Social Conflicts and Third Parties

Strategies of Conflict Resolution

Jacob Bercovitch

ROUTLEDGE

Social Conflicts and Third Parties

Westview Replica Editions

The concept of Westview Replica Editions is a response to the continuing crisis in academic and informational publishing. Library budgets for books have been severely curtailed. Ever larger portions of general library budgets are being diverted from the purchase of books and used for data banks, computers, micromedia, and other methods of information retrieval. Interlibrary loan structures further reduce the edition sizes required to satisfy the needs of the scholarly community. Economic pressures on the, university presses and the few private scholarly publishing companies have severely limited the capacity of the industry to properly serve the academic and research communities. As a result, many manuscripts dealing with important subjects, often representing the highest level of scholarship, are no longer economically viable publishing projects—or, if accepted for publication, are typically subject to lead times ranging from one to three years.

Westview Replica Editions are our practical solution to the problem. We accept a manuscript in camera-ready form, typed according to our specifications, and move it immediately into the production process. As always, the selection criteria include the importance of the subject, the work's contribution to scholarship, and its insight, originality of thought, and excellence of exposition. The responsibility for editing and proofreading lies with the author or sponsoring institution. We prepare chapter headings and display pages, file for copyright, and obtain Library of Congress Cataloging

in Publication Data. A detailed manual contains simple instructions for preparing the final typescript, and our editorial staff is always available to answer questions.

The end result is a book printed on acid-free paper and bound in sturdy library-quality soft covers. We manufacture these books ourselves using equipment that does not require a lengthy make-ready process and that allows us to publish first editions of 300 to 600 copies and to reprint even smaller quantities as needed. Thus, we can produce Replica Editions quickly and can keep even very specialized books in print as long as there is a demand for them.

About the Book and Author

Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution
Jacob Bercovitch

The pressing need to find new ways to settle social disputes and render them less destructive has led to a concern with the role that outsiders—or third parties—can play in the conflict resolution process. This book contributes to an increased understanding of the nature and activities of third parties in a wide range of conflict situations.

Dr. Bercovitch first describes and interprets the major elements of the third-party intervention process, then provides an empirical examination of its structure and characteristics in settings as diverse as family struggles, labor-management problems, and international disputes. Throughout, he illustrates the dynamics of the process from the vantage point of the third parties themselves. Finally he points out the conditions most likely to strengthen this type of conflict management and discusses the means for determining the appropriate forms of intervention at different junctures of a dispute.

Jacob Bercovitch is a lecturer in international relations at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.

To My Parents, with Love and Gratitude

Social Conflicts and Third Parties

Strategies of Conflict Resolution

Jacob Bercovitch

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1984 by Westview Press

Published 2019 by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Bercovitch, Jacob.
Social conflicts and third parties.
(A Westview replica edition)
1. Conflict management. 2. Social conflict. 3. Negotiation.
4. Social interaction. I. Title.
HM136.B38 1984 303.6 83-10351

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-28750-4 (hbk)

Contents

Tables and Figures

TABLES

FIGURES

Preface

Students of social behavior can not venture far without being reminded that individuals and groups face one kind of conflict or another throughout most of their lives. Whichever way one looks, there is certainly no shortage of conflicts. There are conflicts between spouses, between friends, between departments, organizations and firms, conflicts between groups of people and conflicts within and between nations. The only kind of conflict we have not yet seen is interplanetary conflict. Conflict is a phenomenon which most of us experience at first hand, but only few of us go far toward understanding it.

Although most conflicts are managed, or settled, through a variety of peaceful and well-established means (e.g. negotiation, markets, courts etc.), some conflicts may tend to escalate and be expressed through coercion and violence. The cycle of an escalating conflict and violence may strike everywhere. It may strike the family, the factory, or the nation. Wherever it strikes and whichever form it assumes, violence is a form of behavior which is designed to kill or injure a person, or destroy his property. What makes violence so frightening is that it can evolve out of normal conflict situations, and that it can kill thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands of people. In one way or another, the challenge of violence is one of the gravest problems we face today.

Given the fact that much violence grows out of circumstances in which people or groups find themselves in conflict with others, does this mean that conflict as such is bad? The answer to that is emphatically negative. Conflict as such is neither good, nor bad. When dealt with appropriately, it may lead to progress and creation; when dealt with inappropriately, it may lead to violence and destruction. If most people in conflict possessed the desire, as well

as the skills and ability, to deal with their conflicts appropriately, more amicable agreements could be achieved and less violence witnessed. If we only knew more about conflict management, more conflicts could be managed peacefully and effectively.

One of the more constructive aspects of conflict management involves the efforts of interveners, or third parties. A variety of individuals and agencies engage in this form of peacemaking (as distinct from peacekeeping) in order to help the disputing parties to find a solution to their conflict. Peacemakers of this sort (i.e. pacific and voluntary) offer an alternative to the use of violence or legalistic approaches. This book is about third parties in conflict situations. It is not intended as an instruction manual, it is intended to stimulate discussion and interest in this aspect of conflict management.

Options and strategies available to third parties are quite numerous. Third parties may intervene in conflicts between people acting as individuals and in conflicts between larger social units. And yet, despite its importance and the vast expansion in its use, we still know very little about this form of conflict management. The purpose of this book is to understand, in some detail, the structure and process of this conflict management mechanism and offer some insights into its underlying principles. Used in context, these insights and understanding provide an important basis for moving back and forth between theory and practice, between the real world and the conceptual world, and for thinking about the 'art' and 'science' of third party intervention and the conditions of its effectiveness.

There are a number of ways of getting beneath the structure and process of intervention to describe what happens in particular conflict situations. One may examine aggregate historical data, or conversely, concentrate on a single case study of intervention. One may set up elaborate experimental procedures, manipulate the stimulus (e.g. a third party) and record its performance under different conditions, or one may study the quarrelling parties and consider their interpretation of their experience with this type of conflict management. Alternatively, one may study third party intervention from the perspective of the interveners themselves. This is the framework of thinking that underlies this work.

It must be stated at the very outset that none of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. There are also no specific guidelines to distinguish 'legitimate' from 'illegitimate' approaches. Measuring instruments are not necessarily more exact (whatever that may mean) than retrospective verbalization elicited in response to specific questions. There is no reason to believe that data provided by the subjects themselves is more suspect than other kinds of data. Provided verbal data shows some consistency with observable, non-verbal behavior, our confidence in its validity and legitimacy need not be shaken.

In this book I have relied mainly, but not exclusively, on interveners' verbalized information and interpretation offered in the course of an unstructured interview. Given the somewhat sensitive nature of conflict management, it quickly became apparent that such information could be obtained only if the rules of confidentiality were not breached. Protecting the interveners' identity proved an effective tactic for generating information about their performance. I have maintained this line throughout the book.

It would be unfair to suppose that this study was concerned with reporting, in an unstructured fashion, some information on third party intervention. Such information is utilized merely as an illustration, or supporting evidence, in the effort to develop a theory-building approach to the practice of third party intervention. Hence the concentration in the first part of the book on clarifying concepts, classifying phenomena, and developing a model of third party intervention. This model helps us to dissect our subject matter, make inferences about it, and develop genuine propositions which may be validated by empirical work.

With this model (which, it must be admitted, is still in its infancy) in mind, the book explores, in the second part, the structure and behavior of third parties in interpersonal, intergroup, and international conflicts. In reviewing the evidence on third parties' behavior, the book suggests, in the last section, the incompleteness of the model, and offers some points for the development of a wider perspective on third party intervention.

The approach adopted here obviously has its limitations, but in blending discussions of the practical side of intervention with the theoretical aspects of the process it can hopefully contribute to the 'art' and 'science' of intervening. Conflict is an inescapable feature of our existence, the least we can do is contribute to knowledge and wisdom about conflict management, and act to reduce the discrepancy between that which is actual and possible in conflict management and that which is not.

Jacob Bercovitch

Acknowledgments

Like most first books, this too had its origins in a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1980. Neither the passage of time, nor the extensive revisions undertaken in preparing the book, have made me less aware of the imperfections - conceptual and methodological - of this exercise. In offering it now to a wider, and more diverse, audience, the book reflects the conviction that such imperfections are more than outweighed by the need to pull together, in a systematic fashion, ideas about conflict management and third party intervention.

Very little is known about effective conflict management, even less is known about effective third party intervention. I have attempted to provide some meaning and coherence to this area of enquiry, and offer in this way a distillation of knowledge and experience that could be of use to students, researchers, and practitioners.

I owe thanks to a number of people. I was encouraged and guided by Michael Banks and Michael Nicholson, and I owe them both a special thanks. I am also grateful to Philip Reynolds, Richard Little, John Burton and Chris Mitchell for comments on earlier drafts and criticism of some of the ideas. My colleagues in London, Andrew Smith and Philip Windsor, acted as constant critics and friends. My colleagues here, Richard Kennaway, Mark Francis and our visiting Fulbright Fellow, Michael Stohl, provided the right intellectual ambience, and a much-needed prod to complete this project. None of them, though, should be held responsible for the ideas and views expressed here.

Liz Dobson, Irene Macdonald and especially Liz Sanders in London typed different drafts with great professional care and skill and

turned an illegible draft into a coherent manuscript. I wish to thank them for that.

I am particularly grateful to Jean Bailey who has supported and encouraged me throughout the entire odyssey, and to Gillian Wess whose help and advice were so invaluable.

My greatest debt is expressed in the dedication.

Jacob Bercovitch

Part 1
Conflict, Conflict Management and Third Party Intervention: Developing a Conceptual Framework

1
The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management

Introduction

In all societies, irrespective of their system of organization, or location in time and space, there are three basic modes by which conflicts are handled. These are; (a) violence and coercion, (b) various forms of bargaining and negotiations, and (c) the intervention of a third party. Third party intervention may be (i) binding, or (ii) non-binding. In the former case parties become merely petitioners or supplicants attempting to persuade a third party to give a favourable decision, in the latter they are assisted by a third party in the process of seeking a jointly acceptable decision.

Although the practice of third party intervention is probably as old as conflict itself, the subject has only very recently been studied systematically. Social scientists scarcely looked beyond detailed descriptions of single cases of intervention. The range and implications of third party activity were more often assumed rather than disclosed. Third parties, or mediators, as they are often called, have been depicted as being neutral and somewhat ineffective, or powerful individuals or states acting in a dictatorial manner. Both images haunted students of third party activity for far too long a time. Both are unsatisfactory images which need to be discarded or revised.

This book purports to take some steps toward developing a more accurate and relevant perception of the strengths and limitations of

third parties in conflict situations. It approaches third party intervention with a broad, exploratory design. Its primary purposes are the presentation of a set of ideas about third party intervention, the evaluation of these ideas, and an examination of third parties' behavior in several conflict systems, representing a wide variety of the forms of human existence. Although the book is concerned with providing knowledge that might later be applied, it does not carry with it a prescriptive label. It clarifies some aspects of a particular conflict management mechanism. It does not, though, offer a solution to the problems of social conflict, nor is it concerned with improving all systems for resolving conflict.

The main interest of the book - third party intervention in conflict situations - can be justified by (a) the paucity of such investigations and the lack of systematic knowledge concerning effective interventions, (b) the growing dissatisfaction with other, and costlier, forms of conflict management and, most significantly, (c) the need for innovative techniques of conflict management. The number of lethal conflicts and the extent of violence and destruction are on such a scale that unless we make some progress toward understanding conflict and the factors which can influence its course and outcomes, we may well fail to ensure the survival of homo sapiens.

We find ourselves today in a maze of conflicts; between individuals, groups, societies, and religions. Some of these conflicts may have a revitalizing effect, others may precipitate a confrontation with consequences which are too horrendous to contemplate. Some follow definite rules, others involve irrational and violent behavior. We can, at any rate, no longer remain impervious to the experience of conflict or the reality of human existence. "Ours is a dangerous age in which the race between creative knowledge and destruction is closer than ever before. Destruction has not yet arrived and knowledge still has a chance. Those of us who have scientific training and ability should do everything in our power to speed up creation and slow down destruction." (Scott, 1958: 134).

With this in mind, the book is conceived as an effort in generating socially useful knowledge, in particular knowledge about the nature, role, and functions of third parties. I do not assume that such

knowledge will enable us to move apparently intractable conflicts toward a solution. It should, though, help us to move toward a better understanding of the third party process. Knowledge of conflict management, it is true, does not guarantee successful experience; lack of knowledge, on the other hand, probably precludes such experiences.

Knowledge of the many roles and functions that third parties provide and the factors that contribute to their effectiveness can be, and hopefully will be, instrumental in promoting the values of peace, balance and conflict resolutions. These values are central to the whole approach. For this reason they are articulated explicitly, rather than allowed to creep in stealthily.

A precondition for such an approach is conceptual clarity and a measure of verbal precision. If we seek to describe a range of behavior, we must begin by observing the obvious need to distinguish it from other phenomena. This is particularly important in the case of conflict, for as Boulding reminds us, conflict "is found almost everywhere. It is found through the biological world, where the conflict both of individuals and of species is an important part of the picture. It is found everywhere in the world of man and all the social sciences study it.' (Boulding, 1962:1). What, then, is conflict? What are the factors which affect it, and what is the place of third parties in the management of conflict?

The Nature of Conflict

In everyday language conflict denotes overt, coercive interactions in which two, or more, contending parties seek to impose their will on one another. Fights, violence, and hostility are the terms customarily employed to describe a conflict relationship. The range of conflict phenomena is, however, much wider than that implied by its physical connotation. It is used to describe inconsistencies as well as the process of trying to solve them; it has physical and moral implications; it embraces opinions as well as situations and a wide

range of behavior. Conventional usage of the term is inconsistent with the full range of conflict phenomena.[1]

In attempting to analyze conflict phenomena, particular attention has to be paid to the term itself, to the explicit and implicit judgements that are made about it (e.g. is it 'good' or 'bad'?) and to efforts to distinguish it from related, if distinct, events (e.g. tension, war, hostility, etc.). Most perspectives on social conflict are etymological, or they may be classified as either 'actor-oriented' or 'system-oriented'. From an actor-oriented perspective conflicts are necessary, indeed inevitable; from a system-oriented perspective conflicts may be undesirable (because they may interfere with the goal of system maintenance). Combining these perspectives provides a useful context for my own approach to conflict.

Narrow Approaches

Park and Burgess (1924) offer a definition of conflict which identifies it as a conscious, intermittent struggle for status. Lewis Coser (1956), who offered one of the most influential definitions of conflict, regards it as a struggle over values, entailing behavior that is initiated with the intent of inflicting harm, damage, or injury on the other party. Although the interests of actors have not been foresworn, both these definitions are essentially within the system orientation.

The conception identifying conflict with violent interactions in which behavior and perceptions are in opposition has remained a basic conception in conflict studies. Mack and Snyder (1957), without offering a specific definition, identify the distinguishing characteristics of the range of conflict phenomena as:

1. the existence of two or more parties
2. their interaction arises from a condition of resource scarcity or position scarcity
3. they engage in mutually opposing actions

4. their behavior is intended to damage, injure or eliminate the other party
5. their interactions are overt and can be measured or evaluated by outside observers

Conflict, within this approach, is contrasted with cooperation. It denotes not only differences of opinion, but the demonstrable coercive means utilized by parties with a difference of opinion.

Wider Approaches

The narrow, and more precise, approach to conflict is not shared by all researchers. If we are interested in the relationship between social systems and social conflicts, we have to adopt a much wider focus and study those structures or situations which promote mutually incompatible interests or values. Dahrendorf (1959), for instance, suggests that conflicts are present whenever people have differential access to power and authority. Curie (1971) widens the conception of conflict phenomena by asserting its presence in any situation where human beings are being impeded from realising their potential (however that may be defined).

Wider approaches to conflict are not so much concerned with the disruptive features of conflict as they are with the dimensions of a social structure and the conditions which give rise to parties with incompatible goals. They study the nature of resources and the structure of their distribution. Wider approaches to conflict do not assume that a given system's survival is necessarily beneficial, nor do they refer to conflict as deviation, unhealthy, or pathological. Conflict calls attention to the latent problems of a system.(2)

A strong case can be made for either conception. Whether we discuss conflict in terms of behavior, or in terms of a situation, whether we analyze it empirically, or write about it metaphysically, is ultimately dependent upon the purposes and epistemology of the analyst. Values affect the labels we give and determine the 'facts' we select. Conflict can be most profitably examined only when we are

aware of the different perspectives and the fundamental assumptions that dominate each perspective.

Subjective Approaches

A question which has preoccupied conflict researchers for some time, and one to which no clear answer has been given, concerns the extent to which conflict can be understood as a subjective or objective phenomenon. Subjective approaches to conflict assert that, at the most basic level, conflicts are about values and values are ultimately dependent upon perceptions. Hence, conflicts are subjective and the parties' perception of the values in conflict is, in the final analysis, all that counts.(3) The parties' perception transforms a situation into a conflict situation, and it can also transform a conflict from one of violence and coercion into one with mutually beneficial outcomes (Burton, 1970a).

The view that conflicts are primarily subjective (i.e. perceptual) is tenable if we accept that disputed values are not absolute or in fixed supply. That they may be increased, changed, redefined, or transformed in the course of conflict interactions. If conflict actors could somehow be brought, through a third party perhaps, to a greater awareness of their perceptions and predispositions, then opposed values may well change to collaborative values. Subjective approaches to conflict are concerned with the parties' orientation and with devising tools and strategies for rectifying conflict-producing misperceptions.

Given this approach, a situation may be regarded as a conflict situation if, and only if, the adversaries perceive that they are in conflict. From a concern with underlying structural relations, we have moved to a concern with the parties' awareness and definition of a situation.

Objective Approaches

Opposed to this view is the approach which asserts that conflicts exist whenever there are incompatible interests, irrespective of whether or not the actors are aware of these interests. Where subjective approaches to conflict emphasize motivational and attitudinal factors, objective approaches stress structural and predispositional factors. With a different focus on conflict phenomena, it is not surprising to note that each approach offers its own mode of conflict resolution. The former sees conflict resolution as entailing a change in perceptions, the latter argues for a fundamental restructuring of social situations (see Schmid, 1968).

This kind of approach takes on normative elements or implications. The scholar, analyst, or observer defines, in his own terms, the existence of a conflict situation ('the happy-slave syndrome'). An 'objective' conflict is said to exist when actors find themselves in a situation which engenders mutually incompatible goals (e.g. labor-management). Neither conflict behavior nor hostile attitudes need be present (the actors may, after all, suffer from 'false consciousness'). The existence of a presumed goal incompatibility is, according to this approach, a sufficient reason for defining a social situation as a conflict situation.(4)

An objective approach to conflict defines a conflict in the analyst's own terms, not the parties. It is an approach which is concerned with the contradictions contained within any social structure and the extent to which distinct groups develop incompatible goals as a result of these contradictions.

Toward a Conception of Conflict

This short, and far from comprehensive, exposition serves to show us just how ambiguous, and complex, the concept of conflict can be. The conceptual division along the objective v. subjective and narrow v. wide dimensions is but one of few possible divisions. In an effort to synthesize the different strands and components of a conflictual relationship, we draw upon Galtung's conflict triangle (see Galtung, 1971:125). This, to my knowledge, offers the only satisfactory

formulation of conflict which allows us to examine (a) a specific conflict situation, (b) motives and the parties' cognitive structure, and (c) the behavioral-attitudinal dynamics of a conflict process.

Instead of a simple definition of conflict, Galtung offers us a format of three inter-related conflict elements, which can be considered jointly or separately. These elements can be illustrated by a simple triangle as in Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1 Galtung's Conflict Triangle

A conflict situation, corresponding to the wider or objective approaches to conflict, refers to a situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties. Conflict attitudes are closer to the subjective approach to conflict, consisting of the psychological and cognitive processes which engender conflict or are consequent to it. And conflict behavior consists of actual, observed activities undertaken by one party and designed to injure, thwart, or eliminate its opponent (this corresponds to the narrow approaches to conflict).

The conception of conflict in terms of its three interrelated components clarifies the term, directs our attention to the various conflict sources (e.g. frustration as a source of conflict attitudes),

makes it apparent that a wide variety of situational factors (e.g. norms, rules, constituents etc.) affect conflict behavior and attitudes and, more importantly for our purposes, it encourages us to propose better schemes of conflict management. Unless we are clear about conflict, we can not think about conflict management.

Conflict Management

Why Conflict Management?

Conflict management is often confused with conflict prevention or conflict control. This is a regrettable confusion. To suggest that conflicts can be managed implies that conflicts are dynamic social processes, moving from an incipient, latent stage, to maturity and termination. It also suggests that conflicts have certain consequences for the parties involved as well as for the environment in which they occur. The proper concern of conflict management is thus with increasing values and beneficial consequences and decreasing costs and harmful consequences. Conflict management is an attempt to feed learning into the process of conflict, learning which can make conflict more productive and less costly (Boulding, 1966).

In saying that the purpose of conflict management is not to eliminate, prevent, or control conflicts, but rather to increase their values and benefits, and decrease costs and dissatisfaction, we relate conflict management to (a) consequences, and (b) conflict outcomes. Let us look at each of these briefly.

Consequences. It is customary to think of conflict as being undesirable and, on the whole, harmful and disruptive. It would be a folly, however, to regard conflict consequences entirely in this light. Conflict is not, as some functionalists would have us believe, a manifestation of social pathology, a breakdown or a malfunction of a social system. It can have beneficial consequences - both latent and manifest - for the parties and the environment in which it occurs.

Coser's analysis (1956; 1957) sought to identify and conceptualize the intended beneficial consequences of conflicts. These may be usefully divided into (i) beneficial consequences for the parties themselves, and (ii) beneficial consequences for their environment (see Mitchell, 1980)[5]

(i) Positive conflict consequences for the parties themselves include the creation of a sense of identity and solidarity. Conflict facilitates interactions between unequal parties and forces them to modify their opinions. Conflict prevents rigidity and facilitates internal change. The inventory of positive conflict consequences can be summarized by suggesting, as Himes does (1966), that conflicts produce the following important consequences for the parties; (a) equalizing (putting parties on an equal footing), (b) attention-arresting (focusing attention on real problems), and (c) solidifying (increasing internal cohesion).

(ii) Positive conflict consequences for the environment, or wider system in which conflict occurs, include preventing social stagnation, encouraging growth and change, stimulating innovation, and generally producing consequences that are system-enhancing and strain-reducing. An evaluation of conflict, in terms of its latent and manifest functions, shows us the importance of conflict as a 'safety valve', and its place in the integration of a social system, the establishment of new hierarchies and power structures, and the creation of new institutions and value-systems.

A proper evaluation of conflict consequences makes it clear that conflict can be both adaptive and adjustive. It can act as a catalyst, danger signal, and a spur to achievement. The functional potential of conflict is at the heart of any conflict management strategy.

Outcomes. Conflicts are neither instrinsically bad, nor intrinsically good. They are not autonomous, self-exacerbating processes leading, inevitably, to violence and destruction. Nor can they be described as

invariably entailing beneficial consequences. Whether conflicts achieve renewed strength, cohesion and growth, or whether they lead to higher levels of destruction and increased wastage of resources, depends, in the final analysis, on (i) conflict outcomes and (ii) the manner of reaching a particular outcome.

(i) Although conflicts have no clear beginning or end, we assume that each conflict terminates and manifests itself in a specific outcome (Coser, 1961).[6] Broadly speaking there are three possible outcomes. These are, in ascending order of both parties' expectation of benefits (a) dominance and imposition (e.g. conquest, elimination, or annihilation), (b) withdrawal or avoidance, and (c) compromise and resolution (Boulding, 1962; Kriesberg, 1982). Outcome (a) entails costs, damages, and destructive consequences, while outcome (c) entails gains and positive consequences. If both parties can be made to choose outcome (c) rather than (a) or (b), they may experience consequences which may be of benefit to themselves as participants in a conflict, and to their system of organization.

(ii) This brings me to the second aspect, namely, the way by which specific outcomes may be reached. There are three possible ways by which a specific conflict outcome may be attained. These are, in terms of the numbers of participating parties, (a) unilateral, (b) bilateral, and (c) multilateral. Unilateral procedures, such as violence and coercion, or indeed withdrawal, are associated with single party benefits and outcomes (a) and (b) above. Bilateral procedures, such as negotiation, and multilateral procedures, such as third party intervention, are associated with joint benefits and outcome (c) above. How an outcome is reached obviously helps to determine the distribution of gains and losses between the parties, and within their environment (Williams, 1977).

The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that we are interested in conflict management because we want to

try and influence the way by which a conflict is terminated and positive consequences distributed. Unless conflicts are properly managed, by various institutional forms or societal roles, conflict parties may try to commit themselves to a strategy of victory/defeat, or win at all costs. When conflict parties take this position, a satisfactory compromise or joint benefits are extremely unlikely. The most that can be achieved is to limit destructive consequences of the ensuing conflict behavior.

The purpose of conflict management is to influence the course of a conflict. Numerous factors may, of course, influence a conflict. Amongst the most important of these are, (a) the characteristics of the conflict parties, (b) the nature of the issues at stake, (c) the strategy and tactics employed by each party, and (d) the presence and activities of disinterested third parties (Deutsch, 1973). This book is envisaged as an examination of the attitudes, resources, and roles of third parties in various conflict situations. In particular, it is concerned to study how a third party can change the course of a conflict, help to manage it and provide the conditions for generating adaptive and integrative functions and beneficial consequences.

I conceive of third party intervention[7] as an aspect of a conflict management mechanism designed to arrest possible destructive consequences and inhibit a dysfunctional conflict cycle, as well as help the parties to find a proper, and satisfactory, basis for an agreement. Thus, I am concerned to find out how third parties condition the structure and provide the incentives for achieving these goals. I want to know more about how third parties can stimulate cooperative interactions and beneficial consequences. I also want to understand the conditions under which third parties are likely to be effective, the distinct possibilities and opportunities they are likely to create, and the methods and procedures which they can utilize. An overview of the general process and the approach to conflict and third party intervention is present in Figure 1.2.

Types of Conflict Management

Up to this point, the process of third party intervention has been presented as an aspect of the wider process of conflict management. Before examining, in greater detail, some of the definitional considerations and assumptions about third parties, it seems pertinent to recall our conception of conflict which emphasizes its three interrelated components; namely, conflict (situation), attitudes, and behavior. Conflicts may start with any of these components. They may start with incompatible goals, negative attitudes, or destructive behavior. Conflict management, and for that matter third party intervention, may, likewise, seek to affect a conflict situation or alter conflict attitudes and behavior. Thus, one way of differentiating between types of conflict management may be to ascertain whether the focus of conflict management is on (a) the latent aspects of a conflict (e.g. incompatible situation), or (b) its manifest aspects (e.g. destructive behavior).

Although the generic term conflict management is often used interchangeably with conflict resolution, conflict regulation, and even conflict creation, I assume throughout this study that the primary purpose of conflict management is to arrest the expansion and escalation of conflicts and create a structure or conditions which would be conducive to realizing beneficial consequences. Whether this is achieved by changing perceptions or altering behavior is, at the moment, immaterial. What is important is that conflict management, and third party intervention, may be attitude-oriented, or behavior-oriented; each will, presumably, call for different processes, different strategies, and different third party roles.



Figure 1.2 Conflict, Conflict Consequences and Third Party Intervention

Another basic distinction between types of conflict management concerns the distinction between endogenous and exogenous conflict management. The former refers to conflict management undertaken by the parties to a conflict (e.g. negotiation); the latter refers to efforts undertaken by an outside party. Exogenous conflict management can be further subdivided into (a) binding, and (b) voluntary. Binding conflict management refers to arbitration and adjudication. The voluntary mode is usually referred to as pacific third party interventions. It is with this form of conflict management that the book is concerned with.

Bearing these typologies in mind, one can proceed to discuss types of conflict management and their link to conflict settlement or conflict resolution. A conflict is settled when destructive behavior has been reduced and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast to that, a conflict is said to be resolved when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to destructive behavior and hostile attitudes has been reevaluated, or reperceived by the participants in conflict (Mitchell, 1981). Conflict management can, therefore, be directed toward conflict settlement, or it can be directed toward achieving the more complex, if enduring, outcome of conflict resolution.[8]

Combining the dimensions discussed in this section gives us the typology of conflict management as shown in Figure 1.3.



Figure 1.3 Types of Conflict Management

To effectively manage a conflict, or intervene in it in order to influence its course, one must know something about the causes of conflict. Different conceptions of the causes of conflict will dictate different approaches to conflict management. Although a discussion of causes is well beyond the scope of this work, we must realize that the causes of conflict are manifold; the efforts to manage it must also be multiform. The idea that there can be only one form of conflict management, only one pattern of third party intervention, is very wide off the mark.

The causes of conflict may generally be found in (a) the individual organism, (b) the social system or environment, or (c) in the

interactions between individuals and groups of individuals (Himes, 1980; Corning, 1973; Oberschall, 1978; Kriesberg, 1982). Individual, or micro-approaches to conflict emphasize personality traits (e.g. authoritarianism), motivation (e.g. frustration), or basic human nature (e.g. instinctivists, see Fromm, 1973). The social and interactional perspectives trace the causes of conflict to the breakdown of structural arrangements (e.g. power or economic relations, failure of social institutions, political inadequacies, etc.), or to interactional factors which prompt individuals and groups to assert their distinctiveness and to commit their resources for common goals. (9)

All these factors, preconditions, or precipitants of conflict contribute to the causation of specific conflicts. They may do so when, operating in tandem, they generate (a) incompatible interests and values, (b) a sense of identity or separateness, and (c) attitudes and feelings that are commensurate with this perception.

Over time, these factors converge, in a causal process, in a way that is decisive in initiating a conflict. The accumulated conflict potential will be released when actors with a strong sense of identity and a feeling of discontent, stemming from their failure to meet their substantive or instrumental needs, experience a catalyzing situation. A catalyzing situation, however minor or trivial, transforms conflict potential into an active conflict. As virtually every phenomenon could act as a catalyzing situation, it is impossible to delineate in advance the nature and role of these triggering events. What can be done, though, is to ensure that once conflicts do arise, they are managed in a way that can achieve outcomes which are mutually desired.

Third Parties in Conflict Management

Social systems have a wide variety of procedures, built into their structure, for managing conflicts. Conflicts can be managed by institutional forms (e.g. collective bargaining), social roles (e.g. third parties), or social norms (Deutsch, 1973). Of these, perhaps the best

known methods of managing conflicts are legal regulation and bargaining and negotiation. Third party intervention is probably the least understood conflict management process. This is partly because there is practically no first-hand research on it, partly because of the range and complexity involved and partly, no doubt, because of the impenetrable wall of secrecy of 'professional confidence' behind which so much of the work of third parties takes place.

Third party intervention is conceptually and empirically quite a different form of conflict management than adjudication, or negotiation (Eckhoff, 1967; Gulliver, 1979; Witty, 1980).[10] The pacific intervention of a third party turns the initial conflict dyad into a triad, where the third party can affect the behavior or outcomes of the others (Wilkinson, 1976). It is a triad where the third party causes the others to act differently, but neither actor relinquishes control over decision making and all participants remain free to decide whether or not to change their behavior. A third party, which may be invited by one party or both, or intervene on its own initiative, can be an individual, a group of individuals, an organization, or even a state. It can be active or passive, or it can move from one role to another. To gain a better understanding of the reality, and effectiveness, of third party intervention, it is useful to start by clarifying the concept from the fuzziness to which it has become subject.

The Basis of Third Party Intervention

Firstly, then, what do we mean by a third party? A third party is, as the term implies, someone who is external to a certain conflict and who interposes between the conflict parties in order to help them with their conflict management efforts. This usually occurs when (a) a conflict is long, drawn out and complex, (b) the parties have reached a deadlock with their own conflict management efforts, (c) continuation of the conflict is seen as an exacerbating factor by all concerned, and (d) there exists some communication or cooperation between the parties (Mitchell, 1981).

The inclusion of a third party in a conflict between two or more disputants has important structural implications for conflict management. It may create distinct possibilities for exacerbating a conflict. It may invite the formation of a coalition between the principals at the exclusion of a third party. Much more commonly, though, it can act as a catalyst in changing the parties' relationship from destructive to a more cooperative relationship. In either of these cases, the effect of a third party's presence is to modify the nature of interactions between the disputants.

To examine what a third party can do in the process of conflict management. To evaluate its role, strategies, and behavior. To analyze the influence which it can exercise, attention should be paid to some definitional considerations.

Third party intervention may be defined as "the intervention into a dispute of a person or an agency whose purpose it is to act as an instrument for bringing about a peaceful settlement to that dispute, while creating structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement may be laid" (Harbottle, 1979–80:120). On a more general level to "intervene is to enter into an ongoing system of relationship, to come between, or among, persons, groups or objects for the purpose of helping them" (Argrys, 1970:15). The process of third party intervention consists of "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more problems in the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself" (Young, 1967:34).

The basis of third party involvement is voluntary. Its intervention, moreover, is of an ad-hoc nature and the influence a third party exerts is supposed to be beneficial. The effect of third party intervention is to modify the basic structure of conflict management. A third party brings with it certain ideas, knowledge, and assumptions, as well as interests, all of which are designed to influence the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome. The relationship between a third party and the disputants can be seen as having the following characteristics:

1. third party intervention is a voluntary relationship
2. it is designed to affect, influence or otherwise regulate the course of a conflict
3. it is a relationship between an outsider offering help and a conflict system requiring help
4. third parties can offer a wide range of helpful activities; they have, though, no authority to impose a particular outcome
5. the relationship is perceived by all concerned as temporary only.

Why would third parties get involved in other people's conflict? There may be a number of reasons for doing so. A third party may be invited by one or both disputants, or it may be asked to intervene by other interested parties (e.g. U.N. or regional organizations). A third party may intervene on its own accord when it perceives that some of its basic interests may be affected (e.g. U.S. intervention in the Middle East). A third party may also intervene in order to preserve, a system of interaction (e.g. relatives intervening in a family conflict).[11] Finally, third parties intervene in conflict situations because theirs is a relatively inexpensive and non-violent method of conflict management for which disputants themselves express a preference (Latour, 1976). One way or another, then, third parties have a number of reasons for intervening in conflict situations.

Whether a conflict arises between individuals (e.g. family conflict), between groups (e.g. labor-management conflict), or between nations (e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict), a third party may intervene and play an important role in realising constructive consequences. A third party may play a formal or informal role, a directive or facultative role, a conflict preventing role or a conflict resolution role.[12] It is clear that third parties can adopt different roles and that the roles they adopt will depend, inter alia, on personal-situational circumstances as well as the state of the conflict (e.g. incipient, violent, stalemated, etc.). If we are to go beyond the strictly intuitive level, or offer assumptions as fact and analysis, it is important to discover the roles and aims of actual third parties, and to see how these are affected by situational conditions.

The literature on third parties in actual conflict situations is noted mainly for its brevity. Walton (1969), for instance, discusses third party roles in interpersonal conflict and Douglas (1962) has documented, in considerable detail, the role, strategy, and behavior of a third party in an industrial conflict. Young (1967) has investigated the role third parties assume in international conflict with particular emphasis on the U.N., while Yarrow (1978), Ott (1972), and Rubin (1981) have investigated specific conflict situations where a third party was a significant factor in the process of conflict management.

Notwithstanding these fine studies, there has been much resistance to the possibility of examining the nature and role of third party intervention. Consequently, this aspect of conflict management has remained, despite its importance, understudied and least understood. The existing data are sparse, many propositions have not been tested and virtually no attempt has been made, as yet, to compare and contrast the various approaches taken by third parties themselves. Each discipline studies techniques of third party intervention in isolation of other disciplines. In doing so we have come to understand parts of the process, but not the process as a whole. No single book can exhaust the possibilities and performance of third parties in conflict management. One can, though, offer a broad outline of a comprehensive perspective, highlight points of similarities and differences, and analyze the process in the context of conflict management at several levels of behavior.

My approach to the problem of third party intervention is to examine it not as a separate, autonomous process, but rather to consider it as an integral part of conflict management in general, and bargaining and negotiation in particular. As Carl Stevens makes clear:

> An analysis of mediation is not possible except in the context of a general analysis of bargaining negotiation. That is, unless the investigator has some theories about the agreement process in negotiation, about why and in what ways the parties do (or do not) reach agreement, it is difficult to see how he can analyze the contribution of a mediator to the resolution of conflict (Stevens, 1963:123).

Schelling, likewise, suggests that a third party is "…best viewed as an element in the communication arrangements with a payoff structure of his own who is given an influential role" (Schelling, 1960:44). Although third party intervention is an exogenous form of conflict management, it is necessary to recognise that its values, role, interests, and perceptions are very much determined by the conflict situation in which it intervenes and the parties with which it deals.

The best way to look at third party intervention is in terms of a system of interactions comprising two or more social units (e.g. individuals, groups, nations, etc.) in a conflict relationship and a third party attempting to create the conditions for a constructive confrontation. Systems interact with their environment, absorb inputs from it and produce outputs which may change the nature of the environment (on the systems approach see Anderson and Carter, 1974). The environment of a system in conflict includes, in addition to the two principals and a third party, other relevant factors and features; some visible, some not so visible (e.g. constituents, wider audiences, institutional constraints, norms, etc.). These have to be included in considering the process of third party intervention. The model by James Wall (1981) can be modified to incorporate these various factors.



Figure 1.4 A Third Party Paradigm

What I am arguing here is that what a third party can, chooses, or is permitted to do, is affected by the context, conditions, and process of interaction between the parties. Third parties enter a conflict relationship in which the disputants have different expectations, goals, costs, and rewards, and where they experience pressures and stresses stemming from an uncertain situation, or from over-eager constituents. To propose a watertight set of categories for the intervention of third parties, without taking these factors into consideration, is in reality a futile intellectual flight of fancy, or merely an exercise in normative thinking.

The framework in which a third party operates consists of complex and interdependent relationships. The best way to capture the complexity of this framework is to recall that third parties operate within the process of conflict management and negotiation and that this process includes features such as background factors (e.g. cognitive differences between the parties), goals, and conditions (e.g. number of parties, situational constraints, etc.), any one of which may affect third party behavior, or be related to different outcomes

(for support of this conception see Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Druckman, 1973, 1977). A third party is not, and can not be, neutral. By its very presence, it affects the process or some of the conditions of conflict management interaction. Likewise, these factors and conditions affect, at least in part, the process of intervention and the performance of third parties.

Within this labyrinth of relationships, a third party, whatever its status or strategies, operates in a difficult and uncertain arena. It is also, though, an area where a third party can adopt a wide variety of roles and techniques.(13) A third party can exercise some influence over the conditions of conflict management interactions (e.g. establish agenda, encourage communication, separate negotiations, etc.). It may be able to modify background differences (e.g. 'controlled communication'), or the physical and social environment (e.g. site neutrality, time limits). Finally, a third party can modify goals (e.g. identify new issues) and enhance the psychological climate of conflict management (e.g. build up trust, increase motivation). Each of these roles, or any combination of them, can help the disputants with their conflict management.

Conclusion

Despite the importance, long history, and ubiquity of third party intervention,. it has hardly attracted the excitement of the scientific community.(14) The time is surely ripe for a systematic study of the conditions of intervention, its performance, and its effectiveness. Such a study can answer many questions that have remained unanswered. It can foster a better understanding of third party intervention and have more relevance for both current and continuing specific conflicts. In doing so, it may contribute to the successful application of third party intervention. The opportunities for such interventions can certainly be anticipated to be on the increase.

How do I propose to conduct such a study? I propose to look at the process of third party intervention in contexts as diverse as family

conflict, industrial conflict, and international conflict. I will also attempt to organize the findings along interdisciplinary lines. More importantly, however, I will adopt an epistemological position which states that the reality of third parties' existence cannot be simply mirrored by observing fragmented aspects of their behavior in simulated or experimental settings. Nor can it be depicted as an autonomous system which functions in accordance with the observer's whims or prescriptions. The reality of third party intervention can be best represented by the being, existence, consciousness, and possibilities of actual third parties, and not by some representational mechanism which pertains to a specific segment of reality. The reality of third parties is entailed in their experiences, descriptions, and perceptions. This form of representation, however selective, offers the most adequate form for the description of this problem.(15)

It is of course perfectly possible that this reality may be described in terms different from mine. There is no denial that the occurrence of third party intervention can be observed and recorded in a more structured manner and linked to different types of data. But if we wish to be alongside the entities we encounter, rather than be outside them, we have to attempt to grasp their worlds, their knowledge, and their behavior. My epistemological position is thus grounded upon involvement and being in the world. Upon making every possible effort to know, rather than to preknow.

Notes

1. It is interesting to note that etymologically the word conflict is derived from the Latin word confliqere where it means to strike together.

2. In an earlier paper I elaborated the theme of the various approaches to conflict and their implications. See Bercovitch, (1980 b). For a fuller analysis see my Conflict and Conflict Management (forthcoming).

3. A useful summary of this approach and how it differs from other approaches is provided by Mitchell (1981).

4. Conflict, according to this approach, is built into a structure and can only be resolved by eliminating the contradictions within that structure, see Schmid

(1968).

