	25.56	7.68	12.91
Pct. of Absolutism $(\bar{Y})$ explained by $(\bar{X})$	24.19	190.82	4.23	36.03	9.62	16.19

Sources: See Table 1.

Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the column labeled “IV” were estimated GMM. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan test statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level is 4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.

Table 3. First-stage IV regressions

(Dependent variable = slave exports in thousands)

	250 km radius buffer			500 km radius buffer		
	Western sample	**Atlantic sample**	**Sub-Saharan sample**	**Western sample**	**Atlantic sample**	**Sub-Saharan sample**
Distance to American destinations	-4.38***	-3.04*	-5.74	-7.46***	-5.84**	10.81
	(1.23)	(2.10)	(8.76)	(2.26)	(3.06)	(17.39)
Distance to N. African destinations	-2.23	3.80	0.74	-5.20	3.93	30.93
	(2.95)	(8.39)	(16.79)	(4.50)	(14.68)	(35.26)
Agricultural suitability	32.57***	50.19**	18.97	152.76***	181.57***	142.95*
	(1.23)	(30.71)	(37.96)	(51.63)	(60.40)	(82.21)
Population in 1960	4.24***	3.92	4.74*	10.17**	11.45**	6.94
	(1.60)	(4.88)	(2.47)	(5.65)	(6.91)	(5.97)
Elevation	-10.01***	-14.19***	-13.23***	-24.45***	-31.75***	-21.75
	(3.73)	(4.88)	(6.44)	(7.50)	(9.97)	(16.00)
Forest	165.77	140.03	164.67	297.00*	275.11*	283.91*
	(169.24)	(177.82)	(182.24)	(157.91)	(160.36)	(159.08)
Desert	-88.67**	-114.67**	-132.72**	-105.47***	-113.82**	-113.60**
	(35.56)	(51.61)	(56.86)	(39.76)	(53.62)	(53.75)
Constant	540.60**	154.63	538.73	884.87***	316.41	-2061.30
	(223.24)	(536.71)	(1378.22)	(324.80)	(881.03)	(2792.58)
Number of observations	200	169	131	200	169	131
Adjusted R-Squared	0.3515	0.3367	0.2865	0.6037	0.5941	0.5286
F-statistic	16.41	13.18	8.46	44.31	36.13	21.82

Sources: See Table 1.

Notes: Coefficients estimated OLS. Conley standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. Conley standard errors allow for spatial correlation over five contiguous buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.

Table 4. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on LIBERAL authority in West Africa

(Dependent variable = Pct. of polities with LIBERAL authority)

	Western sample		**Atlantic sample**		**Sub-Saharan sample**	
	OLS	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**
	250 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	-0.0084	-0.0247	-0.0068*	-0.0044	NA	NA
Conley standard errors	0.0063	0.0269	0.0041	0.0063		
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Number of observations	117	117	86	86		
Adjusted R-squared	0.0313		0.11			
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		0.83		3.363		
	500 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	-0.0037*	-0.0084	-0.0057**	-0.0125**	-0.0031**	-0.0070**
Conley standard errors	0.0022	0.0087	0.0024	0.0056	0.0016	0.0031
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	180	180	149	149	111	111
Adjusted R-squared	0.1671		0.1759		0.2823	
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		1.66		0.0010		2.37

Sources: See Table 1.

Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the columns labeled “IV” were estimated GMM. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan test statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level is 4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.

Table 5. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on democratic authority in West Africa

(Dependent variable = Pct. of polities with DEMOCRATIC authority)

	Western sample		**Atlantic sample**		**Sub-Saharan sample**	
	OLS	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**	**OLS**	**IV**
	250 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	-0.0456**	-0.0357	-0.0081	-0.0210*	-0.0067	-0.0044
Conley standard errors	0.0196	0.1211	0.0057	0.0126	0.0053	0.0071
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	117	117	86	86	48	48
Adjusted R-squared	0.1129		0.2174		0.6961	
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		3.04		0.1483		1.52
	500 km radius for buffer					
$\widehat{(\beta)}$ Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000)	-0.0185**	-0.0935***	-0.0072	-0.0193	-0.0020	-0.0095
Conley standard errors	0.0083	0.0341	0.0064	0.0259	0.0041	0.0066
Environmental controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	180	180	149	149	111	111
Adjusted R-squared	0.1618		0.1188		0.2238	
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions		3.17		7.83		0.0820

Sources: See Table 1.

Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the column labeled “IV” were estimated GMM. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan test statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level is 4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.

Figure 2. The slave trade and indirect rule



Figure 1. Merging the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database and the Ethnographic Atlas



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The Slave Trade, Colonialism And Africa's Underdevelopment

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Abstract:

A revisit to the episode of Africa's slave trade and colonialism is clearly two important issues that markedly affected the economic development of African continents during the last five centuries.

The triangular pattern of exchange under the Atlantic trading system led to the greatest benefit of Europe and left Africa being the loser. The Fertile and largely untapped resources of the New World (i.e the North and South America as well as the Caribbean Island) were tremendously transformed through the importation of African labour force-slave trade via the dreaded ''middle passage'' or the Atlantic crossing with Europe serving as the provider of capital.

The absence of data about the size of Africa's population in the 15th century makes it difficult to carry out any scientific assessment of the result of the population flow.

Britain being the first to industrialize in the 18th century spearheaded the abolishing of slave trade activities in the 19th century. The realization of Britain that instead of transporting the Africans to the New World to work under service condition in white-owned plantations, it was better to leave the Africans where they were and encourage them to produce what was needed by British industries. This gave rise to the transition between the end of the Atlantic slave trade and the beginning of colonialism.

It is against this backdrop that this paper discusses how the phenomena of the slave trade and the colonialism that played part in its underdevelopment.

1.Introduction

The external slave trade (especially between Africa on the one hand and Europe and the New World on the other) and colonialism were two important episodes that markedly affected the economic development of the African continent during the last five centuries. In other words, in order to have a proper grasp of the present stage of Africa's development or underdevelopment, one must revisit these two important episodes in the European encounter with Africa. As clearly demonstrated by Walter Rodney, in his classic study *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972)*, the perpetual exploitation of Africa's human and material resources by Europe since the beginning of contact between the two continents in the 15th century has been responsible for the former's underdevelopment and the letter's development. Europe's exploitation of Africa's labour and land – the two most important factors of production – for nearly five hundred years through slave trade and colonialism had greatly undermined our capacity to develop in quite a number of ways. This paper therefore discusses how the phenomena of the slave trade and colonialism had played an important part in Africa's underdevelopment.

2.The Atlantic Slave Trade And The Origin Of Africa's Underdevelopment

Trade was the most significant factor in the establishment of contact between Europe and Africa in the 15th Century, and the slave trade was an important component of this relationship. Under the Atlantic trading system, a triangular pattern of exchange was gradually developed in which Europe became the greatest beneficiary and Africa the greatest loser. The fertile and largely untapped resources of the New World (i.e. the North and South America as well as the Caribbean Islands) were tremendously transformed through the importation of African labour force – slave via the dreadful 'middle passage' or the Atlantic crossing, with Europe serving as the provider of capital. Thus, the New World provided the veritable land that produced a variety of crops and minerals; Africa supplied the labour that worked the plantations and mines of the New World; and Europe provided the capital and largely expropriated whatever was produced by the African slaves in the New World. The 17th century saw an escalation in the Atlantic slave trade largely because of the development of the plantation system, particularly sugar plantation, in the New World. The extent to which the external slave trade retarded Africa's growth could best be gauged under its impact on the continent, which could be examined under the following:

- The Trans-Atlantic crossing, also known as the middle passage, was one of the most horrendous continuous phenomena in human history. It lasted for three centuries, peaking in the 18th century, a period within which the largest number of Africans was sent across the Atlantic into slavery in the Americas. The number of Africans who were captured, sold, and brought to the Americas and resold into chattel slavery defies quantification because of the manner of their capture and the survival rate in crossing the Atlantic as well as the difficulty in retrieving exact figures from ship logs. Estimates of Africans who survived the trans-Atlantic passage into enslavement during the 18th century, however, are put around 6,133,000. (Gadzekpo, 2005: 1375).

  The massive loss to the African labour force was made more critical because it was composed of able-bodied young men and young women. Slave buyers preferred their victims between the ages of 15 and 35, and preferably in the early twenties, the sex ratio being about two men to one woman. Europeans often accepted younger African children, but rarely any older person. The most healthy were generally shipped wherever possible, taking the trouble to get those who had already survived an attack of smallpox, and who were therefore immune from further attacks of that disease, which was then one of the world's great killer diseases.

  Absence of data about the size of Africa's population in the 15th century makes it difficult to carry out any scientific assessment of the results of the population outflow. No one has been able to come up with a figure representing total losses to the African population sustained through the extraction of slave labour from all areas to all destinations over the many centuries that slave trade existed (Rodney, 1972: 111; Hopkins, 1988: 80).

  The actual numbers of the slaves carried from Africa to the Americas are unknown. The debate on the exact volume of the trade which has recently developed into what is often referred to as "the numbers game" has generated a lot of interest among scholars. The totals cited by the majority of writers range from 15-20 million African slaves exported to the Americas; to 18-24 million shipped from Africa, the difference being accounted for by looses on the way. The following estimates ofworld population (in millions) according to continents given one European scholar are perhaps instructive: (Rodney, 1972: 111):

• **Africa**	• 1650	• 1750	• 1850	• 1900
	• 100	• 100	• 100	• 120
• **Europe**	• 103	• 144	• 274	• 423
• **Asia**	• 257	• 437	• 656	• 857

Table 1

The above table indicates that whilst the population of Europe and Asia recorded an increase between 1650 and 1850, that of Africa virtually stagnated, largely because of the Atlantic slave trade. In other words, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, which was a global economic system of forced migration, shipped approximately 15 to 18 million Africans to the Caribbean, North America, and South America. This forced migration had a devastating demographic impact on Africa, which seriously undermined its capacity to develop well into the present century.

- Closely related to the above impact is that the overseas slave trade in the New World was responsible for populating and developing the abundant land resources of the Americas and the West Indies. Before the trade across the Atlantic most of the Caribbean and other parts of the New World were sparsely populated. Similarly, the vast resources of this part of the New World were largely untapped until the arrival of the African slaves. The trade in African slaves was the first great human migration across the Atlantic; as such, it provides an extraordinary or classical historical example of international labour mobility, though oof an enforced kind. Therefore, whether for better or for worse, the Atlantic slave opened up the floodgates for the exploitation of the enormous resources – both agricultural and mineral – of the New World (Hopkins, 1988: 111). In this regard, while the population and resources of the New World were developed, as a result of the overseas slave trade, the African continent deprived of its most vital resource – humans – was underdeveloped.
- There is a general consensus economic historians that in one way or the other the African and Atlantic commerce also had contributed to the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 18th century. What is in dispute is the extent to which the process of industrialization and benefited from the Atlantic slave trade. However, the fact that there is even a consensus among specialists about the contribution of the Atlantic commerce to British industrialization is in itself enough to assign a role of the Atlantic slave trade to the phenomenon of Industrial Revolution. Here

again, we could see the rationale behind Rodney's argument that Europe's industrialization and development were achieved at Africa's expense. In other words, as Europe developed, Africa was being underdeveloped.

