Jaan Valsiner

General Human Psychology

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Albrecht Dürer, *Hercules*, 1498

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Preface

This book is meant to restore the topic of *general* psychology into the central place of psychology as human science. Since the1930s it has lost its central role. This is exemplified by comparing the last major treatise in the field—William Stern's *Allgemeine Psychologie* (Stern, 1935) with our contemporary review-style textbook of the same title that is used in German universities (Spada, 2005). The former outlines a general personalistic account of general psychology, while the latter includes review chapters of content domains that are supposed to belong to the institutional curriculum of "general psychology"—at least in German language room where the label is still used.[1] Psychology has changed its scientific style since the 1930s (Toomela & Valsiner, 2010) in ways that reduces theoretical work to invention of nice labels for empirical self-presentations. This has discredited the task of generalization which is important in any science. It is time to return to general theorizing in psychology. The present book is definitely a presentation of general that ideas unify different sub-fields of psychology.

The plan for writing of this book got its beginning in 2012 when I started to teach *Allgemeine Psychologie 2* at Sigmund Freud Privat Universität in Vienna. I was faced with the dilemma—what that second semester of general psychology could entail? There were no examples for it. So I created it myself—general psychology is the understanding of the human *psyche* at its highest forms of inventions and creativity. It is universal—applicable to all societies and over history—while the local conditions are unique. It aims at general laws of psychological functioning and overcomes the damages to social sciences that the postmodern thinking has produced (Valsiner, 2009). Any science generalizes, and psychology is no exception.

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[1] In contrast, ín the USA there are no courses on general psychology. The obligatory "introduction to psychology" is popularizing overview of fashionable topics. Given that in terms of social dominance psychology that is "made" in USA since 1950s is evident around the World, there has been no obvious place for re-birth of general psychology as the core of psychological science, with few exceptions (Jens Mammen's *A new logical foundation for psychology* (Springer, 2017) and Niels Engelsted's *Catching up with Aristotle* (Springer, 2017)).

While building on the example of William Stern's treatise of 1935 this book widens the borders of psychology to general high-level cultural phenomena beyond those of Europe or North America. It continues the line charted out in our collective "Yokohama Manifesto" of 2016[2]—general psychology of human beings at its highest level is a version of cultural psychology. The latter is a re-invention of the recent three decades of a tradition that prevailed in psychology before it became artificially experimental and was known as *Völkerpsychologie*—the antecedent of our contemporary cultural psychology.

As it is being dedicated to the highest psychological functions—intentional ways of being in society—the new general psychology is not a new version of humanistic psychology, nor of the contemporary fashion for "positive psychology". Humanistic psychology—building on the work of Abraham Maslow—has been built upon the Western cultural traditions that both overlook the experiences in non-Western societies and their own histories of cruelties against fellow human beings. While I share the values of humanism with all social scientists for whom wars, lootings, and genocides are deeply reprehensible phenomena, I cannot exclude these dark sides of humanity from the comprehensive coverage of the new general psychology outlined in this book. The remarkable—and unfortunate—disappearing of humanity in revolts, wars, and revolutions is as much part of being human as that of the care and appreciation of oneself and a fellow human beings.

The author's credo in this book is deeply humanistic—yet it is not a book that belongs to the category of humanistic or positive psychology. I consider the realities of human ways of functioning—joining acts of construction with those of destruction—intertwined within this basic humanistic look. Human beings develop new technologies—for war, torture, and exploitation of the others—and then find remedies to cope with the acts of destruction. My humanism has its surrealistic touch—at least it is ironic about our usual psychologists' beliefs in our own benevolence in the huge canvas of actions we call Life. While subjectively appreciating the humanistic ideas of Abraham Maslow in psychology I cannot close my eyes to the realities of wars in peace—and peace in wars as Georg Simmel pointed out in 1904—in all of their complexities.

Many friends have had formative roles in bringing this book to life. First of all the support by Dominik Mihalits who back in 2012 started as my teaching assistant in the first time I taught the course in Vienna, later became my doctoral student and finally my colleague is most central. He provided the ever-fresh challenges to my ideas from the psychodynamic side that for me was essential to keep my innovational efforts on track. Pina Marsico has always kept feeding good ideas into my thinking when it was losing its focus, and Luca Tateo has never stopped urging me to become imaginative about psychology as an artistic science. Nandita Chaudhary has for years helped me to overcome my individualistic focus and to see the relevance of wider cultural worlds in the lives of us all. Kevin Carriere, Christian Hojen

Bisgaard, Enno von Fircks and Brady Wagoner gave me careful and fascinating feedback on how not to lose the social frame in my post-Sternian personological efforts. Robert Innis provided constructive critique for a number of chapters, particularly helping me to understand intentionality. Special thanks will go to all the students at SFU-Vienna from 2012 to today who have suffered through my rather experimental lectures that were part of preparation for this book.

Chapel Hill, NC, USA   Jaan Valsiner

Introduction: Psychology as General Science of Human *Being*

> *We are the theater of the embrace of opposites and of their dissolution, resolved in a single note that is not affirmation or negation but acceptance. (Paz, 1995, p. 274)*

Human beings are a passionate species for whom affect is in the centre of the developing *psyche*. We focus on inventing terms that reference meaningful affect. On that primacy of the affective life by the notion of *affectivating*[1]—relating to everything we do, think, or imagine. We not only *understand* the World—we *relate to* it with the flow of our feelings extended into it—and then attempt to change it.

Affectivating is universal. Every person in the World relates to it in his or her unique personal way—but in all of these ways one feature is common to all—*feeling into* the particular setting one is in. Our efforts to be "rational" are the result of our feeling into the World, but not at the starting point. This is a radical break from the rational self image of psychology as science. Psychology as science has for two centuries sought for a general perspective that—in abstract terminology—captures all that is universal for all human beings while recognizing the high variety of cultural forms that are present in the concrete life settings all over the World. We need to create a theoretical account that recognizes the universal in the particular.

The effort in this book is to develop such theoretical account, I look at the human *psyche* as it continues along the traditions of personological innovations introduced by William Stern in the 1920s–1930s (Stern, 1935, 1938), and I add to it the sociocultural perspective of cultural psychology of semiotic mediation (Valsiner, 2007, 2014, 2019). This is a new form of general psychology that starts from "the top" of human phenomena—highest forms of artistic, literary, economic, societal, technological inventions, and relate systemically with the lower psychological processes of perceiving and acting. All human conduct is imbued with values—constructed through sign mediation by persons and proliferated through communication processes between persons. This is elaborated in Chap. 2.

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[1] Elaborated in Cornejo et al. (2018).

What we see in this book is an effort of intellectual weaving—bringing together some classic work from history of psychology, linking it with critically relevant human phenomena—some of which are inevitably emotionally disturbing. Yet psychology needs to be ready to make sense both of pleasant and positive aspects of human experiencing and the negative—existentially disturbing—features of our being. Human beings create weapons—to kill others—and then end using those as status symbols in peacetime societies. They also set up landmines for ordinary civilians to stumble upon, and create terrorist acts in the middle of peaceful marketplaces in countries far from military conflict spots. The distinction of war and peace seems to become convoluted in the twenty-first century.

The personological system of thought was the result of intellectual synthesis by William Stern (Fig. 1.) in the course of the first three decades of the twentieth century. After 1930s his work became "classic"—which in psychology of today means it is mentioned but not re-read for new ideas. Here I try to overcome that limit of our contemporary scholarship and build upon the personological foundations that Stern set up.


Fig. 1 The originator of the personalistic focus in general psychology—William Stern

For Stern,

> The "person" is a living whole (*Ganzheit*), individual, unique, striving toward goals, self-contained and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience (*fähig zu erleben*). (Stern, 1938, p. 70)

The focus on *Ganzheit* is important here—in other places Stern calls it *unitas multiplex*—unity in diversity. It indicates the need to understand the ways in which complex wholes of the human psyche functions. Stern posited that they functioned at the intersection of the person and the world—in between three modalities of life.

Modalities of life for Stern (1938, p. 72) included

	Person	World
I.	Vitality	Biosphere
II.	Erleben	World of objects
III	Introception	World of values

Stern's three modalities unite the psychological side—experiencing (*Erleben*) and valuating (introception—inserting meanings into the relation with the World)—with the realities of the outer World—the biosphere that includes objects that have socially determined values.

Stern's general philosophical focus was deeply humanistic:

> The aim of human life involves the affirmation of the individual, in his being and acting, both of his own intrinsic significance and of the objective significance of the world, so that he acquires reality as a person through the coalescence of the world of objective values with his own substance. This coalescence or incorporation the personalistic theory designates as *introception*: it denotes the activity that gives direction and form to all genuinely human life. (Stern, 1938, pp. 72–73)

The goals-striving person creates ones subjective life-world—"genuinely human life"—navigating in the world through moving between objects and values in the process of introception. Stern goes on to elaborate

> The concept of introception is psychophysically neutral, covering as it does the purposes of life functions and not merely a mode of experience. This is also true of *all specific forms of introception: loving, understanding, creating, consecrating,* etc. (Stern, 1938, p. 73, added emphasis)

It is important to note here that Stern considers higher order processes of the psyche—loving, understanding, creating, consecrating—as forms of introception. It is here where the personalistic goals of creating a new kind of personality theory—based on values that feed into the processes of experiencing via introception—and my goals in this book—the "top down general psychology"—meet. Yet they diverge in one central point—while for Stern introception is "psychophysically neutral" then from a perspective of cultural psychology of semiotic mediation it is always **affectively non-neutral**. The basis for introception is the affective feeling into the world (*Einfühlung* in terms of Theodor Lipps) that is guided by the system of social representations by which the societal value systems are encoded into the environment.