5. Coser (1956) identifies 18 functions of conflict and in so doing he makes it clear that conflict can be highly adaptive for social systems. See also Himes (1980) for a more recent approach.

6. I am not concerned here with resolving some of the difficulties pertaining to conflict termination (e.g. who decides that a conflict has ended? What if one party does not accept that a conflict has ended? etc.).

7. I refer to activities undertaken by an outsider whose decisions have no binding or judicial effects on the parties as pacific third party intervention (it is totally unlike coercive third party intervention or interested intervention, e.g. coalition formation). I also prefer to use the generic term of third party intervention because it is impossible to draw precise boundaries between various forms of intervention (e.g. when does conciliation end and mediation begin?) and because such distinctions provide only static descriptions of a conflict situation (e.g. an intervention may commence along passive lines and then become active, or vice versa).

8. Conflict resolution is undoubtedly the more desired outcome. Being so much more complicated, it can only be achieved under certain circumstances.

9. The idea here is that certain patterns of interaction favor some actors, but not others. The latter may seek to challenge such interaction, while the former are content to maintain it. Group mobilization and conflict is a product of such interactions. For a useful review of breakdown and mobilization as causes of conflict, see Oberschall (1978).

10. In talking about mediation and arbitration Meyer (1960) suggests that the one (mediation) "involves helping people to decide for themselves; the other (adjudication) involves helping by deciding for them" (p.164).

11. I am excluding the notion of 'implied mediation' (i.e. the idea that all conflicts are mediated, even when there are no mediators or other third parties). For an analysis of this kind, see Barkun (1968).

12. By role I mean an expected behavior pattern associated with the presence and activities of a third party. Third parties may, of course, occupy several roles simultaneously. For a listing of third party roles, see Rubin (1981).;

13. That is one reason why discussion of the role of third parties is often misleading.

14. There are, for instance, only three references to it in a recent comprehensive review of the field of conflict studies. See Deddring (1976).

15. Some may argue that this is a 'selective' approach. Of course it is, reality can not be directly apprehended, it is mediated by representational mechanisms. Any mechanism can lead to false statements about an object, any information is always mediated information. The mechanism used in this book makes use of human perception. Perception, by those directly concerned, plays the decisive role in this study. For an interesting discussion in support of this view, see Fassnacht (1982).

2
From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution: The Problem-Solving Approach

Introduction

In the first chapter I have argued for the adoption of a broader perspective on conflict; a perspective which suggests the centrality of conflict to all social relations, and makes it clear that the term conflict can not be confined to overt violence only. I have also indicated that my concern is not the elimination, prevention, or suppression of conflicts, but rather their management. Many scholars, from a wide variety of disciplines, including law, sociology, politics, and anthropology, have attempted to understand, and analyze, the best means of managing conflicts. The aim of this chapter is to offer a framework for the study of a particular conflict management mechanism; namely, the pacific intervention of a third party. Conflict management by traditional means, such as isolating the parties, or adjudicating their differences, fails to deal with the underlying dimensions of conflict. The third party approach, described below, is commonly known as the problem-solving, or third party consultation approach. It involves specific skills, it requires innovative thinking and, if successful, it can get at the underlying causes of a conflict and permit its resolution.

As conflict, in its many forms, is a ubiquitous feature of human existence, third party intervention, as a general method of conflict

management, can take place in interpersonal conflict, industrial conflict, organizational conflict, and even international conflict.[1] Although the procedures of intervention may vary from one level to another, such interventions are predicated upon (a) the desire to minimize the destructive and dysfunctional components of a conflict, and (b) the desire to bring about a successful outcome integrating both parties' goals and objectives. This may be achieved when the parties concerned participate in designing the outcome, when they interact directly and in a cooperative mood, and when they are prepared to consider all the facts and feelings involved in the conflict. A successful third party has the knowledge and expertise to bring about these conditions.

Parties in a conflict situation are not usually in a mood for cooperation, indeed they may often wish to withdraw and cease communicating. They are also likely to be hostile, angry, and suspicious. Their general approach to conflict management is exemplified by the win-lose dynamics. This orientation has a number of rather predictable consequences. It encourages each party to manage a conflict so as to 'win' and it results in adopting such methods as appeal to authority, exploiting the other's weakness, resorting to rules, or submitting a conflict to a powerful third party.

Most of these approaches to conflict management are characterized by:

1. disagreement about means (e.g. my way of managing conflict v. your way)
2. a clear us-them distinction between the parties
3. each party sees the conflict from its point of view only
4. each party's efforts are directed toward a total victory
5. conflicts are usually personalized
6. disagreements are emphasized
7. negative stereotypes become prominent (Blake & Mouton, 1961).

In contrast to these, the problem-solving, or third party consultation approach to conflict management purport to change this win-lose orientation to one where both parties can accomplish

positive gains and get at the underlying causes of their conflict. It in approach which aims to resolve a conflict and not merely to settle it. (2) It is directed at the attitudinal and situational components of a conflict relationship, not merely at its behavioral manifestations. It is an approach which involves:

1. a focus on resolving the conflict rather than defeating the other
2. avoidance of voting, adjudication, or search for compromise
3. acceptance of conflict as natural, even helpful
4. a shift in attention from fixed solutions to goals and motives
5. collective responsibility for quality, and acceptance, of outcome.

Traditional third party approaches to conflict management (e.g. mediation or conciliation by a single individual) seem to perpetuate a win-lose relationship, with each party standing by its convictions and defending its positions. In many respects such approaches are normative, controlling, and judgemental, making sharp distinctions between right and wrong and defined in terms of fixed rules and values. Furthermore, such approaches affect only the behavioral component of a conflict relationship. The sense of tension and hostility beneath the surface behavioral antagonisms, will remain totally unaffected.

The ultimate objective of these interventions is to achieve a compromise settlement. The techniques available to an intermediary, seeking to bring about this objective, are assumed to be related to its 'negotiating power' (e.g. persuasion, pressure, interposition, etc.). The intermediary itself is ideally expected to be a prestigious individual, enjoying the full backing of a large organization, shuffling to and fro (and naturally manipulating the media skillfully), establishing his neutrality (sic) and offering last minute peace plans and face-saving formulae.

By the 1960's dissatisfaction with the traditional third party approach, and systematic insights into the nature of group dynamics, combined to permit a shift toward a problem-solving, or consultation-based approach to third party intervention. What is the basis of this approach? How does it provide a constructive alternative to

traditional approaches? What are its practical implications and effects? And just how relevant is it? This chapter will focus mainly on these questions.

Assumptions

Conflict

What is meant by the term conflict? The definition of conflict used in problem-solving approaches is very wide. Conflicts are essentially about values or resources. They are not 'built-in' to any particular structure, but rather evolve out of the interactions between the relevant parties. Conflict, therefore, is interactional. Neither fate, nor history, or a divine will create conflict; the parties themselves bring it about. Interactions result in conflict, and conflicts can stimulate a search for new methods and solutions which are mutually acceptable.

Conflicts, at any social level, are about values. Individuals, groups, or nations perceive certain values and goals which they wish to pursue. These may be scarce, material values (e.g. territory), or intangible values (e.g. prestige). Confronted with situations where they can not achieve their desired values, parties perceive themselves to be in a state of conflict and regard their conflict as being of a win-lose kind, in which each party is determined to win. The implication of this is that even though the parties' response may entail physical and social costs, it can not be defined as 'irrational', 'unjust' or 'immoral'. Parties' responses to their environment, and their choice of behavior, are based upon their own subjective perceptions of problems and values in that environment. The parties' perception of the conditions which exist between them enhance the likelihood of a conflict, or reduce it.

Perceptual processes may provide an accurate or inaccurate assessment of the conditions of interactions, and they may also determine the extent to which the parties will see their situation as a

win-lose or win-win situation. Thus, the concern of this approach to conflict can be described in terms of the following arguments:

1. an understanding of conflict requires a focus on the interactions between parties
2. conflict interactions, like other types of social interactions, represent a response to the parties' perception of their conditions and environment
3. conflicts are essentially subjective phenomena; they arise from the interplay of values and choices
4. conflict is a "…creative element in human relationship. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice, and opportunities for personal development can be achieved" (Burton, 1972:137)
5. the approach to conflict management should be designed so as to achieve a common perspective or perception
6. conflict can be successfully managed when both parties learn to change their perception of the conflict from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game (Cf. Hill, 1982).

Conflict Resolution

The possibilities of conflict resolution constitute a logical extension of the assumptions about conflict. Most approaches to conflict management are concerned merely with settling a conflict. The problem-solving approach to conflict management is designed to resolve a conflict. It can do so by (a) creating new options, or (b) getting the parties to treat their conflict as a shared dilemma. Either way involves changing perceptions and redefining goals and values. The problem-solving approach to conflict management focuses on perceptions, interactions, values, and needs (and not only on declared goals). it is an approach which is intended to go beyond marginal changes in a conflict situation; it goes for a fundamental change in each party's concerns, and the promotion of a collaborative conflict resolution process (Burton, 1969; 1972 (b); de Reuck, 1974; Mitchell, 1981; Hill, 1982).

A successful resolution demands a change in symptoms and underlying causes; in behavior and perceptions. It demands Abandoning power-oriented strategies which treat symptoms only, and embracing a participatory, analytical, and non-coercive approach which provides for the release of pent-up feelings and brings to the surface underlying values, motives, and perceptions. By its very nature, conflict resolution is a much more demanding and complex undertaking. Being so demanding and complex, the parties concerned may lack adequate knowledge, experience, or motivation to achieve this outcome. This is why the problem-solving approach is best implemented by a special third party (Burton, 1983).

Third Party-Based Interventions

The Third Party in Conflict Management

The problem-solving approach is based on interactional and perceptual assumptions. It is also based upon the presence and activities of a third party providing a certain input, or direction, to the parties1 own conflict management efforts. The third party is to be utilized in such a manner as "to transform the conflict from a confrontation to a problem-solving exercise" (Burton, 1972 (a):140). This transformation can be achieved when a third party, emphasizing the needs of resolution and acting as a catalyst and facilitator, introduces "knowledge about the nature of conflict generally, the problems of perception, the processes of escalation, the confusion between role behavior and personality, the errors in costing objectives and other aspects of it" (Burton, 1972 (a):141). The emphasis of a third party is on facilitating the process of creative problem-solving (Fisher, 1972).

A basic idea of the problem-solving approach is that a third party, fulfilling a wide range of catalytic and analytic functions, is more than an extension of the parties1 own conflict management; it is in fact an input designed to alter their perception, nature of decision making,

and the very structure of their interaction. The interdependency between an intervener and conflict parties translates itself, in practice, into transition from conflict to conflict resolution and in increasing effectiveness in group discussion, leadership, decision making, and other interactional skills. Schematically, the relationship between a third party and the conflict parties can be represented as shown in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1 A Third Party in Problem-Solving Intervention

The critical stage in the whole process concerns the definition of the dimensions and procedures of conflict management as undertaken by a third party. Without a detailed stipulation of the substantive issues and the expected patterns of behavior involved in the process, we may be in danger of indulging in compulsive idealization. What, then, are the practical requirements which are consonant with the problem-solving approach and form the basis for maximizing the impact of a third party?

Conflict as a Problem

Within the context of conflict management there is usually a discrepancy of views, attitudes, and perceptions between the conflict parties. There may also be a discrepancy between a third party and the original protagonists. The existence of a continuum of systems of beliefs, each different from the other, to which each party clings tenaciously, can accentuate a competitive, win-lose pattern of conflict management. It can also produce behavior that is defensive, evasive, inhibited, and norm-oriented (in order to strive for, and maintain, a positive distinctiveness). The first challenging dilemma for effective intervention, therefore, is how to stimulate a socially shared system of beliefs and reduce the saliency of the distinction between us-them, ingroup-outgroup. One way the perceived differences between the parties may be minimized is through contact, communication, and the simple expedient of identifying their conflict as a common problem.

Focusing on conflict as a problem to be resolved, rather than as the problem, helps the parties in a number of ways. It provides them with a new cognitive map which allows them to move away from the trap of fatalism or determinism. When a conflict is looked at as a problem to be resolved, learning and diagnosis are possible; as is confrontation of seemingly intractable issues. The focus of conflict-as-a-problem is on a shared system of beliefs in the availability and desirability of a satisfactory outcome. The parties create a conflict; they can also design and utilize conditions that approximate success in the transition from a given situation (i.e. problem) to a desired situation (i.e. problem resolution) through a process of thinking, learning, and changing (i.e. problem-solving).

The idea that interpersonal, intergroup, and international conflicts be defined as problems should not be taken to mean that problems are failures; on the contrary, it should imply that problems produce the experience of a challenge. Helping the parties to devise appropriate behavioral responses to the perceived challenge is one of the main tasks of a third party. In extending the use of problem-solving to conflict interactions, it is clear that the success of this process is dependent upon the parties' social skill and competence, their increased sensitivity, and understanding of the nature of conflict (e.g. misperception, mirror-images, subjective conflict, need to recost

values, etc.). It is also dependent upon their willingness to explore freely the information available, and on their mutual desire to search for a satisfactory solution (rather than accept a coercive settlement). It is dependent upon their belief that everyone is of equal value, that differences of opinion are helpful, that the other party may be trustworthy and cooperative, and that the energies of each party may be directed to defeating the problem, rather than each other (Filley, 1975). A third party can arrange optimum conditions that facilitate these beliefs.

Problem-solving activities constitute an ideal form of decision making (by decision making I mean making a choice among alternatives; problem-solving implies a creative solution). Problem-solving involves two or more parties going through a sequence of episodes, from problem definition to a consensus decision, until a mutually preferred pattern of interaction has been generated. Under normal conflict-interactional circumstances, groups generate low levels of competence; under a problem-solving cycle, high levels of solutions and implementation strategies may be generated. Problem-solving produces a context that can bring conflicting parties together in a minimally evaluative, minimally attributive context. Such a context allows parties to be open to issues and ideas that would otherwise remain unexplored, and to pursue certain lines without much embarrassment or inhibition. In such a context conflict parties can learn, within a relatively short time, new modes of behavior for resolving their conflict.

As a conflict management strategy aimed at the attitudinal-cognitive components of a conflict relationship, the entire process can be conceived as having two major dimensions, (a) the understanding process, and (b) the solving process. The understanding process refers to the parties' efforts to attain an understanding of their interaction that is coherent, adequate, rational, and well-connected to their external environment (i.e. that there is some congruence between the parties' own internal world and the world outside them). The solving process refers to a process of search through a space of alternative decisions, their evaluation and an agreement on a single, mutually-preferred alternative (Maier, 1970).

For a problem to be understood, the parties must surmount some of the barriers to communication which so distort a conflict situation, they must be able to perceive accurately, even under stress, and they must be encouraged to express their feelings and misgivings. This involves defining the problem and obtaining as much undistorted information as possible. Once the locus of the problem has been accurately perceived and agreement concerning its nature has been secured, the parties' efforts focus on exploring the causes and possible courses of action. Throughout this process, a third party uses conflicting parties as information-generating sources, encouraging them to express and clarify their views, providing cues, and generally sensitizing the:n to the requirements of effective conflict management. Viewed as a whole, these various aspects may be depicted diagramatically as in Figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2 Problem-Solving and Third Party Intervention[3]

In an ideal world there would be no need for a third party. Conflicting parties would be aware of the advantages of problem-solving and cooperation and would have the necessary knowledge and experience to meet the situational (e.g. learning context), emotional (e.g. trust), and rational (e.g. exploring all alternatives) requirements. Our world, alas, is far from ideal, and the process of

problem-solving is most likely to be effective when it involves the intervention of expert outsiders.

Objectives of Intervention

Within the over-riding objective of acting as 'input variables' to resolve a conflict, third parties have immediate and long-term objectives. The former include the promotion of communication and other interaction skills, the latter include a satisfactory resolution of a conflict. Third party interventions are designed to establish, enforce, and exemplify problem-solving interactions. At the broadest level, the objective of a third party may thus be defined as facilitative - to facilitate communication, exploration, and problem-solving. A third party can be regarded as a catalyst entering into a supportive relationship with the parties through which it can achieve (a) a context, or a situation, in which the parties will have the freedom, opportunity, and motivation to explore their conflict, (b) a pattern of interaction that is open to new ideas and new information, and (c) an increased awareness of, and willingness to, revise beliefs and their interactional consequences. What, then, are the more specific role requirements or functions which are at the core of the third party approach and which act to move conflict management forward toward problem-solving?

To fulfil its pattern of expectations, a third party must establish "the conditions in which negotiations will lead to a deescalation and avoid escalation of the conflict, extend the range of choices of functional cooperation and present the conflict as a problem to be solved and not as a contest to be won" (Burton, 1969:157). These can be achieved by specific behavioral interventions combined with a variety of supportive activities within a specific context.

1. The development of a sense of mutual positive motivation is undoubtedly important in helping to push the problem-solving process forward.[4] A third party can induce and maintain mutual positive motivation. It can do so by creating an atmosphere of trust

(Walton, 1969) in which the parties neither fear nor engage in naming and blaming. Furthermore, a third party can maintain just the right level of tension by controlling the physical (e*g. remove parties from their highly-charged conflict environment), or the psychological (e.g. avoid stereotypes and negative evaluations) dimensions of conflict management. An atmosphere of trust, balance in situational and motivational power create the conditions in which cognition is less rigid and communication less distorted. They also constitute an important element in the emergence of a shared system of beliefs between the parties and their readiness to tackle a conflict as a joint task. Positive motivation is a constructive element accentuating considerations of common values, interests, and problems.[5]

2. Another type of specific third party objective is the focus on the diagnostic process, learning and analysis, and the supply of useful concepts and models concerning conflict processes. This can be described as the informational or diagnostic aspect of third party intervention. It is

> …useful not only in keeping the discussion moving in constructive directions, but also in transmitting to the participants a potentially effective tool for problem-solving. Participants are encouraged to engage in process analysis themselves and thus to acquire a more analytic stance concerning their own and other members' interactions.…The ability to step aside and observe the ongoing interaction process is particularly valuable in the resolution of intergroup conflicts. (Kelman, 1972:191).

The information-feeding or diagnostic pattern of behavior is central to third party activity. Emphasis is placed on diagnosing origins and basic issues and moving away from the highly repetitive interactions and usual accusations and justifications which characterize many conflict situations. Injecting ideas, observations, and information on which a new learning can be built, contributes to more constructive communication and stimulates self-diagnosis and dissociation from the less productive aspects of a conflict. Rather than conveying information from one party to another (at the danger of alienating either of them), a third party, adopting this mode of intervention,

offers both parties information (both general and specific) on the origins, manifestations, and escalation of social conflicts. It is on the basis of such information that the parties can begin to identify their problems, understand the nature of their conflict, and reassess their attitude to it.

3. To keep the process of conflict management moving in a constructive direction, a third party exercises control over the ongoing process and regulates the interactions. This objective has several aspects, all of which are concerned with the things the parties do to, and with, one another. A third party may, for instance, note that parties are reverting back to the usual standard of accusations and argumentation, in which case it may have to reestablish a problem-solving attitude. A third party may direct interactions to ensure that they do not display the predictable consequences of a win-lose orientation, or become counterproductive. A third party, generally speaking, guides the interaction and synchronizes the parties1 conflict management efforts.

The process of conflict management is a dynamic process, passing through a number of phases. Parties customarily go through a stage of 'differentiation' (e.g. justifying their viewpoint, emphasizing differences), before they are ready to proceed to the next stage of 'integration' (e.g. diagnosis of common problems, common goals, and a search for resolution, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; Walton, 1969). A third party, refereeing the interactions, can control precipitous action and shift the interactions from one stage to another, thus preventing the emergence of a vindictive win-lose orientation and maintaining focus on redefining values, norms, and standards.

4. Communication is undoubtedly a primary ingredient, and a primary casualty, of conflict management interactions. If conflict parties are to learn anything about each other's motives, preferences, and expectations, they must communicate such information, and do so in good faith. One of the most important aspects of third party's behavior is improving communication (by which I mean increasing both its quantity and quality) between the parties.

Conflict situations are usually typified by hostile perceptions, antagonistic attitudes, and decreasing communications. Parties in conflict are reluctant to divulge genuine feelings or offer accurate information. This makes it very difficult for conflict resolution to occur. Promoting openness in dialogue and improving communication becomes an essential prerequisite to effective conflict management. A third party can enable such openness to develop by maintaining contact and reducing perceived threats, risks, or antagonistic evaluations. Openness in interactions increases the exchange of communication; it also increases its effectiveness (e.g. reducing the gap between intended and received communication signals). Only when the parties are engaged in a reliable communication process, can they deal with their misperceptions, misunderstandings, and misapprehensions. Improved communication is an important ingredient in the management of conflict.

Improving communication is placed above any other third party functions by Virginia Satir (1967) in her study of interpersonal conflict. It is described by Fisher as one of the most pervasive third party functions "…since it is required to clear up initial misunderstanding, to make accurate diagnosis possible, to explore alternative means, goals and areas of communality and so on….it is essential to all stages of the process and is basic to the success of the other functions" (Fisher, 1972:85). Whether intervention occurs before, during, or after a conflict the objective of conflict resolution appears to be best achieved through information sharing and improved communication.

The emphasis on improved communication is most forcefully expressed in the work of John Burton (1969, 1972 (b)). Indeed Burton goes as far as contending that all conflicts are the products of misperception and misunderstanding (1979), and can only be resolved when the parties in conflict can meet, in the presence of a third party, to analyze their relationship, communicate their intentions and expectations, and explore new options without prejudice or pre-commitments.(6)

How can a third party act so as to improve communication? There are various supportive activities which a third party may undertake. It

can elicit observations, ask for information, it can translate and clarify the parties' demands and priorities. It can offer useful summaries and identifying issues that might be helpful in adopting new perspectives. It can impose a minimal structure on the discussion, and arrange conditions that facilitate contact, learning, and exploration. The expertise of a third party lies in understanding conflict and the dynamics of a social relationship, and being able to establish a relationship that would encourage the parties to call upon, and share, their feelings, beliefs, and attitudes.

These four functions serve as the core strategies of third parties in problem-solving interventions. They are operationalized, as indicated above, through specific tactics, and they purport to achieve, explicitly or implicitly, the general objective of conflict resolution (e.g. a change in attitudes and a change in behavior). Different scholars allude to these functions in a different way (see Burton, 1969; Fisher, 1972; Eiseman, 1977; Kelman & Cohen, 1979), they are all, however, agreed that these functions can only be implemented within a specific setting and that they call for special procedures.

Setting and Procedures

Setting and Structure of Intervention

None of the third party's functions or supportive activities can actually be carried out unless the essential physical and social arrangements are present. Individuals and groups in conflict situations tend, on the whole, to enact out roles which are commensurate with their setting and psychological climate. When the setting is both official and close to the conflict, the parties will be under immense pressure to behave in a norm-oriented fashion, repeating, and justifying ad nauseum, their official and publicly-declared positions. When, however, the setting and the psychological climate are so designed as to remove the parties from the pressures

they normally feel, the parties may be able to concentrate on the task at hand. An appropriate setting gives the parties the freedom, opportunity, and impetus to engage in innovate thinking and behavior.

Setting. Given the logic of this approach, the setting for intervention must be physically apart from the location of the conflict. It should be a setting which favors neither party and which frees them both from an emotion-laden conflict environment. Insulation from the conflict environment and balance in situational power can reduce stress and tension, inspire confidence and credibility, and allow the participants to consider, in their 'cultural island', new ideas and engage in collaborate problem-solving in a free and relaxed manner.

A neutral location is obviously necessary to bring the disputants together. The site itself must be suitably isolated (so as to avoid tempting distractions), yet comfortable, informal, and spacious. A luxurious hotel or a university setting would be most valuable and satisfy these requirements. In addition to that an appropriate setting must "combine the partially contradictory characteristics of novelty and realism. A novel context is essential to override the norms that generally govern interactions between conflicting parties …But if the new ideas and the new learning are to find their way into the policy process, then the novelty and insulation of the setting must be balanced by realism" (Kelman & Cohen, 1979:300).

An appropriate setting for problem-solving interventions is one that combines the elements of neutrality, isolation, informality, and flexibility (Kelman, 1972). If these features can be achieved, the right psychological climate for maximizing mutual acceptance and understanding may be created.

Structure and Proceedings. The structure and proceedings of problem-solving interventions are as important, to the analysis and resolution of conflict, as the setting. The structure of intervention is characterized by informal and direct, face-to-face interactions.(7) Symmetry between conflicting parties is maintained throughout the

process. Spatial arrangements are organized so as to elicit cooperative forms of behavior (e.g. reducing physical boundaries by sharing the same table, for instance, may minimize the split into opposed factions),[8] and the entire tone of the structure encourages parties to interact with minimum risk and maximum commitment.

The proceedings of intervention emphasize analysis of conflict, rather than conflict rhetoric. The pattern of intervention passes through the following stages; (a) inviting the participants or their representatives to state their positions without interruptions, (b) stimulating discussion of the main issues as presented, (c) focusing on central issues and discussing various possibilities for their resolution, and (d) expanding areas of shared perception and resolving conflict.[9]

The proceedings of problem-solving interventions are not bound by a tightly-controlled agenda. Participants respond to the discussion as it unfolds. There are no formal guidelines or formal leadership roles. Participants have frequent, and adequate opportunities for private discussions, with, or without, the third party. The proceedings usually last several days with participants meeting for, several hours each day.

Taken together, a third party prepares the groundwork for these proceedings through various devices which engender a facilitative atmosphere. Such devices may include formal or informal lectures, role-reversal and other simulation games, interviews, observations, training groups, and offering a wide variety of theoretical inputs (Doob, 1975). The mixture of these devices will, it is hoped, allow the parties to understand each other's points of view, communicate more effectively, and move toward conflict resolution.

Whichever way we look at problem-solving interventions, their structure and proceedings are very different from traditional third party approaches to conflict management. They offer more flexibility and serve to guide the parties in the direction of conflict resolution and functional cooperation.

Participants

The problem-solving approach to conflict management is not meant to apply to certain conflicts only; virtually every conflict, every social problem can be influenced in this manner (Burton, 1979). The only requirement for the success of this method relates to the identity of those involved in the effort.

Conflict Parties

To facilitate success in problem-solving interventions, the parties directly involved must be identified,[10] available, and willing to engage in serious conflict management. When the parties involved are individuals, the problem of identification is a minor one only. In such instances it is advisable to have the individuals involved free themselves, temporarily, from some of their other duties and participate in this effort for as long as is required. The problems are confounded when we deal with group conflict.

Groups in conflict do not normally seek out innovative approaches to conflict management. To have any effect, problem-solving must break the cycle of polarization and escalation by dealing with group members who are, directly or indirectly, influential in their groups and can affect its policies (otherwise, the whole exercise is no more than an irrelevent academic game). Ideally group leaders and decision makers should be involved, but this is usually not possible. So the individuals involved must be able representatives of their group, with some access to decision making and some power to implement what they may learn.[11] Conflict resolution is not possible unless one deals with people who have the legitimacy and authority to affect attitudes and behavior.

Parties to a conflict should be invited by the interveners, or submit their conflict to them. In either case, they should be selected with care to reflect the wide variety of all vested interests. Potential parties should be eager to learn something new and be willing and able to try and utilize a new approach to their conflict. They should be prepared to talk about their conflict and explore its implications even though that may engender some Stresses and tensions.

Psychological readiness is a prerequisite in approaching or inviting the conflict parties.

Apart from acting as a representative, being influential, stable, and psychologically ready, there are no precise criteria for establishing standards for selection or recruitment. The process is, after all, totally voluntary and it is not all that common to come across persons of good will in conflict situations. The problem of how to identify, attract, and recruit appropriate conflict parties requires tremendous insight and wisdom on the part of all concerned.

Third Parties

Third parties in problem-solving are clearly distinguishable from parties engaged in mediation, conciliation, or other traditional forms of going between the parties. Their goals, motives, attributes, and resources are quite different to those of a traditional mediator. What, then, are some of the features which characterize a third party in problem-solving interventions?

Deutsch, discussing some of the desirable attributes in a third party, suggests that third parties can help in resolving disputes constructively to the extent that they are known, readily accessible, prestigious, skillful, impartial, and discreet (Deutsch, 1973:388). Burton, likewise, comments that an

> effective mediator at the small group, the international level and at all levels between, is the trained and experienced professional whose authority, like the authority of a doctor or any other professional, is based not on his official role or backing, but on his professional skill (Burton, 1972 (a):141).

A third party is therefore a professionally experienced person whose motives for intervention are not related to his/her desire to dominate the parties, but rather to bring them together and help them resolve their conflict. The parties concerned know that they will not be manipulated, they have confidence in the third party.

> The professional and personal qualities attributed to the third party which give the principals confidence in entering a confrontation and which facilitate

> confrontation processes include (a) diagnostic skill, (b) behavioral skill in breaking impasse and interrupting repetitive interchange, (c) attitudes of acceptance, and (d) a personal capacity to provide emotional support and reassurance (Walton, 1969:131).

The skills demanded by this process are not the skills which statesmen and diplomats normally bring with them. These are more the skills of academic experts or applied behavioral scientists, with knowledge of conflict dynamics, communication, perceptions, and group dynamics. A third party must have such skills if it is to achieve its goals. It must not be seen as an 'ivory tower intellectual', but as an effective professional, capable director, respected administrator, and expert researcher. It is doubtful that any one individual can fulfil these roles.

A skilled, informed, and experienced third party must therefore be a group of professionally qualified facilitators. Some would have to provide an inventory of required skills, others to observe, and yet others to train and administer. The individuals comprising the third party work as a team. The demands placed upon a third party in problem-solving are great; only a panel, or a group of individuals, acting with fairness and with a high degree of engagement, can facilitate attitudinal and behavioral change and move the parties toward conflict resolution (without, in any way, making any suggestions, or offering any promises along the way).

To these qualities of professional expertise and specialized knowledge, one must add the quality of perceived impartiality. A third party should not be identified with any particular point of view, or any conflict party. This is why an institutional connection with a teaching (e.g. university) or professional (e.g. marriage guidance) organization is so helpful. An intervener who represents an organization with an impartial and trustworthy reputation (e.g. Quakers) and is patient enough to understand the many frustrations of the process will be seen as having the requisite resources to act as a panel member.

Problem-solving is an intensely personal and emotional approach to conflict management. Its success, or failure, may very well depend upon the identity of the participants.

Applications

A number of scholars employed this method of conflict management in various settings. Although there may be a considerable variety in the way the method has been applied, all these applications involved professional social scientists acting in a facilitative way to achieve conflict resolution.

Satir (1967), Walton (1969), and Blake & Mouton (1976) describe a comprehensive range of intervention alternatives by applied behavioral scientists in interpersonal conflict. Blake & Mouton (1964) and Muench (1960) describe a number of workshops in which labor and management were helped by a third party to examine their perceptions, diagnose their relationship and transform their conflict from a win-lose to a problem-solving approach. Levi & Benjamin (1977) and Lakin (1969) describe a successful application of this model to Israeli Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. And Doob & Foltz (1973) applied this method to Catholics and Protestants living in Belfast.

Several attempts have been made to apply the problem-solving method to international disputes. Burton (1969) attempted to employ the techniques of problem-solving in the conflict in Cyprus. Doob (1970) carried out a succesful problem-solving workshop in Fermeda with Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Somalian representatives. Kelman & Cohen (1979) develop a problem-solving approach to the Middle East conflict. Fisher (1980) uses a similar approach in the India-Pakistan conflict and Wedge (1970) reports on this form of intervention in the Dominican Republic.[12]

Outcomes

Problem-solving interventions are designed to provide the parties with the opportunity, skill, and knowledge that will enable them to transform a win-lose situation into a win-win situation. Such an

outcome can be viewed on two levels; one entailing a change in the attitudes and behavior of the participants, and the other entailing a change in the ensuing policy process. Even if we could have information on these aspects of the process, it is clear that a considerable time will elapse before the intended, or unintended, consequences of such interventions can be assessed.

The third party approach outlined in this chapter is more concerned with the input variables than with an analysis of outcome dimensions. It simply assumes that knowledge and skill can be transferred, and that this transfer will lead, in the long-run, to a better outcome. The problem-solving approach, it is held, will lead to a creative decision, not merely a compromise, avoidance, or a settlement.

In more specific terms, problem-solving interventions may lead to the following results:

1. the parties learn to understand each other's point of view, assumptions, and expectations
2. the parties learn some principles of conflict and group dynamics
3. the parties learn new principles to regulate their interaction
4. the parties learn more about their conflict
5. the parties review their attitudes and feelings
6. the participants establish strong interpersonal bonds
7. the parties engage in open discussion of all alternatives
8. the parties develop communication skills
9. the parties change their actual policies.

Evaluating conflict outcomes is one of the most problematic issues. Outcomes may have different meanings for different participants, or they may take a long time in manifesting themselves. It is also impossible to say, unequivocally, whether a particular outcome is directly and exclusively attributable to a particular form of third party intervention, or whether it is the product of specific interaction conditions. Furthermore, we can not always observe the change which may have occurred, nor can one invariably accept as totally truthful the parties' comments that they have changed. In the absence of an adequate body of studies with control groups, we can

only conclude that the success or failure of such interventions is extremely difficult to determine, and may depend on factors extraneous to the interveners.[13]

Conclusion

I have tried, in this chapter, to discuss what is meant by conflict management and to suggest a third party approach to conflict management which is based upon the principles of social interaction and a distinction between settlement and resolution. The approach, commonly described as problem solving, uses third parties in a special role; a role designed to facilitate analytic and collaborative interactions and to transform a confrontation into an instance of cooperation.

Most approaches to conflict management have an element of coercion, norms, or laws built into them. The third party approach described above is meant to represent another, and more successful attempt, to deal with conflicts effectively and constructively. Such an approach is not meant to be a panacea, nor offer total solutions. It is meant to be an alternative approach to traditional, diplomatic efforts and interparty negotiations. Unlike traditional efforts, problem-solving interventions are not designed to reduce the negative effects of cognitive differences and competitive orientations in conflict management, they are designed to affect the manner, tone, and entire context of interactions.

The assumptions governing this approach and the procedures determining its applications, in particular the role of a third party, have been highlighted. The unique contributions of this form of intervention to conceptual knowledge about conflict management have been examined. In the subsequent chapters I propose to ascertain its validity and contribution to the policy process by moving from the level of abstraction to the level of 'reality' delineated by these concepts and dimensions. This is the next logical step, for if we are to assess the applicability of the approach to a variety of conflict

systems, as well as its limitations, we have to move between the conceptual and empirical levels. There is no other way to answering important questions about third party intervention, or aiding its development than that of fusing researchers' concepts with practitioners' experience.

There are many questions which can be posed and many issues tackled about third party intervention (e.g. the influence of different third party techniques, the influence of different types of parties or representatives). But if the approach is not to remain essentially normative and applicable to experimental or simulation studies only, then we must shift our focus of investigation into the real world. Greater potential for experimentation and novelty in suggesting various methods are often achieved at a greater loss of 'realism'. Somehow this loss of realism must be redressed.

The study of third party intervention in particular and conflict management in general can benefit from real-world investigations. It is somewhat disingenuous of those advocating the problem-solving approach to suggest that we must adopt this approach because it is more successful than traditional approaches (is it?), and if we failed to adopt it, it would only reflect the entrenched interests of diplomats and others (Mitchell, 1973). We should perhaps adopt this approach (as indeed we should many other approaches, e.g. general and complete disarmament), but if we have not, or do not, could it be that there are some real problems with it? Problems which can not always be replicated in small, experimental settings? Could it be that it is no more successful than traditional techniques at managing conflict? Do we really have only these two approaches (e.g. problem-solving v. traditional approaches) to conflict management? Can we really tell the difference between settlement and resolution and, if not, have we been examining a tautology or a normative framework?

There are, no doubt, many problems at the practical level. Hopefully some of them can be answered by investigating the process of intervention in situ. My choice entails foreclosure of other alternatives. The choice of a research strategy in which the focus is on third parties in a variety of conflict settings and an analysis of their opinions, their behavior, their evaluation, means that we have to

discard experimental, laboratory, or simulation-type research. Hopefully the sacrifice of certain issues will be offset by a gain in realism and a move forward in the direction of comprehensive and relevant theory of third party intervention.

Notes

1. I assume throughout that conflict entails the existence of at least two analytically distinct parties, hence I do not concern myself with intrapersonal conflict.

2. A conflict is settled when one party decides to accept a loss, a compromise, or a binding decision. A conflict is resolved when it reflects both parties' values and interests, and satisfies them both.

3. Cf. Levi & Benjamin, (1977); Hill, (1982).

4. The term motivation is used here in a broad sense to refer to incentives, values, and motives which can lead the parties into an effective conflict management process.

5. A third party can induce positive motivation by acting as a source of insights on what is happening "here and now", removing fear and threats, and interjecting superordinate goals (Sherif, 1966; Walton, 1969).

6. For an analysis of the more traditional functions of mediation, see Stevens, (1962); Young, (1967); Wall, (1981).

7. The importance of face-to-face interactions can not be overemphasized. Individuals learn from interactions with other individuals (when they act as individuals, not as members or representatives). Burton (1969) notes that "without face-to-face participation in the consideration of proposals, there can never take place the complex adjustment of attitudes and perceptions that is necessary" (p.39).

8. Side-by-side arrangements favor cooperation, face-to-face arrangements elicit competition. On the relation between space and styles of conflict management, see Sommer, (1969).

9. For a detailed discussion of these somewhat ideal proceedings, see Banks (forthcoming).

10. Identifying parties to a conflict is not a trivial matter. It is particularly difficult when there is a need to reach a consensus on who is, or is not, a party to a conflict (e.g. Middle East, Northern Ireland).

11. Even such individuals will face the very serious problem of re-entry (maintain and transmit what they have learned in an isolated setting, once they are back in their own environment. On this see Bercovitch, 1977).

12. For a comprehensive account of the applications of this method, see Fisher, (1983).

13. In most of the experimental applications of this method, the only outcome appeared to be the absorption of desirable knowledge and increased understanding of the other's point of view.

Part 2
Third Party Intervention in Context

3
Interpersonal Conflict and Third Party Intervention

Introduction

So far in this analysis conflict parties have been treated as abstract entities. I now propose to look at concrete parties (both participants and third parties) covering a wide spectrum of interactions. In particular, I am concerned with the experiences and views of third parties in interpersonal (e.g. marital conflict), intergroup (e.g. industrial conflict) and international conflict. I will attempt to examine what third parties do at each level of interaction, for what purpose, and how do they do it. In this chapter the context of intervention is determined by individuals, interacting as separate entities, within a marital framework. In subsequent chapters, groups and larger social systems will determine the context of intervention.

The Nature of Interpersonal Conflict

The idea that conflict is a phenomenon which may involve two or more individuals, rests on an a priori distinction between interpersonal and intergroup interactions. The former are determined by the interplay of individual characteristics, the latter by the interplay of individual and group characteristics. Conflict between a husband and a wife is an example of a real conflict situation whose

course and outcome is determined largely by the nature of each actor.

Interpersonal conflict, like other types of social conflict, may be realistic (e.g. 'objective' conflict over how to spend the family finance) or unrealistic (conflict as a symptom of some emotional frustration). It may have constructive consequences, or it may, when threat, distrust, and misperception are present, have very serious destructive consequences. Interpersonal conflict is generated because of a clash of personalities, desire of each person for more intrinsic, or extrinsic rewards, or because each wishes to exercise greater power and influence (Holmes & Miller, 1976; Wish, 1976). If interpersonal conflict is not to entail adverse behavioral and cognitive aspects, it must be properly managed. Proper conflict management is particularly important in marital interactions.

Marital Conflict

Interpersonal conflict within the family unit is an experience no one can avoid. Marital interactions, involving two or more different individuals, constitute a natural breeding ground for conflict. Marital interactions, unlike other interactions, affect the totality of an individual's existence. They are primary, unmediated interactions, with a high degree of involvement, mutual attachment, and emotional interdependence. They occur within a structure in which each person gives to, and receives from, the other values and resources. It is also a structure which generates considerable incompatibility and conflict between the two individuals who have inducements to remain within this structure (and gain income, affection, or status) or opt out of it (gain independence). Their success with conflict, management determines the quality and endurance of such interactions.[1]

Sources and Consequences of Marital Conflict. The sources of marital conflict are numerous. Some of the social relationships which can be suggested as the antecedent conditions of conflict include (a) personal differences, (b) competition for scarce resources, (c)

communication barriers, (d) imbalanced expectations, and (e) a change in the basic relationship (Blood, 1960). The antecedent conditions need not necessarily lead to conflict behavior, but they certainly create the conditions and opportunities for such behavior to arise.

The potential for conflict exists, therefore, in the very nature of marital interactions. Potential conflicts become manifest when either person becomes aware of an incompatibility in the interaction situation, or perceives an attempt by the other to block its goal achievement. The appearance of anger, aggression, and rigid conflict behavior is then occasioned by the emergence of an issue which acts as a conflict trigger.(2) Although conflicts may actually strengthen the bonds between the husband and wife, bringing them both together in a closer relationship, they may also escalate, intensify, and generally lead to behavior that is designed to injure, neutralize, or eliminate the other person (Sprey, 1969).