- The Atlantic slave trade increased the propensity for violence and warfare in West Africa, which in turn gave rise to a general state of insecurity. As the entire process of enslavement boarded on violence, communities prone to the slave raiding enterprise usually became suspicious of their neighbours and vice-versa. Prolonged raiding for slaves disrupted normal community life and engendered insecurity. It is perhaps worth nothing that there could never be development without peace and security. The escalation of violence and insecurity brought about by the slave trade undoubtedly increased the incapacity of Africa to develop.
- Closely related to the above, the Atlantic slave trade retarded the growth of African societies in a number of ways. For instance, both agriculture and industry were seriously affected by the slave trade, especially because the most priced human merchandise shipped across the Atlantic Ocean were largely the able-bodied men and fewer women. These were people mostly in their prime (between the ages of 15 and 35) who would have contributed to the development of their societies. Besides being the most highly productive part of their various societies, biologically, people of this age bracket are also known to constitute the highest reproductive component of every society. In other words, the population of West African societies prone to enslavement was largely depleted, thereby leaving such societies with either relatively too young or too old to positively contributed to the development of their respective societies.

3.Colonialism And The Intensification Of Africa's Underdevelopment

The Atlantic slave trade was largely abolished in the early 19th century by the same promoters of the enterprise, i.e the Europeans because it had by then become counterproductive. Interestingly, Britain, the main slave trading nation in the 17th and 18th centuries, was at the forefront of the campaign to stop it. Being the first country to industrialize in the 18th century, Britain gradually realized that instead of transporting the Africans to the New World to work under servile condition in White-owned plantations, it was better to leave the Africans where they were and encourage them to produce what

was needed by British industries. This therefore was the transition between the end of the Atlantic slave trade and the beginning of colonization. This period of trade in non-slave products – mainly vegetable oils such as palm oil and palm kernel and groundnuts and forest produce such as a gum Arabic and rubber – is whether rightly or wrongly referred to as "legitimate commerce".

The conflict of interest between the European merchants operating along the coast of West, Central and Eastern Africa on the one hand and the African middlemen conducting business in the interior of Africa during this transition period on the other, especially in 1879-1896 would set the stage for the eventual colonization of Africa by a number of West European nations. World trade experienced a depression or downturn during this period, which deeply affected the profits realized by the European traders who had for centuries been their trading partners. The attempt by the European traders to reach the sources of the produce they needed in the interior was naturally vehemently resisted by the African middlemen who had been making a fortune through their relationship with the White traders. In the course of this clash of interest between the two parties, the European traders, whenever threatened by African opposition in their attempt to reach the interior would resort to their home governments to intervene militarily on their behalf.

4.Impact Of Colonialism On Africa

- European powers in Africa set up administrations whose main focus was the maintenance of order rather than any type of economic or social development. At the same time, there was a notion that the colonies should be made to pay for themselves. European powers wanted the colonies but did not want them to become economic burdens. As a result, during the early years of colonialism European governments either kept relatively small colonial staff or contracted out the duties of governance to chartered companies (as with the British Royal Niger Company in Northern Nigeria).
- With economic consideration being the main motive behind colonization, the typical economic system that emerged was the metropolitan country – given its level of industrialization – serving the major supplier of manufactured goods to the colonies and the latter serving as the major suppliers of raw materials to the factories of the former. Under this arrangement, the colonies capacity to

industrialize was invariably thwarted, as they were perpetually designed to be primary producers and suppliers of raw materials to the industrial West and consumers of finished goods from the latter. Their capacity and initiative to break loose from this various cycle of dependency could therefore not be realized under this arrangement.

- Similarly, to reinforce the above dependency pattern, virtually all the basic infrastructural facilities constructed under colonialism were meant to serve foreign, metropolitan interests rather than domestic needs of the colonies. For instance, all roads, ports or harbours and railway lines that emerged were geared towards transporting raw materials from the interior to the coast for onward shipment to Europe. These same transport networks were meant to facilitate the movement of imported goods to the hinterland. This pattern of development distorted the economies of the colonies in the sense that the infrastructural facilities were not aimed at the meaningful transformation of the colonies, but rather to serve the interests of the colonizers. Furthermore, the colonial currencies introduced to the colonies were also meant to tie them down in monetary terms to the metropolitan countries.
- The kind of economy introduced by the colonial powers, therefore, turned the colonies into the dependencies of the colonizers. More often than not, most colonies specialized in the production of very few primary produce whose were largely determined by the colonizers and not by the producers. Interestingly, the prices of the imported goods were also dictated by the same colonial powers and not by the consumers.
- Politically, the structures imposed on the colonies were not meant to prepare them towards meaningful development. The colonizers just transplanted what they thought was good for the colonizers. Most of the post-independent political problems of the former colonies could be traced to the kind of political systems enshrined by the colonizers which bred instability. Similarly, the manner in which the colonial boundaries were arbitrarily created was great recipe for problems among the independent countries of Africa. The borders cut across cultural and linguistic heartlands of different ethnic groups. In other words, African societies and cultures experienced significant dislocations and alterations during the colonial era. As colonies were established in the continent, borders

were drawn that in many cases bore no relationship to indigenous and political realities. Colonial borders thus served to group together traditional enemies and to divide communities that had previously been united, the worst example of the latter being the division of the Somali people among British, Italian, French, and Ethiopian authorities (Johnson: 2005: 278).

5.Conclusion

The slave trade and colonialism were important turning points in Europe's relations with the African continent. The European exploitation of the continent's human and material resources through the two systems had impacted so negatively on Africa's capacity to develop and take its rightful position among the comity of nations. For almost three centuries Africa's able-bodied men and fewer women were shipped across the Atlantic Ocean under the obnoxious slave trade. These were peoples that would have contributed to the development of the continent, but instead their labour force was expropriated for the benefit of Europe and the New World. Similarly, under colonialism, Africa's labour force and material resources – in mineral and agricultural resources – were exploited by the colonizers for the development of their economies at the expense of the colonies. Perhaps no other continent had been exposed to such degree of exploitation and degradation as experienced by Africa. Thus, the slave trade and colonialism were two important episodes that had retarded Africa's capacity to develop in comparison to other continents.

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Missions, Education and Conversion in Colonial Africa

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Missions, Education and Conversion in Colonial Africa

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Abstract: This chapter traces the origins and long-term development of African mass-education in colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, it addresses the unique role of Christian missions in prompting a genuine schooling revolution and explores the comparative educational expansion across colonies and between genders. While the initial expansion of missions was motivated by a *global* competition for new church members, the development of African mass-education essentially depended on *local* conditions. It highlights the importance of *African agency* in the process towards mass-education that depended on local *demand* for formal education and the *supply* of African teachers who provided the bulk of mission schooling. The chapter also assesses potential pitfalls when those realities are not considered by studies, investigating historical missionary legacies on present-day African education and social mobility.

Keywords: Christian Missionaries; Education; Africa; Gender; Colonialism; Religion; Human Capital; African Agency

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1. Introduction

Christianity has evolved from a religion largely defined by the culture and politics of Europe to one that has expanded to a major religious force worldwide. In 1900, numerical expansion of Christianity was relatively low outside Europe and the Americas (Table 1).[1] Table 1 documents the rise of Christianity in the global south, over the long 20th century, due to an unprecedented wave of global missionary efforts that resulted in the fundamental shift of the center of gravity of world Christianity to Africa. In 2018, one in four Christians worldwide were African and the 2050 projections forecast further Christian growth.[2]

Table 1: Global share (%) of Christians, 1900-2050

	1900	1970	2000	2018	2025	2050
Africa	2	10	19	25	28	38
Asia	4	8	14	17	18	18
Europe	71	42	29	23	21	15
Latin America	12	24	26	25	24	21
North America	11	15	11	10	9	8
Oceania	1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: Derived from Johnson et al. (2018).
Notes: Figures may not add up due to rounding. Figures for the years 2025 and 2050 are future projections.

Figure 1 shows that by the end of the 19th century, most Africans were following various traditional religions and the Islam. During the 20th century, Christianity expanded rapidly in Africa at the expense of traditional religions, leading to one of the most spectacular cultural transformations in the continent's modern history (Hastings 1994; Sundkler and Steed 2000, 906). The unique historical process of African mass-conversion during the long 20th century was facilitated by vast Christian missionary efforts. Formal education was a key aspect in missionary conversion strategies and thus education became firmly connected to Christian missions. A high proportion of those who attended mission schools converted and helped spread the gospel of Jesus Christ in their local languages (Berman 1974; Frankema 2012). The school thus became, in the

[1] See the companion chapter by Felipe Valencia Caicedo in this volume on the spread of Christian missions across Latin America and Asia.
[2] Worldwide, by 2018 Africa is the home to most Christians: 599 million vs. 597 million in Latin America and 550 million in Europe (Johnson et al. 2018).

words of Ajayi (1965, 134) "the nursery of the infant Church". In the absence of major investments in African education by European colonial states, mission schools provided the bulk of education for most of the colonial era (c. 1880-1960). Missions did not just provide education where the colonial state did not invest in it but the supply of mission schools primarily relieved colonial governments from financing public education (De Haas and Frankema 2018). Christian missionaries thus played a crucial role in the development of formal mass-education in most of colonial Africa, which was intrinsically linked to mass-conversion.

Figure 1: Religious shares (%) in Africa, 1900-2050



Source: Calculated from Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds. *World Religion Database*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008.
Notes: 2025-2050 are future projections.

Towards the end of the colonial era, mission schools were replaced by state schools. As the continued expansion of Christianity shown in Figure 1 suggest, the secularization of education did not hinder Christianity's expansion into the 21st century. In 2018, more than one in two Africans self-identified as Christian. The average years spent in education in sub-Saharan Africa increased between 1950 and 2010 from 1.2 to 5.3 (Barro and Lee 2013), suggesting that, while mission

schools were responsible for the initial rise in mass-education, most educational progress was achieved by the modern African state. Yet, early colonial missionary investments have been shown to continue to carry long-lasting impacts. A growing literature in economic history, has found a positive association between historical Western missionary activities and African educational and occupational outcomes today (e.g. Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Nunn 2014; Wantchekon et al. 2015; Alesina et al. 2019).

This chapter traces the origins and long-term development of African mass-education in colonial Africa. More specifically, it addresses the unique role of Christian missions in the development of formal education and explores the comparative educational expansion across colonies and between men and women. While the initial expansion of missions was motivated by a *global* competition for new church members, the development of African mass-education essentially depended on *local* conditions. The chapter highlights the importance of *African agency* in the process towards mass-education that depended on local *demand* for formal education and the *supply* of African teachers who provided the bulk of mission schooling. Potential mismeasurements are then assessed when those historical realities are not taken more carefully into account by studies, investigating historical missionary legacies on present-day African education and socio-economic outcomes.

2. Christian Missionary Expansion

High European mortality in tropical Africa severely restricted missionary efforts. Prior to 1850, three in four European missionaries had died before their third year of service at the West African coast (Jedwab et al. 2018).[3] In fact, by the mid-19th century, European missionary societies[4] were close to abandoning sub-Saharan Africa as viable mission field due to its hostile disease ecology and unsuccessful conversion efforts (Agbeti 1986, 3-10). The comparative absence of tropical

[3] Similarly, between 1804 and 1825, 54 out of 89 Western missionaries died in Sierra Leone (Curtin 1998, 4). In Liberia, among male missionaries of the Episcopal Church 50 percent died in service 1835-1886, surviving on average 5 years (own calculations from Dunn 1992).