A nice example of the relevance of such values encoded into the environment is mentioned by James Mark Baldwin. The issue is—what kind of kitchenware is appropriate for feeding a pet? As Baldwin remarked,

> I at once lecture the maid for having fed the dog on a fine old Colonial Staffordshire plate. The meaning of the article, so far as its form is concerned, its presence as an object of visual perception and common recognition, is in great measure the same as the dog's; but the selective meaning, the aspect of its presence whereby it fulfils my interest, is as widely different as is the collector's ceramic interest different from the gustatory interest of the glutton. (Baldwin, 1908, p. 180)

The ideas that constitute the basis for theoretical buildup in this book have roots in other classic thinkers—some predecessors and contemporaries of Stern. Thus the semiotic focus here borrows from the dynamic semiosis of Charles Sanders Peirce (see Chap. 2). Yet Peirce's perspective was deeply based on—and limited by—his trust in the classical Boolean logic that does not fit dynamic developmental phenomena. It is therefore the work on developmental logic by James Mark Baldwin (Valsiner, 2009) that was started in 1906–1915 but was never fully accomplished by him. Lev Vygotsky's artistic efforts to make sense of affective synthesis proved very crucial in the elaboration of Stern's introception processes. Not only do we insert our feelings into the current setting, but the result of this feeling-in reverberates with our lives in the time to come. The feelings become not only generalized, but expanding beyond that—*hyper-generalized*.[2] The issue of being human is that of constant hyper-generalization of affective meanings beyond the given setting, towards the always indeterminate future. Contextual embeddedness of our experience here-and-bow works for the unknowable future through such hyper-generalization process.

This book is an effort to put the collective declaration of the need for scientific psychology with "human face" (and heart) to elaborate practice—along the lines charted out in our "Yokohama Manifesto" of 2016 (Valsiner et al., 2016). What the contents of the following chapters brings to the readers is a systematic look at how our personal encounters with socially organized world lead to new synthesis of feelings that result in new meaningful assertions about the world. We need to accept the opposites and see how new versions of understanding emerge from the tensions between them—in art, science, and everyday living. Yet mere accepting the unity of opposites is not sufficient—we need to demonstrate how from their tension (*Spannung*) new psychological forms emerge. This task has not been accomplished in psychology as science up to now.

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[2] For elaborate analysis of Vygotsky's coverage of hyper-generalizing feelings see Valsiner (2015).

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Part V   Synthesis of Cultural Personology

Part I
Phenomenology of the *Psyche* and Semiotic Foundations for Human Psychology

Chapter 1
Constructing and Destroying One's Life: Phenomenology of the Human Life Course

Diego Velazques, 1647–1650, *Venus at Her Toilet*

Contents

Living is ordinary. We act in our everyday lives in very ordinary ways—we sleep, then become awake, get dressed or undressed, drink coffee, gossip about others, kill mosquitos and other enemies, and become bored of all of the above. We look into a mirror trying to find out if we are still young—only to see that fanciful image slowly disappearing. We adjust—as the ordinary life course invites us to move on.

Yet there is an extraordinary moment in every act in our living. We are not only alive—we can, and do, *reflect upon* issues of living and dying. We *want* something. And in an occasional look into a mirror—doing so may lead us to discover our past, present, and future as if these are chasing us. In our reflecting upon ourselves we invent ourselves—a capacity that *Homo sapiens* has developed and mastered to its extreme. This **dynamic move between acting and reflecting—leading to new ways of acting**—is the core of the specifically human level of psychological functioning—the object for understanding in this book. Making signs in the process of experiencing and using them to create meanings of the on-flowing experience is a particularly human characteristic.

In the course of ordinary living, generosity and cruelty can be observed to be mutually feeding into each other. We create love poems as well as weapons of destruction. We create idealized (and ideological) goals for ourselves in the name of which we not only attack others[1] but become martyred by the others and die in deep belief that the loss of our lives matters for higher—religious or political—goals. The pervasive role of such events is a definitive example of the crucial role of higher psychological functions—intentional, ideological, and deeply personalized—in the life course of any person and in the organizational form of any society, ancient, modern, or postmodern. Human beings not only live and reproduce but also die and eradicate one another in ways they consider meaningful both in societal discourses and in intrapersonal feelings about the role of oneself in this tumultuous world.

Person as *Unitas Multiplex*

The person is *unitas multiplex*—as William Stern posited. According to him:

> This must be taken literally. All the multiplicity included in the person, the hegemony of elements, events, phases, strata, is *integral* to the totality and not just superficially cemented to it or supported and conditioned by I; it is the *consonance* of multiplicity with the personal whole and the person with the world, that makes the human life possible (Stern, 1935, p. 73).

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[1] The "Rokeby Venus"—as the Velazques' painting above has been called in England—became the target of a knife attack in 1914. The painting had been in the British National Gallery since 1906, after having been brought from Spain to England into private collections in 1813 and finally purchased by the National Gallery. On March, 14, 1914, a certain self-proclaimed fighter for women's equality in society, Mary Richardson, attacked the painting in the museum with a knife, in protest against the Government's arresting of a fellow suffragette. Vandalism against various images of artwork has been documented over centuries in various waves of iconoclasm—eradication of images for religious, ideological, and political stated goals,

This *unitas multiplex* begins from the most general feature of being human. The unity of construction and destruction is basic in human lives. Children are born, raised, go to war, perish—and the next generation creates more children who grow up and enter the meaningful slaughterhouses of ever new wars that human beings collectively set up. They glorify the acts of war[2]; war heroism becomes a mythopoetic form that captures the imagination of many ordinary people and makes new wars possible—despite the deep desires for peaceful existence.

The Central Axis of Human Living: Unity of Construction and Destruction

We need to be realistic in our basic axioms about what "being human" means—as an addition to the bio-ecological role of the biological species we call *Homo sapiens*. Without doubt human beings have planned and constructed miraculous objects like the Eiffel Tower, skyscrapers, escalators, refrigerators, public parks, bordellos, and concert halls. They have created musical instruments of high vocal sophistication and have taught themselves to appreciate ever complex music and art forms. They have invented the action context of pilgrimages, tourism, holidays, and shopping sprees. None of these inventions have happened in the case of other higher primates in their histories as species parallel in the presence in history to the human beings.

   At the same time human beings have invented also other cultural tools and events—for the purposeful destruction of their environments and fellow human beings, the weapons of all kinds—ranging from daggers and swords to guns and nuclear bombs, and from wartime devastations to torture procedures of fellow human beings who are viewed as different and dangerous "Others." The construction of annihilation devices shows the dark side of the cultural achievements of *Homo sapiens*—one that is easy to hide in peacetimes and mask in wartimes under the irresistible label of "self-defense."

   In this book—on human psychology—I treat the construction and destruction processes axiomatically as mutually linked opposites that regularly transfer from one into the other. That axiom is given here as value-free—I do not intend to lament about human capacities of destruction (although in real life I resent these like most peace-loving people do). The cyclicity of the construction<>destruction process starts for ordinary daily life—we bake a delicious cake and decorate it nicely, serve it to our friends at dinner, who appreciate the beauty of the cake—after which they destroy it and enjoy its disappearance into their stomachs. If there are "leftovers" they may end up in the garbage. The construction><destruction cycle is thus

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[2] In the beginning of World War I in 1914—when the atrocities of the massive devastations in Europe had not yet commences—all participating societies in the war glorified the upcoming event as "the Great War" (see Valsiner, 2018). Feelings of patriotism are easily used as legitimation for killing.

complete. We do not need to look for genocides in different parts of the World to see destruction in place—our daily activities in the kitchen and dining room are a case of Genocide of the Gourmet—yet that aspect of our daily eating does not seem to us to have any similarity with destruction of forests, animals, or fellow human beings.