Once a conflict develops between two individuals who interact in a very intimate fashion, each may feel that it can only protect its own image and position by damaging the other's. Thus, once a conflict between family members becomes manifest, each may wish to challenge the legitimacy of remaining within that interaction structure, or to assert the primacy of its own values, goals, or decisions. The by-product of such a rigid cognitive pattern may well be to reduce each party's effectiveness and making it difficult for each party to handle their conflict rationally (Goode, 1971). The next step in the conflict process may well be that of direct violence between the parties concerned.

Violence, as an aspect of marital conflicts, can be expressed in a number of ways (Lystad, 1975). The most obvious of these is the resort to physical force. The extent to which family members, who are unsuccessful at conflict management, resort to violence and aggression, is truly startling. Although precise data on this form of behavior are obviously difficult to obtain with any degree of precision, studies done both in the U.S.A. and the U.K. provide some information on the magnitude of this problem.

Gelles (1974) reported that about 60 per cent of respondents in his study indicated that they had used physical violence on each other in the course of a conflict. O'Brien (1971), in a study of divorce applications, found that wives complained of physical violence against them in 36.8 per cent of all cases. And Steinmetz (1971), in a study of 49 families, found that 29 of these had used physical violence in the course of marital conflict. The problem is no less prevalent in the U.K. Freedman (1979), Gayford (1974) and Scott (1975) have all examined various samples of women, and found that at least 16 per cent of them had suffered from physical violence inflicted on them by their spouses.(3)

Another aspect of marital conflict, and one that likewise can be described as an attempt to manage conflict by adopting a win-lose (or even a lose-lose) method is avoidance or withdrawal. In either case, either person gets only a part of what it wants. Each party sees the conflict only from its point of view, and the parties remain conflict-oriented, rather than problem, or relationship-oriented (Norton & Glick, 1976).

Most individuals adopt conflict management strategies which do not emphasize aggression or withdrawal as a means of coping with conflict. The natural response to a conflict is to discuss it, outline various possibilities, and reach a solution acceptable to both parties. Conflict management by negotiation and discussion is the most frequently used method. Most individuals can go through a series of stages (e.g. identify issues, explore solutions, etc.), and arrive at a consensus on the most preferred solution. Occasionally, though, individuals may need outside help to go through an effective process of conflict management. It is at this point that third parties can be of considerable value in the conflict management process.(4)

The methods adopted by third parties in marital conflicts may vary from the relatively passive intervention, such as client-counselling, to the more directive form of intervention such as behavior modification. How useful are these methods? Do they enable individuals to manage their conflict more effectively, and if so how? How do third parties create the conditions for mature and rational decision making? What skills and expertise do they bring to bear and how do they utilize

them? To answer these, and other questions, in-depth interviews with twenty-four marriage guidance counsellors were conducted.[5] What follows then is an attempt to record the experience of third parties in a particular arena of interpersonal conflict.

The Process of Third Party Intervention

It is not unusual for individuals in conflict to seek a settlement by resorting to the adverserial mode. This may involve fault-finding, threats of violence, legal decisions, or other types of behavior which may well escalate the conflict. The intervention of a third party is an alternative to this approach. It is an attempt to offer a more constructive approach to conflict management, and to do so within a recognized, respected, and institutionalized setting.

Objectives of Intervention

Whatever the circumstances of intervention, the objectives of a third party in marital conflict can be defined as consisting of

> offering help to examine the present relationship and to give it more effective thought.…This is not merely an intellectual exercise; it must involve the feelings of the client.…(this) can be undertaken by (a) helping the client to feel safe enough to explore his part.… (b) trying to understand the difficulties facing the client and trying to help the client to understand these difficulties and what they mean to him, (c) exploring the nature of the relationship.…(d) offering time and skil(N.M.G.C., 1972).

Marriage counsellors who specialize in marital conflicts were asked to state their main objective; the following comments reveal the range of typical replies.

1. Our main objective is to help the family to resolve their conflict successfully.

2. As a marriage counsellor my main objective is to help each individual with the process of reaching a solution to their problem, not with the process of structuring a solution for them.

3. Our primary objective is to help both partners to cope with their present problem in their relationship as effectively and as satisfactorily as possible.

The primary objective of third parties in marital conflict seems to be, on the basis of this investigation, to stimulate existing personal resources and employ them in a constructive, and mutually satisfying manner. Although only a few studies link marital happiness with satisfactory conflict management (e.g. Patterson and Hops, 1972), one can suggest as Sprey (1971) does, that differences in the level of destructive behavior are associated not so much with different problems, as with different approaches to conflict management. Third parties attempt to identify obstacles to effective conflict management, release the intellectual and experimental resources possessed by each person, and try to direct these resources to achieving a mutually desirable solution. The idea being that a mutually acceptable solution can be achieved and that its achievement is dependent upon maximizing understanding and acceptance. A third party can help both individuals to develop a better understanding and to acquire the necessary beliefs and skills to manage the conflict successfully.

I have described the primary objective of third party intervention in marital conflict as helping individuals to recognize the value of their interaction, their resources and skills, and increasing their saliency by drawing on them in an equitable rate of exchange. Can one be more specific about this broad objective? Responses have been grouped in terms of two specific categories which may be defined as (a) process objectives, and (b) outcome objectives. Process objectives refer to some elements of interaction, outcome objectives to the shape of a solution. Typical responses concerning process objectives included:

1. One of my first concerns is to establish a relationship of support and trust with both parties.

2. Each member must understand the process of interactions. This they can do through feedback and observations.

3. We must focus on the conflict and confront it at its roots. Working together each of us can support the other and get organized to manage conflict more effectively.

Responses emphasizing outcome objectives were fewer in number and concentrated on

1. the need to reduce anger, guilt feelings and emotional intensity,

and on the need

2. to ensure that no destructive behavior occurs during intervention, nor are negative feelings and attitudes allowed to dominate interactions. When these have been controlled, you can work toward an outcome with which both partners feel they can live.

Table 3.1 summarizes the objectives cited by respondents under the two categories of process v. outcome objectives.

Table 3.1 Third Party Objectives in Marital Conflict

PROCESS OBJECTIVES	OUTCOME OBJECTIVES
1. Establish empathy and communication with each individual.	1. Reduce conflict intensity.
2. Identify, diagnoze and clarify conflict.	2. Control anger and negative feelings.
3. Help parties to understand their interaction.	3. Foster new solutions.

PROCESS OBJECTIVES	OUTCOME OBJECTIVES
4. Introduce concepts and notions and act as an interpreter, activator and challenger.	
5. Help members to apply interaction skills to their conflicts.	
6. Serve as a reality-testing instrument.	
7. Facilitate communication.	
8. Enhance each member's decision making.	
9. Maximize motivation to participate in decision-making.	
10. Provide emotional support.	

The much greater emphasis on process objectives is indicative of the underlying approach of third parties at this level. It is an approach which is more concerned with helping individuals go through an effective conflict management, than with promoting specific, and seemingly desirable, out-comes. Third party intervention is designed, through the provision of specific inputs, to enrich a relationship, make it more cooperative, and more adept at conflict management. Such interventions, which are directed toward improving interactions and devising better ways of coping with conflicts, can be described as facilitative interventions. They facilitate, and support, a better structure of conflict management.

According to Meyer Elkin, the Director of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, the objective of marital counsellors is to serve families and "assist the husband and wife to focus on feelings and decisions, so that they may continue to exercise....in a constructive way" (Elkin, 1973:64). This a third party can achieve by acting as

> ....an agent for change in a variety of ways; he encourages full and complete discussion of problem-areas, he feeds back to the couple what he sees and hears and....serves as a model of communication....he encourages the couple to seek motivation that may have been outside their awareness, and as a resource

person he has knowledge…that may supplement his treatment of the couple (Bolte, 1970:39).

Third parties in marital conflict adopt a facilitative, non-directive mode of intervention. In doing so they have two distinct objectives, (a) to increase each person's ability to reflect on, and accurately perceive, their dyadic processes, and (b) to increase each person's capacity for effective conflict management. How can these broad objectives be translated into a behaviorally focused program of intervention? To answer this question, we have to know something about third party behavior.

Third Party Behavior

The tactics by which these objectives may be pursued are extremely varied. One way of classifying them is to examine them under a threefold heading of reflective, non-directive, and directive behavior (Kressel, 1972). Reflective behavior refers to third party's attempts to establish the groundwork for meaningful interactions. Non-directive behavior is designed to affect the psychological climate of interactions. Directive behavior, in contrast, refers to specific instances where a third party takes an active part in promoting, or influencing, particular outcomes. What is the distribution of these specific types of behavior in marital conflict?

Reflective Behavior

Reflective strategies are essential to the success of third party intervention. Such strategies establish the logic of intervention. They encourage discussions of antecedent thoughts and feelings, and they seek to lay the basis for translating a shared cognitive understanding into changing actions and reactions. A concern with reflective strategies was a pervasive theme in the counsellor's conceptualization of their behavior. It manifested itself in the following way.

1. Confidentiality. Establishing trust and gaining the parties' confidence is a prerequisite to any form of reflective behavior. Unless complete confidentiality was established, nothing further could be achieved. This was reiterated time and again by all respondents, of which the following is a typical example:

> As a marriage counsellor it is not my job to assign blame or responsibility, nor do I sit in judgment of the family. If I expect each of them to expose himself - intellectually and emotionally - the maintenance of confidentiality and the removal of the fear of public ridicule are absolutely paramount.

Confidentiality encourages self-disclosure and freedom to explore. Without these, the whole process is doomed to fail.

2. Non-evaluative. Related to the maintenance of confidentiality is the need to adopt a non-evaluative, non-judgmental stance. The significance of this aspect of reflective behavior can not be overemphasized. Whatever the implications of what is said to them, counsellors do not evaluate interactions in moral terms, but in terms of individual responses to a perception of a situation; in terms of the individual's values, and motives. Communication and understanding can only be enhanced when all classes of behavior are treated as by-products of perception and interactions, not as by-products of ingrained norms or rules.

3. Understanding. Before a third party can intervene effectively, (s)he must understand the context, as well as content of interactions. By understanding I mean (a) knowledge of the conflict environment, and (b) knowledge of each person's resources, feelings, and values. Several specific topics were mentioned by respondents.

1. One should listen very carefully to what a person has to say, how he says it and what he does not want to say.

2. Obviously one must listen in a patient and friendly manner, but one must also try and be critical.

3. We give neither advice, nor suggestions nor admonitions. We try to listen effectively, ask questions and not argue.

4. We try and display an attitude of curiosity which encourages each person to give more and more information.

5. Whenever possible, one seeks to clarify the feelings and meanings by asking questions, offering a summary or interpreting.

6. If the persons concerned are to release their feelings and emotions, they must be provided with constant support, empathy and reassurance.

The inventory of procedures available to third parties in their search for an understanding can be summarised as (a) procedures designed to enhance understanding of interactions, and (b) procedures designed to enhance understanding of self and motivation. Under the former category the following third party activities may be found;

a) searching for a definition of the conflict
b) contributing to an understanding of the relationship between perceptions, feelings and behavior
c) providing an attitude of support and acceptance
d) restating the contents of an idea
e) posing direct (is that what you want today?) or indirect (how do you feel about that?) questions
f) identifying and assessing cooperative elements
g) locating preferred options, and
h) guiding interactions in that direction.

Third party activities which pertain to the second category include;

a) clarifying feelings and motives
b) considering human needs, values and aspirations
c) discerning and defining a motivational orientation, and

d) providing encouragement and reassurance of the worth of each person's values and motives.

4. Diagnosis. The diagnostic aspect is a particularly important strategy of reflective behavior. A third party, attempting to identify what a conflict is all about, faces a number of problems. Individuals are often reluctant to divulge the true nature of their conflict. In many cases they may offer an incorrect or misleading self diagnosis. Individuals in conflict are extremely unrealiable guides; if they are to be helped, their conflict must be diagnosed accurately.

Although some respondents felt that diagnosis was beyond the scope of the third party activity, most have accepted the need to

> listen to each other and be as passive as possible. You can not, however, maintain this for long. Having listened and noted what each is saying, you try, without allowing it to affect the whole process, to expand their understanding by suggesting what is happening here and now.

Diagnosis may introduce a new input into the conflict management process, but it is an input that is essential if the parties' misrepresentation of their conflict is not to result in a destructive pattern of conflict.(6) Diagnosis represents an attempt to expand understanding and to educate each of the participants about the nature of their situation.

5. Information. During the course of intervention, individuals may talk about (a) objectives, concepts, and ideas, (b) other people, and (c) themselves. A third party may offer information in the form of opinions, interpretations, and clarification of feelings with regard to each of these dimensions. Respondents were found to favor giving information about the parties themselves rather than offering information about concepts, ideas, or other people. Information about self was evaluated as more important than other kinds of information.

The information which third parties provide may relate to facts, emotions, feelings, or orientation. In all cases, individuals who absorb such information become aware of the social matrix in which they

operate and the possibilities of achieving greater variety of preferred outcomes. Information-giving is a facilitative, reflective technique employed throughout the intervention process. It serves as an input, a reference point, and a 'strategy guide', orienting the parties towards a synergistic shift in their decision making in response to an interactional contingency. Figure 3.1 summarizes, in a graphic form, the main aspects and content of the informational function of third party behavior (the bounded area indicates contents of this form of behavior).

Parties in Interaction Communicate About —	Third Party Provides Information in the Form of—	Content	Affect
1. Concepts, Ideas 2. Other People	Clarification Interpretation	Unexpressed feelings	Negative feelings
3. Themselves	Additional communication	Expressed feelings	Positive feelings

Figure 3.1 Aspects and Contents of Third Party Information Role

The various aspects of third party reflective behavior can be represented, in ascending terms of behavioral involvement, as shown in Figure 3.2.



Figure 3.2 Third Parties Reflective Behavior

Non-Directive Behavior

While reflective third party behavior is designed to identify the underlying conditions of a conflict, non-directive behavior is designed to help both parties to interact more effectively and be more competent in their decision making. There are two important dimensions which relate positively to individual competence and effectiveness; (a) cooperative orientation, and (b) improved communication. Non-directive behavior purports to emphasize each of these dimensions.

1. Cooperative Orientation. A third party can increase the level of positive, cooperative orientation by reducing the level of tension and hostility. This can be achieved by clarifying the real sources of

hostility, shifting the focus from blaming others to focusing on one*s own feelings and, in the words of one of the respondents, providing

> a viewpoint which suggests that the parties in conflict are experiencing a challenge which can act as an occasion for bringing about change.

With a lowered level of anxiety and a reduced level of hostility, a third party may achieve the 'calming effect' that characterizes problem solving.

A third party may utilize various behavioral techniques to achieve a positive and cooperative climate for interactions. Many of these techniques will be discussed below in the section concerning the intervention structure. Here a few of these may be mentioned briefly. A third party can establish norms of equity and reasonableness. It can control accusations, anger, and instances of personal vengeance. In this way some of the most serious obstacles to effective conflict management may become less prominent and the whole flow of interactions may be eased by giving the individuals concerned a framework in which they can engage in non-adverserial conflict management (Kressel & Deutsch, 1977).

2. Communication. Encouraging communication and exploration of all aspects of the interaction was seen by respondents as one of their major contributions to the process of conflict management. Communication between both parties is facilitated when the levels of tension and anxiety are reduced and when the interactions can be made to focus on specific issues. It is also facilitated when the parties have a better understanding of their conflict and its place in their relationship. A third party can create the conditions which encourage a genuine process of communication.

Some respondents felt that communication could be facilitated by adopting a very passive stance:

> It is easy for me to lapse into a short sermon. I often feel like saying *Look here your real problem is…., but I don't. I just sit there, nod my head in agreement and ask each partner to go on talking and discuss whatever issue they desire.

Other respondents felt that communication could be encouraged by offering helpful information and reducing any evaluative feedback (thus stimulating openness).

> You can usually get the husband and wife to communicate if you don't describe their thoughts and actions as good or bad. This places a responsibility on them which, in a state of conflict, they can ill afford to cope with.

Overall, a third party's non-directive behavior creates a double bind where individuals become aware of a cooperative orientation and where they feel sufficiently open about their conflict, their attitudes and feelings, and about the need to communicate these to their partners. The likelihood of achieving a solution of high quality which is also mutually acceptable is dependent upon the success of a third party in stimulating such feelings and attitudes.

Directive Behavior

Directive behavior consists of substantive third party inputs to the process of conflict management. Such inputs may take the form of offering advice or suggestions, putting pressure on parties to accept a specific outcome, or issuing threats or promises in support of a particular course of action. Not a single respondent advocated, or accepted, the need to use directive methods. The following comment is typical of most of the replies:

> You are not there to argue in favour of something that may seem pretty obvious to you. Nor are you there to put forward your own views or ideas. You are there to listen, clarify and reassure, not to control.

Respondents felt that the nature of their intervention was essentially supportive. Directive behavior contradicted the tenets of supportive intervention. The process of conflict management, as practised in marital conflict, can not be expected to work constructively if a third party adopts a strong, directive attitude. A third party gets involved in conflict management so as to assist,

facilitate, and develop interpersonal skills, not to make suggestions about compromise, or advise against some courses of action.[7]

So far I have looked at third party's behavior by analyzing self-reported conceptualizations of marital counsellors. Another source of information involves unobtrusive observation. Observing interactions is remarkably difficult, particularly in so sensitive an area as marital conflict. To bring a measure of structure to such observations, I have relied on the Interaction Process Analysis system developed by Robert Bales (1950). This is still one of the most general and widely-used methods of organizing observational data. In offering an instrument which permits counting of specific types of behavior, it can help those scholars and researchers interested in the study of third party intervention to illuminate some dimensions of its behavior.

Bales's method, rooted in the observation of actual, interacting groups of people, classifies into twelve categories the actions or statements one person makes to another within a social situation. There are twelve categories and six primary dimensions (orientation, evaluation, control, decision, tension-management, and integration), with each dimension having a positive and negative category. There are also three 'meta-categories' which Bales defines as social-emotional area positive, task area, and social-emotional area negative. The unit act which was scored was a discrete verbal segment (i.e. one sentence). Each time a third party expressed a meaningful sentence, it was recorded in the appropriate category. A total of 400 units, representing ten separate cases of third party intervention, were thus recorded. Their distribution is presented in Table 3.2.

From this interaction profile, we can see that the largest number of observed third party acts pertain to the categories of providing an orientation and offering socio-emotional support. Such behavior can be described as consistent with the requirements of problem-solving interventions and can be characterized as reflective, non-directive, and non-evaluative behavior. Both third parties' narrative reporting and my own observations suggest that third party intervention in the area of marital conflict can be accurately described as being

conducive to promoting problem-solving interactions (see also Weiss et al, 1973).

Pacific third party intervention in marital conflict consists of a sequence of acts which seek to offer support and acts which seek to offer information and orientation. There are no attempts to reject, to ignore, to refuse, or to limit the behavior space of the parties. It is a method of intervention which offers a new input, or a net resource to the conflict management efforts of the parties. A resource that can lead the parties to choose an alternative response or an option after an integrative process of learning and introspection, rather than decide on a response which initially presents itself in a conflict situation. it seeks to affect both the means of reaching a decision and the quality of the decision itself and to this extent it promotes a problem-solving orientation by influencing the background, personal-cognitive factors as well as the process and outcome factors of conflict management interactions.

Another view of the process of intervention at the interpersonal level is provided by Florence Hollis (1967; 1972) who developed a typology of recording and processing acts of communication used in the intervention process. The typology rests on five dimensions of communications; (a) communication of a sustaining type, (b) direct influence communication (e.g. suggestions), (c) communication which concerns itself with description and exploration, (d) communication representing reflections on personal factors, and (e) communication which consists of reflection on the situation. Fifteen intervention cases were recorded and studied and the analysis revealed that third parties' communication was predominantly of type d (reflections on personal factors) and type c (descriptions, exploration, and ventilation) and was followed by communication of type a(communication of a sustaining type). This pattern of communication would seem to support the view that third party intervention in marital conflict is essentially reflective and supportive. It is closely related to the intertwined factors of increasing understanding and helping to focus, through sustainment, communication, and information, on mutually satisfying conflict-management interactions. When successful, such interventions lead

not to a compromise, yielding or dominance, but to a review and adjustment of feelings and perceptions, and a solution to which both parties are committed.

The Structure of Intervention

The relationship between a third party and marital partners is essentially supportive and is implemented in a number of specific

Table 3.2 Interaction Process Analysis of Third Parties in Interpersonal Conflict

Socio-Emotional Area Positive	CATEGORY	NO. OF ACTS	%OF TOTAL
	1. SHOW SOLIDARITY (e.g. gives help, reward, raises other's status)	24	5
	2. SHOW TENSION RELEASE (e.g. jokes, laughs)	56	11.7
	3. AGREE (e.g. accepts, concurs, understands, complies)	80	16.7
	4. GIVE SUGGESTIONS (e.g. give direction)	16	3.3
Give	5. GIVE OPINION (e.g. express feelings,wish, analysis)	80	16.7

Task Area		6. GIVE ORIENTATION (e.g. give information, clarifies, repeats, confirms)	96	20
	7. ASK FOR ORIENTATION (e.g. ask for information, confirmation)	32	6.7	
Ask	8. ASK FOR OPINION (e.g. ask for analysis, expression of feelings)	48	10	
Socio-Emotional Area Negative		9. ASK FOR SUGGESTION (e.g. ask for direction, possible way of action)	40	8.3
	10. DISAGREE (e.g. shows rejection, withholds help)	8	1.6	
	11. SHOW TENSION (e.g. withdraws help, anger)	-	-	
	12. SHOW ANTAGONISM (e.g. asserts oneself, deflates others)	-	-	

	TOTAL	480	100%

behavioral tactics. The process of intervention begins either when (a) an individual comes directly to a marital counsellor, or (b) when (s)he is referred to a counsellor by a medical or social agency.(8) A third party never initiates an intervention.

From the moment contact is established, third parties try to develop empathy and alert themselves to the major themes and concerns of the individuals. A third party has a better chance of developing empathy and encouraging openness, when the conflict environment and the structure of intervention reinforce such attempts.

The conflict environment is invariably a neutral location, usually the central or regional offices of the marital counselling service. The environment is generally comfortable and the atmosphere relaxed. The spatial features of the environment (e.g. furniture) are arranged so as to maximize proximity. Side-by-side seating was invariably preferred to the more conventional face-to-face seating. Such arrangements were described not only as comfortable and relaxing, but as capable of

> fostering an atmosphere of friendliness which may lessen the individual fear and anxiety and increase their willingness to talk about all the issues in question.

Related to the nature of the environment are such factors as secrecy and confidentiality. Respondents emphasized, again and again, the need to allay individual apprehensions and fears by assuring them of the secrecy and confidentiality of the process. There can be no individual commitment to this process without such assurances. Increasing the rate at which gestures of assurance are offered, was frequently cited as a factor that can increase the motivation of both partners to address themselves to some real basic issues.

Accurate exchange of communication is essential to the whole process. If this is to be achieved, individuals must be protected from

any outside intrusion. Such intrusions act as serious barriers. As several of the respondents noted:

> Nothing could hinder the effectiveness of a counsellor more quickly than the partners' knowledge that others can find out what is happening.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of secrecy and confidentiality in the course of third party intervention in marital conflict.

The process of intervention is organized around a number of sessions (usually 8–12), each of which lasts an average of 1½ hours. Initial sessions are devoted to clarifying the purpose and role of intervention. These are followed by a discussion of basic theoretical assumptions and an exploration of each other's thoughts and feelings on the antecedents of conflict and reactions to it. This sets the stage for the final phase of intervention which is designed to help both individuals to increase the rate at which they exchange meaningful and positive behavior.

In this context, a third party concentrates on helping individuals tell their perception of events, moving from general issues to specific issues, sharing feelings (and connecting them to experience), identifying obstacles (e.g. social taboos), enhancing communication and providing data. When this has been implemented successfully, both individuals may learn to communicate directly without subterfuge, to receive messages without misinterpretations, and to change patterns of troublesome and unproductive behavior. Conflicts can now be managed in a constructive way, by caring, redefining, and reallocating resources and responsibilities. A conflict situation precipitated an integrative search for an outcome that would meet the needs of both parties.

When individuals demonstrate that they can successfully follow through a constructive pattern, they may be able to proceed to the stage of decision making, planning, and decision implementation. This includes specific details of exchange (who will do what, when, and how). Although the process of intervention consists of several weekly sessions, held consecutively over a two-three month period, it is not a linear process, moving inexorably from one phase to another.

The role of a third party is primarily didactic and supportive. Such a role is often enacted

> ....in a pretty haphazard fashion. You may take one step forward and one step backward. You may begin the whole process with persons who unload their problems first, or with those who offer solutions. In general, though, we do try to move from problem through exploration to solution.

The structure of third party intervention at the interpersonal level provides a context which minimizes all the stresses and tensions affected by the physical and social factors of conflict management. By manipulating the neutrality of the setting, its informality and arrangements of interactions, by determining, in advance, appropriate time-boundaries and by meeting - alone - with the conflict parties directly, a third party can ensure that its intervention is embedded in a structure which reduces all dysfunctional aspects and creates the appropriate conditions for a transformation from a state of conflict to a state of conflict resolution. Third party intervention at this level seeks to operate in a stress-free environment. Such an environment tends to produce productive conflict management strategies and successful outcomes. The responses to a conflict and the transformation of inputs into outputs are more satisfactorily achieved within such an environment. It is also an environment in which a third party can offer sustainment, support, information, promote communication and exploration, and stimulate interpersonal competence and skills.

Attributes and Characteristics

What sorts of skills and characteristics do third parties have? What attributes do they themselves stress as being important in the course of implementing an intervention?

The emphasis on helping skills appeared in all the responses. When asked further about the meaning of helping skills respondents mentioned those shown in Table 3.3.

Personal characteristics are also important in designing and executing an intervention program. What do counsellors themselves report as essential characteristics? Table 3.4 provides the answer to that.

Such attributes are indicative of a non-evaluative, non-judgemental orientation. They do characterize persons with a high sensitivity, tolerance of ambiguity, high levels of empathy, generalized trust, willingness to cooperate, and low authoritarianism. These individual parameters are complementary to the process of problem-solving and creative decision making.

Table 3.3 Third Party Helping Skills

1. Clarifying	7. Displaying belief
2. Providing information	8. Moving from general to specific
3. Encouraging exploration	9. Sharing thoughts and feelings
4. Accepting others	10. Supporting
5. Identifying obstacles	11. Focusing on issues
6. Listening attentively	12. Offering empathy

Table 3.4 Personal, Self-reported Attributes of Third Parties

Personal Attributes	Cited by	% of Total
1. Accepting of others	20	83
2. Patient	20	83
3. Non-judgmental	18	75
4. Sincere	18	75
5. Friendly	17	71
6. Sensitive	16	67
7. Self-controlled	15	62
8. Compassionate	15	62
9. Tactful	15	62

Such attributes are indicative of a non-evaluative, non-judgmental orientation. They do characterize persons with a high sensitivity, tolerance of ambiguity, high levels of empathy, generalized trust, willingness to cooperate, and low authoritarianism. These individual parameters are complementary to the process of problem-solving and creative decision making.

As to acquired attributes, considerable emphasis was placed on experience of intervention. Replication, it seems, brings assurance to all aspects of human behavior. Other acquired attributes which may have a salutary effect on intervention effectiveness have been described as; knowledge, diagnostic skill, and performance ability. Respondents felt that the areas of knowledge most directly related to their effectiveness included group processes, individual psychology, effective communication, and behavior modification. Appropriate organizational affiliation (being attached to, and identified with, an organization of known impartiality and established expertise in the field of interpersonal conflict) was another attribute cited by most respondents as being of great importance.

When asked about the number of individuals who should act as a third party (one individual, or a panel of experts), I found that, without exception, respondents intervened, and preferred to intervene, in conflict situations as individuals.

> A relationship of one-to-one with family members is vital. The necessary climate for success can come about only on this basis.…If family members as individuals were faced with a panel of experts, they may well feel threatened and the panel members themselves may have to cope with possible rivalries or dislikes amongst themselves. A third party should definitely be a single person in our case.

An adequate identity influences third parties' ability to perform their functions and implement a successful intervention. From the insights gleaned from third parties' own responses, the foregone skills, attributes, and characteristics may be considered to be both necessary and desirable in undertaking an effective process of intervention. Characteristics such as sensitivity to others, attitude of acceptance, behavioral and diagnostic skill, high professional

experience (giving a third party high control over an intervention situation), organizational affiliation and personal knowledge and experience are all conducive to a successful intervention. The impact and effectiveness of third party interventions may be determined by such personal attributes and characteristics. Their importance should not be overlooked.

Intervention Outcomes

Does third party intervention make a difference to the outcome, and if so can it be documented in any systematic form? A discussion of conflict outcomes is the most problematic and the one that is most likely to be subject to bias (Gurman, 1973). This is because (a) the individuals concerned may have genuine difficulties about rating an improvement in their relationship, (b) third parties' observations are not totally disinterested, and (c) the difficulty of setting up controlled studies. Notwithstanding these problems, there remains a need to examine, albeit in a less than totally satisfactory way, the outcomes of intervention. Here I propose to look at this issue from a third party's standpoint.

How does a counsellor, acting as a third party, know whether his/her intervention makes any difference to a conflict situation? Very often a counsellor can offer no more than an informed judgment on a conflict outcome. It is hard to know when such judgment is wrong and when it is not. Generally speaking, respondents identified four possible outcomes, (a) divorce with a good relationship, (b) divorce with a bad relationship, (c) marriage with a bad relationship, and (d) marriage with a good relationship and suggested that either (a) or (d) could be considered successful outcomes and a definite step forward in the relationship.

More specifically, few respondents underlined their ideas about outcomes by stating that

> Intervention may be considered successful when both individuals learn to transcend the limitations and problems of this conflict, work through their own

resources and achieve an outcome with which they themselves feel satisfied.

Marital counsellors see their own intervention as effective when it produces a better coping ability and greater levels of adaptability. Personal, social, and marital adjustment count as examples of successful intervention. Bearing in mind the difficulty of devising any composite score to evaluate such interactional changes, it is perhaps surprising to note that in a study of 42 case records, outcomes were described, by third parties themselves, as successful in 18 cases (Bercovitch, 1980).

Despite the methodological handicaps concerning the problem of evaluating outcomes and effective interventions, Beck (1976) studied various improved aspects of marital interactions including improved communication, better handling of conflict, more reciprocity, and more satisfaction as putative by-products of third party intervention. Nearly two thirds of individuals (in a sample of 585 cases) reported improvement, following intervention, in such aspects as approach to problem-solving, perception of conflict, feelings about conflict, and ideas about handling it.(9) The marked changes in problem-solving abilities, reported by individuals, reflect the intellectual, facilitative, and supportive pattern of third party intervention in marital conflict.

Even in the absence of a control group, it seems reasonable to suggest that the intervention process, rather than other extraneous or random effect, is responsible for individual gains associated with better conflict management. The individuals' specific interaction with a third party provides the basis, and components, of a problem-solving approach to conflict. Although outcomes can mean different things to different people, there is no doubt that a third party is an example of a mechanism which can stimulate a creative shift in perceptions and behavior.

Conclusion

Traditional methods of managing marital conflict emphasize the adversarial model and rely on various norms and rules. Although this

model, suggesting as it does, the use of lawyers to reach a compromise, has certain advantages, the pacific and facilitative intervention of a trained counsellor offers many more advantages (Kressel et al, 1977). It promotes a thorough exploration of issues and stimulates fuller, and more accurate, communication. Rather than focus on faults, blames, and accusations (dominant adversarial themes), it focuses on trust, openness, and a comprehensive search for a mutually satisfactory resolution.

In this chapter I have attempted to describe the behavior of third parties in marital conflict. Self-reports of the subjects' internal states were utilized as a major source of information.(10) These reports, and other findings, are generally congruent with a path of intervention that is very closely associated with the problem-solving model. They suggest a pattern of intervention that is decidedly non-evaluative and nonjudgmental. An intervention that is concerned not with power balances, or specific outcomes, but rather with sustainment, reflection, and exploration. An intervention that is directed not toward a fixed amount of resources, but toward underlying values, motives, and attitudes.

In attempting to bridge theory, research, and application in the field of conflict management and third party intervention five bridging points may be identified. These are: values, problems, goals, parties, and behavior.

Values are those ideas which guide the approach of third party intervention and serve as a criteria for choosing activities. Such values postulate that interactions are a response to the parties' perception of their environment, that conflicts arise from ineffective feedback between the parties and their environment and can be resolved not by directives or habitual rules, norms and regulations, but by a creative and collaborative process of understanding and searching for a resolution. Problems refer to the orientation of intervention which defines a conflict as a problem in the interaction between the parties and their environment, and to the conflict management effort, focusing on it as a problem to be resolved by utilizing both parties' resources. Goals identify the objectives of intervention which may be postulated as the development of a

problem-solving orientation and enhanced conflict management interactions. The parties refer to the participants, which in this case are individuals directly involved and capable directly of changing their relationship. Behavior identifies the supportive-facilitative choice of actual intervention activities.

The process of third party intervention at the interpersonal level unfolds as a continuous effort to develop problem-solving interactions, to enhance task competence and to stimulate more effective decision-making procedures. Effective problem-solving requires resources and opportunities and a collaborative effort by socially competent actors. It requires direct and immediate access to the decision-making structure and a willingness to change its form. It deemphasizes external factors, bureaucratic rules of behavior and moral notions as causative agents in the process of conflict or conflict management. It emphasizes the recognition of a problem and the learning of new, and more productive, rules of interaction, rules which require rational planning, complete exchange of information, and new decision-procedures. The pacific intervention of a third party can translate these requirements into a practical set of goals, structures, and tasks, and provide the motivation, resources, and opportunities for their implementation. In essence this mode of intervention carries the conviction that individuals can know and do something about obstacles, difficulties, or problems in their interactions by looking forward towards a new, creative, and restructured pattern of decision-making, not by looking backward towards habitual or evaluative responses to their conflict.

There are, no doubt, some limitations on this mode of intervention. The mixture of behavior and strategies can work better in some situations. This approach may be only one way of helping individuals manage their conflicts. However, it appears, on the basis of our cases, that third parties find the ideas of this approach tailored to their particular area of application. They may well complement it with other approaches, but its importance and relevance to interpersonal conflict management can hardly be overstressed.

Notes

1. See Levinger (1976) for an extended analysis of this approach.

2. For a discussion of what these issues or circumstances and their significance as conflict triggers are, see Philips (1977), Blood (1960).

3. There is no doubt that the true figure is much higher and can not be gauged accurately because of the reluctance, by some parties, to acknowledge its existence. This point comes out quite clearly in the Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage, (London, HMSO, 1975). See also Borland (1975) and Revoize (1978).

4. Although a number of people may legitimately act as third parties (e.g. clergyperson, doctor, etc.), there is only one group of people who are exclusively concerned with marital interactions and marital conflict; marriage guidance counsellors.

5. Interviews lasted between one-and-a-half to two hours. There were twenty-six open-ended questions, grouped under five main headings; objectives, behavior, structure, attributes, and outcomes. All interviews were taperecorded, on the understanding that the information would be strictly confidential, and later transcribed.

6. The diagnostic aspect of third party behavior is a subtle exercise in introducing some elements to facilitate going to the locus of the problem. Much of it is very indirect (e.g. "Did I hear you say that?" "Is it possible that?" "Did you mean that?" etc.) and parts of it consist of organizing a summary of what has been said.

7. The temptation to engage in directive behavior is very strong indeed. Individuals in conflict wish to have advice, indeed they appeal for it and ask a counsellor for his/her own suggestions of an outcome. This is a temptation which most counsellors manage to resist.

8. In a study of 252 intervention cases, it was found that 133 (or 58 per cent) of individuals came directly to a counsellor and the rest were referred to it by a legal, medical, or social person. See Heisler, J. "Some of Our Clients", an unpublished research paper, London: NMGC, 1977.

9. On most items individuals reported improvement more frequently than did counsellors. Differential ratings further compound the problem of evaluating outcomes and effectiveness of interventions.

10. On the nature of self-reports as an important source of data in the social sciences, see Ericsson & Simon (1980).

4
Labor-Management Conflict and Third Party Intervention

Introduction

All aspects of human existence are interrelated. Within this totality of existence we can distinguish patterns of dynamic processes (e.g. social, physical, cultural) and a hierarchy of levels at which they occur. Thus, at one extreme we find interactions and relationships between individuals, acting on their own behalf, as autonomous decision-making units, while at the other end we have interactions and relationships between organizations that retain their basic socio-political identity, but cooperate in specific collective activities (e.g. alliances). In between these units, we have an aggregate of individuals, whose boundaries may be more or less visible (e.g. ethnic groups, labor, as against political parties or classes), whose duration may be temporary or permanent, and who interact with other aggregates of individuals within a functional, or organizational, framework. This structure provides the potential for the emergence group conflict and its management. What then are the characteristics of groups, and how do they affect the process of third party intervention?

Social Interaction in Groups

A group is an abstraction out of the total human reality. Its existence, though, can not be denied because it is an abstraction. Individuals learn, by experience and conditioning, to act together in groups. But a group is not just a random collection of individuals. It is an aggregate of individuals who have certain symbolic or material interests in common. Cartwright and Zander defined a group as a "… collection of individuals who have relations to one another that make them interdependent to some significant degree" (1976:46). Homans's classic study (1950) uses the criteria of (a) interactions, (b) sentiments, and (c) shared activities to define a group. Paul Hare's conceptualization of a group captures all the essential properties of a group. He observes that groups achieve a distinct identity as social actors when:

> 1. The members share one or more motives or goals which determine the direction in which the group will move.
> 2. The members develop a set of norms, which set the boundaries within which interpersonal relations may be established and actively carried on.
> 3. If interactions continue, a set of roles becomes stabilized and the new group becomes differentiated from other groups.
> 4. A network of interpersonal attraction develops on the basis of 'likes' and 'dislikes' of members for one another. (1976:5)

Although there is no definite cutting point in the continuum between a collection of individuals and a fully organized group, the term itself is commonly used to describe such social units as friendship cliques, teenage gangs, political parties, sporting teams, or work crews.(1) Some groups are formed spontaneously, others are established deliberately. Some are primary (e.g. small family group), others secondary (e.g. Association of University Professors). Individuals may, of course, belong to many different groups. The basis of their identification with, and affiliation to, a group is the expectation that, in their interaction with others, they will obtain rewards, resources, or values. Individuals enter the groups which have the greatest potential for providing them with values and

rewards. They expect their group interactions to facilitate the achievement of desired ends. When this does not occur, individuals may change groups or form new groups.

Group interactions are much more complicated than individual interactions, for their basic problem is to reconcile self with the collective orientation: the adjustment of ego-interest with the group-interest. To reconcile this ever-present dilemma, groups develop a process of social ordering which transforms multidimensional patterns and preferences into a single, relatively stable, arrangement. This social ordering is a dynamic process, introducing a qualitatively new dimension to the process of interaction between groups. The emergent whole, in group interaction, is more than the sum of its component parts. It manifests itself through the interrelated aspects of (a) group leadership, (b) group norms, and (c) group cohesion.

Group leadership connotes occupancy of official group positions, the commensurate control over group resources, and a dominant position in the group decision-making structure. Group leaders may be seen as gate-keepers who mediate the flow of inputs and outputs between a group and its environment. Group norms provide a direction and an underlying degree of regularity and predictability to group interactions. They are shared by all group members and are acquired in the course of acculturation and socialization.[2] Group cohesion refers to the process (normative or functional) through which individual members become integrated and so give their group greater strength, stability, and effectiveness. Cohesiveness enables a group to function as a whole in a manner that is not inherent in any of its parts. It establishes a high degree of solidarity and gives each group its own distinct collective identity. Group leadership, norms, and cohesion determine the process as well as the content of group interactions.

When two or more groups interact, conflicts will occur, sooner or later. Once a conflict becomes manifest, it may be expressed in cognitive terms (e.g. hostile attitudes) or behavioral terms (e.g. overt aggression). Whichever way it is expressed, the emergence of conflict accentuates differences between groups and produces internal pressures within groups. The result of all this is a stronger sense of

group identity and loyalty and a clear dichotomy of 'us' v. 'them' (or in-group v. out-group). Group differences become pronounced and interdependencies diminished. This is true of small groups and of large, or complex systems. It is the reality of intergroup conflict. Conflict between groups becomes institutionalized and legitimized by rules and norms. Whatever its origins, each group accepts the conflict, behaves in a discriminatory manner toward the other, and desires nothing more than to win the conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This pattern exerts a strong influence on the parties' approach to conflict management and the style of third party intervention.

Labor-Management Conflict

Labor-management conflict is an instance of group conflict. The key to understanding labor-management conflict is in recognizing two distinct groups, locked in a system of interaction which is concerned with the production of desired values and resources. The rewards associated with this mode of interaction are then inequitably distributed. Labor and management interact within a system where each group gives up, and receives, something very different from the other. Not surprisingly, this gives rise to conflict (see Batstone, 1979). Conflict is the motive force of a labor-management system; all the processes of the system are determined by the necessity of managing conflict.