[4] The most important Protestant missionary societies included: Africa Inland Mission, Baptist Missionary Society, Basel Mission, Church Mission Society, London Missionary Society, United Free Church of Scotland, Wesleyan Methodist, Methodist Episcopal, Universities' Mission to Central Africa. Main societies of the Roman Catholic Church comprised: Holy Ghost Fathers, White Fathers, Society of African Missions, Society of the Divine Word.

diseases in the southern zones of sub-Saharan Africa was the major reason why early initiatives in the south were more successful than early attempts to enter the interior of west or central Africa (Johnson 1967). Malaria did not only represent the principal barrier to European missionary expansion in tropical Africa but also for European imperial expansion. Africa remained "the white man's grave" (Curtin 1961) until quinine became the standard therapy for malaria (and other intermittent fever) in the second half of the 19th century (Meshnick and Dobson 2001). Quinine extended European survival in the tropics significantly encouraging increasing numbers of European missionaries to volunteer to spread the Christian faith in tropical Africa post-1850 (Jedwab et al. 2018). The advent of quinine thus set the timing for both Christian missionary expansion, as well as the later scramble for Africa.

Missionary efforts often preceded European colonization. Protestant missions spread significantly earlier, since the early 19th century.[5] Global competition for new church members intensified during the mid-late-19th century when the Catholic missions had recovered from its almost total collapse of its missionary orders (Neill 1964, 397-401; Isichei 1995, 84-86) during the crisis of the Napoleonic era (c. 1800-1815). In Ghana, missions strategically weighted costs and benefits when choosing where to establish their churches and schools. During the first half of the 19th century they targeted healthier places, with relatively lower malaria-risk, where European missionaries could survive and train local African missionaries and teachers (Jedwab et al. 2018). African demand for Christian teachings initially developed among African populations near coastal European trading communities. Missions diffused along pre-colonial trade routes, avoided African kingdoms hostile to Christian teachings, and typically settled in proximity to their point of entry at the coast. This is consistent with the observations by Johnson (1967) and Maxwell (2015) that early converts were often ex-slaves and social outcasts.

The expansion of Christianity in Africa increased with the onset of European colonial rule during the late 19th century. Colonial pacification permitted missions to safely enter previously hostile regions: the cross followed the flag.[6] Equally, colonial investment into transport infrastructure, such as railroads and roads that lowered transport costs, attracted not only African cash crop growing farmers and exporting merchants but also missionary activity (Jedwab and

[5] Protestant missions already had expanded during the early-mid 19th century in Sierra Leone, South Africa, Ghana, and Madagascar.
[6] This excludes regions of Muslim-dominance.

Moradi 2016; Jedwab et al. 2018). Also, in areas with comparatively high(er) African incomes from cash-crop cultivation (i.e. cocoa, palm oil) and mining activity, there was greater demand for Western education (Frankema 2012; Jedwab et al. 2018; Juif 2019). Once the urban demand was satisfied missions diffused among rural populations. Muslim areas were mostly avoided.

Missionaries' primary intention was to convert Africans to Christianity. Mission societies viewed the provision of formal education as the most effective way of attracting new Christians, thus much of their efforts went into establishing schools (Berman 1974)[7]. Mission schools taught basic literacy, catechizing its students throughout the week. The British colonial administration, strongly interested in keeping costs low in its African colonies, adopted an open-door policy, "welcoming" missions from all denominations with the goal to "outsource" the supply of formal education to Christian missionary societies. This fostered competition between mission denominations. The British colonial state nevertheless kept some influence by subsidizing those mission schools through grants-in-aid (from African tax money) that satisfied colonial government (quality) standards, including building, equipment, number of pupils and teacher qualifications and curriculum content, laid out by the colonial administration. However, the bulk of financing and building of mission schools came from African congregations who paid fees or donated their labor and resources, sometimes in conjunction with local chiefs (Williamson 1952; Summers 2016, 322). For example, in Uganda, the Phelps-Stokes report in 1924 noted that fees and financing through collections made at local churches amounted to twice the colonial governments' grants-in-aid (Hanson 2010, 160). As a result, no clear link was observed between colonial government expenditures and enrollment rates in 11 British African colonies before 1940 (Frankema 2012). For example, although Ghana's educational budget was five times higher than Malawi's in 1938, primary-school enrollment in Malawi was five times higher than in Ghana.

In contrast, France opted for public schools financed by the colonial government. While France subsidized the operation of some Catholic mission schools, the vast majority of African students attended state-run schools. By 1900, in French West Africa there were 70 schools with an enrollment of some 2,500 pupils – 85 percent state-run (Hailey 1945, 1260-1).[8] France thus kept a much tighter grip on the development of educational systems in its colonies than the British. The

[7] Additional mission conversion strategies encompassed the provision of healthcare to Africans (Doyle et al. 2019; Cagé and Rueda 2019).

[8] Colonial Madagascar and Benin presented early exceptions to the rule, where there was a significant number of mission schools, as local demand for education could not keep up with public supply (Huillery 2009).

colonial state placed more emphasis on the quality of education for a small segment of the population for the training of an administrative class in the colonial civil service (Cogneau and Moradi 2014; Dupraz 2019). Consistent with the French imperial ideology of *assimilation*, colonial governments, insisted on French as language of instruction, regulated teachers' qualifications and schools' curricula and determined enrolment capacity (White 1996). Mission schools often neglected the metropolitan language rules by teaching in the vernacular, given that their primary interest was Christian conversion in the global competition for new church members (Frankema 2012).

Unlike British colonies, Portuguese and Belgian African colonies had a more explicit bias towards the Catholic Church's involvement in education. Interested in a wide spread of elementary schooling to the masses, the colonial administration in Belgian Africa pursued a strategy of granting free entry to Catholic and Protestant missionaries who set up extensive networks of schools. But only Catholic mission schools were subsidized until the Belgian government claimed entire responsibility over educational affairs in the 1950s and increase of educational investment (Frankema 2013; Juif 2019). Provinces with intensive mining (e.g. Katanga) benefitted from significant investment by mining companies into schooling for their mining workers and their children to save expenses on recruitment and European labor (Juif 2019). Similarly, Portuguese colonial policies favored the Catholic Church explicitly, granting Catholic missionaries the educational monopoly (Gallego and Woodberry 2010). Colonial state-run schools, that taught in Portuguese, were reserved for Portuguese and "assimilados" (i.e. Africans who spoke Portuguese and had adopted Christianity and Portuguese ideals).

3. Educational Supply and Demand in Colonial Africa

The beginnings of literate education in much of 19th century Africa built upon long-established African literary cultures. The Arabic manuscripts contained in the ancient libraries of Timbuktu (Mali), the series of 16th and 17th centuries correspondence of Christian Kongo kings, with the Portuguese court, as well as the scriptures written in Ge'ez by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church represent important symbols of pre-colonial African literary heritage. However, literary knowledge was extremely localized and mainly confined to the intellectual/religious elite that did not prompt mass-education. Knowledge transfer and intellectual activity was of course possible

without literacy. Traditional African knowledge systems included practices of social learning and vocational training that transferred prescriptive knowledge (i.e. how to use techniques, tools or natural resources). As girls learnt from their mothers and other older female relatives, so boys received instruction from fathers, siblings and elders in agricultural production systems, arts, trade, warfare and politics (Anderson 1970, 1). The emergence of formal education in the context of the encounter with European missionaries and colonial states, distinguished itself from African educational systems by grouping children into class rooms for regular daily lessons with emphasis on the importance of reading and writing that required the navigation of stages, pass examinations and gain certificates (Peterson 2016).

While, the *supply* of formal education was essentially determined by the colonial state and missionary societies, African *demand* for education depended on a careful cost-benefit analysis in which African families and political leaders weighed the opportunity costs and returns to education (Cogneau and Moradi 2014). The new set of socio-economic and political institutions implemented by European colonial regimes affected African perceptions of the benefits associated with formal education and adherence to the Christian church (Frankema 2012). Mission schooling, especially by males, became seen as one method of adjusting to the new colonial realities in which literacy skills and Christian adherence offered visible social advantages (Ekechi 1971). Formal education was not only linked to new employment opportunities and social mobility (Wantchekon et al. 2015) but also promised a significant skill premium for African men in the colonial wage economy (Frankema and Van Waijenburg 2012). Especially in the major cities, where white-collar work for the colonial administration, commercial enterprises and mission schools and hospitals concentrated, the socio-economic benefits attached to mission schooling and command of the colonial masters' language and religion was substantial (Meier zu Selhausen et al. 2018).

Figure 2 illustrates the primary-school enrolment rates, carefully reconstructed by Frankema (2012), of 41 African countries in 1938, subdivided into British (black), French (dark-grey) and other-ruled African territories[9] (light grey). It shows that British colonies had comparatively higher enrollment rates than recorded in the French and other colonial territories. Seven out of the nine colonies with enrollment rates larger than 20 percent were under British mandate, while among colonies with enrollment rates below 10 percent the majority was French, Portuguese or Belgian-ruled. The average unweighted enrolment rate of 19 percent in British Africa was close to the 15

[9] Includes independent Liberia and Ethiopia.

percent in the Belgian colonial empire[10] but markedly higher than in the French (6 percent), or the Portuguese (2 percent).

Those different policies towards missionary schools in British versus French-mandated Africa also affected long-run educational and religious outcomes. Cogneau and Moradi (2014) exploit the partition of German Togoland after World War I, as natural experiment, to test the impact of British and French educational policies. When the French on their side of the new colonial border restricted missionary schools, literacy and Christian beliefs started to diverge at the border between the parts of Togoland under British and French control as early as in the 1920s. In a similar vein, Dupraz (2019) exploits the partition of German Cameroon post-World War I between France and Britain, as well as its post-independence reunification, to investigate the causal effect of French vs. British educational policies. Using border discontinuity analysis, he finds that having been colonized by the British rather than the French had a positive effect on the education of cohorts that reached school age after partition. Does this prove that the British 'outsourcing' of education to missionary schools was a much more effective policy to develop mass-education?

Figure 2: Gross primary-school enrolment rates (age 5-14), 1938



Source: Derived from Frankema (2012).
Notes: Enrollment rates sub-divided in British (black), French (dark grey), and other (light grey) African colonies.

[10] There were stark differences within Belgian territories. While gross primary school enrolment rates in Belgian Congo (DRC) at 23 percent, much higher than the average British African enrollment, in Ruanda-Urundi enrolment was only 7 percent in 1938.

Frankema (2012) as well as Cogneau and Moradi (2014) caution that attributing differences in educational development to the identity of the colonizer alone is misleading, as it neglects the existence of local (geographical, institutional, ecological) conditions and African agency in the educational diffusion process. School enrollment, after all, was the outcome of *supply* and *demand* for education. Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium colonized African territories with different social and economic conditions, which in turn affected both local educational *supply* and *demand*. In this respect, Britain had acquired territories that had much more favorable conditions (Frankema 2012). In other words, we face "a problem of sample selection" (Dupraz 2019).