Moving Between Peace and War

In the transition from peace to war (and back), the basic meanings of things change. As Kurt Lewin described in one of his first psychological studies—introspective account of his moving toward the front as a soldier in World War I (Lewin, 1917)—the ordinary objects constructed by human beings change their functions. Furniture meant for peaceful living becomes firewood to keep the soldiers warm in their campsites, buildings turn from living quarters into watch towers or fortresses to wage urban warfare with its massive devastation of the peacetime achievements of architects and city engineers. Furthermore, the border between frontline and the lifestyle back home leads to dramatic personal experiences as war memories of a (then) adolescent volunteer soldier vividly entail:

> …somewhere I throw away my threadbare foot clothes and put on the woolen socks we have found in an evacuated military storehouse, which also contained piles of undershirts and tarpaulins. We have stopped in an alluvial plain and I am stroking the first pussy willows,
>
> Did I hear an early cuckoo? Did I count its calls?
>
> And then I see my first bodies. Soldiers young and old, in Wehrmacht uniforms. Hanging from trees still bare along the road, from linden trees in the marketplaces. With cardboard signs on their chests branding them as cowards and subversive elements. A boy my age—his hair, like mine, parted on the left—dangling next to a middle-aged officer of indeterminate rank or, rather, stripped of his rank by a court-martial. A procession of corpses we ride past with our deafening tank-track tattle. No thoughts, only images (Grass, 2007, p.121).

It is not only encounters with war cruelties on the battlefront but the penitential actions of the army institutions to make fighting the enemy the only option of life or death for the soldiers. Human lives stop to be valued, and instead it is the potentials for killing that become appreciated. It is only in the huge fields of crosses in the war cemeteries that restore the constructive moment after the mass destruction is finished.

From Objects to Things: The Special Cruelty of War

At wartime human beings become turned into things (*Ding*) rather than treated as objects with whom to relate (*Gegenstand*—elaborated in Chap. 10). Social norms undergo dramatic reversals. What in peacetime is a criminal act—killing another human being—becomes a prescribed act in wartime (killing an "enemy"—is

heavily socially promoted—rifles with killing history given to new soldiers to emulate.[3] The fates of people and their relations become dramatically altered as the peacetime is ruptured into war:

> Modern war set huge numbers of people in motion. Mass conscription and volunteerism took millions of men, young and old, from their homes and communities. Soldiers were deployed and redeployed, often at great distance from their domiciles. Civilians were impressed into forced labor. Millions more noncombatants were transformed into refugees as they fled the arrival of armies or bombardments. The mass uprooting of soldiers and civilians in the context of war also set things on new trajectories. Individual soldiers stole from the homes abandoned by fleeing civilians and from the corpses of both comrades and enemies on the battlefield. Noncombatants anticipating the arrival of soldiers buried some of their prized possessions, hid small items on their persons, and gave other objects to friends and relations (Auslander & Zahra, 2018, p. 13).

It is interesting that psychology in general has paid little attention to large societal turmoils like the ruptures of peace into war that sets into motion a completely different normative system of living. Trust becomes replaced by suspicion, the value of ordinary everyday things changes dramatically. Salt and cigarettes replace mansions and jewelry in everyday lives in their importance, observing cruelty becomes ordinary experience. The social norm systems become reversed. We like peace… but at times face a war, and accept the normative organization that the change brings.

In psychology, we abhor aggressivity—be it in bullying in school classrooms or slaughters on battlefields. The desire to believe that war is an aberration of social order is understandably strong in human beings. Yet, any look at history of the humankind would reveal the presence of wars of different kinds. The mutuality of construction and destruction becomes dominated by the latter in transitions to wartimes. What was cherished suddenly becomes the opposite—destruction becomes the norm.

Throwing away (=killing) things can be easy—while treating objects (who counteract, as they *object* to being treated as things) this way is complicated in any society and involves various social invented rituals (legal procedures) that may end in precisely the same act. Killing an "enemy" on the battlefield is an instant act—while killing the same person—captured as "prisoner"—needs to go through the wartime court system that leads to the legally justified execution of the same person as proven to be a "war criminal." Wartimes bring with them their own theatrical organization of life and death—very different from the social norms of peacetimes. The heroic battle scenes are examples of theatrical positive presentations of the war—with the realities of mass killings and lootings in captured towns (Fig. 1.1)[4] constituting the theatrical focus on the horrors.

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[3] Schechter (2018) describes examples of how new soldiers are given personal weapons with "weapon biography" of "this weapon has killed X enemies"—promoting the continuation of such killing spree in battles.

[4] Oudewater is a small town near Utrecht, which in 1575 was besieged—and finally on August 7 captured—by the Spanish troops fighting the Dutch Republic in the 80-year war. Half of the inhabitants were murdered in the 2-day long looting spree that Flemish engraver Frans Hogenberg—

Fig. 1.1   Massacre in captured town of Oudewater, 1575 (engraving by Frans Hogenberg)

It was accepted social practice to let the soldiers of the winning side loose for 2 days to murder and rob valuables in the captured town. Such murderous event was often used by the generals to substitute the absent pay to the soldiers by their robbing of the valuables of the losing side of the conflict. The transition from peace to not only war but massacre was an ordinary life (and death) event in the Middle Ages—aside from the calamities brought by famine and plague. "Positive psychology" would have had no place in those days where well-being could instantly become ill-being or non-being. Constant fear of witchcraft and its corresponding accusations and punishments raged over Europe in waves of fashion and led to a number of pictorial depictions of imaginary scenes of the lives of these dangerous agents.[5] Europe was not different from other continents where such imaginary inventions were and still are rampant.[6]

Killing in theatrical ways carries over from war to peacetimes. The social events of *public* executions of persons declared to be guilty of any socially non-fitting deed have been widespread in world history. The function of such events is that of social impact—aside from elimination of opponents (Fig. 1.2)—of different religious persuasion (Anabaptists) or "dangerous" outsiders (designated as "witches").

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who escaped from war-torn Antwerpen to Amsterdam—depicted a few years later. It is a sixteenth-century moral commentary upon the capacity of human beings for cruelty.

[5] Described well in Hults, 1987.

[6] The North American colonies had their maximum of witchcraft accusations in the 1690s; African countries show examples of these today (Behrend, 2006).

Fig. 1.2 Public burning of Maria and Ursula van Baeckum in 1544 (This case was a notorious example of public execution by burning in sixteenth-century Netherlands. Maria (before 1510–1513 November 1544) was a Dutch noblewoman who had joined an Anabaptst sect. In 1542, Anabaptists were made illegal in the Netherlands. Maria was arrested by the order of the local judge and her sister-in-law Ursula joined her by her own decision out of sympathy and to provide emotional support. As a result of failing efforts to persuade them to give up their faith, <u>both</u> were convicted to death on stake) (engraving by Jan van Luiken)

The fears of witches and their sequels (vampires) were deeply engrained in the European consciousness in the thirteenth to seventeenth century, and it is only in the eighteenth century where such accusations and their local punishments became under government controls.[7]

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[7] In Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was Maria Theresa in 1756 who forbid witch persecutions locally and ordered all suspicious cases to be forwarded to her central court in Wien. The trigger for this governmental intervention was the rising of local witchcraft and vampire accusations in the Empire. In 1755 in Hermersdorf (near Moravian and Silesian border), the corpse of a dead woman was dug out by local municipal decision because "people were complaining about her being a vampire and attacking them at night" (Klanicsay, 1987, p.167). The body—that had been buried a few months earlier—was found to be in good condition (taken as a proof of her being a vampire)— blood in veins, no decomposition. To overcome the "vampire state" her family was required to perform a ritual—drag the corpse, by hook attached to rope, through an opening made in the wall of the graveyard, to be buried and burnt outside. Note the theatralization of the reverse act of the burial in the cemetery (extra hole made in the wall) and the ritual burning of the corpse *outside* of the cemetery.

Before any public punishment comes suspicion—somebody is suspected to be a witch, or a member of a demonic order, or simply a political enemy. Personal characteristics that stand out from the ordinary may lead to such suspicions. In Tamil language a person may be described as fearsome (*payankaramaka*) if the person looks ugly or the opposite—extremely attractive. Extreme attractiveness and extreme repulsiveness have the same dangerous emotional power and are often treated as transformable into each other (Trawick, 1990, p 190). Beauty and death are closely related in the Tamil meaning system.

The simplicity of transitions between war and peace that lead to human suffering leads to a possibility that we can think of Existential Life Dramatizations (ELD). Psychologically interesting are the cases where such suffering is self-inflicted and personally accepted. Roman executioners of believing Christians in the first decades BC (when Christianity was still an outlawed religious sect persecuted in the Roman Empire) were surprised by the personal calm attitudes of the Christian converts in facing their death.

Existential Life Dramatizations (ELD)

I introduce the notion of Existential Life Dramatizations (ELD) as the link between personal construction of moments of sublime in one's life (Chap. 10) and the societal normative setup of dramatic situations in which ordinary persons are invited or enforced to participate. They are all existential—involving for the participants the experience on the border of living and nonliving. The person may survive the dramatized setting—or not. Yet entering into this setting may be desired by the person—as mountain climbers on Mount Everest or speleologists squeezing their bodies into not yet visited small caves indicate. A 70-year-old man who desires to experience a parachute jump and does it sets up such ELD for oneself. If staying alive this event becomes a notable memory device for the rest of his life course. If the parachute fails to open, it marks the end of his life course. The final ELD of the person is the plan one makes for his or her own funeral ritual—often specifying in great details what all the participants—except of course the person oneself—are expected to experience.