The basis for labor-management conflict exists in the conditions of interaction and the incompatibility which it generates. Other general sources of labor-management conflict may also be identified. These include (a) individual differences (individuals belonging to either group differ in terms of educational, cultural, political, and other factors), (b) role and goal differences (workers and management have different expectations and goals), and (c) functional differences (workers and management have different demands, constraints, and responsibilities). Conflict, as presented here, stems from interactional, personal, or structural factors (cf. Robbins, 1974). The complex

functioning of a labor-management system is reflected in the interlinking of both conflict and cooperation.

Labor-management conflict may take many forms; these are, however, limited by the recognition of the facts of cooperation. Although it is customary to focus on the overt, visible, and destructive forms of conflict (e.g. strikes) which is limited only by the rules of the game, there are many other manifestations which should be considered. The forms labor-management conflict may take can be broadly divided into (a) groups, and (b) individual forms. In the former category we find strikes (defined as stoppage of work in the course of conflict), go-slow, work-to-rule, lockout, or mass dismissals. Individual forms of labor-management conflict include absenteeism, accidents, and high turn over (see Clarke, 1980; Hyman, 1972; Hartman, 1960; Handy, 1968; Fisher, 1973; Komhauser, 1954). It is normal, when describing labor-management conflict, to provide quite a list of the forms which a conflict between workers and their employers may take.

There is no single perfect indicator of labor-management conflict. Nor can there be a single one that covers all expressions of industrial conflict. Labor-management conflict is a complex phenomenon, often costly and destructive, but often functional and creative. To ensure that labor-management conflict is not expressed in a destructive form, various efforts to relieve disagreements and conflicts between groups within a larger social system have been undertaken. Some of these efforts (e.g. collective bargaining) have been institutionalized (see Stern, 1976; Scott, 1965); others relied primarily on administrative or mechanical approaches (e.g. separate the parties). The ability to manage conflict successfully is one of the most important strategies which labor and management can possess or acquire. When both labor and management adopt successful conflict management styles, they can achieve (a) the integration of conflicting ideas, (b) the development of unity, or ‘meeting of minds’, and (c) improved methods of interaction which lead to the accomplishment of more of their desired objectives. The best way to adopt successful conflict management is to learn which styles are

available and to be aware of the conditions to which each style may apply.

The model developed by Blake and Mouton (1964) provides an excellent framework for learning various styles of conflict management between groups. As shown in Figure 4.1, the model describes the behavior of each party along two dimensions; (a) assertiveness, and (b) cooperativeness. Assertiveness indicates the extent to which each group wants to achieve its own goals, cooperativeness indicates the extent to which it wants to maintain the relationship with the other group. For the sake of convenience each dimension is scaled from 1 to 9, giving us five distinct styles of conflict management. These are; (a) avoidance, (b) accommodation, (c) compromise, (d) competition, and (e) collaboration. Some groups may engage in conflict management determined to win at all costs, others may feel that mutuality of interests and harmony of relationships should be paramount in their approach.



Figure 4.1 Conflict Management Styles

Of these styles, collaboration is undoubtedly the most effective, as it satisfies the needs and concerns of both groups as well as the needs of their relationship. It is not, though, a style that the parties often resort to. This is because collaboration requires that both parties see their conflict as natural, even helpful, leading to a more creative relationship. It requires trust and acknowledgement of the

other's needs, and a recognition of the legitimacy of the other's feelings and attitudes. It requires a commitment to resolving a conflict to everyone's satisfaction, seeing everyone as having an equal role in conflict management, and it also requires time, energy, and skills. As a result of all these, it is not a style that is explicitly associated with most labor-management conflicts.

Related to all these styles of conflict management is the intervention of a third party. When labor and management are in conflict, unable to reach an agreement, the assistance of a third party may be called for. This third party may be an arbitrator who will hear their case and make a decision, or it may be a mediator, offering advice and suggesting possible ways of managing a conflict. These two forms of intervention are quite distinct[3] The term third party intervention will be taken here to refer to the involvement of a third party in the process of conflict management. An involvement that is voluntary and designed to aid both groups. It is not designed to take responsibility away from them.

The important point to remember about this process of intervention is that it takes place within the context of group interactions and institutionalized bargaining procedures. This is a context characterized by an in-built conflict of interests, limited by the interdependence of the parties and the extent of their cooperation. These key features of a limited conflict of interest and functional interdependence, give rise to various structural pressures that are likely to affect both the nature and style of conflict management and third party intervention. Third party intervention is not, and can not be seen, as being entirely exogenous. It is conditioned, to some extent, by the structure and context of group interactions. The need to distinguish between levels and contexts of intervention is clearly alluded to by one of the more astute students of labor-management conflicts. Ann Douglas, having studied the process of intervention extensively, notes that:

> The orthodoxy of psychologists has overlooked the considerable evidence that there is a tenable distinction to be made between the interpersonal and interparty climate in negotiations. The importance, both theoretically and in

> practice, of making an early distinction between these two levels is simple and plausible (1962:17).

The nature of a conflict, as well as its context, are postulated as important variables affecting third party behavior, and the parties' own behavior, in a conflict management situation. This naturally raises the question whether the options and alternatives available to a third party in interpersonal conflict are the same as those available to it in intergroup conflict. Is there a congruence between the insights offered to us by the problem-solving model and the reality of third party intervention in labor-management conflicts? Is the facilitative-diagnostic approach the one which third parties utilize, and just how likely are they to achieve problem-solving effectiveness? I shall attempt to answer these questions by looking at the experience of some third parties.

The Process of Intervention

Third parties in interpersonal conflicts attempted, as we have seen, to deal with the underlying attitudes and feelings in a relationship. They did not resort to such strategies as imposing, isolating, separating, or adjudicating. They searched for a solution by helping to stimulate creative thinking and innovative behavior. Are the possibilities for such an approach present in the context of labor-management conflict? In order to offer an answer to this question two basic sources of data were drawn upon; (a) in-depth interviews with 24 experienced labor mediators, and (b) observations gathered in the course of 14 intervention cases.

Objectives of Intervention[4]

The objectives of a third party in labor-management conflict are not easy to describe accurately. In general terms the objectives of a third party are sometimes seen as a cross between those of a miracle

worker with a bag of solutions, and the objectives of an irrelevant, or an interfering person. The lack of specific guidelines prompted Arthur Meyer, one of the most experienced mediators in the U.S., to comment that:

> The sea that he (third party) sails is only roughly chartered and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. Worse still, he has no science of navigation, and no fund inherited from the experience of others. He is a solitary artist recognizing, at most, a few guiding stars and depending mainly on his personal power of divination. (Meyer, 1960:160)

There is, no doubt, a need to examine the objectives of third parties in greater detail. In the U.S., the key objective in the Act which set up the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is to "settle disputes through mediation or conciliation" (F.C.M.S., 1972:3). This is a pretty wide mandate, encompassing varied and complex objectives and types of behavior. What sort of objectives do labor mediators themselves bring with them to a conflict?

Respondents were asked to define the objective of their intervention. The most frequent response was to stress the importance of preventing an escalation and reaching a settlement. Affecting the content, rather than the process, of conflict management seems to be the most important objective of third parties in labor-management conflict.

When responses were divided into (a) process objectives, and (b) outcomes, or content objectives, respondents indicated their idea of process objectives in the following way.

> 1) First and foremost we must obtain a clear idea of each party's position, the differences that separate them and the strength of their commitment to their differences.
>
> 2) In labor-management conflicts, there are many occasions when personal animosities may result in a complete lack of communication; it is our objective to establish, at the very outset, direct or indirect lines of communication between the parties.

3) One of the most important things we can do for the parties is simply to provide the conditions for their meetings and to supervise or chair their proceedings.

Another important process objective, and one often alluded to by respondents, concerned the need to help both parties to talk constructively through their differences. This a mediator can bring about by taking into account such factors as representatives1 image, their commitment, and their need to 'save face'. A representative, unlike an individual, has to sell an outcome to his own constituents. Unless he feels that he can do so without incurring an inordinate loss of face, he is unlikely to engage in productive conflict management. A third party must, therefore, consider

> …the position of the representative, especially the position of the union representatives and to build him up in the eyes of his coworkers. If you don't get a representative to 'look good', the whole process is doomed to failure.

The ultimate measure of intervention effectiveness at this level is whether or not it brings about a settlement. Most respondents described their primary objective as relating to the need to secure a settlement and reduce, arrest, or control the destructive components of conflict behavior. Typical responses pertaining to outcome objectives include the following:

1) Our first and primary objective is to reach an acceptable agreement, we have no other interests.

2) We must try and make sure that each party is willing to modify its positions, reduce its commitments and return back to the normal conditions.

3) To my mind, one of our most important objectives is to avoid a strike, lock-out or other disruptive activities and reestablish normal working relations.

Although a few respondents emphasized process objectives (e.g. allow representatives to interact freely without loss of face), the

majority endorsed the view that their primary objective was to bring about an acceptable settlement. There is undoubtedly a much greater emphasis on outcome than on process objectives among labor mediators. Third parties in labor-management conflicts are not so much concerned with enhanced decision-making, openness in dialogue, and mutual positive motivation, as with securing an agreement that would leave neither party too dissatisfied.

Labor mediators do not just intervene in order to secure any agreement. Their intervention is designed to achieve an agreement that (a) would prevent destructive behavior of any kind, (b) would be seen as being within the parties' own interests, and one that (c) would not have adverse consequences for the representatives (see Kressei, 1972). Such an agreement would be deemed an acceptable and satisfactory settlement.

If such an objective is to guide the behavior of a labor mediator, what are his perceptions and expectations concerning the means by which this is to be achieved. How does he cope with the mutually reinforcing features of intragroup pressures and intergroup conflict? The stage at which a third party becomes involved will, of course, influence his perception, expectations, and behavior. But is it possible to say something about the type of behavior that third parties normally engage in?

Third Party Behavior

Third parties, entering a conflict between labor and management and searching for an acceptable outcome, face two major problems; (a) when to enter a conflict, and (b) how to intervene in the course of a conflict. There are no formulae to point out how a third party should behave in different conflict situations. Acceptable outcomes may be attained by parties using different methods and injecting different inputs. Their actual combination will depend upon circumstances, issues, parties, and personalities. In general, the behavior of a third party "…sets into motion or accelerates a dynamic

process…his very presence changes the character of the meetings" (Peters, 1958:766). Is it possible, though, to go beyond this rather general observation and examine more explicitly the behavior of third parties in situ?

One of the most difficult aspects in the study of third party intervention is to evaluate or measure the behavioral strategies that mediators use in their efforts to bring the parties to a settlement. Charles Rhemus observed in 1965 that this aspect was/the least understood and least studied in the field of conflict resolution.(5) The situation has not changed all that much since that date. It requires a great deal of sophistication to analyze precisely what third parties do, (6) and a great deal of recall of what they had actually attempted to do. In the absence of any satisfactory method, I have sought to describe and understand the process from the mediators' viewpoint.

To integrate the empirical findings gathered in the course of conducting interviews, I have distinguished between reflective, non-directive, and directive types of behavior (respondents, incidentally, did not make this type of distinction). Reflective strategies attempt to establish the groundwork for effective conflict management. Non-directive strategies increase the probability that the parties will interact freely, and directive strategies refer to a wide range of third party activities designed to manipulate the parties into accepting a specific outcome.

Reflective Strategies

There can be no doubt that the parties' conflict management efforts can be impeded by such factors as inability to identify the real issues, unwillingness to comprehend the complexity of a conflict relationship, and a lack of desire to exchange information. Respondents were generally aware of these issues and indicated an agreement that their first task was

> 1) to gain the trust and confidence of both labor and management. To do so one must avoid the temptation to sit in

judgement of the parties.

2) It is essential to have the parties' confidence. Without that you can not get anywhere. Neither side will talk to you, nor will they let you know the issues which separate them.

Establishing confidentiality and trust is the first task of a labor mediator. Although these are often linked to a mediator's impartiality and neutrality, they can also be induced by specific acts of behavior. A third party can inspire confidence by stating his concern for the parties in conflict and desire to see them succeed in their conflict management efforts. He can convey to them the idea that he understands their conflict and is familiar with the problems they face.

You can often gain the parties' confidence by letting them know of your involvement in other, not dissimilar, conflicts, or by giving the impression of competence, without in any way being condescending.

Establishing trust and confidentiality is a critical variable in initiating a successful process of intervention. Competence, understanding, and a determination not to allow any personal biases to interfere with his work, can all help in establishing third parties' independence and disinterest. The independence of a third party and the sense of confidence it can inspire are influential factors which are likely to affect the parties' willingness to accept intervention, or to give their full support to it.

Once the requisite level of trust has been established, third parties begin the search for the basic issues in conflict, the nature of the relationships between the parties, the relationship between representatives and their constituents, and the causes of the conflict. How do third parties approach this task, and with which tools do they operate?

1. Discovering issues. A third party's search for understanding begins with an attempt to discover the real issues in conflict. These are not always articulated and are often concealed (e.g. a conflict over a

small wage rise may in fact be a conflict of rights, or personalities). In the words of one of the respondents:

> Finding out what the conflict is all about is quite difficult. Both labor and management may present formal demands or grievances which have very little to do with their real feelings.

How, then, can a third party discover the real issues? It can do so by listening, by posing questions, eliciting responses, asking for information, and generally prodding each side into going beyond formal demands.(7)

> I don't just sit there and let each side read his demands and minimum positions. I talk to them separately, listen to what they have to say and I ask them questions that force them to express their feelings beyond their official demands.

2. Identifying the relationship. Once the issues in conflict and the objectives of each group become clearer, a third party attempts to learn something about past relationships, expectations, past conflicts, and any other relevant aspects of their prior relationship. In some areas there may be a long-established cooperative pattern, in others a long history of antagonism and conflict may have characterized the relationship. Knowledge of the relationship, both past and present, between the parties is an important determinant of third party role.

> Very often a current dispute is merely a continuation of a past problem. The more familiar you are with the past history of both, the easier will your present task be.

3. Identifying representative-constituent relationships. A third party meets groups' representatives. They may, or may not, be influenced or constrained by their group. Some may have more power over their constituents, while some have merely a symbolic status. Representatives' titles are not the best guide for gauging the relationship between groups and their leaders. Third parties often attempt, as part of their reflective strategies, to identify and locate the lines of responsibility between negotiators-constituents. They

may not be able to do much about this relationship, but they will, at least, be better aware of the complexity of the situation. As one of the respondents suggested:

> It is not always easy to decide who actually is negotiating and just how much power does he have. Often a negotiator may represent many groups, and you don't know whether they all agree with him. This is one problem a mediator must clear before he offers any substantive contributions.

4. Discovering cause of conflict. Third party's behavior is often determined by the causes of a specific conflict. These causes may be related to (a) unrealistic expectations, (b) negative interpersonal relationships, and (c) new conflict management structures (Kochan & Jick, 1978). Some causes may be based on principles, others on interests. The distinction between conflicts of rights (or values) and conflicts of interests is an important distinction. Most respondents were in agreement with the following statement:

> Understanding what the present conflict is all about may tell you whether it is a conflict over some principles (e.g. recognizing a union), or whether it is over some tangible issues. Mediation is much more likely to succeed when a conflict is over some concrete interests.

Non-Directive Behavior

Non-directive behavior is designed to achieve (a) a more favorable context for conflict management, and (b) to make the parties more adept at conflict management.

1. A third party can help to produce a more favorable context for conflict management by such activities as patient listening, controlling hostility, and generating expectations that an agreement will be reached. A mediator who can patiently encourage both sides to air their grievances, will at least ensure that they continue to be interested in a settlement. Patient listening and control of expressions of oarsonal animosity create a favorable climate for conflict management.[(8)] Most respondents were aware of the extent and

intensity of anger and hostility in conflict management. Their task, in such instances, was described as

> trying to control anger, especially if it is directed at other persons. Failure to do so may often lead to a complete breakdown of their efforts. You must never allow personal slurs to interfere with the issues. Once you control this personality business and suggest the possibility of a real settlement, the whole tone of the meetings is altered.

2. Third parties can create a more favorable climate for conflict management by chairing meetings, calling for, or recessing, meetings and separating the parties, or bringing them together, as the need arises. These activities are an aspect of a third party's control over the situation. A third party can make both labor and management feel more at ease by overseeing to the physical, administrative, and logistical problems involved in getting the representatives of two groups together. Through its control over the administrative dimension of conflict management and the conduct of meetings, a third party can help both groups focus on some real issues and concentrate on the task at hand.

Related to this role is the need for a third party to exercise some control over the agenda. This can be done by determining how many issues will be discussed, in which order, and the manner of their grouping. The sentiments expressed by one of the respondents reflect the importance of this aspect of third party behavior.

> You may occasionally find yourself in a conflict where either side puts down an endless number of issues to be discussed. This is bound to be futile and time-consuming. If you don't want a protracted and fruitless dispute, it is important to reduce the number of issues, so as not to give the impression of too much disagreement and to group them together in broader categories. Reducing the number of issues, or demands, that each group puts forward, and classifying them so that some common interests are identified, can avoid unnecessary and wasteful tangles.

3. Another important strategy which can be conducive to creating a more favorable climate for conflict management relates to the parties' desire to maintain the privacy of their negotiation. Representatives of

groups in conflict are all too often likely to be uncooperative and even 'difficult' if their statements or stands were to be divulged to their respective groups, or the wider public. Publicity has an adverse effect on conflict management and negotiation. A third party can ensure that public statements are kept to a minimum, and that both parties can enjoy the freedom which confidentiality brings. Privacy takes away some of the structural pressures in conflict management.

> Maintaining, as far as is possible, the privacy of the proceedings is essential. Making statements to the press, or inviting the media can be very detrimental to the success of mediation. One must not allow representatives to bolster up their image, or commit themselves publicly to a course of action which they may later have to rescind.

4. There can be no doubt that one of the most crucial non-directive strategies which can significantly improve the climate for conflict management concerns the need to reduce intragroup pressures and help negotiators deal with their constituents. Respondents were aware of this need and indicated their appreciation of the importance of counteracting it.

> Of course it is important to have the interests of the principal parties, but in this process the position of the representative must be considered. The representative must be placed in a position which allows him to look good, so that the agreement will work.

Theodore Keel, one of the most experienced mediators in the field of labor-management conflict, suggests that the elementary principles of intervention in such conflicts can be reduced to one simple rule:

> In every phase of the discussion the mediator must concern himself not with the interests of the principal parties - but with the needs of their representatives. Not only must the representatives do a good job, but his client must be convinced that he has done one…protecting the status of the people you are dealing with is basic, but it is frequently overlooked by people in the academic community, many of whom think only of the merits of the dispute. My job is to deal with the men who are there. (The New Yorker, 1970:41).

A union representative offers support to this view by noting the importance of influencing and modifying intra-group pressures on officials engaged in conflict management.

> What Ted really does is help these guys take lies back to their membership. (The New Yorker, 1970:41)

Helping representatives feel free from the pressures of their constituents is an important behavioral strategy in building up a better working relationship between the prties and removing the adverse effects of a dual conflict (i.e. conflict between the officials involved as well as conflict between the officials and their own groups). Representatives' need to 'save face' may act as one of the most crucial barriers to successful intervention. This barrier has to be overcome, before an effective third party role can be implemented. Protecting the representatives from any external pressures lays the groundwork for a more stable and a more serious search for a long-term settlement. Group representatives, unlike individuals in conflict, are caught in the middle of a dilemma of competing pressures. This dilemma must be resolved if any serious conflict management is to be undertaken.

The other dimension of non-directive third party behavior, that which is concerned with making the parties, more adept at conflict management, can be implemented by looking for, and encouraging, opportunities for communication. Groups in conflict may not necessarily engage in serious communication. Even when they talk directly and clearly, they may hear only what they want to hear. Misunderstanding is certainly a problem in all conflict situations. Thus, a third party can make conflict management by both parties more effective by giving them both equal time to state their case, getting them both to listen, and demonstrate that they understand each other. As one of the respondents commented:

> Very often you get the feeling that they talk at cross purposes. It's as though they are saying something different, or not really understanding what they are saying. This is why it is important to make sure that they speak to the point, and that they are understood.

The parties can also be made to feel more adept at conflict management by allowing each official involved to let off steam and express their fears, making these explicit, and discussing them with the other side. In this way everyone concerned will (a) participate in the process of conflict management, and(b) develop a measure of trust. A third party can help both groups to know, understand, and trust the other side. When this has been achieved, a major obstacle to effective conflict management has been overcome. The importance of this aspect of third parties1 behavior was emphasized by one of the respondents who noted that:

> Whichever method you use, it is undoubtedly the case that you can do better, if you make sure that they both trust and understand each other. It is not an easy thing to achieve, but only when you have achieved it, will you be able to agree on some procedures, standards of behavior, and some criteria of what constitutes a fair settlement.

Directive Behavior

Directive behavior refers to a wide range of third party's activities designed to manipulate the parties (through some form of punishment or reward) into terminating a conflict or accepting a specific outcome. Directive behavior represents a much mone active level of intervention than any of the previous two categories.(9) Directive behavior, I wish to suggest, consists basically of two types of inputs; (a) those related to rationalization and persuasion, and (b) those related to personal or social techniques of influence. Their intended effect is much the same; to secure compliance, modify, or change, an entrenched and uncompromising position, and alter the parties' evaluation of the conflict and the costs of continuing it. In some cases persuasion or rationalization constitute the only form of directive third party behavior, in other, third parties appear to resort to utilizing the full range of the means of influence.

Before examining some aspects of this behavior, it is pertinent to note that there is considerable disagreement amongst labor mediators on the appropriateness of such inputs. While a number of

these tend to disclaim this 'strong arm' image, others accept that, in certain situations (e.g. where there is no contract zone between the parties), a third party can make substantive and direct suggestions. What aspects of directive behavior have been found to be effective in producing a settlement?

1. A third party can, having gone through separate and joint meetings, discover areas of compromise and direct the parties' efforts towards those areas (Kressel, 1972). Areas of compromise may often be more transparent to an informed outsider than to the antagonistic parties. An experienced mediator can translate the demands of each side into an advocacy of a particular area of compromise. The union may put foward demands in their terms, and the management may do likewise in their language. A third party can narrow these differences and bring them both down to a more realistic position. A third party, therefore, can act as a catalyst in creating a 'contract zone' (Stevens, 1963).

2. Although third party intervention is a voluntary process in which neither coercion nor imposition may be found, third parties can get both labor and management to agree to a certain outcome. Persuasion can take the form of (a) bringing reason and objectivity to the interaction, and (b) bringing the parties to a more realistic appraisal of their situation. This can be done, for instance, by emphasizing the prominence of a particular outcome (in terms of its precedence, or group welfare considerations), convincing representatives that it can be 'sold' to their groups, or pointing out the full implications and costs of the failure to reach a settlement. The logic of this approach was commented on by one of the respondents in the following manner

In such a situation when the parties' efforts got nowhere, we try to point out the full extent of the pitfalls, dangers and disadvantages, and get both parties to accept a settlement and avoid all these dangers and disadvantages.

3. Making the parties face reality can be achieved by (a) pointing out the increasing costs of a conflict, or by (b) emphasizing settlements reached in similar conflicts. It can also be achieved by acting as a 'reality advocate'. This was mentioned by several respondents who suggested that, when faced with an impasse, a third party can remind labor and management that its presence and activities embody, in a sense, wider societal interests. Invoking the 'public interest' or societal norms can be

an effective instrument at the hands of a mediator. Parties are after all concerned with their public image. Successful manipulation of their sensitivity about their image can change their position. It has happened many times.

4. Another aspect of third party's directive behavior concerns pacing the negotiations, and more particularly using the time factor in a certain way. Time is obviously of paramount importance to all human interactions. It is particularly important in conflict management interactions when perceptions, costs, and the preferences for certain outcomes may alter. Such interactions can, in addition, go on for weeks, or even months, with each party introducing new values and new issues for consideration. A third party may impose explicit or implicit deadlines and thus squeeze out elements of bluff, or 'acting-up' to one's group. It can, in this way, generate a sense of urgency about an agreement. A heightened perception of time constraints

…puts some pressure on the parties to stop playing up to each other, to state the positions on which they are willing to agree and modify their more unreasonable demands. In my experience I have found both labor and management to be more reasonable when faced with a deadline.

5. In addition to all these strategies, a third party can actually make direct suggestions or recommendations for a settlement. Third party's recommendations, proposals, or suggestions do not carry the potential 'loss of face' for group representatives and can, thus, be seen as critical factors in the establishment of a more effective conflict management process. Proposals and

suggestions advanced by a third party may range from a tentative reformulation of some of the parties' own ideas, to a publicly announced proposal. In order to achieve maximum impact, such proposals are best introduced in private meetings and later presented as the parties' own policies or objectives. Theodore Keel refers to this aspect of his behavior in the following manner:

> I walk into every negotiation and the first thing I say is that I am not here to make recommendations. I promise not to make recommendations. And, of course, from that moment on I am making informal recommendations. (The New Yorker, 1970:42)

Another mediator articulates his ideas on this directive aspect of his behavior thus.

> I try to let the parties make their own suggestions for a settlement…If they talk long enough, suggestions begin to present themselves and I have merely to emphasize them. If the parties seem unaware of some issues, or remain in their fixed positions, I try to prod them by providing my own suggestions.[10]

6. If these aspects of third party's directive behavior fail to produce a desired settlement, third parties may, in the last resort, exercise various forms of personal or social influence. Personal forms of influence relate to a third party's threat to abandon its intervention activities if no progress is being made. Social forms of influence include public pressure (e.g. the threat to make public disclosures), and economic pressures (e.g. offer rewards, or threaten parties with loss of resources). Either form of influence carries a danger (a danger which, incidentally, respondents were all too aware of), but when a situation is deadlocked, and the parties' efforts get nowhere, a third party:, may - and does - adopt this highly active form of intervention.[11]

Directive third party behavior is not indicative of an authoritarian or binding approach to conflict management. It is utilized in certain circumstances only (e.g. time is pressing, both parties trust mediator)

and it supplements reflective and non-directive strategies. Third party intervention here is more than just a process-centered approach. It is a solution-centered approach. Although a solution may be complex and difficult to achieve a third party, in intergroup conflict, has, at its disposal, a wide range of options and techniques. A range which goes well beyond the facilitative, non-directive behavior suggested by the problem-solving model.

If third parties are to intervene effectively in labor-management conflicts, an awareness of the entire range of behavioral options open to them is an absolute requisite for success. These options will be utilized in a manner reflecting personal preferences, issues, circumstances, and parties. At least they should be utilized within a framework of known, experience-based alternatives, rather than a problem-diagnostic framework which, admirable as it is in intent, reflects merely the analyst's premises and his normative ideas. The important point to remember is that third parties in labor-management conflicts are not merely facilitators or conceptualizes; they are investigators, change-agents, influence-agents, and developers (Margerison and Leary, 1975).

As the interview material suggests, third parties are familiar with, and have /occasions to resort to, the more directive, or aggressive strategies.[12] This material was supplemented by two further studies. In a study of the transcripts of intervention in fourteen labor-management conflicts, a total of 3,190 sentences by the mediator were treated as discrete units of behavior (see Bercovitch, 1980a). Their distribution in terms of a third party's interaction profile appears in Table 4.1.

What is most interesting about the distribution of third party acts is their relative low level of acts in the socio-emotional area positive (11.2 per cent as against 33.4 per cent in the context of interpersonal conflict). One may also note that a proportion of third party's activities consisted of showing hostility, disagreement, and manifest tensions (7.3 per cent as against 1.6 per cent in interpersonal conflict). In the task area, over 15 per cent of third party's behavior consisted of making direct suggestions (as against 3.3 per cent in the interpersonal context) and its behavior in the area of giving opinion,

suggestions, and information (65.6 per cent as against 40 per cent in interpersonal conflict) was much more active than in asking for these (only,,15.5 per cent in this context, and 25 per cent in interpersonal conflict).[13]

This evidence seems to indicate that a third party in intergroup conflict gives and expresses less support and rapport, but, on the other hand, assumes an important and direct leadership role in the task area. Such evidence lends considerable support to third parties' own conception of, and approach to, their intervention. It also suggests that third parties, in intergroup conflicts, are not merely messengers, nor is their role confined to bringing the parties together. They act, as has been suggested, as a mechanism with a direct bearing on the role and situational aspects of interaction. Their behavior constitutes an input that is conducive to more effective conflict management by (a) reducing or modifying the detrimental effects of intra and intergroup factors, and (b) working directively - and actively - to promote a settlement.

Another study of third party's behavior (Howells and Cathro, 1982) examines how often do labor and management report the use of mediator's reflective, non-directive, and directive behavior. Over 35 per cent of labor and management report third parties making suggestions for compromise, and nearly 25 per cent of management and over 37 per cent of workers report that third parties pressed them hard for a compromise. There can be no doubt that third parties in intergroup conflict are actively trying to get the parties to face reality, or change their evaluations of a conflict. Indeed, it has even been suggested that third party effectiveness can be improved by a more intensive and directive form of intervention (Gerhart & Drotning, 1980).

The Structure of Intervention

Initiating Intervention

Acceptability. One basic factor affecting the success of intervention is the acceptability of a third party. A third party that is accepted as impartial can generate trust, confidence, and more effective interactions. Some respondents felt that acceptability was most closely related to their effectiveness. Without it there can be no question of initiating, let alone succeeding in intervention.

Acceptability of a third party is a subjective measure. It does not suggest that a person has to be so much beyond reproach as to be totally emaciated and ineffective. It suggests a reputation for impartiality, association with an established, agency and, more importantly, freedom from any political interference.[14] The intervention efforts of individuals who do not meet these criteria will, of necessity, be characterized by

Table 4.1 Interaction Process Analysis of Third Parties in Intergroup Conflict

Socio-Emotional Area Positive	Category	No. of Acts	%Of Total
	1. SHOW SOLIDARITY (e.g. gives help, reward, raises other's status)	123	3.8
	2. SHOW TENSION RELEASE (e.g. jokes, laughs)	84	2.6
	3. AGREE (e.g. accepts, concurs, understands, complies)	153	4.8
	4. GIVE SUGGESTIONS (e.g. give direction)	488	15.3

Task Area	Give	5. GIVE OPINION (e.g. express feelings,wish, analysis)	673	21
	6. GIVE ORIENTATION (e.g. give information, clarifies, repeats, confirms)	943	29.6	
	7. ASK FOR ORIENTATION (e.g. ask for information, confirmation)	386	12.1	
Socio-Emotional Area Negative		8. ASK FOR OPINION (e.g. ask for analysis, expression of feelings)	76	2.4
	9. ASK FOR SUGGESTION (e.g. ask for direction, possible way of action)	32	1	
	10. DISAGREE (e.g. shows rejection, withholds help)	76	2.4	
	11. SHOW TENSION (e.g. withdraws help, anger)	76	2.4	
	12. SHOW ANTAGONISM	80	2.5	

	(e.g. asserts oneself, deflates others)		
	TOTAL	3,190	100%

additional pressures and strains and a considerable discrepancy between role requirements and performance.

Acceptability of a third party can also be related to the balance of advantages and disadvantages which the third party role embodies. Goodman and Krislov (1974) studied the attitudes of both union and management representatives (in a sample of 580 individuals), and found that the majority of union and management representatives felt that, on balance, a mediator was likely to be perceived as acceptable if the parties were convinced of his ability to perform a useful function (e.g. open up communication). Acceptability of intervention seems also to be a product of the degree to which the parties perceive it as helpful and positive.

Requests for Intervention

Third party intervention can be initiated by (a) labor, (b) management, (c) both, or (d) the third party itself may take the initiative in intervening in a conflict. The number of requests for mediation and the source initiating the request are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 (this information applies to the U.K. only).

Table 4.2 Requests for Mediation

Year	Total Number of Requests
1979	3,128
1980	2,487
1981	2,262

Source: Adapted from Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, Annual Report 1981. Annual Report 1982.

Table 4.3 Sources of Request (In Percentage)

Year	Union	Management	Joint	Agency (Third Party)
1979	52%	16.5%	29%	2.5%
1980	53%	14%	30%	2.5%
1981	48%	13%	36%	3.2%

Source: Ibid.

From these figures we can see that the most popular way of initiating intervention is a unilateral request by either labor or management (over 60 per cent). The evidence further suggests that unions are about three times as likely to request intervention than management (this may be due to the fact that the union is more interested in changing things whereas management is more interested in preserving them). Joint requests by both parties for intervention also exceed management's requests. There is no doubt that mediators prefer to intervene in conflicts where both parties put forward a request for help. This was articulated by one of the respondents in the following manner.

> My efforts are more likely to come to a successful conclusion if both parties actually want me there. To be invited by both means that they are both willing to search for a settlement and open their doors to you.

Entering a conflict on the basis of a joint request reinforces a mediator's acceptability.[15] Unilateral requests may be misinterpreted as a sign of 'weakness', or they may, occasionally, be merely the expression of a tactical ploy (e.g. public facade). Either way, third party's acceptability - and effectiveness - may be compromised by disingenuous requests.

Timing

Any discussion on initiating the process of intervention is likely to dwell on the issues of timing and preventive intervention. There are several views with respect to timing. A former assistant to the Director of the F.C.M.S. notes that

> The decision as to timing of the mediator's actual arrival on the collective bargaining scene is not susceptible to general rules. Each case calls for judgement as to when and if entry should be made. It can be never, it can be too late and it can certainly be too early. (Schlossberg, 1962:830)

This was not, however, the view of most of the respondents. Two distinct schools of thought became apparent; one advocating early entry, adopting even a preventive intervention, and another supporting late entry. A larger number of respondents supported late intervention. The logic of this was described by one of the respondents.

> I think that timing of intervention is really quite crucial. We must make sure that before we go in, the parties have exhausted their own procedure…I think that a deadlock in their efforts or the possibility of a serious stoppage makes the parties face reality and bargain more responsibly.

Late intervention is perceived by respondents as being more closely correlated with higher motivation. Once the parties experience escalating conflict costs, the pressures to settle may be stronger, and their conflict management efforts will be, accordingly, that much more earnest. A third party can maximize its effectiveness only when the protagonists have experienced some costs and disadvantages and find themselves in a deadlocked situation. This view is supported by Simkin (1971), Maggiolo (1971), and Berkowitz et al. (1964)[16] It is safe, therefore, to assume that a

> mediator should not enter a negotiation until there is a bona fide deadlock. The reason is self-evident. A premature intervention by the mediator relieves the parties of the pressures under which they are working…Entering a situation before a genuine deadlock is reached, creates an atmosphere of relaxation in

> the parties and, consequently, the mediator has no basic element to keep the parties moving…The ideal intervention is immediately before a strike. (Perez, 1959:717)

In addition to enhanced motivation, Kressel (1972) suggests another factor cited by mediators as favoring late intervention. This is the ability to inject meaningful inputs.

> What I generally find is that if you get in too early you get involved in the same degree that the parties are involved, and you become enmeshed in the discussions and you can't come with any conclusions, and you are really not a new voice. And if you are not a new voice you have trouble. (Kressel, 1972:5)

Phases and Issues

Ann Douglas (1962), in her exhaustive study of labor mediation, suggests that effective and successful interventions go through three stages. These she describes as (a) establishing the range (with its strong emphasis on posturing and disagreements), (b) reconnoitering the range (search for agreement), and (c) precipitating a decision (terminating conflict management with a formal decision). Walton (1969) describes the two phases of third party intervention as (a) differentiation, and (b) integration. The problem-centered behavior of a third party as described by Burton (1969) is postulated to go through three phases; (a) analysis, (b) conceptual inputs, and (c) change and development.

Respondents' evidence suggests that third party behavior fluctuates throughout the process of intervention. Change in focus and behavior come in spurts; intense activity may follow periods of prolonged passivity. There is very little evidence that third parties move, in a linear fashion, from one phase to the next.

> I am not aware of any cut-off points when I intervene in a conflict. Sure, I often begin by trying to understand a problem and then searching for an agreement. But on many occasions, I just go straight to outlining my ideas for an agreement and just work backwards.

The general structure of third party intervention at this level is much more formal than interventions at the personal level. The numbers of those involved is, of necessity, greater. Seating is face-to-face and the formalities of group interactions are closely observed (e.g. address remarks through the Chair). This norm-like behavior makes it very difficult for the parties to unlearn their usually competitive posturings, or for a third party to establish a diagnostic atmosphere and a facilitative structure, and get both parties to take complementary roles in the creative process of problem solving.

One way of increasing genuine participation and reducing group pressures is for a third party to meet separately with both labor and management. I found considerable evidence to suggest that third parties conceive of their behavior differently, depending upon whether they chair joint meetings, or meet the parties separately. There was a general recognition that in joint meetings one could not do much beyond patient listening and control of personal animosities. In separate meetings, though, respondents felt that they could assume a more active leadership role and engage in directive behavior.

> Serious negotiations and real efforts to get the parties to change their positions can only begin in separate meetings. It is only in such meetings that proposals and recommendations can be made.[17]

Separating the parties is an effective intervention tactic. It allows for a movement toward a settlement and brings into focus the more directive aspects of third party behavior. The phases of intervention can thus be described only in terms of joint meetings, adjournment, separate meetings, and then joint meetings again. In either phase a third party will rely upon different skills and employ different strategies. In neither phase, though, does its behavior approximate the detailed categories of problem-solving interventions. A third party in intergroup conflict is a task specialist, not a social-emotional specialist.

In terms of issues with which intervention in labor-management conflicts deals, several types of issues may be proposed. These can be divided broadly into three; (a) issues of interest (e.g. pay and

conditions of work), (b) issues of right (e.g. recognition of unions), and (c) personal issues (e.g. dismissal). Although it seems reasonable to propose that third party intervention will be more successful at dealing with some issues rather than others (Stevens, 1963; Rehmus, 1965), there is no consensus on types of issues which are most amenable to intervention.

A glance at Table 4.4 will reveal that the largest number of conflict issues third parties deal with, are issues of interest. There was also a basic consensus amongst respondents that these are less difficult than issues of rights or principle. Conflict based on issues or basic principles are often defined in dichotomous terms and are not always susceptible to compromise, let alone to third party intervention. The nature of the issue, the way a conflict has been defined, and the rigidity with which both parties stick to their issues, will determine not only the success or failure of intervention, but also the course of a conflict.

It is difficult to obtain precise information on how different issues affect the behavior of third parties, what is certain, though, is that intervention in intergroup conflicts can not be set on a pre-determined course, it is affected by the type of issue at stake. Conflicts that most commonly hinder intervention and call for a more directive approach are those based on issues of principle. Next to these come conflicts over precedent-setting demands, followed by conflicts with only one central issue (no possibility of trade-off here). Howells and Cathro (1982) found strong agreement between labor and management on the ranking and effects of these issues.

Table 4.4 Intervention in Terms of Conflict Issues

Nature of Issue	1979 %	1980 %	1981 %
issues of interest	58	52	56
issues of right	18	17.5	15
personal issues	14	20	21

Source: Ibid.

Given the nature of third party intervention, the nature and intensity of issues in conflict is one of the most important determinants of intervention effectiveness. Some types of intervention are of little use in high-intensity disputes. Some types of conflict call for active intervention, others require a less directive form of intervention. In either case, intervention behavior interacts with issue characteristics. The idea that all conflicts between labor and management can be resolved by adopting one style of intervention only (e.g. Burton, 1970), falls quite short of providing an accurate picture of the complexities of this interaction.

Attributes and Characteristics

A basic aspect of intervention in intergroup conflict is personal relationship with the parties. Personal variables can therefore be considered to be quite important in determining the nature and effectiveness of intervention. The search for an 'ideal' third party may well involve us in an endless journey, made more uncertain by the respondents' ambivalent conceptions of their own attributes and characteristics, and their emphasis on the idiosyncratic and ever-changing nature of their intentions. The idea that the whole issue of personal variables is somewhat beyond generalizing ('it's an art rather than a science') was expressed with some vigor by a few respondents:

> I think that basically we are all different people, dealing with different parties and utilizing different approaches…Because there are so many exceptions to any generalization about the ideal mediator, I don't honestly think that it is possible to isolate qualities which make a person an ideal mediator.

A labor mediator does indeed work without tools or rules. His only professional equipment consists of a rather elusive set of experiential norms and personal skills. Neither of these have ever been clearly identified. Still, intervention can not be considered in a vacuum, "… our understanding of it can be furthered by an examination of the

people who play a central role in the mediation system" (Berkowitz et al., 1964:257). What, then, are the mediators' own thoughts (admittedly from their own subjective experience) on the traits and characteristics of an 'ideal' mediator?

Looking at personal traits firstly, David Cole, a former Director of F.C.M.S., notes that:

> The essential quality making for a good mediator is his ability to build the confidence of the parties. Therefore if he does anything which indicates bias or from which they may suspect bias, he is dead duck in the given situation…the execution of his job involves not only the quality of patience but of extremely good judgement. (Quoted in Manson, 1958:757)

Fairness, independence, and impartiality are attributes which every mediator must possess. Although fairness is a matter of attitudes, independence and impartiality can be developed to a greater degree. The higher the perceived prominence of these characteristics, the more effective the intervention process will be.