For example, regions colonized by Britain were on average richer and mostly lay outside the Muslim heartlands that rejected Christian/Western teachings (Frankema, 2012). The bottom-ten countries in terms of enrollment, both in 1938 (Figure 2) and 1960 (Figure 3), all had sizeable Muslim populations. In the 14 Islamic core countries, including Nigeria, the average primary-school enrolment rate was about 3 percent in 1938 versus 10 percent in colonies without substantial Muslim populations. The French just happened to control most Muslim core countries. Conversely, French colonies *outside* the Muslim core areas, such as Madagascar and Cameroon with extensive missionary investment (Figure 7), achieved enrollment rates comparable to British East Africa (Figure 2). Within West Africa, Britain faced similar regional constraints to mass-education as France. The 4 British West African colonies with average enrollment of less than 6 percent, did not produce higher rates than the 14 French West African colonies (5 percent) in 1938. Also, outside the overwhelmingly Christian Colony of Freetown, with the highest level of African school enrollment for most of the 19th century, mission schooling did not make any headway into the Muslim dominated hinterlands of Sierra Leone.

Muslim hostility towards Christian proselytization and education affected colonial policies, and restricted those to the southern/coastal areas, outside the Muslim heartlands. In Northern Nigeria and Northern Ghana, with sizeable Muslim populations, British governors prohibited the expansion of missionary schooling for a long time, fearing the destabilization of indirect rule through Muslim chiefs (Ayandele 1966; Cogneau and Moradi 2014). Quranic schools catered mainly for spiritual purposes of offspring from parents of higher social standing, focusing on reciting the Quran in Arabic, not with the intention of acquiring literacy skills and knowledge of the metropolitan language (Reichmuth 1993). Quranic schools thus lacked the comparative social

benefits associated with Christian or secular schools and were mostly not government-subsidized, therefore spreading significantly slower. In Uganda, for example, Muslim education did not qualify for government posts, and thus Muslims became to dominate trade instead (Summers 2016, 321). Also, Ethiopia proved no "fertile" ground for the expansion of mission schools because of the population's widespread local adherence to the ancient Coptic Church and the Islam, which severely limited local demand for Christian/Western education (Johnson 1967).

Overall, British Africa appeared to possess more favorable conditions for the expansion of mass-education than non-British Africa. Frankema (2012) has shown that British Africa was facing comparatively less severe malaria ecologies, which allowed European missionaries to survive and increasingly train native missionaries and teachers (Jedwab et al. 2018). British Africa also on average had higher indigenous population densities and controlled those regions with higher potential for trade and agricultural commercialization where the demand and resources for formal schooling were higher. Jedwab et al. (2018) confirm that regions with higher African incomes, proxied by cash crop production, mining activities, and urbanization, witnessed relatively more missionary expansion in colonial Ghana.

Figure 3: Gross primary-school enrolment rates (age 5-14), 1960



Source: Derived from Frankema (2012).
Notes: Enrollment rates sub-divided in British **(**black), French (dark grey), and other (light grey) African colonies.

Post-World War II, state schools replaced mission schools in British Africa. The French colonial state increased its educational spending and increasingly recruited African teachers (Dupraz 2019), partly due to growing African demands for higher quality education and partly in preparation for decolonization (White 1996). Equally, the colonial government in Belgian Africa increased its education budget and included also Protestant mission schools from 1954 onwards (Frankema 2013; Juif 2019). Consequently, school enrollment in French colonies converged towards British African levels. Dupraz (2019) shows that the British advantage disappeared in Cameroon once the French side increased its educational investments. Figure 3 shows that in 1960, on the eve of independence, African primary school enrollment had doubled on average relative to 1938 (Figure 2). Despite considerable convergence of primary-school enrollment between British and non-British African territories the British head start did not disappear entirely: 29 percent vs. 19 percent in the French former colonies, 16 percent in Portuguese Africa. Only the two Belgian dependencies had achieved an average comparable British rate of 30 percent. The primary-school enrolment gap between Muslim vs non-Muslim core countries however widened to 10 percent versus 31 percent (Figure 3).

Secondary school enrollment, despite increased African demand, was only 1-2 percent in tropical colonies (Iliffe 2007, 230). Colonial reluctance to build a well-educated African elite meant that (mission) schools rarely taught curricula beyond basic levels. Secondary schools were thus only open to a narrow elite who then accessed occupations within the colonial bureaucracy and missionary movement (Meier zu Selhausen et al. 2018).

4. Mission Education and Gender Inequality

Access to education was not only unevenly distributed between and within African colonies but also became increasingly gender unequal in both levels and nature. One way to trace gender-specific literacy attainment over the course of the colonial era is to backcast men's and women's literacy by their year of birth from post-colonial censuses (De Haas and Frankema 2018; Baten et al. 2019). Figure 4 charts the literacy gap between adult men and women born over the colonial era in five selected African countries, drawn from modern population censuses. The literacy gender

gap is the difference between the share of literate males and females by birth year (i.e. 5-year aggregate).

Figure 4 shows that women's access to formal (mission) schooling in those countries, relative to men, became increasingly uneven for those born during the colonial era. The gender gap in literacy attainment increased over the colonial era, peaking in the 1940s. Thus, during the era of missionary school expansion women's education attainment fell behind men. Subsequently, the post-1950s birth cohorts show major gains toward gender equality in literacy, which coincided with the shift toward public education provided by late-colonial states in preparation for independence and especially by modern African states, taking-over from mission schools. The declining literacy gap attests that women's education benefitted from this institutional change. In Ethiopia, never colonized (for extended periods) and with ancient roots in Christian Orthodoxy male and female demand for Christian/Western education was limited (see Figure 2). Hence, the Ethiopian educational gender gap remained comparatively modest during the first half of the 20th century. Also, Baten et al. (2019) using years of education from available censuses across Africa show that during the first half of the 20th century for every year of (mission) education gained by the total adult population, the male-female gap grew by one additional year of schooling. This pattern, like the literacy gender gap shown, then breaks down towards the late colonial era with the rapid expansion and secularization of education, through the colonial government and especially through the modern African state (Simson 2018). From a historical perspective it is therefore surprising that early 20th Protestant missions have been related to positive long-term effects on African women's educational attainment in the year 2005 (Nunn 2014).

Figure 4: Gender literacy gap, 1895-1965 birth cohorts



Source: Merged population censuses from Ethiopia (1984, 1994, 2007), Ghana (1984), Senegal (1988, 2002), Uganda (1991, 2002) and Zambia (1990, 2000), accessed via IPUMS.
Notes: Backward extrapolation of census data by 5-year birth cohort measures individuals' literacy at the time of census-taking based on their year of birth. Although, literacy can be acquired later in life, it is assumed that people attained literacy early in life through formal education. Backcasting may overstate schooling for the early period due to survivorship bias and age exaggeration by the elder generations. The sample includes men and women of age 20-99.

Unequal access to primary education over the colonial era, along lines of gender, consequently resulted in unequal levels of human capital between men and women. Figure 5 displays the male-to-female ratio in primary school enrollment across 27 African countries during the early 1960s, on the eve of independence. It shows that South Africa was the only country where an equal number of girls and boys attended primary schools, while in three out of five countries, boys remained at least twice as often represented than girls in primary schools. Among those, 11 countries with gender ratios below two, the majority used to be British-ruled, located outside the Muslim heartlands.[11] Figures 2 and 3 already revealed that primary school enrollment was generally higher in those countries. According to Figure 5 enrollment was then more equally shared between the sexes in former British-ruled colonies. Also, the enrolment of girls in Islamic schools remained extremely low (Reichmuth 1993). However, linking the practice of Islam to

[11] Except for Northern Nigeria.

girls' particularly unequal access in primary education hides the fact that among those 16 African countries in which boys were at least twice as likely to receive primary education relative to girls (i.e. ratio of 2-6), half of them had sizeable Christian populations. An alternative explanation may rather lie in the larger Protestant mission presence in British Africa, that was restricted in French, Portuguese and Belgian colonies. Protestant missions followed the belief that personal salvation came from being able to read the Bible (i.e. *sola scriptura*), thus increasing incentives for both male and female basic education for baptism. Although Catholics also sought converts through education, compared to Protestant translations, the Catholic missions placed a lower priority on the production of vernacular scriptures (Stanley 2018, 59).[12] This is corroborated by Nunn (2014), who finds that Protestant main-mission presence during the early colonial era is especially beneficial for present-day education of women relative to men. In contrast, he documents that exposure to Catholic missions has no long-run impact on female education but a large positive impact on male education today. In a similar vein, Montgomery (2017) finds that the historical presence of Catholic missions in early colonial Tanzania negatively affects the gender gap in education today.

Figure 5: Male to female primary school enrollment ratio, c. 1963



Source: UNESCO (1966), 434-435.
Notes: Enrollment rates sub-divided in former British **(**black), French (dark grey), and other-ruled (light grey) colonies. Estimates vary in their year of reporting between 1960-1964. 1 = equal enrollment between the sexes.

[12] By the 1850s, some parts of the Bible had been translated into 27 African languages. In 1904, full or partial biblical printed translations existed in 112 African languages (Johnson 1969).

Secondary schools catered mainly to boys. In 1942, only 13 percent of the 11,500 enrolled in the 43 colonial recognized secondary schools in British West Africa were girls (O'Connor 1964). Similarly, in 1946, the share of girls in the Belgian Congo (DRC) was 9 percent and at independence, no woman was among the hundreds of Congolese with secondary school diplomas (Juif 2019). Figure 6 shows that on the eve of independence secondary school enrollment was even more skewed towards men. Whereas males were on average twice (2.1) as often represented in primary schools (Figure 5) in 1963, an average male-to-female ratio of 4.6 in secondary education indicates that only one in five students were in fact female. While seven out of the least unequal countries were former British colonies, ratios appear particularly uneven in the three previously Belgian and French West African dependencies. Gender unequal access to tertiary education was even more pronounced with about one in 10 students enrolled being female in 1963.

Figure 6: Male to female secondary school enrollment ratio, c. 1963



Source: UNESCO (1966, 438-439).
Notes: Enrollment rates sub-divided in former British **(**black), French (dark grey), and other-ruled (light grey) colonies. Estimates vary in their year of reporting between 1962-1964. 1 = equal enrollment between the sexes.

Not only was access to education unequally shared between the sexes but also the nature of the school curriculum was markedly different for boys and girls (Musisi 1992; Leach 2008). Missionaries disapproved of co-educational schools. Boys, in addition to literacy, arithmetic and Bible study, learned vocational skills such as carpentry and masonry that prepared them better for

wage employment (Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf 2019). In contrast, girls' mission schools, besides basic literacy and numeracy emphasized domestic skills with the goal of marriage and motherhood, that inclined African gender roles to imitate late Victorian, concepts of masculinity and femininity (Musisi 1992). This often resulted into much smaller social roles than women had held in pre-colonial African societies. Africans actively expressed their frustration of the gender imbalance in the quality of schooling to the mission and the colonial government (Hanson 2010, 161-2; De Haas and Frankema 2018).[13]

Consequently, women became practically excluded from employment in the colonial wage labor market, which in turn affected parents' demand for their daughters' education in the absence of any visible social and economic advantages. Even among the upper layer of Christian-educated Africans, women were largely barred from formal participation in the urban colonial economy of British Africa (Meier zu Selhausen 2014; Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf 2019). As a result, women's work remained mainly domestic or informal. Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf (2016, 2019) have shown that on average less than one in ten women who married in Anglican churches were employed in the formal colonial economy by 1930, compared to two in three of their husbands. In the absence of opportunities for women's formal work outside the home during the early colonial era, it appears that literacy, creating some male social mobility (Wantchekon et al 2015; Meier zu Selhausen et al. 2018), rather functioned as a means of women's marriage mobility. Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf (2019) have found that in the capital cities of Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Uganda, literate Anglican female converts had a greater likelihood to marry Anglican elite men prior to 1920s. Ambiguously, although the domestic focus of mission schools' curriculum did its best to keep women outside the colonial wage economy, mission schools and hospitals became the first and exclusive niches for women's formal employment as teachers and nurses/midwives, until the late 1940s when the civil service became increasingly feminized (Meier zu Selhausen 2014; Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf 2019).