Constructing One's Life Course: Self and Cultural Models

Human beings grow up, move through their lives, and die in ways that they have made personally meaningful. The first cry of the boy to be given the name Napoleone in the Buonaparte family back on August, 15, 1769, would have been similar to any baby's first vocal encounter with their life worlds. What followed in the life course of the boy in the following 51 years was unique not only for the man carrying that

name but for the whole history of Europe and the world. The young man advanced rapidly in his military career to become the leader of a grand army and innovator in many administrative practices in governments. He became a hero for many—and war criminal for some. The numbers of people killed in various battles and conquests of the "Napoleonic era" were astronomical—while the man himself was creating his life course as the emperor. He was certainly highly skilled to accomplish this. It is a case of how one man's life course construction had dramatic impact on the lives of many others, and on both the destruction and construction in the societies involved.

Napoleon Bounaparte was not different from any other human baby before or after him in the beginning of his life course. Yet his life course—constructed by him and his immediate social others—was unique in its dramatic upward mobility (that ended in his retirement on a faraway island). Yet each and other life course charted out by former infants as they proceed through their individual lives are similar in how the potential life course is being made actual through meaningful efforts of development into new ways of being. *Novelty is being created in all relations*—children becoming different from their parents, they simultaneously become different from one another, and they invent new ways of acting and thinking by new technological devices.

Constraining of the Construction Process of Meaning Over the Life Course

Human development is normatively set up within the societal framework in ways that set up expectations for the life course. First of all, it is set up as to its general form (Fig. 1.3)—in the Occidental societies it involves a sequence of stages of growth to the middle-age level, with subsequent decline into the old age. Proliferation of images of such "staircase of life" in Europe carried with it the social representation of decline of physical and psychological functions after a mid-age culmination time. The middle of the human life course becomes socially glorified.

The European historical social representation of age is not representative of humankind as a whole. This general life course model is not shared by Oriental societies where the older-age decline is not emphasized. Instead, the *elders* (in contradistinction to the *elderly* in the Occident) are entrusted different complex societal decision-making tasks that are benefitting from the age-accumulated experience. The elders are entrusted to make important decisions for the community—while the elderly are sent into retirement and—if rich enough—to retirement homes.

Social representations of the human life course like the one in Fig. 1.3. set the stage for social expectations for human conduct at different life course stages (or levels). Thus young children under some age (first step in the life course staircase) are expected to play, rather than work. In a similar vein on the other end of the

staircase, "the elderly" are supposed to enjoy their "deserved rest"—interspersed with episodes of ailing health and dismissal of their wisdom.

Interestingly, there existed a gender difference in the depiction of the human life course. Whereas the male line (in Fig. 1.3.) entailed a hierarchical upward and then downward climbing, the female line (in Fig. 1.4.) noted the gradual change in the beauty of the body over life course.

There is a certain difference between genders in the efforts to stay young— through the care of one's body. Hans Baldung Green back in 1544 described the "seven ages" in the lives of women that emphasize the maintenance of once established bodily beauty that has a central role in the self-conscious look at the life course desires (Fig. 1.4.). There is no stern prescription of the logic of "staircase" left here, but the desperate effort to fight the signs of getting older.

The fight about the ambivalence of getting older continues across centuries. In our twenty-first century, this is reflected in the availability of (expensive) antiaging cremes in cosmetics shops. We personally resist the social representation of normative ageing. Men's way to defy the realities of the life course takes a slightly different direction (Fig. 1.5). The interest of men getting older in the company of charm and care of younger women is well known and captured in many moralistic paintings as in Fig. 1.5. Moralism does not help to limit the efforts of men to feel young.

Lucas von Cranach was 17 years old when painting the couple on Fig. 1.6. He (and his workshop) returned to the theme repeatedly in the following decades. The focus on the monetary aspect of the relationship gains the centrality of the painting. The growing financial success of a man with age cannot grant his staying young but indeed can pay for the companionship of the youthful but pragmatic partner. If the beyond-prime adults on the descending part of the staircase start taking interest in others on the ascending one, they can be ridiculed socially (Figure 1.3) as it was the case in Renaissance or accused of sexual abuse as it would be usual today. What is overlooked in this social canalization of the appropriate conduct is the goals-oriented nature of human personal ascent (e.g., a young girl looking for a "sugar daddy" support for her studies in a country where government stipends do not exist)

Fig. 1.4 The seven ages of women (Hans Baldung Grien, 1544)

or descent (a man getting older feeling the need for sensual and sexual closeness to young women to feel younger than his current age stage socially prescribes). The social structuring of human life course in a society and the personal setup of one's life course from young to old age need not coincide.[8] The young strive to become older—the old strive to stay younger—beyond any social norms for the life course.

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[8] The research program initiated and carried out in Berlin Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung from 1980 to the present time originally led by Paul Baltes (1939–2006) was dedicated to demonstrating that even if adults in their old age in Occidental contexts become frailer in health and some cognitive processes, their accumulated life wisdom would grow (Baltes, 2006, Baltes & Meyer, 1999). The selective optimization theory that resulted from the project stands as one of the contemporary pillars of gero-psychology (Boll et al., 2018).

Fig. 1.5 Ridiculing older men interested in young women: *The Lovers* (Lucas von Cranach d.A, 1489)


Fig. 1.6 Reflexive loops of experiences feeding forward to the progression of personal life course philosophy (after Zittoun. 2015)

Integration of Personal Life Course Philosophy (PLP)

Human life course entails affectivated phenomena that feed forward to the next step of the transition from the *unitas multiplex* state of any moment in life (as emphasized by Stern) to a dynamic structure or personal life course (Fig. 1.6).

Tania Zittoun's elaboration of the life course entails the emergence, articulation, and lifelong hierarchical integration of generalized understanding of the self-reflection of MY LIFE that is a generalized abstraction of the Self. It is based on both concrete lived-through experiences—ordinary life dramas of self-constructed kinds and those set up by events in the society in which the Self is embedded. In parallel, there are the personal meaning-making efforts—subjective generalizations that are triggered by experiences or invented in one's soul-searching ("I am sinful" or "I am not good enough")—all of which feed forward into the establishment of the hyper-generalized meaning complex of MY LIFE. These Personal Life Philosophies (PLP) are the generalized synopsis of the personal life so far—looking forward to the future. These are structures of signs that make the construction of life course narrative possible—if such narrative construction is triggered by the inquisitive grandchildren or curious psychologists. Under non-triggered conditions, it exists as an established structured but not expressed *Ganzheit* of meanings in the deep internal infinity (in William Stern's terms).

As a life course developmental abstraction, the PLP follows the general ontogenetic orthogenetic principle that Heinz Werner introduced in the 1920s under the example of a similar general idea in the philosophy of Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Orthogenetic Principle (Fig. 1.7) prescribes the emergence of articulated parts of the *unitas multiplex* leading into subsequent hierarchical integration into two kinds of hierarches—transitive (A-B-C) and intransitive (P-Q-S-P…).


Fig. 1.7 Heinz Werner's theory of Differentiation and Hierarchical Integration (the Orthogenetic Principle)

The co-presence of these two kinds of hierarchies (elaborated in Chap. 13) in the PLP makes it possible to include both fixed and dynamically open components in the structure. Development of human beings is thus conservatively opportunistic—the system is ready for unexpected adventures while it preserves its ground form over the life course.

Social Normativity of Constructing Life Courses

Each personal life course is built on the basis of societal mapping of the normative life course cultural model. Figure 1.8. illustrates a number of such models.

Model A is an example of the template of a life course where the child at birth is of the highest knowledge level that would decline monotonically over the life course, until after death—the idea of rebirth is central (A1) for the miseries of losing one's value over the life course. The decline over the actual lifetime is compensated in the post-death to pre-birth cycle—the invention of the afterlife together with cyclical notion of time[9] allows the person to accept the social representation that all living is that of regress—toward the promising reverse cycle of rebirth. This guidance for meaning making in living is not an option if no pre-birth or after-death time periods are included into the life course (models A—without A1, B, C). Here the comparison of the present state of being on the life course trajectory can go either into the past or into the future. Model C is the regular occidental scenario of "staircase of life" where after reaching the top level of capacities, the person constructs one's own reduction as moving toward the old age.

Human life course is truncated by specific societal anchor points inserted onto the life course—expectations for not bearing children after one's daughter has done


Fig. 1.8 Various possible forms of life course trajectories

[9] The contrast between irreversible and cyclical models of time—that makes big difference in the organization of life courses of the living—is actually eliminated if it is treated as a version of linear time as part of Riemannian infinitely large time cycle.

so, mandatory retirement ages, and dismissive stories told among the middle ages people about "the elderly." In contrast Model B—linear increase of capacities—fits the notion of "older age wisdom" and its potential uses in society.

Rituals of Life Course Progression

The social normativity of the prescribed life course is set by social rituals that truncate the ongoing flow of living into qualitatively different segments. The rituals of naming in childhood set the child up on the course of named personhood. The adolescent transition rituals mark the entrance into adulthood. The marriage rituals set up the young persons in their marital roles that center on the production of the next generation and maintenance of family clan relations. Children's births (and deaths) provide further structure for the life course. By the second half of the life course, this structure becomes built on the deaths of family clan members and the coming of age by the children.