Other personal traits cited as contributing to effective intervention included honesty, perseverance, and persuasiveness.[(18)] Such personal traits are more closely associated with the presence and activities of a pragmatic, task-oriented leader, with the tact and ability to guide and control separate meetings and chair joint sessions. Third parties in intergroup conflict are more assertive and more directive than their counterparts in interpersonal conflict. Different perceptions of personal attributes reflect different role conceptions.

In addition to ascribed personal characteristics, respondents also emphasized acquired characteristics such as knowledge of labor-management problems, knowledge of law and committee procedures, and experience of collective bargaining. Previous relevant experience was described by all respondents as being more useful and valuable than any other aspect of their formal education or training. Effective interventions, it seems, are associated, by mediators themselves, not with high levels of theoretical knowledge about conflict and conflict management, but with previous role-performance.

Other qualities and attributes cited by respondents include(a) intellectual qualities (e.g. logic, rationalization, articulation), and (b)

administrative and technical qualities (e.g. ability to chair meetings, summarize statements and produce reports, technical know-how of legal rules and work processes). The emphasis of these qualities is on the effective use of an existing structure, not on reflective inputs or theoretical interpretations. There was no evidence to suggest that third parties relied on the growing body of conflict studies, nor was there any expressed preference by any respondent to intervene as a co-member of a panel of mediators. Intervention is an intensely personal process; its qualities are unfolded and its tasks are accomplished only when the commitment to a personal process remains unshaken.

Although a consensus on details may be absent, it is possible to develop, on the basis of the comments made by respondents, a typology of the important attributes and characteristics of third parties in labor-management conflicts. This I have attempted to do in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Basic Qualities and Characteristics

Personal	Cited by %	Education	Cited by %	Experience	Cited by %
Fairness	85	Knowledge of labor law/problems	66	Collective bargaining	87
Patience	83	General education	45	Industry	72
Honesty	80	University education	32	Personnel	64
Perseverence	80	Knowledge of psychology	28	Union experience	58
Reliability	76	Knowledge of committee procedures	28	Government	43
Resourcefulness	75				
Persuasiveness	70				
Practical	65				
Tactful	62				

These attributes, together with general skills (e.g. controlling meetings, summarizing feelings) and more specific skills in establishing relationships (e.g. listening attentively, speaking, putting people at ease, controlling guilt or fear), define the respondent's conception of the 'ideal mediator'. Individuals who have these

qualities and the requisite experience will be acceptable to both sides and thus be more effective. Individuals with a different mix of personal variables (e.g. diagnostic skills, academic attainments) may well find their attributes submerged under the weight of their perceived irrelevance at best, or unacceptability at worst.

Intervention Outcomes

The problems of determining intervention outcomes, from the standpoint of the third parties, poses numerous difficulties. The view that the success of intervention depends primarily on personal qualities and specific circumstances, rather than on any general principles of intervention, was quite current among respondents. The problem is further compounded by the absence of any clear criteria to determine the success or failure of certain outcomes, and the mediators' own uncertainty about their contribution. Respondents emphasized the role that other factors play in determining an outcome (e.g. parties' motivation, increased conflicts costs etc.) and tended to play down their own involvement. This sentiment was expressed by one of the respondents in the following manner:

> We try not to think too much about the exact role we play, the contributions we make, or our effectiveness. Anyway, if an intervention is successful, it's mainly due to the parties' efforts, and they take all the credit for it. If it is unsuccessful we share the blame…Our idea of a successful intervention is to get the parties working together. We can not pretend to find an answer to their underlying problems.

Third party intervention in labor-management conflicts represents an attempt to help the parties reach a settlement without the need to resort to compulsory arbitration, strikes, or a prolonged period of inconclusive conflict management. It is remarkable how often mediators suggest that factors outside their own presence and strategies (e.g. economic climate) have a greater impact on intervention outcomes. Without a clear criterion for evaluating outcomes, without guidelines for distinguishing 'good' settlements

from ‘bad’ settlements, it is not perhaps surprising to note that mediators tend to view themselves as ‘present by the grace of the parties’, to evaluate their contribution in such an idiosyncratic fashion and, where possible, to play it down (cf. Koeb, 1981; Weisenfeld, 1962).

Another approach to the question of determining the success or effectiveness of intervention is to study the total number of cases settled as a percentage of total cases referred to a mediator. This is also an unsatisfactory measure, for it deals only with conflicts in which there was some form of third party intervention (would labor-management conflicts in which there was no intervention produce different outcomes?). Without controlled groups it is, yripossible to offer any conclusive evidence for the success of mediation.[19]

From the perspective of the parties themselves, there is an overwhelming support as regards the contribution made by a third party. Goodman and Krislov (1974) found a very high level of unanimity (70 per cent) among both labor and management who agreed that the mere presence of a third party was conducive to a settlement. Almost half of the trade union officers and management representatives (48 and 42 per cent respectively) felt that without intervention the likelihood and number of strikes would increase considerably. Analyzing the conflict parties’ own responses it seems clear that mediation has made a very favourable impression on them. It appears that both labor and management like this procedure (presumably because each feels it can get what it wants, see Howells & Cathro, 1982).

Goodman and Krislov (1974) go on to ask both labor and management representatives which specific third party inputs were of particular importance in achieving a settlement. On the union side, the mediator’s ability to exert a calming influence and suggest new settlement zones were seen as particularly constructive. Another important third party contribution was described as the ability to resolve representational dilemmas (e.g. union representatives could convince their constituents that everything was being done to secure a desired settlement) and allow them to withdraw from difficult positions. On the management side, the most important contribution

a third party could make to achieving an acceptable outcome was the ability to bring an independent viewpoint and enable a fresh beginning to be made. Management respondents also emphasized reduction in hostility, and allowing parties to reach an agreement without loss of face as important contributions made by a third party. Both union and management indicated that the mediator had been a useful source of guidance in legal, procedural, and other matters, and they both expected a different outcome if a mediator had not been present.[20]

Whichever way one looks at it, it is difficult to overlook the important role third parties play in achieving a desired outcome. As it is difficult to achieve universal satisfaction with any procedure of conflict management between groups, it is salutory to note just how high the percentage of those satisfied with this form of intervention really is. A great number of group conflicts may, of course, be settled by the parties' own conflict management efforts. When the parties' own efforts get nowhere, a third party can make an undoubted contribution to breaking their impasse.

Conclusion

Third party intervention in labor-management conflicts is a complex human interaction involving a number of actors in a particular form of conflict behavior. It is an ongoing process whose primary objective is to get the parties to reach an acceptable outcome. I have tried, in this chapter, to go against the prevailing agnosticism in this area and study this process in terms of some of the conflict dimensions which are postulated as relating to the effectiveness of intervention. I did not propose to make, nor do I intend to offer, definitive statements concerning the relationship between any of those dimensions and the consequences of intervention. My purpose, and scope, are much more modest; to study and explore those dimensions, and to do so by focusing on the experience and conceptions of third parties themselves.

In the preceding chapter, the behavior of a third party was described in terms of the features and factors of problem-solving. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests a considerable departure from the problem-solving approach to conflict management. Third party intervention in labor-management conflicts is more concerned with specific outcomes, than with establishing specific processes of decision making. The behavioral and procedural variables associated with this mode of intervention are not designed to enhance problem-solving in labor negotiations but to aid those involved in conflict management come to terms with the demands, tensions, and complexity of the situation.

The consultation-based, problem-solving approach is not directly applicable to labor-management conflicts. Third parties in labor-management conflicts operate in an arena where the actors are competitively interrelated, where they anticipate pressure from representatives and constituents alike, where information is restricted and freedom of interaction is limited, where there is no clarity of issues, and where, finally, time pressures are important. Under these conditions a third party must, and does, act to develop the exchange of valid information. But in addition to this communicational function, it has very significant procedural functions (e.g. chair meetings, control administrative details) and substantive functions (e.g. offer suggestions, emphasize conflict costs). Without this substantive function, third party effectiveness will be reduced considerably.

It may well be that problem-solving interventions can generate more satisfactory outcomes even at the group level. The reality of group interactions and the requirements of norms, conformity, constituents, and role obligations leave little room for initiatives of this kind. A learning atmosphere and a problem-solving basis can be established where these irreducible and unchanging structural dilemmas are absent. There are sufficient ambiguities and tensions in conflict management without in any way succumbing to the need to offer a new role structure for third party intervention.

The values, problems, goals, parties, and behavior have a different identity, and suggest different conditions of intervention at the group level of analysis. The values which guide a third party can be

described as solution-centered rather than process-centered. The problem does not conjure up a problem-solving approach, but a more pragmatic problem of how to resume normal conditions of interaction and avoid conflict escalation. The goals of intervention refer to the desire to narrow differences and reach a voluntary agreement. The parties engaged in conflict management are not the individuals directly involved, but representatives whose behavior is constrained by certain variables. Behavior here represents not only the reflective and non-directive components, but a significant substantive and directive component.

Our understanding of third party intervention can be advanced only if we are aware of differences as well as similarities. Third parties, in intergroup conflicts, can reduce some of the situational and role pressures, they can not affect the personal-cognitive element in conflict management. Nor can they stimulate, through the injection of conceptual inputs, a convergence of beliefs and values, or stimulate interpersonal attraction and a free exchange of communication. A third party, in intergroup conflict, does not act to develop the conditions of problem-solving. It does, though, act as a structural element leading to more functional, cooperative, and productive conflict management. In so doing it can offer an invaluable contribution to a peaceful settlement.

Notes

1. Boulding distinguishes five types of involuntary groups (e.g. race, sex, religion) and seven types of voluntary groups (e.g. social, political). See Boulding (1962).

2. Some norms are relatively unimportant (e.g. folkways), but others (e.g. mores) can not be violated by group members without invoking negative sanctions. Norms prescribe appropriate ways of interaction and define expected standards of behavior. They reflect common experience and affect future interactions.

3. Voluntary intervention seeks to bring the parties together in a better conflict management relationship. Arbitration is an acknowledgement that they

can not agree on how to settle their conflict. Arbitration takes away decision-making from the parties.

4. I am mainly concerned here with the objectives of third parties associated with a well established, public mediation agency. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the U.S., and the Conciliation and Arbitration Service in the U.K. have jurisdiction to intervene in conflicts between labor and management in the private as well as public sector.

5. See Rhemus (1956). See also Kolb (1981).

6. Very often a third party may adopt a passive posture, doing little beyond being present. This in itself could have a constructive effect on the parties' conflict management. See Peters (1958).

7. There is an implied notion here that some conflicts may in fact have 'hidden issues' which are not always translatable into formal demands. On this point see Stevens (1963) and Simkin (1971).

8. Such behavior may help the parties to focus on their conflict, and not on each other. Depersonalizing a conflict is an important strategy of non-directive behavior.

9. It should be recalled that there was no evidence of directive third party behavior in marital conflict.

10. In a comparative study of the effectiveness of intervention in four countries (U.S.A., G.B., Ireland, and Israel), Galin and Krislov (1978) found that over 75 per cent of respondents, both labor and management, had agreed that proposals and suggestions made by a third party were seen as more constructive and helpful in reaching an agreement.

11. Direct pressure by third parties is quite widespread. Galin and Krislov (1978) found that over 80 per cent of workers and managers reported that third parties had pressured them into an agreement. The corresponding figure for the U.K. was only 35 per cent.

12. Kochan and Jick (1978) found that these strategies correlate with a movement towards a settlement.

13. Landsberger (1955) offers further support for the presence of directive third party behavior. In coding 12 cases of intervention in labor-management conflicts, he found that third parties made more suggestions for a settlement than the parties themselves.

14. The Conciliation and Arbitration Service in the U.K. was subjected to criticism as being a channel for direct government policy. As a result of this criticism, the government established the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) as an independent statutory body in 1976.

15. Indeed a number of respondents indicated that they would be somewhat reluctant to intervene unless they received a joint request.

16. Berkowitz et al. (1964) found that 75 per cent of mediators preferred to wait until the parties reached an impasse before intervening. For further support for late entry see Galin and Krislov (1978).

17. In my analysis of total third party behavior, it became apparent that over 90 per cent of directive third party behavior was initiated or committed in separate meetings. See Bercovitch (1980).

18. It is interesting to note that respondents did not attach any significance to basic demographic variables (e.g. age, religion, nationality, etc.). For an interesting study of these characteristics, see Weisenfeld (1962). See also Landsberger (1960) for another attempt to elucidate the personal dimension in intervention.

19. In terms of overall numbers of cases we can see that 2,487 requests for intervention were received by A.C.A.S. in 1980 and 2,262 requests in 1981. Of these mediation resulted in progress toward a settlement in 1,467 cases in 1980 and 1,364 cases in 1981. It was unsuccessful in 443 cases in 1980 and 352 cases in 1981.

20. Galin and Krislov (1978) found very high agreement among workers and management that third parties acted as catalysts to an agreement (69 per cent of managers and 76 per cent of workers in the U.S. agreed with this, the respective figures for the U.K. were 73 per cent and 74 per cent), and that without intervention the number of strikes would increase significantly (66 per cent of managers and 75 per cent of workers in the U.S. agreed with this statement). They also found evidence to suggest that third parties made constructive suggestions, pressed for solutions, and helped workers to ‘save face’.

5
International Conflict and Third Party Intervention

Introduction

Of all forms of social conflicts, international conflict is undoubtedly the most important. As a phenomenon which can manifest itself in behavior where the means employed can threaten the very existence of the international system, international conflict affects us all in a way no other conflict does. This, I believe, lends a sense of urgency to all those efforts - intellectual and practical - which seek to improve the quality of the parties' conflict management interactions, or establish the conditions for the regulation, management, or resolution of international conflicts. With international conflict becoming increasingly more dangerous and costly, and most states showing an increased sensitivity to differences and decreased sensitivity to similarities, the dangers of an escalating conflict are all too apparent. If this process is not to drive us to extinction, we must understand its nature and develop a common interest in managing it effectively and changing its character.

The Nature of International Conflict

When we speak of international relations, we imply a certain degree of interdependence. The interdependence we refer to is between nations. Their organization determines the configuration of

the international system, and the extent and intensity of conflict within that system. The higher the degree of interdependence between nations, the greater the likelihood of conflict. International interdependencies, like other social relations, are a mixture of cooperative and competitive interests. When competitive and inconsistent interests outweigh cooperative interests, suspicious and hostile attitudes will be stimulated and a conflict situation will be defined as a win-lose situation. If unmanaged, such a situation can lead to a violent and irreconcilable confrontation.

The term conflict does not have different associations according to the level of analysis; behavior, though, does. The behavior which is of particular concern in this chapter is the behavior of the sovereign state. The sovereign state, with its legal monopoly over the use of force, despite efforts to dislodge it, remains one of the most important actors in international relations. The number of states in the international system has risen steadily from 60 in 1945, to 170 today. This growth increases the number of possible relationships, interdependencies, and the potential for conflict.

In viewing international relations, the global scene may be seen as comprising states only, or as comprising transnational systems only. Alternatively, it may be viewed as comprising a large number and variety of actors. Some are states, others are organizations, groups, or non-states. All these entities interact; all of them have to deal with, and manage conflict situations. The conflict situations that I wish to focus on in this chapter are those between states. To suggest that states are the actors one studies does not imply a state-centric perspective. It simply conveys the ideas that one is interested in the conflict behavior of these entities.

Although states share many of their attributes with groups, they also have a number of specific attributes. A state has a higher degree of control over its members. There is no authority outside a state to interfere with its activities. A state expects the loyalty of its citizens. It is invested with nominal equality in international relations, and it maintains a strong self-image. States have a higher degree of autonomy and freedom, and a higher awareness of their own values and structure than other actors. They are also units with the most

exclusive, and acceptable, claim to resource-mobilization (Nettl, 1968).

The relationships and interdependencies between states is permeated by criss-crossing interests and basic antagonisms. When they are in conflict, states (or rather their representatives) display little trust, and bring with them, to an interaction situation, few common values. Accordingly, the intensity of conflict between states may be that much higher and the difficulty of managing international conflicts that much more pronounced. These structural features of behavior at the international level of analysis should be recognized (Senghaas, 1973; Skjelbaek, 1973; Williams, 1981). Only the disappearance of nation-states, or a world government, would alter this feature.

International conflict, like peace, is a process, rather than an end state. It is active and dynamic, rather than passive and static. In its behavioral manifestation it consists of all the organized and collective efforts by one nation to control, influence, or destroy the persons and property of another. As with other types of conflict, there are constant attempts to constrain or manage such behavior. These may range from suggestions for the reduction of international tensions to various socio-political mechanisms. Although the range of possible approaches to managing or regulating international conflicts is quite immense, they are all predicated upon one or more of the following elements; (a) developing a commitment to common values and beliefs, (b) developing common interests, (c) strengthening the structure of international communication and diplomacy, or (d) encouraging the pacific intervention of another actor (Harf, 1971). These approaches have not always succeeded in getting states to manage their conflict through nonviolent political or social processes, but it is difficult to envisage of other approaches (short of utopian ones) that would offer better prospects.

International conflict is a multi-causal and multifaceted phenomenon, not easily accounted for in terms of single traits or approaches. Its occurrence should not (unless it is violent) be taken as an interruption of ‘normal’ interactions. It is a very natural and probable consequence of the existence of actors with different values

and interests. Given a system with fairly autonomous and diverse units, linked together in a relationship that is both competitive and cooperative, the potential for conflict is unbounded. This does not mean that every relationship manifests itself in conflict. Whether or not a relationship will in fact develop in this way will depend upon a set of diffuse structures, attitudes, and feelings. These may be suggested as the causes of conflict.

A large number of factors may be adduced as the causes of international conflicts. Some of these are basic causes, others more immediate (Levi, 1960). Three basic causes of international conflicts can be identified; (a) economic, (b) political, and (c) social-psychological (Smith, 1979. Cf. Kelman, 1955; Haas, 1974).

Economic causes of international conflict stem from the unequal. distribution of scarce resources and the commensurate perception of dissatisfaction among a large number of states. Such perceptions are often translated into conflict situations and, in some circumstances, into collective violence. Political causes refer to the competitive interplay of states, external objectives, and the relationship between power and interdependence. The social-psychological causes focus our attention on the human element and the psychological characteristics of decision makers and elites.

Approaches to international conflict management are numerous. They reflect the many diverse causes of international conflict. Actors engaged in international conflict can manage their conflict in a costly way (e.g. resort to war), complex way (e.g. nuclear or conventional deterrence), or in an unlikely way (e.g. unilateral pacifism). Neither individual states, nor the international system of states could survive unless some mechanism existed for ensuring that states manage their conflicts in a more effective way. To prevent the occurrence of inefficient, or inept conflict management, the modern international system has developed a weak form of institutionalized regulation of conflict. This form was given an explicit expression at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (Scott, 1917). It was further elaborated in the Covenant of the League of Nations (Zimmeren, 1939) and received its most emphatic formulation in Article 33 (1) of the U.N. Charter (Goodrich and Hambro, 1949).

Like other systems of interaction, the international system of states is highly adaptive. It has developed a set of norms and provisions to provide for non-violent conflict management (Cohen, 1981). These are not as successful, nor are they as effective, as the institutionalization of collective bargaining at the group level. Successful institutionalization of conflict management requires knowledge, skills, confidence, and consensus on basic norms. Agreement on basic norms is sadly lacking amongst the diverse, self-interested and interdependent, actors operating on the international scene. The international system, where conflicts may be most destructive, is also the most resistant to constructive approaches.

The pacific intervention of third parties, be they individuals, representatives of private or international organizations, or indeed other states, is one of the few constructive approaches designed to overcome some structural obstacles and offer an operationally feasible program for the control of violence and the settlement of conflicts. The intervention of a third party reduces the likelihood of violent conflict management. It is a structural device to attain a well-defined objective; to balance the interests and resources of the conflicting parties with the possibilities of an acceptable outcome (Young, 1972). How often do third parties find themselves in conflict situations, and how do they act to increase the likelihood of successful conflict management and mutually advantageous outcomes?

Third Parties in International Conflict

Third party intervention is closely related to the simpler two-party process of negotiation. In studying third party intervention one can focus on (a) the behavior and activities of a third party, (b) its effects, and (c) its extent (Levine, 1971). A number of studies have been undertaken to determine the extent of third party intervention and, whenever possible, its relationship to particular conflict outcomes.

Levine (1971), examining a universe of 388 official intervention efforts between 1816–1960, found an increasing use of such interventions since 1921 (from 2.4 interventions per year to 3.9). Northedge and Donelan (1971) provide a list of fifty major international conflicts from 1945 to 1970. Using their data basis, one finds that third parties were involved in 31 conflicts (or 62 per cent of the total) and that their intervention efforts achieved a successful outcome in 7 of these (or 22.5 per cent of cases intervened in). Holsti (1966) analyzed 77 major international conflicts between 1919 and 1965 and found that in 49 of these (or 64 per cent of total) there was some form of third party intervention and that these conflicts showed the least evidence of destructive behavior.[1]

More comprehensive studies were undertaken by Zacher, Haas and Butterworth. Zacher (1979) examined 116 conflicts between 1945–1977 and the intervention activities of the U.N., the O.A.U., O.A.S., and the Arab League. At least one of these organizations was involved in helping the parties' conflict management efforts in 40 cases (or 35 per cent of total), and achieved success in 21 conflicts (or 18 per cent of total).[2] Haas et al. (1972) studied 146 international conflicts, in which there was some form of official third party intervention, in the period 1945 through to 1970. From their data one can see that only 35 conflicts involving fatalities did not entail the involvement of a third party, and that organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S. had relatively high success in stopping hostilities (45 and 35 per cent respectively) and abating conflicts (42 and 74 per cent).

The most comprehensive survey of international conflict and interventionary effort was undertaken by Butterworth (1976). Using his data basis of 310 conflicts in the period 1945–1974, I found that in 255 conflicts (or 82 per cent of total) there was some form of official third party intervention. The frequency of official and institutional intervention is presented in Table 5.1.

One can further examine the data to study the predominant modes of intervention. These are presented in Table 5.2[3]

Whichever we look at it, third party intervention seems to be an important method for managing international conflicts. It can hardly be described as being in a state of disuse. The depth and insight of research on third party intervention may lag behind other fields. There are few valid generalizations on this method of peaceful settlement and few scholars have studied it systematically. In this chapter I propose to look at the phenomenon of third party intervention by relating it to the work of other researchers, analyzing it in terms of the explicit framework developed in the first part of this book, and offer a number of insists and observations based upon the experience of third parties themselves.(4)

Table 5.1 Frequency of Intervention by Specific Agents

Third Party	Frequency	Per Cent
U.N.	122	40
O.A.S.	26	8.5
Arab League	16	5.2
O.A.U.	13	4.2
I.C.J.	12	3.9
U.S.	8	2.6
N.A.T.O.	5	1.6

Source: Adapted from Butterworth (1976).

Table 5.2 Techniques of Intervention

Nature of Intervention	Frequency	Per Cent
Mediation	59	19
Enunciation	50	16.1
Discussion	37	11.9
Investigation	24	7.7
Good Offices	18	5.8
Exhortation	18	5.8

Nature of Intervention	Frequency	Per Cent
Observation	13	4.2

Source: Ibid.

The Process of Intervention

Whether third parties are private individuals or representatives of states or organizations, their intervention alters the character of a conflict. Regardless of the setting, third party intervention encourages the emergence of a peaceful approach to a conflict. The process of intervention is based upon the following assumptions; (a) both parties are more interested in settling their conflict than in 'winning', (b) both parties have some identity of interests, (c) both parties want to have some control over the outcome, and (d) both parties are prepared to rely on an 'acceptable' outsider. For a more detailed study of how this process is initiated and effected, we have to look at more specific examples of objectives of interveners, their behavior, and attributes.

Objectives of Intervention

Discussions of the specific objectives of intervention are often marred by serious disagreements, lack of consensus, and a relatively high level of confusion. This is not all that surprising. Intervention objectives encompass a very wide range of activities and touch upon the many roles that third parties may play in a number of conflict situations. Third parties, it is true, may intervene in an international conflict, perform certain types of behavior and generally seek to achieve a peaceful settlement. But what sort of third party behavior can achieve this objective, and how do experienced mediators themselves conceive of their objectives and the manner of implementing it?

The literature on third party intervention enumerates at some length the functions, roles, and characteristics of third parties in international conflicts. Alan James, in an early effort to inject a measure of coherence to the field, argues that:

> The process takes the position of the parties as its starting point and tries to establish enough common ground to support a solution. This may involve no more than a third party offering to act as a medium of communication, so as to get the states concerned talking to each other. It may lead to proposals being put forward by the intermediary for the consideration of the parties. Or it may result in much toing and froing by the mediator as he tries to persuade one of them to agree to a formula which holds out some hope of acceptance by the other. (1969:36)

Pruitt (1971) argues that the objectives of third party intervention include trying to persuade each party to accept the concessions the other has made. Burton (1969) suggests that the most important objective of third parties is to help conflicting parties identify, confront, and resolve their basic issues by adopting the problem-solving method. Schelling (1960) argues that third parties can suggest specific proposals or give prominence to 'focal points'. Rubin and Brown (1975) mention reducing irrationality and helping to explore alternatives as two important intervention objectives. Edmead (1971) argues that an important objective of third party intervention is to help conflicting parties cut their losses. And Young, in the most systematic study of intervention in international conflicts (1967; 1972), suggests that third parties' objectives in international conflicts can be described as informational (e.g. offering information, increasing communication), tactical (e.g. offer services), supervisory (e.g. monitor agreement), and conceptual (e.g. offer new ideas for a settlement).

How do experienced practitioners of intervention relate to these objectives? Although there is undoubtedly a high individual quality about each person's approach to conflict management, the most frequently cited response identified the general objective of intervention as

> a search for the elements of common interests and a progressive enlargement of that area, and a corresponding narrowing down of the differences between the countries involved.

When intervention occurs in a conflict which manifests itself in violent behavior, the most important objective is

> to put a stop to hostilities, to get a cessation of violence or ceasefire and then to do the best one can to encourage the parties to resort to negotiation.

The Secretary-General of U.N. in his report on his intervention efforts in the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan notes that

> the first and primary objective has to be to see the fighting end, rather than indicting or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it. (U.N. Doc. S/6657)

Two basic intervention objectives may be inferred from the responses. These, I suggest, can be best described in terms of (a) reducing the level of destructive behavior, and (b) increasing the opportunities and the motivation for a more constructive approach to conflict management. When conflicts are at a critical stage of armed hostilities, obtaining a cessation of hostilities and reducing violence are the most important objectives a third party can achieve. When a conflict it is not accompanied by hostilities, a third party can modify the disputants' motivation, calculations of benefits and risks, and work toward an acceptable agreement. The nature of a conflict, or the stage at which intervention occurs, determine the broad objective of an intermediary.

The scope of third party behavior depends, in part, upon the objectives attached to its intervention. Efforts to get the parties to negotiate constructively may take a different form from the efforts designed to bring about a ceasefire. When the parties' conflict has already manifested itself in a costly and destructive manner, third parties' primary objective is, undoubtedly, to reduce costs and arrest destruction. When, however, the parties become involved in a non-destructive, but nonetheless unsuccessful, conflict management interaction (e.g. verbal antagonism), third parties can affect this

interaction by simplifying a complex environment, providing information, facilitating communication, and directing efforts toward a salient and acceptable agreement.

The objectives of intervention, as indeed the contribution of a third party, are contingent upon such factors as the historical and social context, the nature of the issues at stake, and the phase of the conflict. The literature on third party intervention has often failed to emphasize this contingency.

I have referred throughout this work to two basic categories of intervention objectives, namely, process objectives and outcome objectives. Most respondents emphasized outcome objectives, but few suggested the importance of getting the conflict parties to communicate more effectively:

1) A mediator occupies a unique position in furthering the cause of peaceful settlement. He can encourage communication, directly or indirectly, between those involved, and contribute to a better under standing of their mutual grievances.

2) When the parties to a conflict are in a situation of high emotional involvement, many aspects of their behavior tend to be distorted. An impartial mediator can achieve a settlement by clarifying the situation, eliminating misunderstanding, and getting both countries to reconsider their situation.

Process objectives expedite conflict management. The most important process objective appears to be to facilitate a movement in the direction of conflict settlement. This can be done by helping with communication in a deteriorating relationship and by reducing the parties' concern with their public image, loss of face, or commitment to a declared position.(5) The significance of process objectives was articulated by one of the respondents in the following way:

> One of the most important things a mediator can do is to support international negotiators in their need to negotiate with their adversaries and supporters at home at the same time.

Outcome objectives figure much more prominently in the respondents' replies. This is to be expected. International conflict can have such destructive consequences, that if it were not to be defused, limited, or regulated, it could threaten the very existence of some of the parties involved. Amongst the primary objectives of a third party is the need to convince the parties to accept a peaceful settlement of differences. Count Bernadotte, the U.N. mediator in Palestine in 1948, in considering his mediatory efforts, described his objective thus:

> What is my role as a mediator…I have but one purpose, to leave no stone unturned in my efforts to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the situation. (U.N. Doc. A/648)

Granted that third parties intervene in a conflict with a view to controlling or arresting destructive, conflict and achieving a desired outcome, the basic question which comes to mind concerns the ways by which they achieve their objectives. How do third parties condition the process of intervention and the nature of their behavior in a manner which corresponds to their overall objective? The achievement of their objectives is made possible by specific behavior. It is to this aspect that I now turn.

Third Party Behavior

The nature of third party objectives, the issues at stake, and the conflict context are of crucial significance to understanding the types of behavior which may be undertaken by a third party. A third party may be an individual, an organization, or another state which is in some way external to a conflict. A third party enters an existing relationship and attempts to induce a change in this relationship. How can it do so? What is the nature of its inputs and the types of behavior congruent with its objectives? How can a third party lead to the development of more productive conflict management?

The behavior of third parties in international conflicts can vary in terms of (a) the resources committed to its intervention, (b) its degree of penetration, (c) formality of intervention, and (d) intensity of intervention. Here I wish to adopt a different scheme and suggest that the behavior of third parties in the context of international conflict management can be best described in terms of two broad categories relating to the process of decision making and negotiation; these are (a) information-search (e.g. establish communication, search for common principles), and (b) social influence, (e.g. persuading the parties to converge on an acceptable outcome).[6]

The search for information involves overcoming some of the impasses which prevent any communication between the parties. It is designed to help the parties identify the issues, delineate areas of agreement and disagreement, and provide disputants with more accurate information concerning their preferences and expectations. This aspect of third party behavior can make the issues in conflict and their scope much clearer. The second aspect, social influence, connotes the more direct and penetrative third party activities whose purpose is to affect, in some manner, the parties' evaluation, motivation, and behavior. In some international conflicts a thindv party may do no more than collecting and transmitting information,[7] in others a third party may have to evolve a carefully conceived set of tactics to influence, or change, the parties' motivation and expectations.

Either of these aspects of third party behavior is carried out by specific tactics. These tactics are the ingredients in implementing an intervention strategy and achieving its objectives. They are flexible and change with circumstances and the nature of intervention. An experienced third party knows how to utilize these ingredients effectively. I have designated these behavioral tactics as reflective, non-directive, and directive. The manner by which they manifest themselves in specific techniques is the concern of this section.

Reflective Behavior

When a third party employs reflective behavior, it can be said to be engaged in receiving, transmitting, and interpreting messages and signals which denote the parties' attribution of meaning to their conflict and perception of their situation. States as international actors interact within a system of heterogeneous values, competing ideologies, and different belief-systems; these become particularly salient in conflict situations. Conflict management may, therefore, be conducted by actors with images and belief-systems which bear little relevance to reality. To simplify the situation, and to ensure that the parties operate within a mutually accepted set of aspirations, expectations, and motivations, a third party engages in reflective behavior. It does so not only in order to keep communication channels open, but also in order to assess and evaluate each party's position, and its rigidity, to determine how they view each other and how divergent, or convergent, are their expectations and preferences.

Third party's reflective behavior, in the course of which a third party may well act as a go between funnelling information, is designed to help disputants identify issues, disclose information, and understand the consequences, or costs, of certain courses of action. Reflective behavior helps the parties to understand their conflict and the possibilities of its management. Identification of issues and motives, and increased understanding can help the parties with their conflict management efforts.(8)

Respondents expressed their approach to this aspect of their intervention in the following way:

1) My view is that he (third party) can not be too pragmatic about his efforts and that his foremost duty, if he wants to accomplish anything worthwhile, is to consider the facts of the matter and to strive towards an agreement within that framework.

2) A mediator is not concerned with the merits of a conflict, his main purpose is to try and get the parties to agree on the facts and principles as the parties see them. There can not be an

understanding of the nature of the conflict unless the relevant facts are established.

3) My view is that you try at first to find out each side's point of view and the points to which each side attaches greatest importance. Within these guidelines you work toward an acceptable outcome.

A third party's reflective behavior is expected to achieve some convergence of expectations by reducing distortion, ignorance, misperceptions, or unrealistic intentions. Fred Ikle (1964) refers to such behavior as "establishing the rules of accommodation", and Galo Plaza, in his report to the U.N., notes:

> My task has been to try to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement…It has required me in the first place to try to find in the positions and aspirations of the parties concerned sufficient common elements to serve as a basis acceptable to all. (U.N. Doc. S/6253)

International conflicts are all too often characterized by a tangle of complexity, multiple issues, oversimplification, and stereotyping. Reflective behavior represents an attempt, by a third party, to unravel this complexity and, in so doing, help the parties reach some agreement on the conflict at hand. Without identification of, and agreement on, basic issues and expectations, there can be no momentum in the parties' conflict management efforts. (All the efforts to bring together Israeli and Palestinian representatives break down precisely because there is no agreement about the conflict situation or its issues).

There are various ways of initiating, and continuing, the pattern of reflective behavior. When the parties are in a state of physical (or even psychological) communicational isolation, a third party can solve some of the problems by acting as an indirect communication conduit. It can facilitate communication between representatives, and explain to each party the constraints on the other (see Lall, 1966). A third party can clarify facts and eliminate misunderstanding. It can also convey the perceptions and feelings of each side to the other.

Effective communication of an opposing side's interests is an important function a third party can perform. Helping the parties understand each other and focus on real and substantive issues can induce a change in perception and generate movement toward an agreement.

When parties are engaged in conflict management, the best service anyone can offer is to ensure that each side understands how the other sees things. It is difficult to imagine that any agreement can be reached until there is some agreement on issues, problems, and what is at stake. An approach to conflict management has to be built piece by piece. The first step in such an approach is to engage in reflective behavior and help put the conflict in context. In some instances third parties' reflective behavior may be quite straightforward and uncomplicated. In others, a third party may have to elicit information from each of the disputants in a more circuitous way.(9)

Whichever way reflective behavior is implemented, it is crucial in effecting a shift from zero-sum outlook to a mixed-sum outlook. This in itself will not ensure a settlement, but without it the chances of a settlement will be negligible. Third party intervention begins with reflective behavior and with attempts to find, and define, the negotiation space, and attempts to widen it in a series of interconnected activities. Reflective behavior, whether in the form of providing information, or transmitting information, lays the basis of an effective intervention.

Non-Directive Behavior

The primary purpose of third parties' reflective behavior is to reduce the degree of complexity and uncertainty inherent in any international conflict, and produce some knowledge and information regarding the issues in conflict, the parties' intentions, and their expectations. This aspect of intervention consists of several types of clarificational and communicational measures combined in different ways. Such measures can not, however, remove the stresses, tensions, and the generally/dysfunctional aspects of international

conflict management interactions.[10] The non-directive behavior of a third party is designed to help the parties' conflict management efforts by exercising some influence over the physical and social structure within which it is waged.

Exercising some influence over the environment of conflict management can increase the parties' motivation to negotiate in earnest and strive to reach an agreement. There are a number of measures a third party may adopt to create the conditions for more constructive conflict management. Generally speaking, these measures can affect (a) the context, or structure of conflict management, and (b) the process of conflict management. How can a third party make the context of conflict management more favorable, and the parties more responsive to each other?

1. Controlling Publicity. The effectiveness of conflict management is often thwarted by being linked to a significant degree of publicity (through which each party's performance and behavior can be monitored by domestic constituents). Interacting publicly tends to be dysfunctional for conflict management, as it can distort positions, generate misperceptions, and produce a more rigid type of behavior - all of which have deleterious consequences for conflict management and negotiation. In discussing aspects of their intervention, the majority of respondents drew attention to the need to reduce the pressures on negotiators by controlling the level of publicity. A typical remark, capturing the flavor of the responses, argued that

> publicly conducted negotiations result, in my view, in an unwillingness to compromise or to make concession. It also brings in too many parties who are not directly concerned with the conflict. Maintaining the secrecy of the negotiations can be a great help in reaching an agreement.

Regulating the level of publicity or openness of the negotiation reduces the pressure experienced by disputants and creates a more viable framework for their relationship. By shielding disputants from various audiences and constituents, a third party can increase their willingness to negotiate earnestly and their preparedness to make

concessions./. In this way a third party can generate some progress toward a settlement.(11)

Although there may be some debate about secrecy and the control of publicity as non-democratic tools, there can be no doubt that they are effective in enhancing conflict management and negotiations. Kissinger maintained strict secrecy as a tactic to facilitate concessions in the Arab-Israeli disengagement negotiations in 1975 (Quandt, 1975; Perlmutter, 1975; Sheean, 1976). President Carter isolated both Begin and Sadat from access to their respective audiences which would have exercisd pressure away from an agreement (Carter, 1982; Dayan, 1981). Manlio Brosio, the chief Italian negotiator in the Trieste conflicts, comments on this aspect of conflict management. "We were all determined to succeed and we knew that we could succeed only if we kept our talks strictly confidential.'1 (Campbell, 1976:121)(12)

2. Controlling Environment. Controlling the publicity of interactions is an aspect of third parties' non-directive behavior which can reduce the disputants' intransigence, concern with public image, and inflexibility. Another aspect of third party behavior is its control over the environment of interactions. It is often in the interest of all concerned to interact in a neutral location, preferably one chosen by a third party. A neutral environment (e.g. Camp David) gives a third party greater responsibility for supervising the administrative and tactical conditions of interaction. It also ensures that neither side will derive an undue psychological advantage from negotiating on its home territory.

Control, and choice, of the environment by a third party preserves a semblance of symmetry in situational power. This in itself is a feature which is apt to encourage more effective conflict management (see Walton, 1969). Respondents characterized this aspect of their behavior as being 'decisive'.

> …on the whole there are too many negative consequences if negotiations are conducted in one country's territory or the other. My feelings are that it is extremely desirable to negotiate on neutral grounds away from your own public. A mediator can have access to a neutral ground.(13)

3. Controlling Resources. Another aspect of third parties' effects on the process of conflict management is their control over resources. Two resources are of particular importance, participants and communication.

(i) A third party can exercise some control over the number and identity of participants. It can identify the important participants, gain their confidence, and work mainly with, and through them.

> One of the difficulties a mediator may face is to work with too many representatives without a clear leader, or to work with representatives who have no authority to take really important decisions. If you can identify the important representatives and orchestrate your movements with them, the whole process may be different.

(ii) A third party's ability to regulate communication and be at the center of it, may have important consequences for the pattern of conflict management. Contrary to expectations, full communication between disputants in an intense conflict may actually lead to the discovery of new issues and to further escalation (Deutsch and Krauss, 1962). A third party, through its central position in the communication network, can coordinate communication signals and ascertain the parties' need to communicate directly or indirectly. It can, if the need arises, increase or restrict communication for a while. Both aspects of third party's control of resources aid the parties to reduce their win-lose orientation and help them to discover new areas of agreement.

Exercising some influence over the structure of conflict management is one aspect of a third party's non-directive behavior. The other aspect of such behavior is related to its exercise of influence over the process of conflict management. This is achieved by freeing the parties from outside pressures, and recasting issues.

1. Reducing Pressure. One of the important situational factors affecting the whole process of conflict management at this level is the relationship between the degree of outside pressure v. the motivation to settle a conflict. Motivation to settle can be increased

by decreasing outside pressure. A third party can reduce some outside pressures (e.g. need to save face, or act assertively) by allowing both parties to convey a strong image to their respective constituents, while encouraging them to adopt a more realistic stance vis-a-vis their opponents. Respondents were well aware of this form of third party contribution to conflict management. As several of them argued:

> 1) The presence of a neutral person who is toing and froing between the parties can help each country to portray itself as strong and dominant internally, while conveying, through the mediating person, a more accommodating and responsive posture to the other country. There is often a considerable gap between what they say to each other in public and what they say to me.
>
> 2) Activities of a mediator, exploiting the conditions of secrecy, can encourage each participant to make concessions and move toward a settlement without appearing to be reneging on public commitments. You have to be sensitive to their public commitments and to know how to whittle them down.

Helping representatives to overcome some of the concerns and dilemmas which arise from their need to save face and to appear unyielding is one of the most important functions a third party can perform. By reducing outside pressures, a third party can control one of the most important barriers to effective conflict management. Third parties allow each side to let out their expectations in confidence, while appearing, in all other circumstances, to stick to their mandate.