[13] Africans also voiced their frustration with the quality of mission schools that placed religious instruction at the forefront rather than imparting formal skills that would have qualified for work in the formal colonial economy (Berman 1974).

5. The Africanization of the Mission

The term "missionaries" may evoke the image of an organization run by European clergymen serving in remote tropical Africa. Impressions nurtured by the inspiring missionary rhetoric and hyperbolic biographies of European missionaries in 19th and early 20th century Africa. These sensationalized images were often purposefully generated, motivated by mission committees need for propagandist accounts to elicit funding from their metropolitan readers (Pietz 1999; Maxwell 2015) as well as to distract from the distressing European mortality rates across 19th century equatorial Africa (Öberg and Rönnbäck 2016; Jedwab et al. 2018). Missionary expansion can also be more easily traced with reference to Western efforts because of their generally, superior documentation in mission atlases and missionary biographies (Fahs 1925; Jedwab et al. 2018). The use of geographic locations of Western residence mission stations (Nunn 2010, 2014; Cagé and Rueda 2016, 2019) or the number of Western missionaries (Woodberry 2004; Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Woodberry 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2014), as key measures of missionary influence by studies investigating missions' long-term effects on present-day African education (see Section 6), continues to foster the widespread impression of the beneficial impact of Western missionaries.

Western missionaries were undoubtedly crucial for initial conversion efforts, strategy and set-up of formal education in early colonial Africa. However, it's hard to imagine how a few thousand Western missionaries could have evangelized 140 million (38 percent) Africans by 1970. In reality, the principal agents of Christian and educational expansion were African missionaries and teachers. While spreading the gospel as catechists, clergymen and teachers in schools and churches, as well as medical assistants and nurses in mission hospitals, Africans also conceived the missionary movement as a vehicle of their own occupational mobility (Meier zu Selhausen et al. 2018). Western missionaries were typically responsible for exploring and mapping the territories they were sent to, performing translation work, learning the new language(s) from indigenous teachers, organizing the construction of mission churches and schools, as well as the training of African missionaries and teachers (Maxwell 2016, 268). There were various strategic motivations for this.

Firstly, Africans naturally acquired immunity to malaria (as children) and thus suffered much lower mortality (as adults) in tropical Africa compared to European missionaries (Jedwab et al.

2018). The investment into the training of African missionaries and teachers thus reduced the (sunk) costs (i.e. training and travel costs) resulting from high European mortality in the tropics. The introduction of quinine therapy then extended European survival significantly, which further accelerated the training of a native African clergy.

Secondly, given the limited financial capacity of missionary societies, the contribution of African teachers and missionaries was a requirement for the expansion of missionary education as financially it was too expensive to employ more European missionaries and teachers. European teacher salaries consumed most of mission societies' education budgets (Frankema 2012) and their training, travel costs to Africa, as well as medical and equipment needs, further added to their costs (Jedwab et al. 2018). African missionaries and teachers were comparatively more cost-efficient and mostly paid through local contributions (Frankema 2012). Their lower malaria-mortality meant that the investment into their training did not represent a sunk cost.

Thirdly, African staff were more effective in their conversion efforts through communicating the gospel in African vernacular languages (Pirouet 1974; Frankema 2012). African missionaries were intimately involved in making Christian scriptures, hymn books, and catechisms more widely accessible for the masses through their translation into African languages. Western missionaries quickly realized that African expertise was crucial to ensure that the Christian concepts were properly conveyed in local terms (Maxwell 2016, 275-6). Equipped with vernacular catechism or the Bible and hymnbooks in local language, African missionaries were arguably also less perceived by the local population as spearheads of colonialism. Therefore, the *Africanization* of the mission became a pre-requisite for rising enrolment rates (Spitz 1924, 372).

Table 2: Foreign and local missionary staff in Africa, c. 1908

	Ordained missionaries			Un-ordained mission staff			Mission stations
	Western	African	Ratio	Western	African	Ratio	Main & Out-stations
Protestant (1908)	1,566	1,552	0.99	2,987	24,933	8.35	12,246
Protestant (1908)*	917	1,151	1.26	2,964	16,654	5.62	7,048
Catholic (1911)	2,078	94	0.05	3,339	8,595	2.52	2,957
Catholic (1911)#	1,691	90	0.05	1,307	8,196	6.27	2,383

Source: Calculated from Dennis, Beach and Fahs (1911, 93-96), *World Atlas of Christian Missions*, New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. Streit (1913, 101-102). *Atlas Hierarchicus*, Paderbornae: Sumptibus Typographiae Bonifacianae.
Notes: * Excluding South Africa. # Excluding Southern Africa.

Table 2 reports the number of European and African ordained and un-ordained staff of Protestant and Catholic missionary societies present in Africa at the beginning of the 20th century. It shows that while Protestant missionary societies ordained an equal number of European and African missionaries as early as 1908[14], Catholic ratios were much more skewed, following a stricter racial hierarchy (Column 3). Africans made up only one out of 20 Catholic ordained recruitments in 1911. Catholic celibacy possibly enabled more young European priests to run Catholic mission stations and schools in rural areas compared to Protestant missionaries who often travelled with their wives and families (Oliver 1952, 242), which increased costs. The significantly higher Protestant Western-to-African ratio may also reflect Protestant missions' earlier 19th century expansion on the African continent. The Roman Catholic Church, backed by the Vatican, only renewed their missionary efforts post-1860s. Thus, by 1908 Protestant missionaries were at the forefront and had established four times as many missions in Africa as their Catholic contenders (column 7).

Table 2 also shows that for every Protestant Western un-ordained mission worker (e.g. teachers, evangelists, catechists) there were around eight Africans, compared to a Catholic African-to-European ratio of 2.5 (Column 6). Outside southern Africa, Catholic missions however relied more on African staff (Row 4). Although Catholic mission societies relied significantly more on European missionaries than their Protestant competitors, the lion's share of total (ordained plus un-ordained) missionary agents remained nevertheless African. Table 2 makes it clear: already during the early colonial era, the numbers of indigenous workers, including teachers, had already grown to vastly outnumber European workers.

Figure 7 shows the number of African versus Western mission staff in the ten most important Protestant mission fields in Africa in 1904. Madagascar, the most active Protestant mission field at that time, was one of the exceptions in which the French permitted missionary infiltration (Isichei 1995, 150-1; Wietzke 2015).[15] It becomes clear that the great majority of mission staff were African. In Uganda for instance, 2,500 African teachers and evangelists ran 170 Protestant mission schools and 162 mission stations as early as 1904, whereas European missionaries and teachers constituted barely 3 percent of the total mission workforce (Meier zu Selhausen et al.

[14] Outside South Africa (Row 2), with a larger European presence, Protestant African ordained staff even outnumbered European.
[15] Also, Cameroon and Benin received missions.

2018).[16] Furthermore, in the Belgian Congo, with allegedly the highest numbers of European missionaries in tropical Africa,[17] Frankema (2013) has shown that between 1908 and 1957 the number of Western missionaries increased by a factor of 14, while primary school enrollment simultaneously rose by a factor of 37. Such a remarkable increase was only possible due to the rapidly growing involvement of Congolese missionaries and teachers.

Figure 7: European and African Protestant missionary staff, 1904



Source: Calculated from Dwight (1905). Catholic missions have reported missionary staff per regions, not on the country level (Krose 1908).

Africa's Christianization and development of mass-education has thus commonly been narrated from a Eurocentric perspective that ascribes undue agency to Western missionary efforts, overshadowing the vital contribution of native Africans in pushing the Christian and educational frontier (Maxwell 2016, 263). The widespread view that mission Christianity and formal education in colonial Africa was diffused from an (imperial) European center into a passive Africa, appears to be grossly misleading. The presence of foreign missionaries was never a sufficient condition for mass-conversion, nor-education (Hastings 1994, 463). Instead, "Africans had to embrace the missionary zeal and make it theirs." (Frankema 2012, 352).

[16] This ratio remained relatively stable. Frankema (2012) counted that in 1938 of the 8,456 primary school teachers in Uganda, only 3 percent (285) were Europeans.

[17] Frankema (2013) counts for the Belgian Congo 500 foreign missionaries in 1908, while by 1938 and 1950 the number of foreign missionaries had rapidly grown to 3,732 and 5,336 respectively.

6. Historical Missionary Legacies

Do historical missionary activities and associated human capital investments continue to affect African development outcomes one century later? A recent, yet striking surge of studies in economics and economic history has set out to investigate the long-term effects of early 20th century European missionary activities on present-day African development. Since 2010, there are close to 50 studies that link the location of Western residence mission stations in Africa, reported in mission atlases and maps in one particular year, to contemporary African development outcomes.[18] Education is the most common and most plausible outcome studied. Other studies link a density measure based on the number of Western missionaries per area or population to present-day Africa development.

This literature finds strong path-dependency. Historical exposure to European main mission stations and European missionaries one century ago has been positively associated with long-term educational outcomes by several studies (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2014; Nunn 2014; Cagé and Rueda 2016; Baten and Cappelli 2017; Alesina et al. 2019).[19] Exposure to religious competition between Protestant and Catholic missionaries generated particularly positive long-term effects on African human capital (Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Larreguy and Schmidt-Padilla 2017). However, did early mission education indeed pave the way for contemporary generations to attain higher years of schooling, social mobility, and incomes, or are there unobservables that could partly explain those long-term correlations?

The partial availability of locations of only European-run main missions from maps and missionary atlases can create a pitfall for researchers in the absence of detailed source critique. Firstly, what do we learn from purely Western missionary long-term effects, representing the minority of total missionaries in Africa (see Section 5)? Jedwab et al. (2018) have uncovered that official mission atlases and maps, commonly used by most persistence studies, essentially omit the vast majority (ca. 90 percent) of total missions. Fahs (1925) already criticized that mission atlases and maps only report missions of European residency but ignore the lions' share of missions

[18] See Jedwab et al. (2018) for a meta-analysis of this extensive literature.
[19] One exception represents Wietzke (2015) who finds no statistically significant long-term effect of early-colonial missions in Madagascar on contemporary education and economic development outcomes.

and schools run by African missionaries and teachers. The data contained in mission atlases thus reflect the implicit data priorities of European missionary societies.