Each of these structural transformation points is linked with specific affective relating by the person to one's own self. Here I analyze the case of a young Tamil woman Chandra (for elaborate coverage see Egnor, 1991). It is a personal story of no dramatisms—she is not abused or disliked by her new family into which she enters by marriage. Yet the psychological complications she encounters are complex in their subjective buildup of her (and her son's) life course. Despite specific Indian contextual features of Chandra's case ("arranged" marriage), her set of feelings and their contextualizations can easily be viewed in most other societies in the world.

As Margaret Egnor-Trawick introduces Chandra:

> Chandra was born the seventh daughter of an urban middle class Brahmin family. She has no brothers. When she reached seventeen and graduated from high school her parents insisted that she be married, *even though they could barely afford the costs of a seventh wedding*, and in spite of Chandra's strong desires not to marry but to continue studying. *Chandra fought her parents' efforts to marry her*, but her fate was decided when a young lawyer from a good family appeared among the suitors and *asked for no dowry*, only Chandra herself (Egnor, 1991, p. 10, added emphases).

Having seven daughters is a serious economic strain on the parents as the family had had to bear costs for the weddings and the social pressure to get all daughters appropriately "settled" (i.e., married) early led to their crossing the desire of the youngest daughter to continue her studies. The daughter's resistance to the social pressures is natural from the perspective in getting "settled" in her own terms (i.e., have education that leads to a profession). The two families agreed to marry Chandra and Laxman, but still Chandra resisted. Her resistance was fruitless. Pictures of her wedding day show her glaring angrily into the camera (ibid, p. 10).

The example of resistance to an unwanted marriage was a crucial moment in Chandra' bifurcation point of forced becoming "married woman" and her move from her natal household to that of her new husband's family. Resistance in general

is in the core of any development.[10]The change of households mandated by the marriage arrangements is a case of becoming a refugee from her own home. The enforced move to new status in the life course led to another complication for Chandra:

> Although Laxman and his family are kind people, marriage was a shock for Chandra. On her wedding night she was in a cold sweat, *knowing vaguely that something terrible was going to happen to her*, but not knowing what it would be. Finding out was no comfort to her. Thereafter *every night she broke out into the same cold sweat, and trembled uncomfortably as Laxman approached her* (Egnor, 1991, p. 10, added emphasis).

The "no talk" status of sexuality issues in Chandra's natal family had prepared her poorly for the new life with a husband. The exploration of this new domain was left to the new family environment:

> For Laxman, too, marriage was a shock and a revelation. He was amazed to find that the intelligent and well-educated Chandra had never been taught about this most crucial aspect of life. He *bought books on the subject* for her to read. She read them, but her fear of being with him at night did not diminish. Only now, she says, she has gotten used to it. (p 10, added emphasis)

The affective traces of the "first night" diminish slowly, and factual education about sexuality does not change the emotional impacts—even if other members of the family are supportive and understanding:

> Laxman believes that Chandra has been doubly cheated—cheated in not being allowed to continue her education, and in not *being given a chance to learn about the world*. Hence he is sympathetic to Chandra's plight. Despite this attitude, *or perhaps because of it, he is very protective* of Chandra. He *will not take her to movies in town, or even visit neighbors in the village or to weddings*, though she sometimes asks him to take her to these places (Egnor, 1991, p. 10).

The supportive husband feeds into the isolation of Chandra that results from her reluctant entering into the marriage. While reflecting that Chandra's parents did not give her "a chance to learn about the world" himself continues that practice by way of his sympathetic stance. In fact we learn that Chandra had been before marriage quite well-learned about some aspects of the world:

> Chandra had been an accomplished dancer and singer before her marriage, and was considered a great beauty. After marrying, she became sick with dysentery and lost much weight, which she never regained, so that people say she is less beautiful than she was before (though she is still goodlooking and proud of it). Laxman also laments her loss of weight. Chandra's father-in-law observes a similarity between people and trees: when the male pipal tree is married to the female neem tree in a certain ceremony performed in temple courtyard, *the neem tree after that grows thin and scraggy, though the pipal tree flourishes* (Egnor, 1991, pp 10–11, added emphases).

The isolation due to new marital role led Chandra her mastery in singing and dancing, and her weight loss was an attack on her self-valuation in terms of her

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[10] Interestingly, the centrality of resistance for psychological processes is only recently emphasized (Chaudhary et al., 2017). In the present coverage based on innovated Gegenstand theory, this concept is the cornerstone for all higher psychological processes.

beauty. The sacrifice for women by leading them to isolation in their family matters can feed positively into the life course of the husband but can be limiting to the wife. The wife assumes the socially expected caregiver role for the husband:

> Chandra's concern for her husband is expressed in the anxiety she feels when he is late coming home from work. Her worry of these times is so great that she gets diarrhea, she says. Her general nervousness also causes her to perspire heavily and continuously, so that she must bathe twice a day. But *this nervousness is also expressed in an energy which is seemingly unlimited*, she says she does not like to keep still, and she uses this energy to accomplish *the huge amount of household work she has to do as the only daughter-in-law* in this large extended family (Egnor, 1991, p. 11, added emphasis).

The load of household work that awaits a daughter-in-law in an extended family is heavy—all the more as Chandra is the only daughter in law. Her energy in doing it—linked with fear for her husband's well-being—shows the compensatory functions of here everyday activities. It is often in the case of everyday organization of life that the affective complexity of persons finds its compensatory role in accomplishing little necessary tasks and *striving toward perfection* in those. Together with such home perfectionism comes home religiosity:

> Chandra is also the most devoutly religious of all the younger people in the family (her husband, by contrast, is an atheist), except for her seven-year-old son, who is a devotee of the elephant-headed-god Ganesa, and keeps a large collection of the Ganesas in his closet, bathing his favourite ones daily. *Chandra encourages this piety* in him (Egnor, 1991, p. 11, added emphasis).

Ganesa—as the Hindu God of overcoming obstacles and trickster—is a symbol of resistance and solution of difficult tasks—fits Chadra's subdued resistance.

The almost comic difficulty in the parenting role of Chandra's comes into action during her menstrual periods:

> The hardest time for Chandra is the monthly three days of menstrual seclusion, during which period she is confined to a small area and is not allowed to bathe or to do her ordinary household work. She also must avoid her son this time, and he causes her great embarrassment by chasing her around trying to touch her and asking what will happen to him if he does. *Both mother and son end up angry and in tears* after these confrontations (p. 11).

The menstrual seclusion is a concept difficult to understand for the child who turns it into the activity of exploration. The frustration of the mother's refusal to be touched leads to tears—and so does the feeling of being trapped once again.

Personal Religiosity: Between Piety and Conversions

Most treatments of psychology of religion are focused on the religion—rather than on the psychological functions of the religious sentiments for the person. The notion of piety is central to the latter. Piety is a feeling of personal responsibility to others—family, kin, deities—characterized by humble attitude toward life.

William James' *Varieties of religious experience* (James, 1902) is a formidable analysis of the knowledge of psychology of religion in terms of personal spirituality. In writing about religious conversion James references, a certain Stephen Bradley whose account of his life in 1830 illustrates the process of becoming religiously converted. Bradley's retrospect (from age 24 back to 14):

> I thought I saw the Saviour, by faith, in human shape, for about one second in the room, with arms extended, appearing to say to me Come! The next day I rejoiced with trembling: soon after, *my happiness was so great that I said I wanted to die; this world had no place in my affections,* as I knew of, and every day appeared as solemn to me as the Sabbath (Bradley, retrospect of age 14—James, 1902, pp, 189–190, added emphasis)

Bradley's feelings of happiness expanded beyond him—he felt the whole world should share the feeling.

Nine years later in 1829, Bradley learned about a religious group promoting itself in his neighborhood and entered into discussions with the converts to that Methodist group. Members of that group tried to bring Bradley to their network:

> Many of the young converts… would come to me when in meeting and ask me if I had religion, and my reply generally was, I hope I have. This did not appear to satisfy them; they said; they said they *knew they* had it. (James, 1902, p. 190)

The social pressure for conversion was—in Bradley's case—paralleled with doubtful (yet positive) orientation toward the efforts. He would still go to a Methodist service—while "feeling nothing at heart." Yet after that, Bradley continued:

> I got home, and felt indifferent to the things of religion until I began to be exercised by the Holy Spirit, which began in about five minutes after, in the following manner:—
> "At first, I began to feel my heart beat very quick all on a sudden, which made me at first think that perhaps something is going to ail me, though I was not alarmed, for I felt no pain. My heart increased in its beating, which soon convinced me that this was the Holy Spirit from the effect it had on me. I began to feel exceedingly happy and humble, and such a sense of unworthiness as I never felt before. I could not very well help speaking out, which I did, and said, Lord, I do not deserve this happiness. (James, 1902, p. 190)

What is important in this personal retrospective account is the resistance to the conversion efforts that—with a latency—turn into their opposite through a total bodily experience. Such totality of experience is central for human ways of living in various versions over the life course. Religious conversion is one example of such wholistic processes. The nature and quality of the conversion experience make it similar to the phenomena of falling in love, or grieving after one's close friends have passed away. As William James remarked after reviewing the accounts that existed in psychology of his time:

> Love is, for instance, well known to be irrevocable, yet, constant or inconstant, it reveals new flights and reaches of ideality while it lasts. These revelations form its significance to men and women, whatever be its duration. So with the conversion experience: that it should for even a short time show a human being what the highwater mark of his spiritual capacity is, this is what constitutes its importance—an importance which backsliding cannot diminish, although persistence might increase it. As a matter of fact, all the more striking instances of conversion… have been permanent (James, 1902, p, 252)

Conversion experience is a rupture in the life course subjective state of affairs which not only becomes generalized—rapidly—across the *whole field* of the subjective domain. The new belief system is completely taken in—capturing all of the affective field of the person's self (see Chap. 2)—as well as the body.