2. Recasting Issues. In addition to identifying conflict issues and providing each party with information about the other's perceptions and intentions, a third party can exercise some influence over (a) the, ordering of these issues, and (b) the manner by which they will be discussed.[14]

A third party can encourage disputants to consider the issue at stake as an integrated package, thus having greater latitude to arrange tradeoffs (this strategy works better in low-intensity conflicts). It can determine which issues will be discussed first, how to deal with the central issues, and how to initiate an acceptable agenda. All these aspects of third party's influence over the process of conflict management can increase the parties' motivation to negotiate in earnest and reduce intransigent behavior. Recasting conflict issues may help to restructure a conflict management process and allow it to flow more smoothly.

Another aspect of third party's influence over the issues in conflict and the way they are to be approached concerns the search for a formula in negotiation. Searching for a formula, rather than building up an agreement inductively, can provide participants with clear and orderly guidelines for determining their terms of interaction (Winham, 1977; Zartman, 1978). A broad formula (e.g. "territory for peace") provides an overall umbrella for the interactions. It gives a meaning to the numerous issues at hand, and helps the parties to think of their narrower and practical applications.

Respondents were well aware of the dynamics of conflict management and often indicated their preoccupation with a formula or principles to govern their subsequent intervention:

> As soon as you can get the countries involved to agree in principle to a basic formula, or to share an interpretation of their conflict, you are well on the way to bringing about a successful mediation. An agreement on basic principles brings a change in mentality which makes a settlement much more likely.

Taken together, the non-directive aspects of third party intervention are characterized by a complex pattern of behavior - the effects of which are to (a) reduce situational complexity and ambiguity, and (b) facilitate a more productive process of conflict management. The non-directive intervention of a third party makes it easier for the parties to identify common interests, accept a common definition of their situation, and engage in a more meaningful dialogue. Non-directive behavior is, in short, designed to influence the social and physical structure of conflict management. To ensure that the parties

will actually move toward a settlement, a third party engages in directive behavior, whose scope and manifestations are designed to change the perception of issues and the motivation to settle.

Directive Behavior

Directive third party behavior is related to the second aspect of third party behavior, namely, social influence. It consists of a variety of measures and inputs which seek to influence the parties' perception and motivation. Directive third party behavior introduces new values and resources into a conflict situation; values and resources which may alter the whole structure and process of conflict management. Considerable evidence was found to suggest that third parties in international conflict often resort to directive behavior and that it takes the form of (a) offering proposals or recommendations, and (b) exercising direct influence.

1. Proposals. Respondents were unanimous in their view that suggestions, proposals, or recommendations coming from a third party can short-circuit the whole process of offers and counteroffers, bids and counterbids, and lead to a credible and acceptable outcome. The gist of the respondents' comments can be gauged from the following remarks:

> 1) The mediator's own proposals or suggestions are very important and in many cases they could actually be decisive. At any rate, his proposals are more likely to be acceptable than those of one of the parties. This is why a mediator is often asked to put forward suggestions and proposals very early in the proceedings.
>
> 2) If he is to succeed, a mediator must make his own suggestions for a settlement…there are times when his suggestions are not only welcome, they are actually being asked for by one or both countries.

In presenting his own proposals or suggestions, a third party may focus attention on what is perceived as common concerns, or it may actually introduce new issues and alternatives. At any rate, a third party can break a conflictual impasse by

> putting forward various suggestions. Such suggestions could be critically important because both parties may see them as face-saving formulae and will be encouraged to accept them.

Third parties can play a direct role in the conflict management process through a variety of formal or informal proposals. Third parties' proposals can create saliency, break a deadlock or an impasse in the interaction, and allow each of the parties to preserve its own image of assertiveness and strength. The importance of this aspect of third parties' behavior has been documented in several primary sources. Count Bernadotte suggests that his

> …role as a mediator is not one involving the handing down of decisions on the future situation…but one of offering suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place. (Bernadotte, 1951:145)

Trygive Lie, as a mediator, took an active part in both the Palestine and the Berlin conflicts and was particularly instrumental in getting a settlement, based on his own substantive proposals, in the Berlin conflict (replacing the currency in Berlin, in return for lifting the blockade).[15] Hammerskjold's proposals secured an agreement between the U.S. and China.[16] but proved somewhat less successful in the Suez conflict of 1956.[17] in another case the proposals advanced by a third party (Lt. Gen. Wheller, the World Bank representative) provided the essential points for an agreement between India and Pakistan (see Gulatti, 1973). Third party proposals were equally successful in securing a settlement in the border conflict between Iraq and Iran in 1974 (see U.N. Doc. S/11291) and in getting disengagement agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria (see Rubin, 1981). President Carter, acting in a directive manner, put forward numerous proposals, and indeed submitted the draft

agreement which served the basis of the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' (see Carter, 1982).

The following observation on third parties' proposals are also worth recalling. Galo Plaza comments on the Cyprus conflict:

> I have considered very carefully the meaning to be attached to my terms of reference. Clearly my first duty was to undertake consultation with the parties… I have done that…(and) it has been suggested to me, by some of the parties concerned, that my next responsibility is to bring forward my own proposals for those conditions of a settlement which, in my opinion, would allow the parties to go as close as circumstances permit. (U.N. Doc. S/6253)

Cyrus Vance is equally aware of the strategic value of third parties' own proposals. Interviewed in Israel, he notes:

> We believe, and the parties agree, that if we are going to play an effective role, the best way that we can play an effective role is to make suggestions…to the parties and receive their comments on those specific proposals…which can then be discussed with the other parties. (Jerusalem Post, 31.7.1977)

Third parties in international conflicts offer proposals and recommendations as a means of influencing perceptions and providing a basis for an agreement. Such proposals can reduce the gap, or narrow the differences, between the parties. They do not, nor can they, pertain to the intellectual and rational process of problem-solving, but to the substantive aspects of an outcome. There may be some debate about the nature and utility of third party's proposals. There may be circumstances when such proposals are welcome, and circumstances when they are not welcome. There can not, however, be any doubt that third party intervention often takes the form of putting forward proposals and substantive recommendations. The competence of third parties to take an active and directive role in conflict management, to offer solutions and facilitate concessions, and generally provide the critical impetus to a settlement, should be recognized.

2. Influence. Third parties can also exert influence on the parties through their judicious exercise of power. The sort of power I have in

mind is persuasive rather than coercive. The exercise of third party's persuasion involves the use of threats (deprivations) and promises (gratifications). Despite basic dissimilarities, both these forms of third party behavior are future-oriented, and both are designed to achieve the same effect, namely, to increase the parties' motivation to reach an agreement, by changing, or manipulating, their perception of costs and rewards.[18] The choice of means, and the procedures for transmitting them to the parties, depends upon the resources available to a third party and their importance to the disputants.

The evidence from respondents suggests that third parties spend much time trying to persuade disputants to make concessions and that in doing so they are guided by a higher expectation of a settlement. The majority of respondents were of the opinion that:

> 1) Mediators should bring pressure on the parties, especially in the later stages of their involvement. They should, however, do so with great care and in a not too obvious way.
>
> 2) In an international conflict there are all sorts of outside pressures on the parties. A mediator may use some of these outside pressures to influence each party and to make them aware of all the possible risks they may face.

The parties can be persuaded to make concessions when (a) a third party convinces them that it is in their interest to do so, (b) when it convinces either party of the constraints that limit the other's freedom of action, and (c) when it directly pleads for concessions or describes the dire consequences that would follow if the parties failed to reach an agreement. When the parties are convinced that other alternatives are worse, they may well feel inclined to make concessions and settle their conflict. The belief in the necessity of concessions sustains the process of conflict management and builds up support for its successful conclusion.

Third parties can also exercise influence through the manipulation of information. Its central position in the communication structure and its ability to provide communication facilities, withdraw them, or

make them public allow a third party to exert some leverage on the parties. Several respondents indicated that:

> It is sometimes possible to influence their behavior by threatening to provide information to the press. This method should, however, be used with extreme care and only in certain cases. If used too often, a mediator may lose credibility and the parties will resent this.

This form of influence was successful in the 1965 conflict over Kashmir, when the mediator

> gave consideration to a further study in the form of a draft statement about the ceasefire violations which was designed for public release…Both governments reacted promptly. (U.N. Doc. S/6651)

It was also used extensively, and successfully, by Kissinger who, having insisted on secrecy, often offered selective leaks to the press which were designed to present one side as intransigent and unyielding. Such a tactic may create certain tensions in the relationship between the parties and a third party, but it can also act as a form of pressure, helping to increase the flexibility of the participants (they are, after-all, concerned with their image in, and esteem of, the world community).[19]

Third parties can also influence the parties' behavior by exerting direct moral pressure. This may take the form of

> suggesting that certain settlements are fair and just and take into account each country's interest and concerns, and that a settlement which does not include those elements is unlikely to last for long.

Moral and personal pressure, as a useable component of a third party's directive behavior, is related to its presumed embodiment of the notions of public interest, fairness, and equality. Such notions can create strong motivational factors in eliciting concessions (Bartos, 1977). A third party invoking this form of pressure can reduce polarization and increase the effective negotiation space.

The most persuasive, and effective, form of direct third party influence is its ability to promise new resources, or threaten parties

with the withdrawal of resources. To be able to do so, a third party must, inevitably, possess (a) a resource base which the parties value as significant, and (b) values and benefits whose distribution can increase or decrease each party's costs and evaluation of a conflict. This form of influence changes the parties' perceptions of the rewards associated with different outcomes and their willingness to link their behavior to a specific outcome:

> There are occasions when the only way to break a deadlock in the negotiation is to offer each country economic aid or other financial help, or conversely threaten to withdraw such aid or help, in order to get a settlement which both desire.

In exercising this mode of influence, a third party helps to change what is perceived to be at stake in a conflict. It helps to change the 'size' of a conflict by increasing the perceived importance of the consequences of a failure to reach a settlement. There are many instances of this form of third party behavior. In the Trieste conflict, all the parties agreed that the offer of economic aid from the U.K. and the U.S.A. for port construction in the Yugoslav Zone played an important part in clinching the settlement (see Campbell, 1976, esp. pp. 98–99; Eden, 1960, esp. pp. 207–208). Financial incentives were offered to Pakistan (contingent upon its acceptance of the third party's proposals) and were undoubtedly crucial in helping to revise its position (Gulatti, 1973). Kissinger's intervention in the Middle East culminated in a successful agreement having promised substantial military resources to Israel (Sheean, 1976). Carter used both the threat of accusing Israel publicly and the promise of large scale financial assistance as a link to the successful conclusion of the negotiation (see The Times, 9.3.1979, 15.3.1979, 16.3.1979 and 20.3.1979). Increasing the price of non-settlement, or the attraction of a settlement, is an important third party activity. In conflicts where the parties appear to be far apart in their position, there are no alternatives to such activities.

Third parties in international conflicts undertake, as we have seen in this section, a range of measures, singly or in combination, which can be looked upon as attempts to change the parties' evaluation of

their conflict and elicit more desired responses. Such measures, be they threats, promises, or direct transfer of resources, alter the parties' motivation and approach to conflict management. They create a new decision-making context that admits more, and different, preferences, intentions, and expectations, and provides the parties with an incentive to respond in a manner which can increase the likelihood of an acceptable outcome. Third parties' directive behavior represents a systematic and conscious attempt to influence the parties' perceptions and evaluations by modifying their orientation and approach to conflict management. Such behavior co-varies with the strength of the situational, representational, domestic stresses, tensions and other limitations. It is, though, both necessary and effective if the parties are to contemplate new settlement possibilities. Necessary, because parties in international conflict are unlikely to accept expert-based solutions, and effective, because no other type of input will move a party from an entrenched position.

The Structure of Intervention

Consent

The structure of third party activities is related to the formal diplomatic machinery of interactions between states and the notion of non-intervention in the affairs of another state. Activating intervention requires the voluntary acquiescence of the states concerned to internationalizing their conflict, and to allowing a third party to assist with their conflict management. The requirement to secure the parties' consent places certain limits on third party intervention (e.g. it may often come too late in the conflict), but it remains, nonetheless, a prerequisite for any intermediary activities.

The need to secure the parties' consent may serve as a restraint on some intermediary agents. Notwithstanding such restraints, intervention activities are incompatible with lack of consent. Most respondents were clearly aware of the need to secure mutual

consent, and quite a number (twelve) indicated that they would not intercede in a conflict unless they had the parties' consent.

> One must take into account the interests of the states concerned, their situation and seek to receive their unqualified consent. Without this consent, it is impossible to fulfil any meaningful task. Without their consent, you might as well not intervene.

There are various ways of securing the parties' consent. A mediator can impress the parties with his backing, authority, responsibility, and the need to support his efforts. Alternatively, a third party can, in the words of one of the respondents

> secure the consent of all concerned by indicating to those involved that you are not there to pass judgements, assign blame, or condemn one side as aggressor. The concern of a mediator is with establishing a more favorable climate for negotiation. This should reassure the parties and encourage them to give their consent.

The parties' consent can, therefore, be secured by having a reputation and demonstrable competence, or by assuaging their apprehensions about the voluntary and non-binding nature of intervention activities.

Timing

Gaining the parties' consent establishes the negotiability of a conflict and the acceptability of a mediator, seizing opportunities at the right time establishes the principle of effectiveness. When, then, is the right time to initiate intervention? A glance at Table 5.3 indicates that most intervention efforts are initiated only after a conflict has manifested itself in hostile or violent behavior.

Third parties may intervene early in a conflict, trying to prevent the emergence of violent behavior, or they may intervene later, trying to hasten its settlement. In either case we can say that the stage at which intervention is initiated can affect the pattern and outcome of vention. Douglas (1962) proposes that third parties should not

intervene too early, while Edmead (1971) suggests that interventions are more likely to be effective if initiated at an early stage before the parties commit too many resources to their conflict. Generally speaking, respondents showed a consensus for late interventions. This consensus was expressed in the following manner:

> Timing of intervention is of vital importance. Offers of intermediary assistance should not be made prematurely before the issues have been adequately spelled out, identified, and discussed. If mediatory assistance is offered too early, the parties can not have a perception of the possible trade-offs, nor are they sufficiently apprehensive about the escalating costs of the conflict. Once they become aware of their own inability to do something about their conflict, as well as its increased costs, signals the most propitious timing for intervention.

Table 5.3 Timing of Third Party Intervention

Phase of Conflict	Frequency of Interventions	Percentage
Pre-hostilities	64	20.6
Hostilities (non-military)	38	12.3
Hostilities (military)	117	37.7
Post-hostilities	26	8.4
Post conflict	10	3.2

Source: Adapted from Butterworth (1976).

Timing defines the circumstances of intervention. These are most conducive to intervention when (a) the parties experience dissatisfaction with their conflict management efforts, (b) they face an uncomfortable, potentially escalating, situation, and (c) they are aware of the limitations of resorting to military action. Such circumstances produce greater readiness to reach an agreement and greater flexibility. These circumstances are more likely to be found when a conflict has clearly erupted and some hostilities have occurred. Nothing concentrates the parties' minds better than the spectacle of destruction, or their perception of increased costs and resources. When this happens, the conditions for intervention are ripe.[20]

Procedures

A distinctive feature of the structure of third party intervention at the international level is that it is conducted by representatives with an eye on their domestic constituents and relevant audiences. It also involves a large number of participants, all of whom may be under instruction to frustrate or facilitate intervention, all of whom are further accustomed to interacting formally within an institutional machinery. This makes the process of conflict management much more rigid and complex. It also affects the structure and procedures of third party intervention.

A division of intervention into phases and procedures suggests two basic phases during which a third party is involved in different procedures and fulfils different functions. First, there is intervention at the formal level of interaction. It is characterized by explicit codification, strict adherence to an agenda, and the observation of formal interaction rules. Here a third party tries to find out the 'facts', transmit messages, establish contact, and achieve some agreement on basic principles. Then there is the more penetrative intervention at the technical (detail) level in which experts may participate, details worked out, and proposals exchanged. It is at this level that 'probing' or directive strategies are best introduced. Formal intervention initiates contacts, determines the scope of a conflict, and suggests the criteria which should be met if an acceptable outcome is to be achieved. The more informal and directive procedures of intervention are content-oriented and related to defining positions, changing the issue structure, and influencing motivation.

This overall pattern of intervention can be broken down into several sub-phases through which all intervention cases have to pass. The prevailing view concerning the division of intervention into smaller subprocesses, expressed by the majority of respondents, indicated that their approach to their work is predicated upon the notion that

> each case is different, and a lot depends on the nature of the conflict, but in general, the mediator starts by listening very patiently to the parties. Then

> investigating and ascertaining the facts and the situation and the way they are seen. Finally he can find the ways and means of getting the parties to agree to acceptable compromise. This may, of course, involve him in some form of pressure or persuasion.

Respondents seem to divide their experiences of intervention into three phases; an initial phase of formal intervention dominated by the parties' endeavours to establish their assertiveness, strength, and commitment to a publicly stated position. This is followed by information search and inventorying of alternatives. Finally a mediator directs all his efforts in an attempt to reach the outcome which is most feasible and acceptable. If successful, intervention may terminate with a formal agreement; if it is not successful, the parties go back to estimating the consequences of their conflict. The structure and procedures of third party intervention are such that neither its behavior, nor that of the parties, can be interpreted as being compatible with the process of individual decision-making or problem-solving. The temptation to suggest different structures of intervention and different interventions roles, bursts out of those scholars concerned with normative-prescriptive approaches to conflict. It is not, alas, a temptation to which practitioners of international relations succumb.(21)

When intervention is initiated it is influenced, to a certain extent, by the extremity of each party's behavior and demands. A third party refrains from utilizing any active or directive strategies; it adopts a fairly passive posture and allows each party to articulate its ideas about the conflict, its causes, and the possible settlement to which each party aspires. The parties' formulation of issues and choice of alternatives is both inflexible and competitive at this stage. A graphic description of the nature of this stage is conveyed by the Yugoslav negotiator in the Trieste intervention:

> We have to give-off the so-called baroud d'honneur. That was rather repulsive for me to do, but I had instructions from my government to demand the whole Free Territory of Trieste. I had to put forward all the arguments and I rattled them off the whole first week, keeping myself busy and keeping all the others busy. I am quite certain Thompson and Harrison (the mediators) understood it

> was a matter of letting off steam. When they told us that the only way we could talk shop was if we came down to Zones A and B, then of course we dismissed all the advisors and experts and…met in my flat. (Campbell, 1976:95)

In subsequent stages the parties are involved in the more serious, and slippery, process of exchanging commitments, threats, promises, and employing other persuasive strategies. The third party will, at this stage, act alternatively as a chairman or a leader, presiding over the parties' interactions, controlling their communication or inducing them to offer concessions (and these are usually made at the last minute). The structure and context of intervention in international conflict determines the multirole character of a third party. The procedures it adopts and the strategies it enacts can only be identified and associated with this structure (Pechota, 1971). Intervention in international conflicts can only be considered, and studied, by reference to the structure, atmosphere, and network of constraints which characterize the interaction between states.

Third Parties' Qualities and Characteristics

Are there certain characteristics or personal qualities which can make intervention more successful? And if so, can they be studied systematically? The issue of personal characteristics has been cited by some as being predictive of success (e.g. Young, 1967), whereas others (e.g. Ott, 1972) claim that it is amongst the least important factors in executing an effective intervention. How do experienced international mediators view this question, and which personal qualities and characteristics do they consider to be most important?

Most respondents agreed that 'good' mediators can carry out their functions more effectively, and that to become a 'good' mediator one had to have certain desired qualities as well as the necessary training and experience. One of these important qualities concerned the authority vested in a third party. This was expressed by several of the respondents in the following way:

1) You can't carry out a program of intervention as a private individual, however well-intentioned. To be effective you must have the support of an organization such as the U.N. or have the full support of your own country behind you. The support of an important organization or a country is one of the crucial assets to our behavior.

2) As a mediator, one does not enter a conflict situation in a private capacity, but as the formal representative of some country or institution. This gives him an authority which complements his own personal authority.

Intervention in international conflict involves individuals qua representatives, not individuals qua individuals. Getting the backing of a government, or an organization, enhances the authority and effectiveness of a mediator. Lack of such backing could seriously affect the acceptability and performance of a mediator. The authority of mediators in international conflicts is extrinsic (and not intrinsic as suggested by the problem-solving model). It affects almost every aspect of the intervention process and is often quite decisive in affecting the attitudes of the parties (see Holmes, 1970; Raman, 1975; Campbell, 1976).

The authority of a third party, as well as the inclination of the disputants to settle, have an important effect on the effectiveness and success of third party intervention. Another factor which may affect its effectiveness and success is the ability to establish a rapport with the parties. A third party can have rapport or a close relationship with others if it possesses certain personal qualities. What are the most highly regarded personal qualities?

Respondents felt that the most important personal qualities which were likely to enhance their effectiveness were, in descending order, patience (22 respondents, or 86 per cent of total sample mentioned this quality), respectability, stamtoa, persuasiveness, courage, honesty, trust, intelligence, and helpfulness.(22) Such personal qualities can be associated with success in other occupations, and they are undoubtedly important in mediation, as they would be in

most aspects of life. The success or failure of intervention depends, in the final analysis, upon a host of factors. The reputation and personality of an intervener can be singled out as one of these factors.

Desirable personal qualities are undoubtedly necessary to create an atmosphere in which all the parties concerned can feel comfortable. They are not, however, sufficient to account for the effectiveness of intervention. For third party intervention to be effective, a third party must possess (a) a high degree of skill and competence, (b) it must be credible and gain access to all the parties involved in a conflict, and (c) it must acquire their confidence and credibility.

There is no doubt that qualities such as experience with previous conflicts, expertise in international negotiation, and an established reputation can help a third party affect both the context and the content of conflict management (see Cot, 1972). Another quality which has been traditionally mentioned as being conducive to third party's credibility and effectiveness is impartiality. Young (1967) claims that a "high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations" (p. 81). Impartiality, in the sense of having no known biases vis-a-vis either party, is often linked to effective third party intervention (see Jackson, 1952; Northedge and Donelan, 1971). Indeed it is often described as the one indispensible quality.

Although a number of respondents felt impartiality was an important quality, the majority of respondents described it merely as a contributory factor and not as indispensible, or even necessary. One of the respondents, an experienced U.N. mediator, commenting on his experience, noted that:

> A person undertaking mediation on behalf of the U.N. does not often succeed. This is not always his fault. Without any resources, or sanctions behind him, there is very little that he can do to move the parties toward an agreement.

The traditional importance attached to impartiality stems from the failure to recognize third party intervention as an extension of the two-party negotiation model. To regard intervention as totally exogenous is both erroneous and unrealistic. A third party enters a

conflict and turns it into triadic negotiation. In the process of its intervention it engages, like the other parties, in behavior designed to elicit information and to exercise influence. If its behavior is confined to information-search only, its presumed impartiality is of no consequence. If, however, its behavior is designed to influence both parties, then its resources, saliency, and prestige will help it to achieve a desired outcome; much more so than will its impartiality.

Intervention effectiveness is derived not from impartiality, but from the saliency of a third party, its standing and prestige, the resources it could bring to bear, and its perceived ability to exert some influence on either party.[23] In a study of successful mediations Frei (1976) found that these were most often related to mediator's resources (e.g. mediation efforts deployed by a big power were more successful than those of a regional organization) and its prestige (e.g. heads of states were much more successful than U.N. envoys), not to their impartiality. Possessing resources that the parties may value, or resources which can be brought to bear on the parties, is one of the most important attributes of a successful third party.

Relevant resources can be (a) ascribed resources (e.g. authority, respect), (b) personal resources (e.g. personal qualities establishing rapport), (c) acquired resources (e.g. reputation), and, most importantly, (d) tangible resources (e.g. informational, economic, and physical resources). Attributes and characteristics which enhance a third party's reward and legitimacy basis, are also likely to contribute to a more effective intervention.

The factors contributing to effective intervention are complex and varied. Some are not yet discoverable, others are unique to specific cases. Amongst the factors which can be isolated as being generally responsible for the success or failure of intervention, the appropriateness of procedures followed, and the skill, authority, and identity of a third party, figure most prominently.

Outcomes

Of all the aspects of third party intervention, the most difficult relationship to study is the relationship between third parties and conflict outcomes. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the temporal problem (e.g. when does intervention terminate? Do we examine outcomes immediately after intervention, or allow for a time lag, and if so, should we allow for a brief time lag, or a long time lag?). Then there is the problem of the criteria for determining outcomes. Several possible outcomes of intervention may be designated (e.g. conquest, compromise, withdrawal, see Holsti, 1966; 1983) and one may then study the number of times where intervention produces a particular outcome. This is also unsatisfactory because conflict outcomes rarely manifest themselves as clear-cut phenomena. Then, there is the problem of perception of outcomes. Outcomes that appear satisfactory or successful to one party (e.g. Camp David agreement), may well be perceived by another party as containing the seeds of future conflict. Outcomes that are perceived as useful at one moment may subsequently be seen to have been rather less so. In the absence of any possibility of devising controlled, yet realistic, research on international mediation, we are faced with an insoluble conceptual and methodological problem. Whichever research focus we adopt, the study between inputs and subsequent actions, is invariably fraught with difficulties.

Having said that, it is still important to study, on the basis of interview and aggregate date, the outcomes of intervention. In general, it is possible to recognize three types of outcomes; (a) a settlement and peaceful interactions, (b) continuing intervention efforts, and (c) breakdown of intervention efforts and conflict escalation. Of these, it is perhaps not surprising to note that all respondents agreed with the statement that:

> Any mutually acceptable compromise that restores conditions and stops hostilities and violence can be considered as a successful conclusion of the mediatory efforts.

Respondents considered intervention to be effective and successful if it contributed, however indirectly, to a settlement of sorts. Such contributions were not conceived in terms of basic attitude - change,

or an integrative solution, but in more modest terms of helping the parties reach some accommodation.[24] The point of importance here is that mediators in international conflicts are fully aware of the impact they can have on conflict situations. They are also fully aware of the limits on their impact.

Several empirical studies address themselves to an analysis of intervention outcomes. They all employ intervention cases as their unit of analysis and look at various independent variables which may affect its effectiveness. Employing this method of systematic historical analysis Levine (1971) examined 388 intervention cases between 1816–1960 and found a positive correlation between increased number of intervention cases per period and decreased violent behavior within that period. Holsti (1966) found that in 49 out of 77 conflicts there was some form of pacific third party intervention and that 47 per cent of these cases ended in a settlement. Northedge and Donelan (1971) described intervention as being instrumental in achieving an acceptable outcome in 7 out of 50 conflicts (14 per cent).

Frei (1976), aware of the difficulties of defining successful outcomes, examined 65 cases of intervention between 1960–1974 and indicated that either 8 cases out of 65, or 28 cases out of 65 could be described as successful, depending upon one's definition of successful outcomes. Haas et al. (1972) found that regional or international organizations, approaching a conflict as an institutional third party, had relatively high success with conflict abatement (the U.N. had 42 per cent success, O.A.S. - 74 per cent) and stopping hostilities (U.N. - 45 per cent, O.A.S. - 55 per cent), but relatively low success with conflict settlement (U.N. only 26 per cent, O.A.S. - 26 per cent). In the most comprehensive study to date, Butterworth's (1976) findings concerning the success of institutional third parties in achieving various outcomes can be adapted and presented in tabular form, as shown in Table 5.4.

All these studies show that institutional third parties can be particularly useful in abating or restraining international conflicts. We do not,

Table 5.4 Frequency and Percentage of Intervention Outcomes The Contribution of Third Party Intervention

Intervention Outcomes	No Different	Per Cent	Somewhat Different	Per Cent	Very Different	Per Cent	Inapplicable	Per Cent
Stopping hostilities	86	27.7	49	12.9	10	3.2	174	56.1
Abating conflict	141	45.5	85	27.4	29	9.4	55	17.7
Isolating conflict	111	35.8	24	7.7	9	2.9	166	53.5
Restraining conflict	134	43.2	87	28.1	33	10.6	56	18.1
Settling conflict	190	61.3	44	14.2	21	6.8	55	17.7

Source: Ibid.

however, know whether conflicts in which the parties accept the intervention of an outsider are more, or less, likely to terminate in a settlement. Nor do we know whether a better, or even a similar, outcome could have been attained without the participation of a third party. Until we have some answers to these questions, third parties' contributions to successful outcomes should be kept in their proper, and critical, perspective.

Respondents were, on the whole, more concerned to emphasize the parties' motivation to settle, rather than their own unique inputs. This was expressed by one of them in the following manner:

> Yes, it is true to say that if no settlement is reached, you could look at it as a failure. But it is not right or appropriate to speak of it as mediator's failure. It is the parties' failure, the failure of their desire to reach a settlement.

Third party intervention, as a voluntary mode of conflict management, illustrates the fact that ultimately both the nature of a conflict and the outcomes achieved depends, first and foremost, upon the parties themselves, the issues in conflict and their motivation.

Geoffrey Harrison, commenting on the successful settlement his intervention brought about in the Trieste conflict, notes that

> …one of the absolutely essential ingredients of the success of our negotiation was the fact that there was…a very real desire on the part of both Belgrade and Rome to get the issue settled. (Campbell, 1976:71)

This, more than any other situational norm, social role or institutional form, affects the character of conflict management, the nature, and effectiveness of third party intervention, and the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome.

Conclusion

I have tried, in this chapter, to blend empirical evidence with broad analytical interpretations, and weave together diverse sources into a mosaic that, hopefully, yields insights into, and contributes to, our understanding of the process of conflict management and third party intervention. Such insights and findings make it possible for us to trace the first steps towards the development of a broader conceptual framework of conflict management, and have a clearer perception of the process and structure of third party intervention. I have tried to contribute some richness to these conceptual considerations by examining various kinds of evidence of third party intervention. An exploratory approach, such as I have adopted, can allow us to study the work and features of third parties, and to evaluate some of the ideas about it (with which the literature on conflict management is replete).

Having looked at the definitional considerations, assumptions, and prevalence of third party intervention in international conflicts, attention was paid to third party behavior and strategies. We have seen that third parties frequently become involved in conflict situations and that they undertake a range of activities which can help with the parties' conflict management and negotiation by modifying the physical and social structure of conflict management as

well as increasing the motivation to reach an agreement. Third parties increase the chances of an agreement by helping representatives overcome some of the problems associated with a complex and stressful exercise, by reducing their inflexibility and changing aspects of their strategic evaluation. They do not increase the chances of an agreement by seeking to resolve the basic underlying issues in conflict. This is a contribution which third parties are unwilling or unable to make.

Looking at third parties1 intervention as an extension of the parties' own conflict management efforts, it can be argued that a third party, whether it adopts passive or active strategies, can increase the effectiveness of conflict management in a number of ways. A third party can affect the conditions of conflict management interactions (e.g. maintain secrecy, guard privacy) as well as the process of conflict management interactions (e.g. provide information, coordinate concessions, reduce need for face-saving. It can affect the issues of conflict management (e.g. increase saliency of issues), and it can affect the persons involved (e.g. reduce irrationality, control personal animosity). These effects can bring about an agreement, or a settlement; they do not bring about a new, and integrative, method of decision making. The aptness of the analog of third party intervention in interpersonal conflict, where its intended efforts are indeed designed to teach the parties to resolve their conflict, should not be mistaken for legitimate evidence.

In looking at third parties in international conflicts, we saw that third parties often have occasion to undertake substantive measures or engage in directive behavior to facilitate an agreement. In searching for information and exercising influence, third parties behave in much the same way as the other actors. This aspect of third party behavior has received far too little attention in past research on conflict management, where its activities were assumed to be totally exogenous and totally unlike that of the parties. When this assumption is made, one can offer various imaginative and creative approaches to conflict management. Such approaches, however, based as they are on unrealistic expectations, can not, alas, help us to deal with real conflict situations in international relations.

The ideas presented in this chapter can not be decisively evaluated, nor are they likely to engender instant understanding of conflict management and third party intervention. The number of variables which impinge on this process is immense and consideration can be given only to some of these. It is also difficult to weight the relative significance of some variables (e.g. is third party contribution more important than the nature of the issue?). This does not, however, mean that we must present only ideographic studies. What I have sought to achieve in this section was to raise a generalized, researchable question and offer a glimpse of the way it is approached by scholars and practitioners. The parameters of the problem have been delineated. What conclusions can now be drawn?

Notes

1. In a more recent study Holsti (1983) examined 94 conflicts between 1919–1980 and found that third party intervention accounted for 45 per cent of all settlement attempts and for 25 per cent of all successes,.

2. The U.N. intervened in most conflicts (21), but the O.A.S. had the highest percentage of success (37 per cent) in conflict management.

3. From these figures we can see just how much more widespread is the mode of non-binding third party intervention.

4. As in the previous chapters, I have relied mainly on unstructured, open-ended personal interview, and primary and secondary documents. The names and addresses of experienced international mediators were gathered from U.N. Doc. A/7751 (1.11.1969) and U.N. Doc. A/8108 (18.11.1970), both of which provide lists of experts nominated by their governments to serve as mediators. This was supplemented by direct approaches to individuals and officials who figured predominantly as mediators in recent international conflict (e.g. Gunnar Jarring, Galo Plaza, etc.), and by reference to appropriate primary sources.

5. This is clearly expressed in Galo Plaza's report to the U.N. following his intervention in the conflict in Cyprus. See U.N. Doc. S/6253.

6. Both Galo Plaza and Gunnar Jarring refer, in their respective reports to the U.N., to these two aspects of their intervention behavior. See U.N. Doc. S/6253 and U.N. Doc. S/10929.

7. Such interventions are often referred to as fact finding, or investigative interventions.

8. The more intractable a conflict, the more intense or multi-issued a conflict, the more important will this aspect of third party behavior be. Indeed one of the frequent problems of conflict management is the tendency of parties to expand the number of issues in conflict, or to attach different degrees of importance to them. This makes discussion and exploration extremely difficult.

9. Gunnar Jarring, for instance, had to travel between the Middle East capitals to get the parties' ideas on their conflict 23 times in less than 3 months in 1968. See U.N. Doc. S/8309. On another occasion he sought to solicit more information from them by submitting to all the parties an identical questionnaire. See U.N. Doc. S/10070.

10. For a review of these, see Hopmann and Walcott (1977).

11. On the importance of this aspect of third party behavior, see the views of one of the most experienced international negotiators, Avrell Harrimann (1975).

12. For a review of the detrimental effects of a high level of publicity, see Rubin and Brown (1975).

13. On the importance of conducting negotiations on a neutral ground, see Campbell (1976). See also the views of the Indian negotiator during the conflict with Pakistan over the Indus river, Gulatti (1973).

14. Building a momentum toward a progress by agreeing on small, procedural issues first is described as 'fractionating conflict' by Fisher (1964; 1972). It was also found to be effective in experimental situations, see Deutsch et al. (1971).

15. See Lie (1954), especially pp. 199–218.

16. See U.N. Doc. S/415. For a further account of this intervention, see Gordier and Foote (1972).

17. See U.N. Doc. S/3728.

18. It is unclear whether the parties will be more likely to strive toward an agreement when they perceive a high cost-to-rewards ratio, or when they perceive a high reward-to-cost ratio. It is unclear whether third party's persuasion and influence are more effective when they involve gratification, or when they involve deprivation. For a structural analysis of threats, see Heilman (1974).

19. On the effects of this tactic, see Golan (1976) and Kissinger (1982).

20. Frei (1976), examining 65 cases of international mediation between 1960–1974, suggests that the best conditions for intervention are (a) late entry, and(b) low-intensity conflicts.

21. For an interesting, descriptive study of the structure of international mediation, see Stenelo (1972). Cf. Mitchell (1981).

22. To these one may add a sense of self-deprecation, or humility (see Jackson, 1952), and a sense of humour (see Pruitt, 1981). Humour in particular creates a good mood and contributes to a better rapport between people.

23. Saadia Touval first suggested the need to revise the theoretical assumption of impartiality in 1975. In a later publication (1982) he found that

most mediators in the Middle East conflict had an underlying sympathy for one side or another, and that this bias did not prevent their acceptance. Their acceptability depended on the parties' perception of the consequences of intervention and the advantages that may accrue to them. See also Gulliver (1979).

24. Intervention can thus be described as successful when it achieves the modest goal of helping the parties to reach an agreement. If its major objectives were to resolve a conflict, its success rate would be very minimal indeed.

Part 3
Conflict Management and Third Party Intervention Reassessed

6
Uniform or Diverse Interventions? Process v. Content Interventions

Introduction

The study of third party intervention in numerous conflict situations, ranging from the individual through labor-management to international conflict, has promoted the growth of a significant, if primarily impressionistic, body of literature. Given the importance of conflict, and the increased reliance on third parties as an alternative conflict management strategy, it is noteworthy that so little field-research has been conducted. Much of the work which deals with the problem of third party intervention seems to be predicated upon two quite different assumptions; (a) that a third party is something of a miracle-worker, offering a satisfactory resolution to any party in conflict, or (b) that a third party is a generally unwelcome and unwanted intruder, interfering with the parties' own conflict management, or even imposing its views on them.

This study represents a departure from these, or indeed other normative assumptions. It involves a more detailed and evaluative analysis of third party behavior and deals specifically with (a) modes of actual third party intervention, and (b) situational variables which affect the relationship between a third party and the disputants. In studying third parties in their naturalistic setting, the contrived aspects of laboratory investigations or 'closed systems' have been

reduced. Since the study was conceived as an exploratory study, several findings concerning the relationship and interaction between third parties and the disputants have emerged. These will be considered in this chapter.

Kinds of Intervention

What has become transparently clear is that third party intervention, as an approach to conflict management, depends, to a large extent, on the character, context, and participants in a conflict situation. These are important aspects in determining the effectiveness of any intervention program. Within this situational framework, the picture which emerges is of third parties undertaking a series of steps, which constitute a particular intervention strategy, in order to meet parties' needs and achieve social purposes. Broadly speaking, the various steps and strategies related to third party performance have their roots in two basic kinds of intervention. These are best defined as (a) process interventions, and (b) instrumental, or content interventions (Bartunek et al., 1975; Lipshitz & Sherwood, 1978). Interventions should only be designed within this general framework.

Process interventions are characterized by system inclusion (i.e. all parties involved are included) and diagnostic-facilitative interventions. Their scope and impact is quite extensive. They are meant to affect the entire system of interactions and generate a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. Instrumental interventions, on the other hand, are more limited in scope. They are characterized by system omission (i.e. most of those involved in a conflict are not present) and by outcomes which alter situational contingencies, but leave the general experience and boundaries of a conflict system unaffected.

Process Intervention

Process intervention is a fundamental intervention strategy which remains the same regardless of the conflict, or the parties involved. Of course, some aspects of process interventions may change, and process interventions may be observed to take various forms, e.g. analytical, acceptant, catalytic, confrontational (Blake & Mouton, 1976). Each of these may be more or less active, complex, open, or difficult to institutionalize. What they do, though, have in common is that they all focus on the social, attitudinal, and interpersonal dimensions of a conflict relationship. They attempt to improve information management and communication by directing attention toward the meaning of a relationship and bring actual conditions closer to desired conditions. Process interventions combine a number of approaches to deal with the problems of (a) emotions, (b) perceptions, and (c) communication in any conflict situation. When these problems have been dealt with, common psychological blocks to creative decision making may be removed.

Emotions. Conflict relationships entail a considerable degree of emotional involvement. This is particularly so when conflict parties are directly involved in the process (as opposed to being indirectly involved through group representatives). Many of the emotions which arise in the course of a conflict are problematic, disturbing, or unsettling (e.g. anger, fear, aversion). Such emotions lead to distinct cognitive labelling and hinder the capacity of individuals to engage in a serious conflict management effort, or to establish and maintain positive attitudes between them. Both efficiency and effectiveness may be affected by emotional spill-over and negative responses.

In process interventions a third party is acting in a facilitative, diagnostic, and nondirective manner to deal with these emotion-based difficulties. It acts to increase the flow of facts and information (negative emotions are often related to absence of facts) and to encourage expression of feelings and emotions which parties seek to suppress or exclude from their conscious awareness. A third party in process intervention is typically concerned with increasing the system's capacity to determine goals and choose courses of action, while decreasing, at the same time, its level of defensiveness, anger,

frustration, and stereotyped thinking. This involves diagnosis, feedback, trying to understand and reassure each party, and creating flexible structures for interaction. It involves helping each party to define the situation as it perceives it, clarifying feelings, accepting them, and mobilizing more collaborative energies to deal with the conflict at hand.

This strategy of intervention may work well at some levels of analysis; it does not seem particularly helpful to participants in, for instance, protracted international disputes. Conflicts in the Middle East, Southern Africa or Latin America are high-intensity conflicts between diverse groups of people, most of whom perceive a threat to their existence or vital interests; most of whom interact in a highly-charged environment where cohesion, trust, openness, and mutual support are extremely low. A third party, entering such a conflict, where there is a clear us v. them distinction, can establish mechanisms to increase motivation and reduce uncertainty in social interactions. It can not alter or modify the emotional dimension because its intervention is an example of a second order intervention (that is, it deals indirectly with the conflict parties). Process intervention, with its emphasis on intra-unit as well as inter-unit change, and on the ability to deal with emotional components, which block superior conflict management, can not be described as implying a mechanical application irrespective of context and target-unit. The outcomes resulting from a successful application of a process intervention can be defined as change in terms of motivation, learning, and improved goal-achievement. Outcomes resulting from a successful application of instrumental intervention, on the other hand, can be defined as change in terms of status, prestige, and reduced forms of antagonisms. An intervention involving only two people will produce a different outcome from an intervention in large scale conflict.