Secondly, this measurement bias is further accentuated by the fact that European (and main) mission locations were the earliest missions that opened in the most developed and connected areas (Jedwab et al. 2018). Thus, missionaries did not assign themselves randomly across the continent but systematically chose conducive fields. Based on ecclesiastical censuses contained in the British Blue Books, Jedwab et al. (2018) carefully reconstruct *all* missions (i.e. main and out-stations, with and without school) in Ghana for the period 1751-1932. They show that for the various mission denominations in Ghana costs and benefits mattered for choosing where to establish their churches and schools. Locational determinants were not constant over time but *dynamic*. They interacted with local conditions (i.e. geography, institutions), African incomes, global medical innovations (e.g. quinine), investments into transport infrastructure (railroad, roads) and the timing of colonial conquest. Economically more developed localities (e.g. mining towns and cash crop production areas) with potentially greater demand for mission schooling subsequently adopted Christianity at an earlier date. For both Ghana and Africa, Jedwab et al. (2018) demonstrate that the use of relevant and properly timed historical controls is crucial to reduce endogeneity bias from (main) mission locational choices.[20] They also show that missionary long-term effects on human capital, culture and economic development outcomes become considerably weaker when controlling for factors that explain mission locational choices over time. In a similar vein, Fourie and Swanepoel (2015) show that indigenous residents of districts with Christian missions in 1849 have on average higher educational attainment about 150 years later. But, educational persistence disappears once they account for early selection into mission locations. This suggests that location-specific omitted variables may affect both the choice of missionary placement and long-term effects.

What is clear is that paying attention to the *dynamic* determinants and *African agency* in the expansion of Christian missions (i.e. the inclusion of both main and out-stations) is critical. This will minimize the risk of grossly overestimating missions' long-term effects, which otherwise may lead to overly optimistic conclusions of the legacy of missions on current African education. More

[20] For instance, despite overwhelming evidence of Muslim resistance against Christian schooling efforts (Frankema 2012), most mission legacy studies entirely neglect the role of Islam in their choice of control variables. Other studies control for railroads networks, although they had not even been built by the time of nineteenth century European mission settlement.

work is also required not only to document potential legacies but to better understand the actual benefits of mission schooling *during* the colonial era as well as the *mechanisms* through which missionary activity then persisted over time.

Early mission schooling did not only influence human capital formation but also affected long-term African inter-generational social mobility and health outcomes. Wantchekon et al. (2015), based on retrospective interviews from the descendants of those whose (grand)parents attended the first regional schools in colonial Benin, investigates the long-term effects of education on the social mobility and living standards across generations and compares those to near-by control groups where no schools had yet been set-up. They document significant higher levels of political activism and social mobility for the first generation of students of mission schools, as well as their descendants. Also, Alesina et al. (2019) show that the main missions in colonial Africa correlate strongly with contemporary intergenerational mobility in educational attainment. For colonial Uganda, Meier zu Selhausen et al. (2018) document that contrary to the widespread belief that indirect rule perpetuated the power of African political elites (Mamdani 1996), a remarkably fluid, colonial labor economy undermined chiefs' previous social advantages. Sons of chiefs gradually lost their previous high social-status monopoly to an upwardly mobile, commercially orientated, and mission-educated class of Protestant Ugandans (e.g. clerks, interpreters, teachers). On that path, the colonial administration as well as mission schools and churches functioned as key steps on the ladder to social mobility.

Missionary educational investments in colonial Africa have also been shown to persistently affect post-independence political elite-formation. Ricart-Huguet (2019) shows that the uneven supply of primary education across colonial African districts explains why some districts are more represented among modern African governments than others. Post-independence political elites were more likely to forge later ministerial careers through public education in French colonies compared to mission education in British colonies. Again, through retrospective interviews Wantchekon (2016) follows the first generation of students and their unschooled counterparts, as well as their descendants for two generations, after the establishment of colonial and missionary schools in Benin. He finds evidence of upward mobility across generations on education. However, the evidence suggests that while the second generation moved up, the third generation moved down from their parents' income levels, possibly highlighting decreasing returns to education during the post-colonial era. This chimes with the observation made by Pritchett (2001) who did not find any

effect of post-independence major expansion of education on GDP per capita, which largely stagnated or declined in Africa between 1970s and 1990s, tempting him to wonder, "where has all the education gone?".

For French West Africa, Huillery (2009) examines the long-term impact of colonial public investments in schools and health clinics. Due to the limited number of Christian missions in French West Africa, she studies the role of investments into education and health by the colonial state during the early colonial era (1910-1928). She uncovers a sizable legacy of colonial human capital investments on long-term African schooling and health outcomes. The addition of one more teacher (doctor) per 100,000 inhabitants during the colonial era translates to one additional percentage point of school enrollment and dropping children's stunting to about 0.5 points in the 1990s. The evidence on the benefits of education for health outcomes is less clear. Using 18,000 patient admissions from one of the earliest mission hospitals in East Africa, Doyle et al. (2019) find that Christian conversion was associated with superior health outcomes and lower incidence of skin and sexually-transmitted disease diagnoses, but numeracy per se, one proxy for education, did not predict better health outcomes. In a similar vein, Cagé and Rueda (2019) uncover that despite an overall positive impact of colonial missionary exposure on HIV infections in Africa, proximity to historical missionary health facilities decreases the likelihood of HIV due to allegedly safer sexual behavior.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has offered a comparative analysis of the evolution and nature of mass-education in colonial Africa. It has emphasized the importance of different *local* social and economic conditions - not colonial policies toward schooling per se - that deeply affected both supply and (gendered) African demand for formal education. The chapter has highlighted the unique role of Christian missions in the development of African systems of mass-education. For missions to expand beyond their limited financial and personnel capacity the *Africanization* of the mission and local African contributions (i.e. school fees and taxes) were key. Recent studies that assess missionary's impacts on African long-term development that place their main focus on measures of foreign missions and personnel has overlooked those historical realities. Although Western missionary efforts in

Africa were driven by global competition for new church members, their success clearly depended on *local conditions* and *agency*.

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RELIGION, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT: *'Religion' and 'Education' are inseparable aspects in every human society where they are found. Education has most often been considered as the backbone of development. Similarly, many development theorists have expounded the contributions of religion toward development. The responsibility that religions share in human societies are realised in different aspects of national life. Of particular concern is religions' role in education toward national development. This work is discussed from the dimensions of the contributions of Christianity and Islam in education in Ghana. Generally, education is understood to mean to train or mould. In this study, it implies the art of learning, literacy and the process of acquiring knowledge. In the quest to advance the livelihood of members of society through education, it has become important to expatiate the task of religion in the development of education. This is to help stamp out the reluctance to consider the influence of religion in sustainable and authentic human and national development. This paper is primarily purposed to outline the contributions of religion and education to national development in Ghana. The quest for an all-inclusive development model of Ghana and other developing nations, therefore, calls for an insight into the role and responsibilities of religion toward education. In the case of Ghana, like other nations, the impact of religion on (formal) education has immensely ensured the development of individual lives, communities and traditional institutions since the 19th century. A study with an aim such as this will help promote better relationship among states and religious groups.*

KEYWORDS: Religion, Education, National Development, Contributions, Historical Perspective

INTRODUCTION

Religions immensely contribute to the development of every nation within which it is found. Religion is no panacea, but aspects of it can complement as well as motivate development. Though it can undermine and obstruct, the avenues by which religion influences development activities in different aspects of national life are haunting in their complexity.[1] Religion may serve as an advocacy for funding, innovation, education, empowerment, social movement and service delivery.[2]

In Ghana, like in other nations, religion and education are inseparable from each other. Each has existed to the benefit of the other since the 16th century. A study of the development of

[1] S. Alkire, "Religion and Development". In Clark, David A., *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), pp.502–510.
[2] *Ibid.*

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education in Ghana cannot proceed without recognising the pioneering efforts of missionaries (Christian and Muslim) in formal education which initially brought the gates of higher learning to the people along the coast and in the savannah.[3] However, before this period (the coming of early European traders and Islam to the gold coast), indigenous religion ensured the impartation of knowledge through ceremonial and informal means established by the society. This is to say that the provision of education (teaching or learning) is not a recent phenomenon in Africa and Ghana, for that matter.

Education took a different dimension after the European advent on Gold Coast soil (Ghana) in the 16th century to the middle of the 20th century. Understood as the wealth of knowledge acquired by an individual after studying particular subject matters or experiencing life lessons that provide an understanding of something, education generally requires instruction of some sort from an individual or composed literature. The most common form of education (formal education) known in Ghana result from years of schooling that incorporates studies of a variety of subjects. The act of imparting or acquiring general knowledge, developing the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally of preparing oneself or others intellectually for mature life is a basic component for the development of every nation.

The development of Ghana and Africa, at large, calls for an insight into the impact of religion on modern education. Appraising the impact of religion on formal education to the development of Ghana is central to this paper and an important aspect worth discussing. Development exponents and agencies time and again refer to wars of religions and their attendant consequences as reasons for a total neglect of religion as partners in development. Therefore in discussing issues pertaining to sustainable human and national development, there is a disinclination to consider the power of religion. Their main grounds for this come from their perceived intolerance among religious faithfuls. By going through the text readers will be able to know the concepts of religion and education, their purpose and contributions to national development.

Religion, State and Development

Defining religion is a difficult task and attempts towards that have drawn diverse views from scholars across the globe. Religion is the strongest element in traditional background, and exerts probably the greatest influence upon the thinking and living of the people concerned.[4] In simple terms, religion refers to the beliefs and practices based on a conception of the sacred.[5] Such knowledge to distinguish the sacred from the profane is the essence of all religions. Religion is core to the diverse interactions existing between humans in almost every society. Aylward Shorter,[6] a lecturer in African Studies at the Catholic Higher Institute, writes that religion is a fundamental mode of cultural behaviour; it is and must be part of the interpretation of life that a culture offers. Shorter considers religion as a cultural system

[3] R. B. Bening, *University for Development Studies in the History of Higher Education in Ghana* (Ghana: Public Institutions of Higher Education in Ghana, 2005), p.15.
[4] J. S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (London: Clays Ltd., 1969), p.1.
[5] E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1965).
[6] A. Shorter, *Toward a Theology of Inculturation* (London: Cassell Publishers Ltd, 1999), p.40.

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which acts upon cultural data and within the sphere of culture.[7] Clifford Geertz[8] considers religion as a system of symbols which acts to establish, powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.[9] In this sense, religion must be understood as an aspect purposed to influence human life. Central to the institution of religion are beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and religious officants.[10]

The term 'development' refers to the act or process of growing or causing something to grow or become larger. Thus, the state of being created or made more advanced. The word is used in this paper to mean the process of growth and differentiation, expansion and progress.[11] Understood this way, national development comes to mean the process of transformation and growth that is based on complex cultural, social and environmental factors and their interactions within a state. This implies the ability of a nation to improve the lives of its citizens. Measures of improvement may be material, such as an increase in the gross domestic product, or social, such as literacy rates and availability of health care.

All religions, irrespective of the fulcrum of its belief imply that humans do not and cannot stand alone, and that they are vitally related with and even dependent on powers in nature external to themself.[12] There are a number of religious institutions in Ghana. Most people in the Ghana are associated with either one or another of the world's major religions. However, conversion form one religion to another is a common phenomenon. Religious adherents in Ghana include Christians, Muslims, traditionalists, Buddhists, Hindus, and other eastern religious faithfuls. Although most people have some sort of religious affiliation, they are woefully ignorant as to the basic beliefs of their own religion.[13]

Religion-state relations in Ghana have for centuries been cordial. This has arisen out of the fact that in traditional African psychic no distinction is drawn between the sacred (spiritual) and the secular (physical), and for that matter religion and state.[14] Prior to the advent of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, and still in many Eastern countries, no distinction was made between worldly/secular authority and religious/spiritual authority.[15] It is expected of religious groups to take steps which are set to transform the state. For instance, the church, according to this position, must transform the values and morality of the state or society. This position does not call for the rejection of the world or the state nor does it call for the

[7] *Ibid*., p.41.