Totality of Conversion: The Life Courses of Ascetics

Conversion of the psyche into a new belief system can radiate downward to the body—or the body and its functions can be made into the arenas where the new belief system becomes established through body. The various religious traditions of asceticism have the use of bodily restrictions part of their repertoire of the transformations of the psyche. Almost all religious systems in the world—with few exceptions (Zoroastrians)—have included in their repertoires of gaining the allegiance of their practitioners some form of regulating the functioning of the body. These restrictions may range from mild (fasting, prohibitions on some foods) to ascetic separation from the world (going to live in monastery or a hut in a desert) to drasic (body mortification by flagellation or extreme stop of food intake).

These restrictions may lead the converted person on the path of separating from the surrounding world (in Max Weber's terms *ausserweltliche* ascetism) by way of going to live in a desert, a cave, or a monastery. A version of such separation can also take place in the middle of societal activity contexts with full visibility of the person who has selected the ascetic path in one's life course and wanted to avoid contact with the world—such as the Stylites. Stylites were Eastern Christianity converted monks who established their living quarters on top of pillars of various heights. Thus, they were simultaneously publicly visible (as the pillar could be located in the middle of the community) and separated from the populace (by the height of the pillar on which the converted person lived.

The Stylite life course tradition starts then the Syriac ascetic saint Saint Simeon the Stylite the Elder (born 390 AD, died 459 AD) who lived the last 37 years of his life on a small platform (estimated 1 square meter in size) on top of various pillars (estimated to range from 3 to 15 m above the ground) near Aleppo. His following continued in various locations in Eastern Christianity for the following thousand years—ascetics in such publicly visible but separated from public a "home" were targets of pilgrimages and deliverers of blessings.

The reported background of the life course of Saint Simeon before he decided upon the life on the pillar included religious conversion at adolescent age together with being found a misfit for communal monastic living for excessive body mortification and expelled from the monastery. He then lived in seclusion in a hut for a year and a half—after which his survival was declared a miracle. He tried to escape to live in a seclusion on a mountain—but pilgrims followed him interfering with his seclusional privacy. The decision to escape from them to the life course on the top of the pillar followed. Yet it did not save Simeon from visitors who asked for his advice—only now they had to use the ladder to reach a listening-speaking distance

to the saint on the top. The ascetic lifestyle of a saint on the top of a pillar was widely publicly visible and earned Simeon public role as a wise man whose advice was respected. A church was built around the pillar on which he lived. The ascetic's personal life decision became turned into the social capital of the community. Opting for a life course of living on top of a pillar creates a new phenomenon of a living monument—a person's whole life is visible—but from distance—for the public. The person creating such living monument unites one's private seclusion with the maximum of social presence. The Stylites were invisibly visible publicly, promoting their social role as a public and moral advisor due to the out-of-the usual world lifestyle.

Conversion in the Field

Extreme performance demands constitute catalysts for religious conversions. During wars, the turn to religious salvation systems is on the increase. The existential feelings of the possibility of dying in the next encounter lead to efforts of secondary control beliefs—alignment with the more powerful Other (a deity)—in an effort to survive. The very events—seeing fellow soldiers die next to oneself—would facilitate the turn to the mystical domains of beliefs as a tool for symbolic survival. The context of conversion can even be completely direct. As one Russian soldier described his first religious experience while in Afghanistan:

> This happened when he was carrying a wounded comrade on his back, but the latter died on his back and immediately "became heavier". Thus, a person previously being an atheist, became convinced in the existence of soul (Senyavskaya, 1999, p, 241).

Religious systems are setup networks of usable signs that can become vehicles for linking the present personal needs for meaning making with the affective meaning systems of the cultural history.

Conclusions: Transformations Within the Phenomenological Whole

The notion of *unitas multiplex* needs further elaboration—and all through this book, it is systematically advanced linking it with the structural transformation of the person over the life course. Stern's personological scheme was focused on the here-and-now encounter of the two infinities—internal and external. Different catalytic conditions for transformation of the *unitas multiplex* lead to vastly different life courses of individuals. The key feature of these life courses is meaningful integration of subjective understanding of MY LIFE—the Personal Life Philosophy.

Catalytic conditions—rather than causal events in life course—guide the formation of one's structured self. The first of these general catalytic conditions that

makes transformations within the person possible is the state of affairs in the construction > < destruction opposition. We create and destroy various objects habitually in everyday life—create an elaborate dinner with nice-looking food (construction) only to devour it into our hungry stomachs during the dinner (destruction). Such states can be temporary—the floor of my apartment today looks dirty already—and thus my throwing down my cigarette butt feels ok (so what if it gets a bit more dirty!). In contrast when I see that the floor is meticulously cleaned, I just cannot throw down my cigarette. During peacetime, it would not occur to me in peacetime that I could walk past dead bodies lying in the street without any feeing of horror. In contrast—if encountering the same in wartime is "just one more" of the atrocities I have encountered. The particular experiences are different for persons at different ages—while parents climb out of a bomb shelter to encounter with horror the devastated buildings that were their home, the child will go through the rubbles to add to his shrapnel collection (Moshenska, 2008) and enjoy the warmth of the pieces of metal that brought by the devastation. The unity of opposites takes many intricate forms in the human mind.

Topics for Further Thought
1. What is Orthogenetic Principle (Werner)?
2. Explain the unity of experience and generalization in Personal Life Philosophies.
3. Explain the processes involved in religious conversion.
4. How are wartime atrocities psychologically possible?
5. Describe how social representations organize human life course.

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Chapter 2
Signs in Minds: Semiotic Basis for the New General Psychology

Contents

While walking around in many German cities today, a traveler can come across minimal memorials to the tragic life courses of persons' whole ordinary lives which were devastated by an ideology of extermination of a whole society. The tragic fact of human social history—creation of the Holocaust and genocides in many places and times of history here gets the minimal but most affective symbolic representation—recording of the basic life and death course data on a small plaque inserted into the pavement in front of the place they used to live. In these minimal signs, the whole tragedy of humankind is represented—a powerful message for our future to never let such atrocities happen again! But will the next generations notice? This communication effort across generations is the arena for linking the personal with the societal—religious and political ideologies which become internalized. All that happens through signs. Semiotic mediation is the general core of how human beings organize their lives—and deaths. It is through creating monuments—ranging from micro-size (as here) to those in mega-sizes—that the historical continuity of affective knowledge is attempted. All this happens through signs—the capacity of creating and maintaining the use of some objects to stand in for others is the general human capacity that makes understanding and remembering complex personal and social occasions possible.

The New General Psychology developed in this book is interdisciplinary—it unites the personological tradition of William Stern with the science of making and using of signs—semiotics. The complex phenomena described in Chap. 1 can be analyzed as semiotic phenomena—general psychology of creating, using, and discarding sign complexes. By using signs, we can think beyond the here-and-now setting—imagining the past as well as that of possible future.

Signs as Mediators of the *Psyche*

How do signs emerge? Why are they necessary? The necessity to create signs is a result of uncertainty of living—the need to make decisions at bifurcation points (Fig. 2.1). If there were no uncertainties in human living—necessities to make decisions at critical points where multiple possibilities exist—there would be no need for the invention and use of signs to reflect upon the life course. Only when such uncertainty exists—at bifurcation points—is the invention of signs necessary.

The bifurcation point is a technical term that specifies the basic uncertainty about the future in the organism's life course. Where there is a life course there is always ambiguity of the future (as the field of possibilities for the future can be unclear) or ambivalence—even if the opportunities are clear, the decision between clear options may give the organism tension. This starts from basic approach-avoidance tension (Hood, 1995) that is already characteristic of animal behavior. In the human case, it entails the invention or importation of a sign that imbalances the choice in one or another direction at the bifurcation point.

When faced with a dilemma—which direction to take out of the two equal opportunities? (Fig. 2.1.)—the human being invents ways how to make the equal options

Fig. 2.1 The decision
point—bifurcation
point—in irreversible time

Bifurcation point-- UNCERTAINTY

functionally unequal. Tossing coins or using special rituals for helping to un-equalize the situation is the usual practice. By convention setup by the decision-maker, the random event—if the coin lands one side up rather than the other—becomes used as tool for deciding which direction to take. A sign is "born" in this practice—as a tool for rapid making of decisions.