In process intervention a third party is concerned with fbottled-upf emotions and feelings of stress, anxiety, and insecurity. Each of the conflict parties may appear, or indeed be, bickering, frustrated, and motivated by the desire to win rather than the desire to satisfy the other’s concerns. Such emotions prevent parties from embracing

consensual or integrative decision making. They must be worked through before any progress toward a satisfactory outcome can occur. The underlying purpose of a third party in such a context is to 'help' by getting both parties to express, explore, and modify their negative emotions so as to alter their functioning and behavior. This a third party can achieve with interventions which entail a high degree of self-exposure and whose structure can be described as educative, confrontive, and consultative (see Schein, 1969; French et al., 1978). Process interventions offer an approach to conflict management which is based on tracing the emotions that are beneath the surface, examining them and probing for their causes.

Perception. The other aspect which is just as crucial to process interventions concerns the problem of perception. Parties in conflict have different, and often dichotomous, perceptions of their situation. Parties' perceptions reflect not only an objective, incompatible situation, but also each other's needs and prejudices. To the extent that perceptions are inaccurate, conflict can easily get out of control. No party is immune to this process. Hence a third party in process intervention is specifically concerned with this psychological phenomenon. Its efforts are designed to discover the hidden needs and unravel the unconscious dispositions of the parties. Its general strategy is to deal with values and concepts which can aid misperception and adjust individual perception by reality testing.

The various techniques which a third party can employ to achieve this objective include, as we have seen, inducing the parties to be as explicit as possible about their perceptions (e.g. writing them down in some order) and validating the relevance of partisan and common perceptions. Other approaches which have been utilized by third parties suggest that encouraging the expression of feelings as weil as issues, without one side blaming the other, and discussing each party's perception in an honest manner, can influence the possibility of finding a mutually beneficial solution.

A third party in process interventions is concerned to ensure that the parties do not perceive only two possible solutions to a conflict, namely, winning or losing. It, therefore, asks questions and elicits

information in order to increase awareness of common structural problems. Increasing awareness of common issues and clarifying issues and positions which have been misparceived are at the very heart of all process intervention strategies.(1)

One of the most important aspects in successful conflict management is the ability to understand the perceptions, expectations, and choices of other parties. A third party can reduce perceived discrepancies by insisting on summarizing issues, restating positions, disseminating positive information etc. All this may lead to parties defining their relationship not as us v. them, but as us v. the conflict. Perceptual consonance encourages flexibility of roles, adaptability, and innovative change. In the specific context of a conflict relationship, it effects a shift in interactions, from an initial state that is conditioned by erroneous perceptions and past consideration, to a desired state of here-and-now dimensions and constructive approaches.

The possibilities of such a shift are contingent upon openness, understanding, free and unrestricted information, trust, and interpersonal competence. Process intervention, with its focus on attitudes, negative feelings, understanding, and win/lose perceptions, can involve conflict parties in such an exchange. It can, however, do so only if (a) the number of parties permits participation by everyone involved, and (h) those involved exchange their own perceptions, rather than those of their referrent groups. Process intervention is effective only when a third party has direct access to the disputants(2). It can not be relied upon exclusively to dislodge representatives from being anchored to the solid and relatively enduring perceptions of their respective groups.

Communication. Adequate and reliable communication between conflict parties is a prerequisite to cooperation and a successful conflict management. A third party undertaking process intervention is far more than a go-between taking messages back and forth. Nor is it merely a structural device to remove some of the constraints to communication between the parties. A third party provides not only the opportunity to communicate, but the opportunity to check the

content of communication and to ensure that each is able to understand the other. Summaries, clarifications, restatements, and informational inputs are the usual tactics on which a third party relies to help the parties replace an invalid communication system with a sound one. Consensual decision making and conflict resolution are the by-products of a direct, valid, and undistorted communication network.

In many situations where conflict parties are not communicating, it is believed that if only one could initiate and increase communication, the parties' tendency to cooperate and resolve their conflict will be higher (e.g. Burton, 1967). The interpretation of evidence concerning the relation between a third party and a conflict system suggests that this is true of process interventions only; it does not have the same effect in other interventions. In some situations (e.g. highly intense conflict) increasing communication channels, or the opportunities to communicate may actually result in heightened conflict (see Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Increasing reliance on contact, cooperation, and effective (or controlled) communication is a characteristic of process interventions. Third parties, in process interventions, can influence the way information is being collected and presented so that it is optimally relevant to the phases of diagnosis, conceptual resolution (e.g. analysis), and operational resolution (e.g. implementation). These activities require cognitive efforts and can be sustained only when the parties are able to communicate, without fears, apprehensions, or reservations, their desires, beliefs, and expectations. In the interpersonal context, communication along these lines may, indeed, be possible. In the group, organizational, or larger context, on the other hand, communication is guided by norms and standards, and any attempt to increase communications may actually generate more misunderstanding. Process intervention, with its emphasis on openness and communication, does not in itself produce a decrease in intergroup or international conflict, even though it creates pleasant contact conditions.

Process interventions are specifically directed toward improving intra and inter-personal skills and competence. Their most significant

impact occurs in terms of changes in individual cognition and behavior. This, a third party can achieve by going, as we have seen, through the following activities:

i) Diagnosis. Predominant third party activities, in this phase, include gathering data, developing an image of each other, discussing assumptions and perceptions, defining the problem, and generally agreeing on a conceptual framework that will guide each party's conflict management behavior.[3]
ii) Conceptual resolution. Vital third party activities here include demonstrating compatibilities of perception, providing ways of thinking about conflicts, involving the parties in exploring issues and alternatives, and supplementing their insights.
iii) Conflict resolution. During this phase the parties evaluate alternatives in terms of quality and acceptability and choose an alternative that can meet these criteria and satisfy them both. In this way a dysfunctional interaction pattern may be replaced by a more constructive one.

Process intervention has, as its basic goal, the improvement of the parties' use of their capabilities and resources to achieve a more creative decision making and a resolution of their conflict. Although third parties may vary tremendously in terms of their experience, reputation, and ability, they are, fundamentally, individuals who have demonstrated, through career and personal success, the capacity to fulfil the requisite maintenance functions (e.g. trust builder, tension reliever) which are at the very core of process interventions. A psychological consultant or applied behavioral scientist are the most suitable persons to implement such interventions.

Process interventions are based on the assumption that in a conflict management relationship, a third party (a) generates information, (b) provides resources, and (c) improves the way individuals are functioning. This relationship also incorporates the notion that in process interventions individuals take full responsibility for their activities. Third parties' values and interests are excluded from this relationship.

Process intervention is a special, and in many respects an ideal, approach to conflict management. As such it can be viable only when certain conditions are present. Environmental norms and conditions

must be conducive. There must be sufficient trust and congruence between the parties. They must have the time and the competence to address themselves to the core of the conflict, and they must be prepared to embrace collaborative values (Eiseman, 1977). When these conditions prevail, process intervention can achieve greater understanding and a more creative and stable solution to complex situations. When they are not present, a different kind of intervention may be called for.

Conditions Affecting Process Intervention

In each conflict situation there are specific characteristics that affect the course of a conflict and the effectiveness of a third party. The variables which seem to make the greatest difference include (a) the nature of the issue, (b) the nature of the parties, (c) the nature of their relationship, and (d) their experience with conflict management (Buckingham, 1982). Is it possible to go further than that and suggest the basic variables which can influence the success of process interventions?

Trying to establish the conditions for joint problem-solving, or dealing with the underlying feelings in conflict is, by no means a common experience. Significant barriers must be overcome, and certain interactional conditions must be present. When these are absent, the parties themselves, or a third party, must introduce them, or failing that, resort to some other form of conflict management. A review of successful cases of process intervention would suggest the following as the essential elements or conditions in undertaking this kind of intervention.

1. Situational conditions. Process intervention is affected by such situational conditions as a supportive or participative climate (which encourages creativity) v. an authoritarian climate (which discourages it). It is affected by spatial arrangements and degree of informality. It is affected by the absence of time pressure and the presence of undistorted information which can be shared by everyone. Finally, process interventions are more likely to

succeed when conflict parties are roughly equal in size, have much the same experience, and when they can be creative, free and open.

2. Rational conditions. For process intervention to be successful, it is necessary to understand situational conditions and achieve a rational and effective decision making. Rational and effective decision making is dependent upon a clear expression and formulation of a conflict. It is dependent on information having the same meaning for both parties. On clear and specific statements of issues (rather than generalized statements). On feedback between the parties that is descriptive and non-evaluative. On identifying alternatives on the basis of present motives and information (and not on the basis of assumptions from past experience). The success of process intervention will depend on the parties' willingness and ability to expend high levels of energy to define the problem clearly, gather facts, identify alternatives, give information without accusations or judgements, and generally interact in a more rational way.
3. Attitudinal conditions. Process interventions are likely to be successful when conflict parties interact within an interdependent framework and have some positive feelings about each other. Parties' attitudes constitute a screen through which information about others is received, processed, and often distorted. These attitudes have to be identified and dealt with directly (through some form of reality-testing). Unless these attitudes can be identified, discussed, and changed, feelings of anger and defensiveness will enter the process and have a detrimental effect on conflict management.
4. Perceptual conditions. Conflict management is often unsuccessful because it is hampered by parties holding that in each conflict there must be a winner and a loser and each party's determined not to be the loser. This pattern of fus' v. 'them' is learned through socialization by individuals and groups. Such a pattern exerts pressures toward biased evaluations and competitive situations. It is also a partial determinant of communication in conflict situations. If process intervention is to be successful, it

must be applied to situations where the parties have some perceptual consistency, or to situations where the parties' biased evaluations can be changed. This is more likely to be the case at the personal, rather than at other levels of analysis.

The intersection of these four conditions, illustrated in Figure 6.1, suggests the possibilities, and limitations, of process interventions.



Figure 6.1 Conditions Determining Process Intervention

The decision to resort to process intervention can not be made in the abstract. Whether systematically or intuitively, situational conditions, available competencies, and perceptual conditions have to be estimated. Trying to establish a collaborative process when inappropriate conditions (e.g. mutual hostility, suspicion) prevail, or when the parties do not wish to engage in joint problem-solving, will, despite anything a third party might do, be doomed to fail, because it

reflects a basic misunderstanding of the possibilities and limitations of this form of conflict management.

Practical Steps in Process Intervention

A commitment to process intervention involves planning and implementation of certain practical steps which can move the parties in the right direction. It begins with a definition of the problem in terms of what is happening and what should be happening (the 'given' v. the 'desired') and ends with participants generating strategies for achieving their objective. This does not, of course, mean that all interventions are successful; it simply means that process interventions are implemented within the following general framework.

A. Pre-entry Phase

1. Who are the parties? What is the nature of their relationship? What are the issues in conflict?
2. What are third parties' expectations?

B. Contact Phase

1. Open up communication, ensure that all parties communicate with each other.
2. Find what is happening, and who is involved.
3. Establish credibility.
4. Establish informal atmosphere/explain ground rules.
5. Structure a preliminary and flexible agenda.
6. Clarify roles and responsibilities.
7. Depersonalize conflict (i.e. focus on the conflict, not on the parties).
8. Avoid judgements or evaluations.

C. Initial Phase

1. Design an informal atmosphere.
2. Request parties to discuss conflict.
3. Listen attentively.
4. Pay attention to behavior and attitudes.
5. Indicate how the process will proceed.
6. Eliminate tensions and personal antagonisms.
7. Discover the outcome expected.

D. Conflict Identification

1. Identify underlying issues.
2. Summarize areas of agreement.
3. Identify obstables.
4. Place issues and demands in a priority order.
5. Develop a sense of involvement.
6. Achieve a clear definition of conflict/causes of conflict.
7. Provide opportunities for sharing information.

E. Data Gathering

1. Capture as much factual data as possible.
2. Have a clear picture of past circumstances and present factors.
3. Open analysis of 'facts'.
4. Improve feedback.
5. Identify expectations.
6. Analysis and summary.

F. Planning Phase

1. List all possible alternatives.
2. Invent new and more acceptable alternatives.
3. Work out with parties consequences of alternatives.
4. Devise criteria to appraise alternatives.
5. Improve parties' ability to work together.
6. Review and adjustment of parties' attitudes and feelings.

G. Decision Making

1. Offer adequate resources in terms of knowledge and skills.
2. Create new solutions.
3. Encourage participatory and consensual decision making.

H. Planning

1. Summarize agreement.
2. Plan clear action steps.
3. Anticipate difficulties.

I. Evaluation

1. Termination of intervention and separation.
2. Assessment of objectives achieved.
3. Evaluation of intervention.

Process intervention is not a panacea. It involves the application of special skills and complex arrangements to specific conflict situations. We should not be so overwhelmed by its creative potential as to suggest it as a universal mechanism for managing social conflicts.

Instrumental Intervention

As the field of third party intervention evolves and grows, new techniques continually develop. These may differ in terms of procedural or structural dimensions, or in terms of the size and complexity of the conflict parties. Applying the classification of process v. instrumental intervention, we can say that whereas the former is the dominant approach in interpersonal conflict, the latter constitutes the dominant approach in conflict situations involving collective units.

In instrumental interventions the emphasis is on providing an appropriate setting and reducing intergroup barriers. Whereas process interventions utilize a variety of techniques to add resources and facilitate the development of trust, complementary orientation, and effective decision making, instrumental interventions, in which a

third party fulfils task, rather than maintenance functions, are designed to promote specific outcomes.[4]

Instrumental interventions achieve this objective by encouraging parties to work together in spite of differences, or by modifying the interactions within and between the parties. In instrumental interventions, a third party tries to do whatever is necessary to reduce the intensity of a conflict and facilitate concessions. Typically, its activities encompass more directive and advisory behavior. It can offer a neutral setting, opinion, rewards, information, or it can actually propose a solution and induce support for it.

Instrumental intervention is carried on within a defined structure which may acquire institutional features (e.g. conciliation and mediation services, diplomatic machinery). Within this structure third parties rely heavily on their reward, expert or referrent base to generate movement. Third parties may move from one influence base to another, but whichever base they work from or whatever 'package' they devise, their central role in the conflict management process is that of an 'outcome-advocate'.[5]

Third parties in instrumental intervention affect the (a) physical structure of conflict management (e.g. site neutrality), (b) its social structure (e.g. time pressures), or (c) the issue-structure (e.g. promise rewards or threaten their withdrawal). By advocating concessions, facilitating specific concessions without loss of face, or legitimizing and rewarding concessions, third parties can achieve a central goal in conflict management; that of narrowing the gulf between the parties.

At a more practical level it appears that instrumental interventions are pertinent when a conflict relationship is intense, or when the parties are locked in a competitive power/authority structure. In such instances a third party may modify some of the components of a conflict management interaction (but only some), release the parties from face-saving concerns and allow them to make concessions toward an agreement. Additional research is clearly in order to determine, in more specific terms, the circumstances under which process or instrumental interventions would be more useful.

Labor-management conflicts or international conflicts have a different structure from interpersonal conflicts. Intervention techniques which prove effective in some conflicts may be ineffectual, or even exacerbate, other conflicts. The tradition of studying third party intervention as an exogenous variable totally unrelated to the structure of a conflict relationship, the parties' interaction, or the nature of their conflict, may be traced back to Max Weber and his value-free methodological individualism (see Laue, 1982). It is not, alas, a helpful tradition, for it overlooks the existence of different conflict systems and, therefore, different intervention modes.

Third party intervention is an attempt to influence the process or content of conflict management. The direction of this influence, and third parties' roles are determined, inter alia, by the configuration of elements that make up a conflict relationship. The principles and practices of intervention have to be set against the background and dimensions of a conflict situation. When this is done, we find two basic kinds of intervention, each giving rise to different roles and activities, each operating from a different base and with a different rationale.(6)

Process intervention is different from instrumental intervention along a number of dimensions. It is different in terms of objectives, participants, identity of third party and quality of outcomes. Familiarizing ourselves with the reality of third party intervention will make it easier to suggest how such interventions can meet the needs of the parties in a particular conflict situation. Some of the basic differences between these two kinds of intervention are summarized in Table 6.1. The key to promoting effective interventions lies in expanding our awareness of the conditions to which each form of intervention pertains.

A third party is a person or persons with a set of skills, values, goals, and expectations. The particular configuration of these elements make up an intervention strategy. The starting point in designing a strategy, for intervention, is to realize that these elements can not be totally divorced from the parties' situation and structure of conflict management. An intervention strategy that helps the parties to use their existing knowledge and resources to create

new arrangements is not necessarily apposite to situations where the parties have incompatible dispositions, competitive attributions, hostile orientations and specific role obligations. Intervention strategies, in common with other forms of behavior, are subject to a set of social influences. Persons studying intervention in isolation from these influences fail to see the situation clearly.

The cause of conflict management is not likely to be enhanced by devising a socially innovative strategy for a third party in interpersonal conflict and postulating it as the most effective strategy in all conflict situations. Nor is it likely to be enhanced by an overreliance on a particular intervention style or role. A successful intervention strategy is flexible and adaptable. It incorporates elements from process and instrumental interventions and utilizes them within an appropriate general framework. Such a framework can meet the requirements of specific conflict situations by recognizing that intervention techniques fall, generally speaking, into "…two classes; a) interpersonal techniques, often utilizing experimental learning devices intended to improve the quality or the relationship among group members, and b) procedure oriented techniques which provide group members with specific strategies for going about their work in a more effective manner." (Hackman & Morris, 1978:49).

Third party intervention is an integral part of the process of conflict management. Its richness and variety can not be adequately described in terms of single variables, nor can it be discussed in terms of structural components or characteristics which pertain to certain conflict situations only. The skills, knowledge, attributes, and abilities which are needed in order to achieve a successful outcome are derived from two basic sources; (a) the nature of third party intervention as a specific activity, and (b) the nature of the issue, parties, and their own approach to conflict management.[7] While this may seem quite obvious, the search for more creative interventions has often focused on one aspect only (e.g. third party activity). Third party intervention in intergroup and interpersonal conflicts shows such a marked departure from the problem-solving model, not because such interventions are more traditional, or less innovative,

but because they are, and of necessity have to be, linked to the elements of a different structure and different social systems.

Intervention Outcomes

The increasing concern with third party intervention and the efforts to understand the bases of effective interventions represent an underlying interest with realizing the functional consequences of conflict. Effective procedures for managing conflict will produce better conflict outcomes. This emphasis on more effective procedures and better conflict outcomes dominates the field of research. It suggests that one can distinguish between various conflict outcomes and also evaluate them, and plan

Table 6.1 Elements of Intervention; Process v. Instrumental

	Process	Instrumental
Focus	emotions, perception, communication	power, authority, resources, rights v. duties
Units	individuals	groups, organizations, states
Functions	conceptual, diagnostic	tactical, procedural, informational
Feedback	immediate, direct	long time, mediated, indirect
Base	empathy, affect	resource, expert, legitimacy
Effects on:		
a) person	improved functioning, changed perceptions	reduced personal antagonism
b) role	none	reduced boundary-role conflicts, facilitating concessions
c) situation	induced trust, openness cooperation and problem	reduced tensions, increased situational symmetry and

	Process	Instrumental
	solving	responsiveness
d) outcome (if successful)	conflict resolution	compromise, accommodation, settlement
Phases:	i) entry -clarify nature of conflict	i) identification -establish expectations
	ii) diagnosis -collect and analyze information	ii) convention -bring together relevant parties
	iii) intervention - establish new rules and roles	iii) intervention -action to loosen constraints on parties
	iv) evaluation -assess intervention, plan future	iv) organization -design structures to rationalize agreement

specific programs to meet the needs of different conflict parties.

A number of criteria have been highlighted in studying potentially important factors in conflict outcomes and their evaluation. Traditionally conflict outcomes have been deemed satisfactory if certain standards - both procedural and substantive - have been met. Standards such as fairness, need, legitimacy, and equality have been important factors in determining the degree of satisfaction with particular outcomes (see Lind et al., 1980). These, it has often been suggested, are more likely to be associated with process interventions rather than content interventions. It is against this background that the whole program of intervention and information about outcomes has to be assessed and evaluated.

It is difficult to talk about intervention outcomes in the abstract. Outcomes are usually relevant to the perceived needs of the actors. Successful interventions are those perceived as providing relevant resources in meeting the parties' needs and interests. All the evidence concerning the behavior of third parties in a wide variety of conflict situations suggests that the participants have very different

perceptions of their needs and interests, and that these may often be different for a third party, and even more so for an outside observer. The first step in evaluating intervention outcomes is, therefore, the need to work out a method for determining the parties' interests and objectives; the second step concerns the assessment to which these objectives have been achieved.

1. The parties' needs and objectives have to be agreed to collaboratively. How should one do this? A third party can ensure that first contact with conflict parties should be devoted to determining needs, objectives, and what each wishes to achieve. Completing a written questionnaire, responding to a structured interview, or engaging in an open group discussion can provide valuable information about the parties' approach to their conflict. Such information can serve as a basis for devising a subsequent program of intervention and can be critical to its success. The parties' needs and interests determine their approach to conflict management and their future interaction with a third party.

2. Once objectives and needs have been assessed and an intervention program designed to achieve these needs implemented, how does one know if the objectives have, or have not, been achieved? This, I must reiterate, proved one of the most difficult issues to analyze. One can, as so many scholars do, reply on the basis of subjective impressions. This is neither a satisfactory, nor a particularly helpful reply. This study indicates that there are several methods for assessing outcomes. It is difficult to point at any one of these as being *better* than the others. Until we know how to evaluate outcomes, and do so fairly and objectively, we will have considerable difficulty in establishing a relationship between intervention programs and types of outcomes.

Intervention outcomes can normally be evaluated by means of simulated situations (e.g. Bartunek et al., 1975). Thus, one may be able to observe outcomes in conflict groups which act out the related roles of their situation. Changes in dimensions between simulated groups and 'real' conflict groups before, during, and after intervention may be noted and assessed. This general approach lends itself to adaptations in a variety of situations involving individuals as conflict parties. Because of the difficulties of conducting controlled experimentation or structured simulations in, for instance,

international conflict, this method can not always elicit specific, and appropriate, information on conflict outcomes at this social level.

Another method of evaluating intervention outcomes is that which seeks to establish, via attitudinal surveys or other means, the parties' own degree of satisfaction with specific outcomes. Lissak and Sheppard (1983), in their comprehensive review of this method of evaluation find that many more criteria than those previously suggested (e.g. fairness, equity, etc.) appear to be articulated by conflict parties as being meaningful to them in evaluating outcomes (e.g. implementability, reducing costs, airing grievances). This suggests that intervention outcomes can not be simply defined as satisfactory if one or two criteria have been achieved. Satisfaction with conflict outcomes is a function of (a) the parties' satisfaction with procedures of conflict management, (b) relevant 'subjective' criteria (e.g. fairness), and (c) contents of an outcome.

The third method of evaluating intervention outcomes, and the one adopted in this study, is to use third parties' conception of the situation. Third parties should be able, by means of observation, or by reference to the parties' objectives, to offer their assessment of conflict outcomes. The primary advantage of this method is that such observations are carefully thought-out, unobtrusive evaluations. The major disadvantage of this method, as was evident in the section on outcomes in chapters 3, 4 and 5, is that third parties are very often reluctant to attribute too much significance to their efforts, or they are likely to offer a subjective interpretation of outcomes.

Intervention outcomes are affected by many variables, of which the presence of a third party is but one. It is often suggested that certain types of intervention can lead to certain (and by implication better) outcomes. I have attempted to show in this section that no definitive conclusions on this relationship can be drawn. Much more useful research has to be undertaken before we can discuss the characteristics of successful outcomes, let alone discern the mutual dependence between types of intervention, an evaluation of their effectiveness, and the frequency of certain outcomes.

The size, complexity, and intensity of conflicts at all levels have created the need for mechanisms of conflict management. In the

past such mechanisms had clearly defined administrative, authoritative, or legalistic grounds, and relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on separating or relocating conflict parties. The voluntary intervention of a third party is a new and more promising approach to conflict management. It involves a shift in emphasis from power-oriented strategies to participation-oriented strategies. Such a shift will result in sounder, though not always creative, conflict management.

The task of conceptualizing third party roles and strategies has only just begun. Whether these are defined in terms of the purpose, nature and degree of intervention, size and complexity of target groups, or type of mechanism, it should be clear by now that third parties' behavior can not be described solely in terms of the problem-solving model. An enlarged perspective on third party intervention is advocated here. A perspective which recognizes the complexity of the phenomena and posits the conditions under which different strategies are likely to modify different aspects of a conflict relationship.(8)

The prevailing, and in some respects simplistic, approach which discusses process interventions as encompassing the full gamut of third parties' roles and strategies fails to take account of the dynamics of social systems and how their openness, permeability, and interaction with an environment pose very serious barriers to the adaptation, direction, and effectiveness of process intervention. Here I propose to discuss the effects of only two dimensions of interaction, namely structural and psychological, and examine their implications in terms of the potential utilization of process intervention.

The Structural Dimension

Who are the conflict parties? The question may appear unimportant to those advocating a particular mode of intervention as the only route to effective conflict management and conflict resolution. In reality the question is one of the most crucial questions an intervener faces. When conflict parties are acting out their own histories, perceptions and personal values, the here-and-now context,

without which process intervention can not be implemented, may be considered to be present. When, on the other hand, conflict parties are acting out the norms, commitments, and perceptions of their groups, a third party is faced with a different, and much more problematic context. In the first instance, individuals can bolster their cognitive ability and develop a concern for the other's needs; in the second instance, the system in which the individual is embedded impinges on his attitudes and behavior in a serious way. He is in a sense merely the carrier of a social position.

To appreciate the differences in conflict management between individuals and larger social systems, the model developed by McGrath (1966), and subsequently elaborated by McGrath and Vidmar (1970), may be utilized as an illustration. Their model suggests that parties engaged in conflict management are subject to three different pressures; (a) pressures toward an agreement (A-pressures), (b) pressures stemming from their reference group - if any (R-pressures), and (c) pressures toward a creative outcome or conflict resolution (C-pressures). A-pressures include such components as the nature of the issue and the parties' prior relationship, R-pressures include both role obligations and attitudinal commitments, and C-pressures relate to positive feelings between parties, a high level of motivation, and the desire to experience a 'creative shift'. The nature of conflict management will be determined by the relative strengths of these pressures.

Third party intervention can be discussed in terms of its effects on the factors determining conflict management. The main effects of a third party are to increase A-pressures and, where possible, C-pressures, but reduce R-pressures (comprising attitudinal, evaluative, and behavioral components). R-force pressures are much stronger determinants of conflict management than either A- or C-pressures. They are also inversely related to C-force pressures. This amounts to saying that in representational structures (e.g. collective conflict) a third party's role is mainly directed toward reducing the deleterious effects of R-pressures, whereas in interpersonal conflict its role is directed toward increasing A-or C-pressures (Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974).

A third party intervening in situations where the participants act on loyalty and are motivated to win, and where their own conflict behavior is determined by norms, commitments, end role obligations will find itself, as third parties' self-reports indicated, concerned with reducing role obligations (Benton and Druckman, 1974), saving face (Brown, 1968), and affecting attitudinal commitments (Johnson, 1967). Such an involvement calls for a choice of goals, means, and strategies which characterize a role that is far removed from that suggested by the approach of process intervention.



Figure 6.2 Factors Affecting Parties in Conflict Management

The idea that all conflicts can be resolved by increased communication and a change in the parties' cognitive and conceptual maps is an intuitively appealing idea. But in failing to take into account the total relationship between an input (i.e. a third party), a structure (i.e. conflict parties and conflict management), and a process (i.e. kind of intervention) it remains no more than that. Each configuration of these elements calls for a different intervention strategy. Only an approach that fails to recognize the extent to which third party intervention is embedded in, rather than divorced from, this total configuration can remain oblivious to some of the very real structural dimensions and barriers to process interventions. The individual

> who acts for himself is in a very different situation from the national official who acts as a representative…and is part of an elaborate structure involving many other elements of his society - including various government units, pressure groups and public. To understand the actions taken by such officials, one must take into account the contribution of all these elements, both in terms of their direct participation in the decision-making process and in terms of the constraints they impose on the responsible actors. (Kelman, 1965:596).

When these are taken into account, it is apparent that neither integrative bargaining nor process intervention can be applied to all situations irrespective of their structure or complexity.

The Psychological Dimensions

The psychological dimension consists of a set of variables which determine the propensity of conflict parties to engage in certain types of decision making.

Parties in conflict process information about their situation and engage in an interdependent interaction in which the outcome is determined by their values, resources, and interests. Parties arrive at this outcome by sending and receiving signals, both verbal and non-verbal, and exercising various forms of influence. More specifically, each party in a conflict relationship has a set of expectations,

motivations, and resources which may be adjusted to fit the demands of a particular situation and translated into a specific outcome.

When the parties' expectations and motivations respond to new information, and can be adjusted to it, the likelihood of process intervention facilitating a new perspective on the conflict and getting parties to break away from old perceptions is quite high. Learning and conflict resolution are possible in such a context. Neither choice behavior, nor decision making do, however, follow this path in all situations. The quintessential aspect of conflict within a representative structure is that information may be deceptive, that its interpretation is based on images and belief-systems (rather than actual content) and that it does not affect expectations or behavior directly (Snyder & Diesing, 1977). This psychological pattern implies resistance to new information, particularly when it is introduced by an outsider (e.g. third party), or when it occurs in an ambiguous situation (e.g. conflict). When information and communication are utilized in a manner which conforms to old perceptions and expectations, an intervention strategy, such as process intervention, will have a minimal impact on the situation. The diffusion of new information is assimilated very differently by different conflict parties. (9)

The individual as a conflict party is a more coherent and more adaptable decision maker than a group or a large social system. Extending the process of individual decision-making and information-processing to all other levels of behavior poses very serious problems indeed. There is a logical gap between individual actors, their communication and decision making, and collective actors. Their environments are different - both structurally and dynamically - and such differences have their repercussions on the way conflicts are defined and dealt with. This differentiation between social levels is a fundamental feature of all social situations.

At the heart of the strategy of process intervention are the assumptions of methodological individualism, communicational openness, and responsiveness to new information. The imputed assumptions are tailored to the requirements of individuals interacting rationally within a fairly adaptive framework. Individuals'

level of aspiration or expectation can, indeed, be adjusted by an experienced third party undertaking some 'cognitive bolstering'. Social systems' levels of aspiration or expectation can not be so easily adjusted. This is because, inter alia, such actors are not homogeneous, nor can their aspirations be necessarily surmised by reference to existing information, and, furthermore, they are not likely to be yielded too easily. Groups, organizations, and nations have cognitive, emotional, and subjective elements which are much more stable, and enduring, than the individual's.

A third party in interpersonal conflict is operating in a sensitive, trusting, familiar, and potentially changeable psychological universe (from the parties' point of view, that is). At the collective level, a third party is operating in a universe that is characterized by perceptual fixedness, habitually ingrained ways of looking at things and responding to them, and relatively closed images. These psychological aspects act as very serious obstacles to cognitive interventions and conflict resolution. It is doubtful whether an intervention which is concerned merely with stimulating creativity and problem-solving can overcome the structural and psychological dimensions which define intergroup behavior. It is erroneous to extrapolate from the pattern of conflict and conflict management between individuals to explain conflict and conflict management between groups.

It may not be necessary to make a detailed assessment of the structural and psychological dimensions and their implications for conflict relationships. Their influence on the pattern of conflict management in general and third party intervention in particular can not be neglected. Exclusive reliance upon a cognitive, process-like intervention in collective conflict does not further the aim of effective conflict management. Indeed, it may even be counter-productive. In many conflicts between human groups instrumental interventions can be both more relevant and more effective. Interactions between groups are not interactions between individuals writ large; nor is conflict management between groups a continuation of conflict management between individuals. When due consideration is given to the process of diversification and the constellation of factors which

affect group interactions, we can understand more adequately the pattern of related, and different, third party interventions.[10]

What I am suggesting here is that in each conflict relationship there are expectations and specific characteristics that can, and do, affect the role performance of a third party. An effective intervention strategy varies with the nature of that relationship. The idea that a third party will have the greatest impact when it can affect the perceptions of the parties is rooted in the pervasive idealogy of individualism and the failure to pay attention to the dimensions which distinguish between interpersonal and intergroup conflict. Interpersonal conflict is fully determined by the expectations and perceptions of the individuals involved; intergroup conflict is affected only marginally by individual perceptions and interactions, it is determined by their respective membership of various groups or social categories. This determines the nature of their interaction and this, ultimately, determines the nature of third party intervention.

Process interventions, and the efforts to apply problem-solving to conflict situations, is a very individualistic approach to the problem of coping with conflict. The point to be made about intergroup conflict is that personal characteristics are seldom found to impact significantly on the patterns of conflict and conflict management between groups. Intergroup conflict 'depersonalizes' individuals. This is precisely why interpersonal conflict can not be extrapolated to explain intergroup conflict. This is why we find some fundamental differences in the behavior of a third party vis-a-vis individuals qua individuals and its behavior vis-a-vis individual qua group members or representatives. The distinction between interpersonal and intergroup conflict makes sense both empirically and theoretically. It should not be overlooked in any discussion on third party behavior. There is a difference in the dynamics of conflict between levels of behavior, and this difference is reflected in different kinds of third party intervention.

Third party intervention is neither automatic nor is it uniform. Third parties' strategies and roles are not invariably linked to such factors as academic credentials, demonstrated success in interpersonal conflicts or known impartiality. An intervention strategy is undertaken in the context of a social environment and, if it is to affect it, must

meet the needs, values, and norms of the actors in a particular conflict situation. Neither students, nor practitioners of intervention should promote, indiscriminately, the wholesale transfer of intervention models from one level to another. When third party intervention is analyzed, as it should be, as an aspect of a total conflict management situation, the relationship between third party behavior, as an 'input variable', and the nature of the parties, and their context, becomes much clearer. On a pragmatic level, this relationship suggests diversity, not unity, of approaches. It also suggests that whereas process interventions are undoubtedly effective in interpersonal conflict, they exist merely as a normative guide at the collective level.

Process and Instrumental Interventions: Illustrations and Applications

Third parties intervene in conflict situations for a variety of reasons. They may be invited by one of the disputants, they may be asked to intervene by some external agency, or they may intervene on their own accord to promote or protect some well-defined interests. The techniques and array of inputs which third parties use in the course of intervention are numerous, but, essentially, what third parties do, choose to do, or are permitted to do, is largely determined by the particular social environment in which they find themselves, as well as by their own identity and interests. Notwithstanding the variety of techniques which third parties may utilize in the course of an intervention, it appears that process and instrumental interventions can be pictured as the dominant strategies for different kinds of situations. Each of these modes specifies the range of behavior for a particular intervention. This in itself does not provide us with a general framework for executing third party activities, it does, though, provide us with a guide for ordering the richness and variety of systematic findings about intervention and achieving a confluence

between theory and direct experience. Hopefully, such an approach makes the analysis more concrete.

In process interventions a third party is an impartial expert, applied behavioral scientist, or consultant with a high level of professional experience, but low power over the parties and low level of interest in the outcome. The focus of its activities is on cognitive and conceptual inputs, and the nature of its intervention is acceptant and catalytic. It emphasizes innovation, basic attitude change, an analytical approach and actual resolution of the conflict. In process interventions third parties perform the functions of catalyzing, assessing, and informing. They implement these functions by utilizing the following specific techniques.

A. Techniques focusing on parties

Assess parties' emotions and motivations
Assess parties' perceptions of conflict and general situation
Discuss each party's presently perceived choices and expectations
Help parties with the 'facts'
Encourage an analytical orientation
Encourage and assure parties
Free parties from constraints or commitments to fixed positions
Offer interpretation and information to cope with complex issues
Educate inexperienced parties
Use theory and conceptual tools to stimulate inventive thinking.

B. Techniques focusing on interaction

Clarify issues and situation
Suggest basic interaction modes
Encourage reflective - rather than emotional - interaction
Ensure effective communication
Encourage positive acts (even if symbolic)
Have parties work on joint tasks
Help parties to interact informally
Get each party to see the conflict through the eyes of the other
Channel discussions on areas of agreement

Focus on conflict, not on people
Treat differences as objective problems to be dealt with
Direct interaction to the problem only
Establish a good personal relationship
Build on each other's ideas.

In contrast to these, content-oriented third parties tend to have moderate to high power over the participants and a specific interest in the outcome. In content-oriented interventions there is a low degree of self-exposure and an emphasis on procedural and structural dimensions (e.g. modify environmental pressures) and on articulating the rationale for a settlement. The target-units are usually groups, teams, or organizations and the third party performs the functions of convening, leading, and linking. The range of specific behavioral techniques which may lead to a satisfactory settlement include the following.

A. Techniques focusing on parties

Reduce personal animosity and antagonism
Encourage parties to 'let off steam'
Control emotional spill-over
Make parties aware of relevant information
Strengthen weaker side
Help parties with problems of issues and perceptions
Act as sounding board
Loosen parties from attitudinal or representational commitments
Allow parties to 'save face'
Reduce stresses and tensions operating on parties

B. Techniques focusing on interaction

Clarify situation
Establish agenda
Suggest procedures for interaction
Maintain secrecy of proceedings
Act as source of communication and information

Get parties to adopt statements of principles
Reduce numbers participating in interaction
Strengthen moderate tendencies within each side
Build a working relationship with parties
Control extreme demands
Ask for offers/concessions
Change choices/expectations faced by parties
Offer advice
Exert pressure
Contrive 'prominent' positions
Reward concessions
Commit additional resources to guarantee compliance
Verify implementation of agreement.

Each intervention mode has been pictured as the dominant strategy in a given conflict situation. To move forward in the direction of a more rigorous theory, we need to develop indicators of the effects of each technique and find some method of describing the most appropriate technique which may be employed as the situation evolves.

Conclusion

This chapter examined a number of questions which are considered to be important in understanding third party intervention. The basic proposition which this chapter amplified appears to be that there is a compatibility, or a correspondence between who the third parties are and what they do, and the conflict situation in which they find themselves. Although the strengths and limitations inherent in each of the techniques which third parties may use have not been assessed, I have suggested that these can, and should, be separated into two broad kinds of intervention; process interventions and instrumental interventions. A shift from one intervention strategy to another is not normally possible. Intellectualizing about such a shift is a way of avoiding, rather than solving, the real problems of conflict

management. Good intentions may be at the basis of suggesting problem-solving as the most satisfactory approach to conflict management. We need not discount well-intended judgements, but we need, at the very least, to be aware of just how shaky their basis is.

Critics of third party intervention argue that its relatively low rate of success indicates a need to embrace different and more innovative kinds of intervention. They find too many weaknesses with content interventions, and believe that an exclusive reliance on process interventions will prove much more effective. This is all very fine, as far as it goes, but it ignores the basic structure of a conflict situation, and the possibilities of third party intervention. It overlooks the fact that third parties engage in an influence relationship with conflict parties and, quite often, with their constituents or referrent groups as well. Approaches which hold the greatest promise for resolving third party—conflict parties dilemmas can not be offered as a comprehensive guide to resolving the more complex third party—conflict parties—constituents dilemmas. This viable difference is often obscured by those who propose exclusive reliance on a single intervention strategy, or those who analyze conflict merely as a series of episodes (i.e. process model rather than structural model) in which a given input may produce the same response irrespective of its setting, context, and problems.

The reality of third party intervention is complex and often quite chaotic. I have tried, in this chapter, to present some findings on strategies of intervention in a manner which can, hopefully, improve our understanding of this process and provide guidance for the appropriate application of intervention techniques. An exploratory study, such as this one, can, of necessity, take only the first steps toward systematizing our knowledge of third party intervention. By recognizing the importance of both theorists and practitioners, and drawing upon the contributions of both, underlying principles of intervention may be linked to a common framework. Developing such a framework will make it possible to understand, and repeat, effective interventions. Once this happens, third party intervention can hold the greatest promise for conflict management in the future.

Notes

1. Bringing conflict parties face to face with their perceptions and subjective values may serve the functional purpose of viewing a conflict through its past and possible future, and separating the conflict from the people involved. On this, see Fisher & Ury (1981).

2. The implication of this is that when third parties have no access to all those concerned in a conflict, it can not be resolved.

3. It is doubtful whether the same effects can be achieved at other social levels.

4. It should be noted that the two kinds of intervention are not mutually exclusive. Many intervention activities are designed to affect firstly the process variables and then the content (or outcome) variables. Improved outcomes are often the result of improved processes.

5. By this I mean to suggest that in instrumental interventions third parties act on behalf of specific outcomes (in which they may or may not have an interest). In process interventions third parties' underlying belief is that if the proper process is enacted, a satisfactory outcome will emerge.

6. Affect basis which is at the very heart of process interventions is very different from a referrent or legitimacy basis which is at the heart of instrumental interventions.

7. This suggests that third parties may require different sets of attributes and skills to deal with different conflict situations. On this see Davis & Dugan (1982).