[8] C. Geertz was among the first social scientists to take religion seriously as an object of study in its own right. For him, it is primarily a system of symbols inherited culturally.

[9] C. Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System". In: Michael Banton (ed.) *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1996), p.4.

[10] J. S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (1969), p.1.

[11] The Family Word Finder (New York: The Reader' Digest association Inc., 1975).

[12] J. B. Knoss. *Man's Religions* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969), p.2.

[13] J. McDowell and D. Stewart, *Understanding Non-Christian Religion: Handbook of Today's Religions* (California: Here's Life Publishers, Inc., 1982), p.9.

[14] See: G. Parrinder, *Divine Kinship in West Africa*, No.:3: 1956, p.112.

[15] An essay on: "Church and State" (Available at: http://www.customtermpapers.org/customessay/politicsessay /churchandstate/532.html: 21/02/2015).

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identification of the church with the state in respect of values, morals and ethical principles. It calls on the church to transform the world by being what it is. John Vincent Taylor notes:

> The church as well is called to act as a leaven in society. A worshipping, disciplined community, dedicated to Christ's way and honestly attempting to realize his standards in its corporate life, is bound to affect the whole climate of the people among whom it is placed. The church can serve the state best by illustrating in its own life the kind of life which is God's will for society as a whole.[16]

This role by the Church is in line with its prophetic responsibility as played during the Old Testament times by the prophets. In this sense, the positive bearing of the Christian faith upon the transformation of human society not only in the private domain of thought and feeling but also in the public domain[17] of law, government, economics and education requires emphasis. Through this involvement, the responsibility of the church (religion) in the area of state development is realised. Religion, therefore, is not supposed to remain aloof from national development if it is accepted that the institution (religion) is not for the individual but for the community as well.

The Concept of Education: Meaning, Scope and Purpose

Etymologically, the term 'Education' in the English language has been derived from two Latin words *educa*re (*educere*) and *educatum*. '*educare*' meaning to train or mould. It again means to bring up or to lead out, to draw out or propulsion from inward to outward. The term '*educatum'* denotes the act of teaching.[18] It throws light on the principles and practice of teaching. The term *educare* or *educere*[19] mainly indicates development of the latent faculties of the child. But the individual does not know these possibilities.[20] It is the educator or the teacher who can know these and take appropriate methods to develop those powers.

In Ghana, among the Akan, the term '*nimdeƐ'* which means 'knowledge' represents the search and concern for development through education. Education ('*nimdeƐ'* or knowledge) in the traditional sense represents a control and discipline of the behaviour of individuals. Therefore, education is the manifestation of perfection already in man. Rabindranath Tagore[21] has observed that the highest education is that which does not merely give us information but makes our life in harmony with all existence. This makes a human self-reliant and selfless.[22] It should develop in the body and soul of the pupil all the beauty and all the perfection he is capable of. Education is the creation of sound mind in a sound body. It develops human' faculty (mind) so that he may be able to enjoy the contemplation of supreme truth, goodness and beauty.

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[16] J. V. Taylor, *Christianity and Politics* (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1957), p.54.
[17] T. L. Paolo, *Political Engagement as an Ethical and Religious Question* (Tampere: Research Institute of the Lutheran Church in Finland, 1979), p.12.
[18] The Family Word Finder (New York: The Reader' Digest association Inc., 1975).
[19] http://teachereducatorselvi.blogspot.com/2015/02/meaning-and-definition-of-education.html (23/2/2015).
[20] N. R. Mikkili, "Value Education and Human Values: Analytical Views". In: *Educationia Confab,* Vol. 3, No. 7, July 2014.
[21] R. Singh and S. S. Rawat, "Rabindranath Tagore's Contribution in Education". *VSRD International Journal of Technical & Non-Technical Research*, Vol. 4, Issue 8: August 2013.
[22] R. Tagore, "Ideals of Education". *TheVisva-Bharati Quarterly* (April-July1929), pp.73-4.

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J. F. Herbert[23] describes education as the development of good moral character. Also, John Dewey[24] writes that education is not a preparation for life, rather it is the living. It is the process of living through a continuous reconstruction of experiences. It is the development of all those capacities in the individual which will enable him to control his environment and fulfil his possibilities. It is clear that education is the complete development of the individuality of the person so that he can make an original contribution to human life according to the best of his capacity.

The field of education is so vast and varied that to give a specific definition of education about which all educationists agree is very difficult. We see that some educationists have defined only one aspect of education whereas the others emphasize its other phases. The reason of this difference of opinions is that different educationists, most of whom are philosophers, have different views about the aim of life. According to Idealists, the aim of life is spiritual development. As such, they regard education as a spiritual process, which aims at bringing together the soul and the creator leading to self-realization. For the pragmatists, education is a process of social progress. As a result of this difference in the philosophy of life, different educationists define education differently.

The different meanings and definitions of education as given above lead us to the conclusion that education should have a comprehensive definition. Thus, education may be defined as a purposive, conscious or unconscious, psychological, sociological, scientific and philosophical process which brings about the development of the individual to the fullest extent and also the maximum development of society in such a way that both enjoy maximum happiness and prosperity. In short, education is the development of individual according to his needs and demands of society, of which he is an integral part.

The above observations by scholars highlight the following special features of education. Education is both unilateral as well as bi-polar in nature. It is a continuous process. It is development of particular aspects of human personality or a harmonious integrated growth. It is knowledge or experience and conducive for the good of the individual or the welfare of the society. It is a stabilizer of social order, conservator of culture, an instrument of change and social reconstruction.

Scope of Education

Generally, education may be formal or/and informal. Understanding the scope of education can be viewed from two perspectives. The first is the narrower perspective and the second, the broader perspective.

- **Education in the narrower sense:** In its narrow sense, school instruction is called education. In this process, the elders of society strive to attain predetermined aims during a specified time by providing pre-structured knowledge to children through set methods of teaching. The purpose is to achieve mental development of children entering school. To make the narrow meaning of education very clear, John Stuart

[23] http://teachereducatorselvi.blogspot.com/2015/02/meaning-and-definition-of-education.html ((23/2/2015); J. F. Herbert quoted by N. Ranjan Dash, *Philosophical Foundation of Education* (Utkal University: Vanivihar Bhubaneswar, 2009).

[24] J. Dewey, "Experience and Education, Freedom and Culture, Theory of Evaluation, and Essays" Volume 13:1938-39. In: Boydston, A. (ed.), *The Later Works, 1925-1953*. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois, 1938).

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Mill explains it as the culture which each generation purposefully gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to qualify them for at least keeping up and if possible for raising the level of improvement which has been attained. Education in the narrower sense is regarded as equivalent to instruction. It consists of the 'specific influences' consciously designed in a school or in a college or in an institution to bring in the development and growth of the child. The word school includes the whole machinery of education from Kindergarten to the University. The education of the child begins with his admission in the school and ends with his departure from the University. The amount of education received by the child is measured in terms of degrees and diplomas awarded to him. The school represents formal education as it imparts education directly and systematically. There is deliberate effort on the part of the educator to inculcate certain habits, skills, attitudes or influences in the learner, which are considered to be essential and useful to him/her. The school exists to provide a special environment for the formative period of human life.[25] School is a consciously designed institution, the sole concern of which is to educate the child. This special environment is essential to explain our complex society and civilization. Education, in the narrow sense, is also regarded as acquisition of knowledge. According to it, education is a process by which knowledge or information on a subject is acquired. But many sensible educationists have criticized this view. They argue that emphasis on the knowledge is likely to reduce all schools to mere knowledge-shops. The acquisition of knowledge is not the only or supreme aim of education, yet it is one of the important aims of education.

- **Education in the broader sense:** In its wider sense, education is the total development of the personality. In this sense, education consists of all those experiences, which affect the individual from birth till death. Thus, it is that process by which an individual freely develops his self according to his nature in a free and uncontrolled environment. It includes all the knowledge and experiences acquired during infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood or old age through any agency of education. In this way, education becomes a lifelong process of growth; it begins with the birth of a child and ends with his death. It is not limited to the classroom only; it is also not limited to a particular period of life. Thus, education becomes the sum-total of all experiences that a person receives either in the school or outside. Since individuals learn through their experiences which are acquired throughout his life, education does not merely become collection of some information.

Characteristics of Education

Though with different perspectives outlining its scope and purpose, the following features are common among all forms of education:

- Not Limited to knowledge imparted in schools (formal education). Education cannot be confined to the processes of giving knowledge to persons in schools only. Its programme goes on from birth till death.

[25] J. Dewey, "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry", Volume 12:1938, *The Later Works*, 1925-1953. (ed.) Boydston, A. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois, 1938).

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- Education as the development of individuals' innate power. It is a process of developing the native endowments of a individuals rather than forcing into their minds something from outside.

- Education as a dynamic process. Education is not static but an active process, which develops the individual according to changing situation and times.

- Education as a Tri-polar Process. It takes place in and through the society in which the teacher and the child both live. Thus, it is the society, which will determine the aims, contents and methods of teaching. In this way, the process of education contains three poles, namely: the teacher, the child and the society. These three factors actively cooperate in the efficient and successful working of the educational process.

- Education leads to (good) change. The impact of every education must lead to the positive development and betterment of the human lives which experience it.

Historical Overview of Education in Ghana

Education in Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) was mainly informal before the arrival of European settlers. Knowledge and competencies were transmitted orally and through apprenticeship. The arrival of European settlers during the 16th century brought new forms of learning; formal schools appeared, providing a book-based education.[26] Their audience was mainly made up of local elites (mulattos, sons of local chiefs and wealthy traders) and their presence was limited to the colonial forts, long confined to the coasts. The creation of the Gold Coast as a Colony in 1874 by Great Britain brought transformations in its educational system. With it came a growing number of mission (Wesleyan and the Basel) schools.[27] While the Wesleyan mission stayed on the coasts with English as main language, the Basel mission expanded deeper inland and used vernacular languages as the medium of proselytizing. With the support of the British government, missions flourished in a heavily decentralized system that left considerable room for pedagogical freedom. Missions remained the main provider of formal education until independence, while, under colonial rule, formal education remained the privilege of the few.[28]

With independence in 1957, universal education became an important political objective under the new government of Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah described education as the key to the future and announced a high level university education backed by a free universal basic education.[29] Therefore, in 1961, the Education Act (EA) introduced the principle of free and compulsory primary education and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology was established.[30] The fall of Nkrumah in 1966 was followed by stronger criticisms toward the expansion of education at the cost of quality. Despite the rapid increase

[26] See: K. Agbeti, *West African Church History* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] C. K. Graham, *The History of Education in Ghana: From the Earliest Time to the Declaration of Independance* (F. Cass, 1971), pp.181–185.
[29] K. Akyeampong, *Educational Expansion and Access in Ghana: A Review of 50 Years of Challenge and Progres*s (Centre for International Education, University of Sussex).
[30] C. K. Graham, The History of Education in Ghana: From The Earliest Time to the Declaration of Independance. (1971), pp.181–185.

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of school infrastructures, the enrolment slowly declined until 1973.[31] In 1974, however, education in Ghana saw attempts of reform based on reports made by committees instituted to investigate the decline in education.