Making of the signs to imbalance the given situation in favor of one course of action over another is itself guided by meta-level interests. The character in Astrid Lindgren's children's books—*Little Boy Rasmus*—is not particularly fond of going to school in the morning. But—as a person who wants to be fair—he decides to give the possibility for going to school a "fair chance"—by tossing the coin. Yet he himself is also the rule-maker for the coin tossing—so he decides he would not go to school if the coin comes up one way, and also if it comes up the other way, yet—if it lands on the edge and stays he would go to school. We set up "fair game" rules that by themselves are "biased" in the direction we already want to proceed. Biases in human lives are made possible by signs.

In human social lives—characterized by goals-oriented reasoning and acting—the setting of rules of fairness as a starting ground is always linked with its opposite field—non-fairness. There are always goal-oriented symbolic (or real) actions by some of the participants in the decision game who counter the "balance of fairness" like Rasmus.

The making of signs in negotiation of a societal privilege is depicted in many forms in Renaissance paintings (Fig. 2.2) illustrating the story of Judgment of Paris. It is a story of how the rules of fairness—on the basis of bargaining—becomes one of corruption. The mythical story of the judgment that the shepherd-god Paris in Greek mythology had to make—decide which of the three women goddesses is the most beautiful—illustrates the contested nature of decision-making. The story of Paris making the decision was of intense interest to artists of the Renaissance (Fig. 2.2) who painted specific moments from the mythological story in numerous

Fig. 2.2 The Judgment of Paris (Rubens, 1632-6, Kunsthistorische Museum Vienna) (Aphrodite (Venus in Roman system) is the goddess in the middle with roses (love symbols) in her hair, as well as pearls. Athena (Minerva), goddess of war and wisdom, stands to the left, with helmet and shield lying next to her, the latter featuring an image of Medusa the snake-haired demon whom Athena had helped to kill. On Aphrodite's right wearing a velvet wrap is Hera (Juno), the wife of Zeus. Rubens paints the same female model viewed from all sides. Athena is seen from the front; Aphrodite from the side; and Hera from behind. The model is assumed to be Rubens' second wife, Helene Fourment)

copies.[1] The issue of fairness of decision-making and the rules set for such decisions must have been a relevant topic for dialogues in Europe from the sixteenth century onward. The story itself involves the oppositions.

<div align="center">
HARMONY <> non-HARMONY,
BEAUTY <> non-BEAUTY, and
FAIRNESS <>non-FAIRNESS
</div>

The tension between HARMONY and non-HARMONY begins from the invitation of guests (the "guest list" in our present day meaning) to the wedding party of the gods—that of Thetis and Peleus—which was set up to eliminate discord and let the wedding go on in harmony. This was planned by not inviting one of the gods— Eris (the god of discord)—to the party. When Eris arrived, she was stopped at the door, and in her anger for being excluded, she threw her wedding present—a golden apple designated to symbolize *fairness*—to the participants of the party. The golden

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[1] Pieter Paul Rubens is known to have painted 12 versions of the story. Lucas von Cranach 22.

apple was to be given as the prize to the "most beautiful" goddess present—thus Eris inserted the basis for discord by suggesting such competition. The myth story here encodes deep psychological reality—if one wants to set out discord in a social system one needs to create competition. Eris's wedding gift—a golden apple— became the starting point for the discord.[2] Instead of rejecting it, the participants of the wedding party accepted the suggestion for the beauty contest and three god- desses—Here, Aphrodite, and Athena—volunteered to participate in it. Thus the roots for the emergence and escalation of the discord that Eris planted by the golden award were accepted by the social system that was oriented to avoid any discord during the wedding party.

The story moves from making a fair decision (who of the three goddesses is the most beautiful) to the evaluation of promises each of the goddesses makes to *be declared to be* "the most beautiful." This is the process of transaction that leads to the construction of a sign that is subsequently turned into the essence of the winner in the bargaining context. The BEAUTY<>non-BEAUTY opposition is given as the dividing line for the detection of the *most* beautiful of the participating goddesses. The decision was obviously very difficult so Zeus invited the fair judge—shepherd god Paris who had shown his fairness of judgment in evaluating bulls—to make a similar decision about goddesses. But goddesses were not bulls—they had their own goals-oriented agendas and means of attempting to influence the "fair decision" in their own favor. Bulls, obviously, do not bargain with their evaluator, but goddesses might, if they get a chance.

Three goddesses immediately entered the competition in the myth—Aphrodite (goddess of beauty and love), Hera (goddess of marriage and—at the same time— the jealous wife of Zeus), and Athena (goddess of wisdom and war). They were taken to Mount Ida, bathed, and at first presented themselves to Paris in their best clothes as is appropriate for competing beauties in our contemporary beauty con- tests. Paris could not decide upon their clothed self-presentations—after which the goddesses disrobed and presented themselves in the nude (this moment is the favor- ite for European artists to cover—Fig. 2.2). Even that was not sufficient—so the fairness of the equal opportunity of the moment of display became linked with the bargaining of promises the goddesses could give to Paris's future. This is the moment in the story where the FAIRNESS <> non-FAIRNESS opposition took the form of non-FAIRNESS dominating its opposite. In our contemporary terms, we here see the emergence of bribery and corruption. The story of the Judgment of Paris is a myth story of the psychological roots of corruption of the previously "fair" decision-making. Its actual title in our twenty-first-century terms could be *Corruption of Paris*.

What were the commodities traded in this effort to imbalance the status quo of the "beauty only" (all three were viewed as equally beautiful)-based competition in the phase of bargaining? Athena offered the shepherd wisdom, skill in battle, and

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[2]This act of creating a competition is similar to the practices of research funding agencies that propose a limited amount of research funds to be applied for in a competitive effort.

other abilities of great warriors. Paris had no ambitions to become a warrior, so Athena's bid did not succeed. Hera offered him political power and governance of all Asia and Europe—this career of a politician in the to-be-formed Eurasian Union did not interest the shepherd as well. Finally, Aphrodite promised him the most beautiful woman—Helen of Sparta (who was already married)—and the young man was seduced by this bribe. Men are seducible. Aphrodite won the golden apple and Paris—the marriage to Helen which, in the mythological sequence that followed, led to the devastation of Troy in the Trojan War. So—in sum—an effort to avoid discord in a wedding ceremony but acceptance of rules for a contest (and volunteering to participate in it) lead to emergence of bribery and to the general state of corruption—ending in war and devastation. The work of the goddess of discord has its own microgenesis that exploits deeply human motivations projected onto Greek gods and goddesses.

The Birthplace of Signs

As the Paris story indicates the assignment of signs, setting up the value (*the most beautiful* woman) involves dialogical negotiation. The assumed "fairness" of the decision is confronted by goals-oriented actions by all contenders. Similarly to the example of the little boy Rasmus, the story of the Troyan shepherd Paris demonstrates the *specific location where human beings create signs*—in situations where the current situation needs some extra condition to unbalance the otherwise well-balanced (by opposite forces) situation. This happens all the time in the flow of human experiences—A and B are equal choices between which we cannot decide. To move ahead, we create a third partner in the setting—C—and apply it to imbalance the stalemate of the situation: A-linked-with-C is now dominant over B and therefore stays as our choice. C is the sign that presents the referent (A) to imbalance the A-versus-B equal situation.

The usual place where such sign construction happens in the human psyche is the rapid construction of affective relation with one of the objects. The statement "I like A" (rather than B) is an act of unbalancing the situation. It is uncontestable by any outside argument ("I like A"—"why do you like A rather than B?"—"because I like A") and can lead to adding predicates to the initial decision ("I like A because it is the best!"). These subjective predicates cannot further be contested. Human experiencing involves constant making of subjective preferences (imbalancing balances) which lead to predicate making—making of signs. In Fig. 2.3, this imbalancing of balances is depicted—making of a sign leads to overcoming uncertainty.

Figure 2.3 indicates the basic non-fairness in human living—when there is an equal chance for action (fair chance), it becomes necessarily turned into some version of non-fair preference through the use of signs. This use of signs is deeply subjective—hence human conduct is affectively based acting out of seemingly objective preferences between choices.

Fig. 2.3 The construction of non-fair decisions in irreversible time

Signs in Action

Human beings are the only species that can reflect about its own life course. This is made possible by combination of three conditions: use of signs in reflection about events, abstraction of the notion of time from the flow of life events, and generalization of characteristics of being beyond the abstraction needed for here-and-now problem-solving.

I follow the notion of Charles Sander Peirce in giving meaning to the sign:

A Sign Is Something that **Stands in** for Something Else in **Some Capacity**

This general perspective opens the door for flexibility of the human mind—as long as the functions ("some capacity") is flexible. Signs can be made of any object that is available for the reflection by the human kind. The psychoanalytic mindset has created a mental tendency to see in any oblong object the representation of the penis. Similarly any social act of unequal treatment of persons by other persons can become subsumed under the sign of *exploitation* or *suppression* (Fig. 2.4).