8. Conflict parties respond in a complex, not uniform, fashion to interventions. In intensified situations, they prefer an active mode of intervention, in low conflict situations they may prefer the help of a catalyst or facilitator. Some of these issues are discussed in Rubin (1980).

9. Individuals can assimilate new information more or less directly and act upon it. Representatives, on the other hand, assimilate new information through the filters of categorization and search for past expectations. It is not easy to change the attitudes or beliefs of representatives by giving them more information. For an extended analysis, see Janis (1983).

10. For some of the exponents of process intervention as the only effective form of intervention (e.g. Burton), there are no differences between levels of interaction. They adopt a sort of a cobweb systems model in which the behavior of each layer can be extrapolated from the properties of other layers. If all human interaction is on such a continuum, then third party intervention can, likewise, be posited as being uniform along that continuum. This is an erroneous premise leading to a wrong conclusion.

7
Conclusion: Looking Back, and Forward

Conflicts between individuals, groups, and nations are an inherent aspect of human existence. They are pervasive, and are part of the very process of interdependence that brings various actors together. Whenever there is interdependence, the seeds of conflict are present. Conflict, as a social process, may take various forms and lead to certain outcomes. Thus, conflict as such is neither good, nor bad. It merely leads to certain results whose value depends upon the measures used. Conflict which is managed intelligently (i.e. proper measures are used) may lead to valued results, conflict which is managed unintelligently may lead to destructive results. This is true of individuals as well as of nations.

In the first part of this work an attempt was made to establish an understanding of the concept of conflict. Definitions of conflict may cover a wide range of interactions and include such dimensions as conditions, behavior, emotions, and outcomes. Most definitions of conflict capture its operational essence (e.g. Coser, 1956:8) and perceive conflict as a process that begins with frustration, moves on to a struggle over scarce resources, and ends with a specific outcome. As used in this work, the term conflict has been employed to designate both the process, or sequence of events, as well as the structural aspects (e.g. conflict situations, attitudes, structural pressures, the relationships between parties, etc.) that influence conflict.(1)

Conflict thus defined exists along a continuous range. At one extreme there are situations that could be described, by an observer,

as conflict situations, but where neither destructive behavior, nor hostile attitudes are to be found. At the other extreme there are the all too familiar situations where individuals, groups, or organizations seek to destroy or dominate their opponents. Conflict situations may range in scope from interpersonal to international confrontations. For analytical, and practical purposes I suggested that these situations can not be treated as if they were of the same order (e.g. the process of interaction between groups has norms and properties which are simply absent from the interaction of individuals). I have also suggested that a situation can be defined as a conflict situation, only when the parties perceive it as such and form attitudes that sustain it.[2]

Conflicts exist because of a variety of reasons. They may be generated by conflicting goals or desires, scarce resources, differentiation, communication barriers, or inappropriate institutional arrangements. Conflict relationships are associated with resources, incompatible goals (i.e. what to do) and methods of achieving goals (i.e. how to do it). Whichever form conflict takes, the concept and practices of conflict management can take meaning only in the context of a wilful, purposive, and effective change in the natural course of a conflict. Conflict management represents the parties' response to their conflict and their desire to reform, reconstruct, or merely alter the 'natural' course of the conflict. Conflict management involves the deliberate choice of a strategy to affect the structure, or process, of a conflict relationship.

Several types of responses to conflict may be identified; (a) conflict prevention, (b) conflict escalation, and (c) conflict resolution. The traditional approach of the emerging social sciences was quite simple; conflicts should be prevented, eliminated, or suppressed. All conflicts were seen as destructive confrontations entailing costs and dysfunctions for the parties involved as well as for their system of interaction and its institutional arrangements. Conflict management was thus reduced to a distillation of techniques on how to avoid, suppress, or eliminate conflict. It was an attempt to tailor conflict

management to fit the social ambience of the status quo and to manage a conflict by avoiding it.

The second approach to conflict management has been taken up by neo-Marxists and other scholars who shift their focus from the elimination of conflict toward its escalation or stimulation. Conflict management thus becomes part of a conscious political strategy to threaten existing institutions and generate progress toward more desired arrangements. From this perspective it is irrelevant whether conflict may be functional or dysfunctional. What does matter, though, is that it is perceived as a testing ground for stimulating further conflict and reorienting man's relations to his system. The emphasis is on fighting, rather than avoiding.

The approach to conflict management adopted in this book can be described as contingent. It is not imbued with heavy normative undertones, nor does it have the hallowed belief in its ability to transform all social relations. The idea of a contingent approach to conflict management is consistent with recognizing the values - or functions - of conflict as well as its potentially negative consequences. It considers conflict management as a series of social techniques designed to realize conflict's positive consequences (e.g. change, new ideas, etc.) and arrest, or reduce, its destructive behavioral expressions. This approach, which seeks to find a solution with advantages to both sides, emphasizes negotiations and various forms of third party intervention as the most satisfactory routes to a solution.

The development of a contingent approach to conflict management has been a long and complex process. A number of perspectives for learning, and utilizing, conflict management behaviors may be suggested. Common to them all are (a) the desire to manage or resolve a conflict (rather than suppress it or stimulate it), (b) the conscious application of knowledge and experience as a tool for modifying patterns and changing practices, and (c) the assumption that all actors are guided by some transcendental reason and that they will use some rational calculus in determining the direction of change in their conflict relationship. When these conditions prevail, rational conflict management may be attempted.

There are a number of ways of studying strategies of conflict management (in the sense described above). The first approach to conflict management may be defined as the power approach or the win-lose approach. Typical win-lose strategies include reliance on judicial or political power. They are also exemplified by administrative or mechanical strategies.(3)

The effects of using such conflict management strategies are well-documented. They include the development of a competitive orientation, an increase in assertive behavior and a decrease in communication. Distinctions between the parties become pronounced and negative stereotypes become prominent. Other effects of using win-lose strategies include pursuing one's own goals, personalizing a conflict, using threats, emphasizing disagreements, and generally attempting to exploit the other (see Filley, 1975; 1977). The outcomes of such conflicts are rarely totally satisfactory.

The second approach to conflict management may be defined as the win-win approach. In contrast to the win-lose approach, the win-win approach focuses upon effective decision-making. Typical win-win strategies include problem-solving, creative decision-making (rather than voting, or averaging), and other strategies in which the parties concerned have a high concern with the quality, as well as degree of acceptance, of an outcome.

The effects of adopting a win-win strategy are that both parties try to defeat their problem (= conflict) rather than each other. Other noticeable effects include cooperative behavior, open and honest communication, flexible behavior, and emphasis on interdependence. Conflicts managed in this way are likely to produce outcomes which are sounder, longer-lasting and more satisfactory.

Blake & Mouton (1964; 1970) introduced their conflict management grid (see Figure 4.1) which represents a synthesis of win-lose and win-win strategies. Their grid plots five styles of conflict management; withdrawal, smoothing, compromise, forcing, and confrontation (or problem-solving) along two separate dimensions of cooperativeness v. assertiveness. Of these styles, only confrontation is an example of a win-win strategy.

Although the particular conflict management style which should, and can, be used in a given conflict situation, depends upon a number of factors, there is no doubt that problem-solving strategies are the most desirable (see Filley, 1977). They enhance creativity, realize the constructive potential of a conflict, promote understanding, and increase cooperation. But can this strategy really be the dominant strategy for dealing with all conflicts?

The major premise underlying the recommendation that problem-solving be used in all classes of conflict is the idea that in every conflict relationship the parties may be free to choose whether to engage in competitive behavior or problem-solving behavior. This choice may be made by the parties directly involved, or, better still, it may be the result of a specific intervention mode undertaken by a third party.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to dismiss any development which encourages the use of more constructive conflict management. The literature reviewed in the first part of this book certainly advocates problem-solving interventions as the most effective strategy irrespective of the type of conflict or the nature of the relationship between the parties. If this suggestion is to be treated merely as a normative statement of what should be, then nothing can be done about it. If, on the other hand, it is to be treated as a practical statement about the real possibilities of third party intervention, then one can indicate certain areas of disagreement with it.

Most of the disagreements stem, I believe, from the failure to incorporate the elements of the process and structure models of a conflict (Thomas, 1976). To understand conflict management in depth, we have to make two distinctions; a distinction between process and structure, and a distinction between internal and external factors (Kilman & Thomas, 1978; Roark & Wilkinson, 1979). The first distinction places conflict management in a temporal (e.g. events), or relational (e.g. conditions) domain. Process refers to a temporal sequence of events in which the approach/to conflict management is explained as a reaction to certain inputs.[4] Structure refers to the conditions and relationships that may influence an

approach to conflict management (e.g. representative role). The second distinction between internal and external is designed to tell us whether conflict management has been initiated by the parties themselves (internal), or whether they were influenced, in their approach, by an outside party (external).

Whether we focus on the parties' own conflict management behavior, or on the performance of a third party, there are two basic modes of conflict management; process management and structure management. Process conflict management has as its focal issues the peceptual determinants of a conflict situation, structural conflict management is addressed to the aspects of the situation exacerbating a conflict. The kind of intervention employed is also determined by whether the focal issue is the process or structure of a conflict. Successful conflict management by a third party requires that this factor be considered. Stated more simply, one must determine whether process or structural (i.e. instrumental) intervention is required. It is impractical to adopt process intervention when conflict intensity is too high, just as it is impractical to adopt instrumental intervention when it is too low or has its origin in interpersonal interactions.

Methods of conflict management by third parties vary considerably in terms of their theoretical basis and the emphasis they place on various strategies. Such methods can not, however, be postulated as being uniform across levels of behavior. Third party intervention is not akin to a friction model where an input is introduced and the anticipated consequences ensue. It is affected by the nature of the units involved and their social context. One can not venture far on the subject of conflict management, unless this relationship is borne in mind.

Conflict management by third parties encompasses a very wide range of activities. Some of these activities are merely administrative, judicial, or mechanical. Other, and more promising, third party activities include dissemination of information, helping the parties to diagnose their situation in a more objective manner, supporting efforts to redefine a conflict and affording the parties the opportunity to develop various skills.

Other third party activities designed to reduce conflict and induce cooperation include facilitating, and stimulating, contact between parties, encouraging representatives, in group conflict, to interant more freely, and inducing cooperation by finding a common enemy which threatens both parties, or introducing a superordinate goal that both desire and which can only be attained if both work together (Sherif, 1958; 1966). The overall impression gained from this study is that no single activity, nor a set of activities, or a given type of third party can be effective in all situations.

No one can say, as some advocates of the problem-solving model seem to be saying, in an abstract sense, or without regard to a particular conflict situation, or the nature of conflict management, that there is one 'best intervention'. Third party interventions constitute a means to an end, rather than ends in themselves. This book suggested that there is not one best means to effect change in conflict situations. The existence of various intervention modes and the question of their impact was considered not by devising neat academic labels, but by immersing onself in the world of practitioners whose experience and understanding can be of considerable help in arriving at informed conclusions about the problem of third party intervention.

A number of useful contributions have been made toward a theory of conflict management in general and third party intervention in particular. In addition, a diversity of strategies and social technologies have been offered as promising routes to conflict management. It is not always easy to evaluate the relevance or effectiveness of these strategies and technologies because research on these issues has overrelied on the case-study or the experimental method. When these methods are used, it is not always possible to see the depth of the problem clearly. Attesting to the intellectual fog which engulfs these methods is the idea that an approach to intervention which is successful in one environment may be transferred to other environments or settings. Such an extrapolation may or may not be an insightful intuition; it must, however, be treated with extreme caution because there is no basis for

concluding that conflict in one environment follows the same rules as conflict in another environment.

I have tried to suggest, throughout this work, that the diversity of approaches to conflict management can not be reduced to one major program of intervention designed to deal with conflicts in all settings. There is a danger in assuming that problem-solving strategies invariably lead to successful conflict outcomes, and must thus be integrated into the structure of organizations and institutions. The idea that conflict situations, or participants, respond, without fail, to certain types of facilitative inputs, shows more than an act of faith in the malleability of social situations and the applicability of the friction model to conflict. Such an act of faith may lead one to overlook the fact that "To use problem-solving where conflicts are rooted in value differences only widens the differences and entrenches each of the participants deeper into his position, and, for all intents and purposes, probably increasing, and certainly not lessening, the level of conflict" (Robbins, 1978:74).

To answer the question 'what constitutes good and effective third party intervention?' by offering, as a basis, the specifications of the problem-solving model may amount to exploration of the parameters of human optimism. It is also, alas, an unwarranted answer. We live in a world in which diversity proceeds faster than unity. In this, the behavior of third parties toward different actors is seen not as uniform, but as a function of certain social-psychological processes and the nature of relations between the actors.

I have tried, in this exploratory work, to go beyond the case-study, or experimental method. I have sought to describe the theory of third party intervention and present some findings on the practice of third party intervention. Research on real life interventions is extremely limited. Given the paucity of such research, I have not tried to manipulate the relationship between various third party specifications (e.g. identity, experience, etc.) and outcome variables. I have, rather, approached this whole question with the intent of describing real world interventions in a number of settings and, hopefully, developing the theoretical linkages for improving such interventions. Such an approach has its many limitations, but given

the glaring lack of research on third party intervention and its conflict management strategies, it can be utilized to serve as a basis for further work.

To engage in conflict intervention means to commit social change, to interfere with the course of a conflict, and to set it on a different, and more preferred, course (Bash, 1981). The question of a preferred change can be treated ideologically (or subjectively), or rationally-analytically. The former involve the broad purposes of intervention which relate to the intervener's goals, values, and philosophical inclination (e.g. the question of a third party intervening in a conflict situation in order to change it in the direction it desires), the latter is concerned with the narrower and more empirical dimensions of an intervention situation (e.g. third party's skills, experience, mode of intervention, etc.). I was concerned with the problem of change and good intervention practice as suggested by the second approach.

The likely consequences, both direct and indirect, as well as intended and unintended, of third party intervention are virtually infinite. Although it is impossible to predict, with any certainty, the effects of a change agent on a pattern of relationship, it is necessary to develop some expectations about positive or negative reactions to intervention. In order to sort out the more significant positive consequences of intervention, it is useful to establish a framework that can organize the parties' expectations in terms of three categories; (a) individual, (b) group, and (c) organizational.

Each category highlights different values which may be achieved through intervention. The individual dimension highlights values such as reduction in stress and anxiety, increased satisfaction, personal growth, strengthened interpersonal relations, higher motivation, and enhanced self-image. The group dimension emphasizes group cohesion and support, trust and stability of norms, adaptability, commitment, flexible decision making, and role maintenance. The organizational dimension is concerned with stability, costs, competence, control of violence and performance. The predicted, and actual, impact of various kinds of interventions must not be dissociated from qualitative consideration of change in these

dimensions. No matter how intervention is made, it certainly changes the 'natural' course of a conflict. To claim, as I have claimed throughout, that a contrived course of conflict management is often better than a natural course requires more than an act of faith. It requires the ability to evaluate 'good' social change, and design 'good' interventions.

How can one design interventions which will be viable and produce positive change? To do so third parties must have a proper grasp of the situation. They must understand the parties, their past relationship, and their present structure. They must be aware of their demands, hopes, and fears. They must know the issues at stake, and the resources committed by each party. When these are made explicit, a third party can devise rational tactics to link available means with preferred ends, and change the course of a conflict - positively.

Third party intervention can be understood as a means-ends relationship, in which a conflict is not allowed to run its 'natural' course. In talking about this relationship, we have to realize that both the parties, as well as the protagonists, may have immediate, intermediate, and long-term ends. Some ends may be accomplished through the use of some strategies, others through the use of different strategies. No strategy can, however, be relied upon exclusively, for it can prove, sooner or later, ineffective. There is no such thing as a 'permanent' intervention, or 'best' intervention. When this conception is understood, professional intervention may be more successful.(5)

The task of studying and conceptualizing conflict interventions has only just begun. Much remains to be done. The need for adequate interventions to deal effectively with the numerous conflicts that cut through our existence is surely unquestioned. This need can, I believe, be met by distinguishing between professional third parties and dispute-settling academics, and concentrating on the former. We must learn to view professional third parties in a number of settings and through a series of successively expanding perspectives. Viewed in these terms, we can learn something about what must, and can,

be done in certain conflict situations. Such lessons could be invaluable in substituting effective interventions for laissez-faire social meddling. Some of the concerns raised in this book have been directed toward this goal.

Notes

1. For an extended discussion of process v. structure models of conflict and their implications, see Thomas (1976).

2. This implies the vital role of perception, or awareness, by the parties in conflict. If parties are in conflict, but are not aware of it, then conflict can not be said to exist. If parties perceive a conflict, even though there are not actual goal incompatibilities, then a conflict exists (although the parties1 perception is inaccurate).

3. Typical examples of what I mean by win-lose strategies are legalistic approaches to conflict management, hierarchial approaches (i.e. sending a conflict to a higher authority), mechanistic approaches (e.g. separating the parties), power approaches (e.g. a teacher asking a student to obey him), and administrative approaches (e.g. majority voting).

4. Problem-solving can thus be described as a reaction to the introduction of a third party. The process approach treats conflict management as a series of related episodes in which behavior is always shaped by preceding events.

5. This may seem a common enough observation, but it appears to have received due recognition only infrequently. It was often subordinated to the tempting intrusions of personal values or normative statements.

Bibliography

Anderson, R.E. and Carter, I.E., Human Behavior in the Social Environment: A Social Systems Approach (Chicago: Aldine, 1974).

Argyris, C., Intervention Theory and Method (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970.

Bales, R.F., Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950).

Banks, M.H., Conflict Resolution: A Manual on the Problem Solving Approach (London: Frances Pinter, forthcoming).

Barkun, M., Law without Sanctions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Bartos, O.J., "Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21 (4), 1977, pp. 565–580.

Bartunek, J.M. et al., "Third Party Intervention and the Bargaining Behavior of Group Representatives", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19 (3), 1975, pp. 532–557.

Bash, H.H., "Conflict Intervention and Social Change", Journal of Intergroup Relations, 9 (2), 1981, pp. 12–30.

Batstone, E., "The Organization of Conflict" in G.M. Stephenson and C.J. Brotherson (eds.), Industrial Relations: A Social-Psychological Approach (New York: Wiley, 1979) pp. 55–74.

Beck, D.F., "Research Findings on the Outcomes of Marital Counselling", Social Casework, 56 (2), 1976, pp. 153–181.

Benton, A. and Druckman, D., "Constituents' Bargaining Orientation and Intergroup Negotiations", Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4 (2), 1974, pp. 141–150.

Bercovitch, J., "Resolving International Conflicts: A Non-Traditional Approach to the Middle East Conflict", International Problems, 16 (1), 1977, pp. 89–99.

Bercovitch, J., (a) Pacific Third Party Intervention at the Interpersonal, Intergroup and International Levels (A Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1980).
Bercovitch, J., (b) "Conflict, Peace and Peace Research", International Problems, 19 (1), 1980, pp. 31–39.
Bercovitch, J., Conflict and Conflict Management (Aldershot, England: Gower Press, forthcoming).
Berkowitz, M., Goldstein, B. and Indik, B., "The State Mediator: Background, Self-Image and Attitudes", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 17 (2), 1964, pp. 257–275).
Bernadotte, F., To Jerusalem (translated by J. Bulman) (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951).
Blake, R.R. and Mouton, J.S., The Managerial Grid (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Co., 1964).
Blake, R.R. and Mouton, J.S., Consultation (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976).
Blake, R.R. and Mouton, J.S., "Reaction to Intergroup Competition under Win-Lose Conditions", Management Science, 7, 1961, pp. 420–435.
Blake, R.R. and Mouton, J.S, "The Fifth Achievement", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 6 (4), 1970, pp. 413–426.
Blood, R.O., "Resolving Family Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4 (2), 1960, pp. 209–219.
Borland, M. (ed.), Violence in the Family (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976).
Bolte, G.L., "A Communication Approach to Marital Counselling", Family Coordinator, 19 (1), 1970, pp. 32–43.
Boulding, K.E., Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
Boulding, K.E., "Conflict Management as a Learning Process" in A. de Reuck & J. Knight (eds.), Conflict in Society (London: J.A. Churchill, 1966), pp. 236–248.
Brown, B.R., "The Effects of Need to Maintain Face in Interpersonal Bargaining", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4 (2), 1968, pp. 107–122

Buckingham, G.W., "Variables Affecting Mediation Outcomes", Peace and Change, 8 (2–3), 1982, pp. 55–64.
Burton, J.W., Conflict and Communication: the Use of Controlled Communications in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969).
Burton, J.W., (a) World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
Burton, J.W., Deviance, Terrorism and War (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).
Burton, J.W., "The Analysis of Conflict by Casework", Yearbook of World Affairs (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967), pp. 20–36.
Burton, J.W. (a) "Conflict of Interests: Subjective or Objective" in M. Barkat (ed.), Conflict, Violence and Peace (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1970), pp. 78–86.
Burton, J.W., (b) The Handling of Industrial Conflict (An unpublished research paper, London, 1970).
Burton, J.W., (b) "The Resolution of Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, 16 (1), 1972, pp. 5–29.
Burton, J.W., "International Problem Solving Organisation", (A paper presented to the 24th International Studies Association, Mexico, 1983).
Butterworth, R.L., Managing Interstate Conflicts, 1945–1974 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976).
Campbell, J.C. (ed.), Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Carter, J., Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Collins, 1982).
Cartwright, T. and Zander, A. (eds.), Group Dynamics: Theory and Research, 3rd ed. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1976).
Clarke, R.D., "Labour-Management Disputes: A Perspective", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 18 (1), 1980, pp. 14–25.
Cohen, R., International Politics: The Rules of the Game (London: Longman, 1981).
Corning, P.A., "Human Violence: Some Causes and Implications" in C.R. Beitz & T. Herman (eds.), Peace and War (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973).

Coser, L.A., The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956).
Coser, L.A., "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change", British Journal of Sociology, 8 (2), 1957, pp. 197–207.
Coser, L.A., "The Termination of Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (4), 1961, pp. 341–353.
Cot, J.P., International Conciliation (London: Europa Publications, 1972).
Curie, A., Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971).
Dahrendorf, R., Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1959).
Davis, H.E. and Dugan, M., "Training the Mediator", Peace and Change, 8 (2–3), 1982, pp. 81–90.
Dayan, M., Breakthrough: A Personal Account of Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981).
Dedring, J., Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research: A Critical Survey (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976).
de Reuck, A., "Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics", Human Context, 6 (1), 1974, pp. 64–80.
Deutsch, M., The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
Deutsch, M. and Krauss, R., "Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1), 1962, pp. 52–76.
Deutsch, M. et al., "The Effects of Size of Conflict and Sex of Experimenter upon Interpersonal Bargaining", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7 (2), 1971, pp. 258–267.
Doob, L.W., Unofficial Interventions in Destructive Social Conflicts in R.W. Brislin (ed.), Cross Cultural Perspectives on Learning (New York: John Wiley, 1975), pp. 131–156.
Doob, L.W. and Foltz, W.J., "The Belfast Workshop: An Application of a Group Technique to a Destructive Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (4), 1973, pp. 237–256.
Douglas, A., Industrial Peacemaking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
Druckman, D., Human Factors in International Negotiations (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973).

Druckman, D. (ed.), Negotiations: A Social Psychological Perspective (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977).
Eckhoff, T., "The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict Resolution", Acta Sociologica, 10 (2), 1967, pp. 158–166.
Eden, R.A., The Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960).
Edmead, F., Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation (New York: A U.N.I.T.A.R. Study No. 2, 1971).
Eiseman, J.W., "A Third Party Consultation Model for Resolving Recurring Conflicts Collaboratively", Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 13 (3), 1977, p. 303–314.
Elkin, M., "Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating Families", Family Coordinator, 22 (1), 1973, pp. 63–71.
Ericsson, K.A. and Simon, H.A., "Verbal Reports as Data", Psychological Review, 87 (3), 1980, pp. 215–251.
Fassnacht, G., Theory and Practice of Observing Behaviour (New York: Academic Press, 1982).
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Twenty-fifth Annual Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).
Fisher, M., Measurement of Labour Disputes and their Economic Effects (Paris: O. Ef.C.D., 1973).
Filley, A.C., Interpersonal Conflict Resolution (Glenview, III.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1975).
Fisher, R., "Fractionating Conflict" in R. Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 91–110.
Fisher, R., Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
Fisher, R. and Ury, W., Getting to Yes (Boston: Houghton, Miffin Co., 1981).
Fisher, R.J., "Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (1), 1972, pp. 67–94.
Fisher, R.J., "A Third Party Consultation Workshop on the India/Pakistan Conflict", Journal of Social Psychology, 112 (2), 1980, pp. 191–206.

Fisher, R.J., "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 (2), 1983, pp. 301–334.
Freedman, M.D., Violence in the Home (Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1979).
Frei, D., "Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of International Mediation", Peace Science Society (International) Papers, 26, 1976, pp. 67–84.
French, W.L. et al., Organization Development: Theory, Research, Practice (Texas: Business Publications, 1978).
Fromm, E., The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (London: Penguin, 1973).
Galin, A. and Krislov, J., "Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Towards Mediation in Four Countries" (Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Management, Working Paper No. 549/78: Tel-Aviv, 1978).
Galtung, J., "Peace Thinking" in A. Lepawski et al. (eds.), The Search for World Order (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971).
Gayford, J., "Wife Battering: A Preliminary Survey of 100 Cases", British Medical Journal. 25.1.1975, pp. 194–197.
Gelles, R.J., The Violent Home: A Study of Physical Aggression Between Husbands and Wives (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974).
Gerhaat, P.F. and Drotning, J.E., "Dispute Settlement and the Intensity of Mediation", Industrial Relations, 19 (3), 1980, pp. 252–259.
Golan, M., The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger (New York: Quadrangle, 1976).
Goode, W.J., "Force and Violence in the Family", Journal of Marriage and the Family, 33 (4), 1971, pp. 625–636.
Goodman, J.F.B. and Krislov, J., "Conciliation in Industrial Disputes in Great Britain: A Survey of the Attitudes of the Parties", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (3), 1974, pp. 327–352.
Goodrich, L.M. and Hambro, E., Charter of the United Nations, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949).
Gordier, A. and Foote, W., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the U.N. (Vol. II). (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

Gruder, C. and Rosen, N., "Effects of Intragroup Relations on Intergroup Bargaining", International Journal of Group Tensions, 1 (3) 1971, pp. 301–317.
Gulatti, N.D., Indus Water Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973).
Gulliver, P.H., Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross Cultural Perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1979).
Gurman, A., "The Effects and Effectiveness of Marital Therapy", Family Process, 12 (2), 1973, pp. 145–170.
Haas, M., International Conflict (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974).
Haas, E.B., Butterworth, R.L. and Nye, J.S., Conflict Management by International Organizations (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972).
Hackman, R.J. and Morris, C.J., "Group Tasks, Group Interaction Process and Group Performance Effectiveness" in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Group Processes (New York: Academic Press, 1978).
Handy, L.J., "Absenteeism and Attendance in the British Coal-Mining Industry", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 6 (1), 1968, pp. 27–50.
Harbottle, M., "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict Resolution", International Journal, 35 (1), 1979–80, pp. 118–131.
Hare, P.A., Handbook of Small Group Research, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1976).
Harf, J.E., "A Model of Inter-Nation Conflict Resolution", International Journal of Group Tensions, 3 (1), 1971, pp. 91–122.
Harrimann, W.A., "Observations on Negotiating", Journal of International Affairs, 29 (1), 1975, pp. 1–6.
Hartman, P.T., Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1960).
Heilman, M.E., "Threats and Promises - Reputational Consequences and Transfer of Credibility", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10 (4), 1974, pp. 310–324.
Hill, B.J., "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From problem-solving Workshop to Theory", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26 (1), 1982, pp. 109–138.

Himes, J.S., Conflict and Conflict Management (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980).
Himes, J.S., "The Functions of Racial Conflict", Social Forces, 45 (1), 1966, pp. 1–10.
Hollis, F., "Exploration in the Development of a Typology of Casework Treatment", Social Casework, 48 (6), 1967, pp. 335–341.
Hollis, F., Casework: A Psychological Therapy (New York: Random House, 1972).
Holmes, J., Some Aspects of Mediation: Report of a Conference Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Talloires, France: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970).
Holmes, J.G. and Miller, D.T., "Interpersonal Conflict", in J.W. Thibaut et al. (eds.), Contemporary Topics in Social Psychology (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976), pp. 265–308.
Holsti, K.J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 4th. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983).
Holsti, K.J., "Resolving International Conflict: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedure", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (3), 1966, pp. 272–296.
Homans, G.C., The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).
Hopmann, T.C. and Walcott, C., "The Impact of External Stresses and Tensions on Negotiations" in D. Druckman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 301–323.
Howells, J.M. and Cathro, S.H., Mediation in New Zealand: The Attitudes of the Mediated (An unpublished report, University of Otago, 1982).
Hyman, R., Strikes (London: Fontana, 1972).
Jackson, E., Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace Through Mediation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952).
James, A., The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969).
Janis, I.L., Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton, Miffin Co., 1983).

Johnson, D.W., "Use of Role Reversal in Intergroup Competition", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7 (2), 1967, pp. 135–141.
Kelman, H.C., "Societal, Attitudinal and Structural Factors in International Relations", 1, 11 (1), 1955, pp. 42–56.
Kelman, H.C., "Social Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations" in H.C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psycholgical Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).
Kelman, H.C., "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution" in A.L. Merritt (ed.), Communication in International Politics (Hobson: III.: University of Illinois Press, 1972), pp. 168–204.
Kelman, H.C. and Cohen, S.P., "Reduction of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach" in W.G. Austin and W. Worchel (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks-Cole, 1979), pp. 288–303.
Kilman, R. and Thomas, K., "Four Perspectives on Conflict Management", Academy of Management Review, 3 (1), 1978, pp. 59–68.
Kissinger, H., Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982).
Klimoski, R.J., "The Effects of Intragroup Forces on Intergroup Conflict Resolution", Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8 (3), 1972, pp. 363–383.
Klimoski, R.H. and Ash, R., "Accountability and Negotiator Behavior", Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 11 (4), 1974, pp. 409–425.
Kochan, T.A. and Jick, I., "The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and Empirical Examination", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22 (2), 1978, pp. 209–240.
Kolb, D.M., "Roles Mediators Play: State and Federal Practice", Industrial Relations, 20 (1), 1981, pp. 1–17.
Kornhauser, R.A. et al. (eds.), Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).
Kressel, K., Labour Mediation: An Exploratory Survey (New York: Association of Labour Mediation Agencies, 1972).

Kressel, K. and Deutsch, M., "Divorce Therapy: An In-Depth Survey of Therapists' Views", Family Process, 16 (4), 1977, pp. 413–444.
Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982).
Lakin, M. et al., Arab and Jew in Israel: A Case Study in Human Relations Approach to Conflict (Washington, D.C.: National Learning Institute, 1969).
Lall, A., Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
Landsberger, H.A., "Interaction Process Analysis of Professional Behaviour: A Study of Labor Mediation in Twelve Labor-Management Disputes", American Sociological Review, 20 (5), 1955, pp. 566–575.
Landsberger, H.A., "The Behavior and Personality of the Labor Mediator", Personnel Psychology, 13 (3), 1960, pp. 329–348.
Latour, S., "Some Determinants of Reference for Modes of Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20 (4), 1976, pp. 319–356.
Laue, J.H., "Ethical Considerations in Choosing Intervention Roles", Peace and Change, 8 (2–3), 1982, pp. 29–41.
Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W., Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1969).
Levi, A. and Benjamin, A., "Focus and Flexibility in a Model of Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21 (3), 1977, pp. 405–425.
Levi, W., "On the Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4 (4), 1960, pp. 411–420.
Levine, E.P., "Mediation in International Politics", Peace Science Society (International) Papers, 18, 1971, pp. 23–43.
Levinger, G., "A Social Psychological Perspective on Marital Dissolution", Journal of Social Issues, 32 (1), 1976, pp. 21–47.
Lie, T., In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954).
Lind, E.A. et al., "Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolutions of Conflict of Interest", Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 39 (4), 1980, pp. 643–653.
Lipshitz, R. and Sherwood, J.J., "The Effectiveness of Third Party Process Consultation as a Function of the Consultant's Prestige and Style of Intervention", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 14 (4), 1978, pp. 493–509.
Lissak, R.L. and Sheppard, B.H., "Beyond Fairness: The Criterion Problem in Research on Dispute Intervention", Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 13 (2), 1983, pp. 45–65.
Lystad, M.H., "Violence at Home", American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 45 (3), 1975, pp. 328–345.
Mack, R.W. and Snyder, R.C., "The Analysis of Social Conflict: Towards an Overview and Synthesis", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (2), 1957, pp. 212–248.
Maggiolo, W.A., Techniques of Mediation in Labor Disputes (New York: Oceana Publications, 1971).
Maier, N.R., Problem Solving and Creativity in Individuals and Groups (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks-Cole, 1970).
Manson, J.J., "Mediators and their Qualifications", Labor Law Journal, 9 (10), 1958, pp. 755–764.
Margerison, C. and Leary, M., Managing Industrial Conflicts: The Mediator's Role (Bradford: MCB Books, 1975).
McGrath, J.E., "A Social Psychological Approach to the Study of Negotiation", in R.V. Bowers (ed.), Studies on Behavior in Organizations (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1966), pp. 101–134.
McGrath, J.E. and Vidmar, N., "Forces Affecting Success in Negotiation Groups", Behavioral Sciences, 15 (2), 1970, pp. 154–163.
Meyer, A.S., "Functions of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 13 (2), 1960, pp. 159–165.
Mitchell, C.R., Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role (Famborough: Gower Publishing Co., 1981).
Mitchell, C.R., "Conflict Resolution and Controlled Communication", Journal of Peace Research, 10 (1), 1973, pp. 123–132.

Muench, G.A., "A Clinical Psychologist's Treatment of Labor-Management Conflict", Personnel Psychology, 12 (2), 1960, pp. 165–172.
Nettl, J.P., "The State as a Conceptual Variable", World Politics, 20 (4), 1968, pp. 559–592.
Northedge, F.S. and Donelan, M.D., International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971).
Norton, A.J. and Glick, P.C., "Marital Instability: Past, Present and Future", Journal of Social Issues, 32 (1), 1976, pp. 5–20.
Oberschall, A., "Theories of Social Conflict", Annual Review of Sociology, 4, 1978, pp. 291–315.
O'Brien, J., "Violence in Divorce Prone Families", Journal of Marriage and the Family, 33 (4), 1971, pp. 692–698.
Ott, M.C., "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases", International Organization, 26 (4), 1972, pp. 595–618.
Park, R.E. and Burgess, E.W., Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924).
Patterson, G.R. and Hops, H., "Coercion, A Game for Two: Intervention Techniques for Marital Conflict" in R.E. Ullrich and T.P. Mountjoy (eds.), The Experimental Analysis of Social Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972), pp. 424–440.
Perlmutter, A., "Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations", International Studies Quarterly, 19 (3), 1975, pp. 316–349.
Perez, F.A., "Evaluation of Mediation Techniques", Labor Law Journal, 10 (10), 1959, pp. 716–720.
Pechota, V., Complementary Structures of Third Party Settlement of International Disputes (New York: U.N.I.T.A.R., 1971).
Peters, E., "The Mediator: A Neutral, a Catalyst or a Leader?", Labor Law Journal, 9 (10), 1958, pp. 764–771.
Philips, G.E., "A Study of Marriage Counsellors' MMPI Profiles", Journal of Marriage and the Family, 32 (1), 1970, pp. 119–131.
Pruitt, D.G., "Indirect Communication and the Search for Agreement in Negotiation", Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1 (2), 1971, pp. 205–239.

Pruitt, D.G., "Kissinger as a Traditional Mediator with Power" in J.Z. Rubin (ed.), Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in The Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 136–147.
Quandt, W.B., "Kissinger and the Arab-Israel Disengagement Negotiations", Journal of International Affairs, 29 (1), 1975, pp. 33–48.
Rhemus, C., "The Mediation of Industrial Conflict: A Note on the Literature", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (2), 1965, pp. 118–125.
Renvoize, J., Web of Violence: A Study of Family Violence (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1978).
Roark, A.E. and Wilkinson, L., "Approaches to Conflict Management", Group and Organization Studies, 4 (4), 1979, pp. 440–452.
Robbins, S.P., Managing Organizational Conflict: A Non-Traditional Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
Robbins, S.P., "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution are not Synonymous Terms", California Management Review, 21 (2), 1978, pp. 67–75.
Rubin, J.Z., "Introduction" in J.Z. Rubin (ed.), op. cit. pp. 3–43.
Rubin, J.Z., "Experimental Research on Third Party Intervention in Conflict", Psychological Bulletin, 87 (2), 1980, pp. 379–391.
Rubin, J.Z. and Brown, B.R., The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: Academic Press, 1975).
Satir, V., Conjoint Family Therapy (Palo Alto, Calif.: Science and Behavior Books, 1967).
Sawyer, J. and Guetzhow, H., "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations" in H.C. Kelman (ed.), op. cit. pp. 466–520.
Schein, E., Process Consultation, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969).
Schelling, T.C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Schlossberq, S.I., "Philosophy and Procedures of Labour Negotiation", Labor Law Journal, 13 (10), 1962, pp. 827–833.
Schmid, H., "Peace Research and Politics", Journal of Peace Research, 5 (3), 1968, pp. 217–232.

Scott, J.B. (ed.), The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917).
Scott, J.P., Aggression (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Scott, P.D., "Battered Wives", British Journal of Psychiatry, 125 (4), 1975, pp. 433–441.
Scott, W.G., The Management of Conflict (Homewood, III.: Dorsey Press, 1965).
Senghaas, D., "Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society", Journal of Peace Research, 10 (2), 1973, pp. 163–184.
Sheean, E.A., "How Kissinger Did It: Step by Step in the Middle East", Foreign Policy, 22 (1), 1976, pp. 3–70.
Sherif, M., "Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict", American Journal of Sociology, 63 (3), 1958, pp. 349–356.
Sherif, M., Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1966).
Simkin, W., Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1971).
Skjelsbaek, K., "Value Incompatibilities in the Global System", Journal of Peace Research, 10 (3), 1973, pp. 341–354.
Smith, C.G., "Studies in International Conflict: Recent Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences", International Journal of Group Tension, 11 (1), 1979, pp. 86–109.
Snyder, G.H. and Diesing, P., Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
Sommer, R., Personal Space: The Behavioral Basis of Design (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
Sprey, J., "The Family as a System in Conflict", Journal of Marriage and the Family, 31 (4), 1969, pp. 699–706.
Sprey, J., "On the Management of Conflict in Families", Journal of Marriage and the Family, 33 (4), 1971, pp. 722–733.
Steinmetz, S., The Cycle of Violence: Assertive, Aggressive and Abusive Family Interaction (New York: Praeger, 1977).
Stenelo, L.G., Mediation in International Negotiations (Malmo, Sweden: Student Litterateur, 1972).

Stern, L.W., "Managing Conflict in Distribution Channels" in W.M. Evan (ed.), Interorganizational Relations (London: Penguin, 1976), pp. 369–389.
Stevens, C., Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
Strauss, A., Negotiation: Varieties, Contexts, Resources and Social Order (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978).
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J., "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict" in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds.), op. cit. pp. 33–48.
The New Yorker, "Profiles: Mediator", The New Yorker, 46, 1970, pp. 36–58.
Thomas, K.W., "Conflict and Conflict Management" in M. Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), pp. 889–935.
Touval, S., "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations1', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1 (1), 1975, pp. 51–70.
Touval, S., The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
Wall, J.A., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25 (1), 1981, pp. 157–180.
Walton, R.E., Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third-Party Consultation (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969.
Wedge, B., "A Psychiatric Model for Intercession in Intergroup Conflict", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 6 (4), 1970, pp. 433–461.
Weisenfeld, A., "Profiles of a Labour Mediator", Labor Law Journal, 13 (10), 1962, pp. 864–873.
Weiss, R.L., Hops, H. and Patterson, G.R., "A Framework for Conceptualizing Marital Conflict" in L.A. Hamerlynk et al., (eds.), Behavior Change: Methodology Concepts and Practice (Champaign, III.: Research Press, 1973), pp. 309–342.
Wilkinson, D., Cohesion and Conflict: Lessons from the Study of Three-Party Interaction (London: Frances Pinter, 1976).

Williams, R.M., Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
Williams, R.M., "Resolving and Restricting International Conflicts", Armed Forces and Society, 7 (3), 1981, pp. 367–382.
Winham, G., "Negotiation as a Management Process", World Politics, 30 (1), 1977, pp. 87–114.
Wish, M. et al., "Perceived Dimensions of Interpersonal Relations", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33 (4), 1976, pp. 409–420.
Witty, C.J., Mediation and Society (New York: Academic Press, 1980).
Yalem, R., "Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution", Journal of Peace Research, 8 (3), 1971, pp. 263–272.
Yarrow, C.H.M., Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).
Young, O.R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).
Young, O.R., "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (1), 1972, pp. 51–66.
Zartman, I.W., "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process" in I.W. Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 67–85.
Zimmerman, A.E., The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (New York: Macmillan, 1939.

Index