The year 1987 marked the beginning of new series of reforms. The Rawlings government had gathered enough founds from numerous international organizations (including the World Bank) and countries to afford massive changes to the educational system. The 1987 Education Act aimed at turning the 1974's (Dozbo Committee) measures into reality: a national literacy campaign was launched, pre-tertiary education was reduced from 17 to 12 years and vocational education appeared in Junior High School. Education was made compulsory from 6 to 14. The reform succeeded in imposing a new education structure, as well as to increase the enrolment and the number of infrastructure. Yet the promise of universal access to basic education and vocational programs were not fulfilled.[32]

However, the return to constitutional rule in 1992 gave a new impulse to Ghanaian education by reclaiming the duty of the state to provide a free and compulsory basic education for all. Under this republic, the Local Government Act of 1993 initiated the decentralization in education administration. This was done through the transfer of power to district assemblies.

The Free, Compulsory and Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) provided an action plan for the period 1996-2005, focusing on bridging the gender gap in primary education,[33] while improving teaching by providing materials and better living condition for teachers.[34] It was later completed by significant acts, like the creation of the "Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training" in 2006 to promote vocational education and the founding of the National Accreditation Board (NAB) in 2007, among several others under the government of John Agyekum Kuffour. In its 2013/2014 report, the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked Ghana 46th out of 148 countries for education system quality.[35] In 2010, Ghana's literacy rate was 71.5%, with a notable gap between men (78.3%) and women (65.3%).[36]

Presently, education in Ghana is divided into three phases: basic education (kindergarten, primary school and junior high school), secondary education (senior high school, technical and vocational institutions) and tertiary education (universities, polytechnics and colleges).[37] Education is compulsory between the ages of four and fifteen (basic education). The language of instruction is mainly English with an academic year usually running from August to May each year.[38]

The Role of Religion in Education

[31] Brief History of State-Organized Education in Ghana.
[32] Ghana Education Service (GES), *The development of Education, National report of Ghana* (2004).
[33] "Free Compulsory Basic Education Prgramme (FCUBE): Ghana, 2007."
[34] Ghana Education Service (GES), *The development of Education, National report of Ghana* (2004).
[35] http://resep.sun.ac.za/index.php/interpreting-the-education-statistics-in-the-2013-2014-global-competitive ness-report/ (23/2/2015).
[36] K. Schwab, *The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014: Country Profile Highlights* (World Economic Forum, 2013).
[37] Ministry of Education, *Brief History of State-Organized Education in Ghana* (http://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=54812: 19/02/2015).
[38] Ghana Education Service, *Education*: *Historical Dictionary of Ghana*, (Accra: GES).

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Education indicators in Ghana reflect a gender gap and disparities between rural and urban areas, as well as between southern and northern parts of the country. Those disparities drive public action against illiteracy and inequities in access to education. In recent years, addressing challenges posed by this gab has been the concern of many religious bodies in Ghana. The history of education in Ghana reflects the antique relationship shared between Christianity and education. Similarly, Islam shares great ties with the development of education in Ghana though later than the Christian religion. Religious bodies, as one of their primary service to society have sought for the formation of citizens through schooling (education). The impartation of knowledge to generations has been the primary focus of the two major religious groups present in Ghana.

There are a number of Muslim missions or Islamic groups in Ghana: the Ahmadiyya, Tijaniyya, Sufi turuq, Qadiriyya, Shiite and the Ahlus Sunna Wal-Jama'a. Prominent among them in terms of educating members and Ghanaians is the Ahmadiyya mission. An Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission is to lead his/her life in accordance with the shari'a; motivate, train (educate) and involve the entire *jama'at*[39] in the field of missionary effort.[40] In Ghana, the contributions of Islam to education mostly started from the north. Aside schools set to train and educate Muslim children, there were Missionary Training Institutions that also provided education to Ghanaians. In most Islamic missions were departments that are responsible for teaching and learning. For instance, the *wakalat ta'lim*[41] of the Pakistan mission, among several responsibilities, performs such functions as attending to the educational affairs of the *jama'at* outside the missions mother country. They are also in charge of managing all educational institutions of the *jama'at*.[42]

An examination of the Tijaniyya mission in Ghana reveals that as a body/unit they are not properly organised with centralised systems. Their socio-religious programs and activities, even though syncretistic, have brought Islam more to the national front in various forms than was the case before Ghana's independence. Tijaniyyans after independence have undertaken changes with the most prominent of it being the adoption of western type of education by its members.[43] This course has greatly been supported by other Muslim Missions and non-Muslims missions in the country. Presently, Islam, as a religion, has established hundreds of educational institutions geared toward the development of Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians, Muslims and non-Muslims. These institutions ranging from basic to tertiary levels of education aim at providing knowledge as emphasised by the Holy Qur'an. The very first word of the Qur'an that was revealed to prophet Muhammad was, in fact, 'Read'. Prophet Muhammad once stated that 'Seeking knowledge is mandatory for all Muslims.' With such a direct command to go out and seek knowledge, Muslims have placed huge emphasis on the educational system in order to fulfil this obligation placed on them by the Prophet.

As the first religious group to introduce formal education in Ghana, Christianity, has served several purposes toward the development of Ghana's education. Like Islam, Christianity has

[39] *Jama'at:* Islamic congregation within a given locality.
[40] N. Samwini, *The Muslim Resurgence in Ghana since 1950: Its Effects on Muslims and Muslim-Christian Relations* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p.156.
[41] *Wakalat ta'lim* is a department or unit responsible for education. They are responsible for educational affairs as contained in the rules and regulations of the mission.
[42] N. Samwini, (2006), p.152.
[43] *Ibid.*, p.145.

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promoted the training of citizens from the basic level to the tertiary level. This was done through the establishment of educational infrastructures and events/activities that are purposed to make education a better one. There are hundreds of educational institutions established by different Christian groups in the country. The history of Ghana's education depicts a high sense of commitment towards the educating of citizens in both secular and religious education. Their contributions to the promotion of knowledge are made real as a result of the inevitable connectivity existing naturally and theologically between religion and education, hence development.

Education in Ghana has come with several positive implications which have aided the advancement of the nation. The Ghanaian education has for several years been characterised as a means that provides direction, adjustment and self-activity. It has also been seen as a means of social change and progress as well as a process of socialization. Among the relevance of education are the following:

- The accretion and storage of human resources
- The formation of mind, personality or character
- Serves as a means for preparation, gender empowerment and mental discipline.
- Developing of democratic citizenship
- Promotion of leadership qualities and vocational efficiency

The Role of Religion in Education towards Development

Religion influences the way people see themselves, each other and the world around them. Especially in developing countries, religion often figures largely in everyday life. This is something that many Western development organisations used to underestimate.[44] The place of religion in education is significantly realised in the human, social, political, economic and spiritual development of Ghanaian students. Religion in education provides the following significance:

Character formation and moral significance: Character is the cream of life and, as such, it should be the aim of all forms of education. Many theologians and educationists emphasize character building in education. Character formation or moral education is concerned with the whole conduct of man. The Ghana Education Service in their policy framework ascribe their first goal to the provision of a framework for the development of standards, core values and ethics (morals) for the teaching professions in order to make them contribute immensely to student development.[45] Character education has to be visualized not in a social vacuum but with reference to contemporary socio-economic and political situation. Therefore, it can be concluded that character building should be the aim of every form of education.

Vocational meaning: The vocational aim also known as 'the utilitarian aim' states that the ideals of education are useless unless they (the aims) enable us to procure the primary needs of our life such as food, shelter and clothing. Education must help the child to earn his livelihood. Education, therefore, must prepare the child for some future profession or

[44] W. Boender, E. Dwarswaard and M. Westendorp, *Religion and Development: Practitioner's Guide* (Utrecht: Kenniscentrum Religie en Ontwikkeling, 2011), p.4.
[45] Ministry of Education, *Pre-Tertiary Teacher Professional Development and Management in Ghana: Policy Framework* (Accra: Ghana Education Service, 2012), p.9.

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vacation or trade. The vocational aim is a narrow aim of education. Therefore, the vocational aim is not a complete aim by itself.

The knowledge or information worth: Educationists who hold the knowledge or information significance of education justify their stand with powerful arguments. They argue that knowledge is indispensable for all right action and it is the source of all power. It is knowledge which makes a realist a visionary successful in any profession. Education in Ghana provides a basic source of modern knowledge which is the foundation of human development in all societies.

The culture implication: The cultural aim of education has been suggested to supplement the narrow view of knowledge aim. The cultural aim of education is no doubt an utmost significance aimed at producing men of culture. Though education in modern Ghana places little emphasis on revitalising cultural heritages of our time, its procedures in outlining the traditional heritage of the Ghanaian society is plausible.

The spiritual significance: The idealist thinkers have opined that the spiritual development of an individual should be the supreme aim of education. Mahatma Gandhi has attached great importance to spiritual values in education. In Ghana, the involvement of religious groups in education has contributed to the spiritual development of both teachers and learners. This suggests a complete living aim. Some educationists have insisted upon the need of an all-comprehensive aim of education. This viewpoint has led to the development of two aims- the 'complete living aim' and 'harmonious development aim' which suggest spiritual and physical/bodily development.

The social and leisure importance: It is clearly evident that no individual can live and grow without a social context. Individual life becomes unbearable to humans, hence the formation of society. While, individual security and welfare depend on the society, individual improvement is conditioned by social progress. Education makes each individual socially efficient as socially efficient individuals are able to earn their livelihood. Also, education ensures the creation of moments for leisure in the life of individuals. This leads to creativity and helps to pursue a personal activity not for earning a living, but to create comfort.

Implication of the Study

In contemporary discussions of ways to attain sustainable and authentic human and national development, there is a reluctance to consider the influence of religion. The reason for this stems from the divisiveness and intolerance among various religious groups. This occasionally results in violent conflicts which hampers, and decline national development. Development institutions and agencies often refer to wars of religions and their attendant consequences as reasons for a total neglect of religion as partners in development. Contemporary development discourse finds itself in a dilemma as to what form their relationship with religion ought to be, in promoting development, especially at the grassroots level.

Since the study has indicated that religion (Christianity and Islam) promotes integral development that goes beyond mere spiritual growth, this study defends the position of religion as very important in sustainable national development through education. It highlights the strong foundation religions in Ghana have provided particularly in education for its advancement. The study further makes clear the responsibilities of religious groups and

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their understanding of knowledge through education which is the backbone of all development.

CONCLUSION

Religion as an important institution in the human community has promoted human development through education and knowledge impartation. Religions assist in providing citizens with knowledge needed to enhance socio-economic, political and spiritual development. Religion can be involved in influencing the progress to a better world. In view of its innumerable adherents and its common belief in the dignity of the human person under God, religion is committed to the promotion of the human good so as to provide basic human needs, guarantee protection of human rights and promote integral development of the globe.

The provision of education though the responsibility of the central government, has been the concern of many religious groups since their advent. Even after independence, Ghana still witness major contributions from the religious sector to the development of education. Education over the years has become one major objective of Christianity and Islam, aside their responsibility to ensure spiritual growth. Providing infrastructures to augment that of governments over the years has made their contributions a conspicuous one. Also, moral and religious lessons have imparted in several ways the moral conduct of individuals though much need to be done to improve moral standards in the country. This creates room for more to be done by religious groups in ensuring wholistic formation through education which is vital for total development. As long as secular discourse and development theories continue to exclude religion in its analysis of globalization, progress and development of people, the results of its analysis will always be defective.

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