Signs can also stand for one another—creating similes and metaphors. The statements illustrate the similes:

"the snake *is like* a river"
"the river *is like* a snake"

One step further on meaning construction we get "The river is a snake"—a metaphor. Furthermore if an allegory emerges—"love is like a river… flowing constantly" the jump to "love is snake" becomes possible. Human minds operate constantly in sign-making and sign-generalization in the direction of metaphoric and allegorical communication processes.

It is Charles Sanders Peirce who has attempted—in the beginning of the twentieth century—to give us a general framework of all signs human beings use (Table 2.1).

Fig. 2.4 Sign as
representation (Peirce)

Table 2.1 Peirce's classification system of signs

Function		Ontological or material categories		
	Phenomenological or formal categories	FIRSTNESS	SECONDNESS	THIRDNESS
PRESEN-TATION	FIRSTNESS	A sign is "mere quality" **QUALISIGN**	A sign is "actual existent" **SINSIGN**	A sign is "a general law" **LEGISIGN**
RE-PRESEN-TATION	SECONDNESS	A sign relates with its object in having "some character in itself" **ICON**	A sign relates with its object in having "some exist-entail relation to the object" **INDEX**	A sign relates with its object in having "some relation to the interpretant" **SYMBOL**
INTER-PRETA-TION	THIRDNESS	"Possibility" **RHEMA**	"fact" **DICENT SIGN**	"reason" **ARGUMENT**

Usually it is the realm of representation (ICON-INDEX-SYMBOL—Peirce's secondness) that has been emphasized in the social sciences—with semiotics here in the lead. This is linked with the efforts to make sense of the phenomena as these are (ontologically) in different forms of signs—words, images of real objects, and traces of real objects. The level of secondness is that of multifaceted reality of our human worlds encoded in terms of signs.

This focus on the secondness is limited when we look at the human *psyche* at its highest level of functioning. Here the thirdness prevails[3]—human beings do not merely represent the objects in their world to one another but argue in favor of one or another possibility that could be—or become—a fact. **It is the *argument*—made by way of *rhemas* and *dicent* signs—that is the level where our New General Psychology treats the psychological phenomena**. Thus the picture of my great grandfather on my living room wall (iconic sign) makes it possible (the portrait as a rhema) to argue for the fact that my family line is of special social importance. The picture of the current president of the given country on the classroom walls in schools is not an iconic depiction of an old or young man or woman but an argument for the political power that is emphasized by the fact of the current presidency. Pictures on the wall are in fact living arguments in human lives—of those people who look at them. But as objects on the wall, they are dicisigns indicating to the "truth" of the current political power. Signs make truths rather than merely represent these truths.

From "Standing **in** *for*" to "Standing **for**"

The criterion for something being a sign is that whatever it is, it stands in for something else in some function. Yet that "standing in" has inherent ambiguity—is the referent object something from the past (e.g., my great grandfather's portrait stands in for him, already dead for a century) or of the desired future (I wear my somewhere community college T-shirt as it stands in for my expected graduation with a degree 3 years from now). The sign that "stands in" is on the border of past and future—creating the bridge from the past to the expected—desired or treaded—future.

Human thinking operates simultaneously in the reality of AS-IS and the imaginary world of AS-IF. This distinction—with the appreciation of the AS-IF

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[3] Frederik Stjernfeldt (2014) has pointed out that the most important triad—RHEMA-DICISIGN-ARGUMENT—has largely been ignored in favor of the ICON-INDEX-SYMBOL triad. Most of the higher psychological functions are organized in the thirdness level where dicisign has key role in being the transition state in meaning construction processes. It stands in between the fixation of the meaning and its transformation—dicisign is a statement about which True or False value can be added *without further explanation* (Stjernfelt, 2014, pp. 55–56) That makes it a tool for ideological strong suggestions ("President X is an imbecile"). Transition to argument adds explanation the assertions by dicisigns.

Fig. 2.5 Hans Vaihinger and the differentiation of the expected future

domain—was introduced into the Occidental sciences in the late nineteenth century by German philosopher Hans Vaihinger (Fig. 2.5). His focus on "useful fictions"— the constructions of AS-IF kind—sets the stage for the central role of the study of imagination as central for psychological science.

We go a step beyond Vaihinger here. The AS-IF field (Fig. 2.5) is further differentiated in the future domain of the irreversible time into sub-domains of normatively ordered kind—AS-SHOULD-BE versus AS-MUST-NOT-BE. The signs "stand *for*" some possible futures—they present something from the past in anticipation of some desired future.

The differentiation of the AS-IS and AS-COULD-BE domains happens across the timeline of the present. It is the irreversible time that makes the AS-IF domain necessarily unknowable in detail, leading to the need to build up imaginary models of the future. In the psychological domain, this is accomplished by signs (Fig. 2.6) that operate in the irreversible time both microgenetically (in here-and-now flow of experiences) and macrogenetically (as regulators of the ontogenetic life course).

Given the human existence in irreversible time, that function is necessarily future-focused (Fig. 2.6). The sign use reflects the regulation of the here-and-now situation together with the focus for the unknowable but expected future. A parent stopping a child from experimenting with matches may on the spot scream "stop, this is dangerous!"—solving the immediate hazardous situation. But the voice of the parent uttering the dramatic word "dangerous" may resonate in the mind of the former child for years to come, in specific situations not linked at all with fire hazards.

The signs emerge in the process of meaning-making—and they can take many different forms. Basically the contrast of these forms is between point-like and

**THE BASIC SCHEME: SIGNS REGULATIG CONDUCT IN
IRREVERSIBLE TIME
(*DOUBLE* FUNCTION- IMMEDIATE AND FOR THE FUTURE)**

Fig. 2.6 Sign functions in irreversible time

Fig. 2.7 A landscape painting as a field-like sign (C. G. Carus *Sunset* 1862)

field-like signs. The point-like signs are specific presenters of something else. So—when a mathematician claims "X = Y" the symbol X becomes the sign for Y—X *presents* Y in the given mathematical argument. From the moment of making this claim, the mathematician can continue using X instead of Y in the unfolding of the given proof. Words are polysemic point-like signs—they are schematic, but not always unambiguous. The field-like signs that emerge can have pleromatic nature—they create a meaning field that goes beyond the original referent in providing an affective flavor to the complex object (e.g., a landscape, Fig. 2.7).

The landscape painting in Fig. 2.7 is not a "true depiction" of a real nature scene, but a complex sign—in the form of a whole painting—of the painter's totality of

feelings at the time of making the painting. It is a field-like sign which still has definite borders (granted by the picture frame). Yet the borders of a picture frame do not limit the wandering mind of the picture viewer—instead, the frame creates a *Gegenstand* that provokes the crossing of borders in our investigation into our internal infinities. Art museums would become mere depositories of artificial objects if such provocation would not bring viewers back to the same masterpieces to explore them directly and repeatedly.

A field-like sign—some scene that presents something else—can become abbreviated into a point-like sign or further extended beyond its boundaries to SWIB (Sign With Infinite Borders). Figure 2.8 shows an example—a discovery of a picture of a tank in an artistic landscape can become presented by point-like sign ("this is a tank") or a field-like sign (feeling into the war landscape), or escalated into SWIB (feeling of total insecurity in the environment and within oneself).

In the meaning-making process, all versions of these signs work together. Point-like signs are involved in the schematization pathway to generalization (Fig. 2.9), while field-like signs and SWIBs operate in the pleromatic pathway.

**Fig. 2.8** Transformations between point-like and field-like signs

Fig. 2.9 Schematization, pleromatization, and hyper-generalization

Two Pathways to Generalization: Schematization and Pleromatization

I suggest that the human *psyche* operates as a system of making generalized meanings that under some circumstances become hyper-generalized and "capture" the human psychological system in full.[4] The domain of values (Chap. 2) is the primary domain for such hyper-generalized—completely influential in their silence but subjective feeling of it as imperative—field-like signs.

Schematization and pleromatization feed forward into each other—thus leading to the state of hyper-generalization of the constructed meanings. In traditional terms, the pleromatic field operates as the context for the schematization process—providing the affective flavor to the category that is emerging. Yet the emerging hyper-generalized signs are of field-like nature and do not allow presentation in the verbal domain. It is the feelings of value that become encoded by the *psyche* as holistic organizers of human subjectivity (Fig. 2.10).

As the new sign emerges in time, its main function is to prepare the meaning maker to future encounters with probable and possible life events. These future

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[4]The notions were introduced in 2006 (Valsiner, 2006) and are elaborated later (Valsiner, 2014, 2020).

Fig. 2.10 The birth of signs in facing the future

encounters are preemptively prepared with the focus on what is possible—a range that may have a clear border (e.g., "miracles will not happen," or "there is no after-life") or a vague one ("maybe there is Hell"). Within these borders, the probable future courses of events get an affective prestructure ("X might happen and I would like it" or" I really do not want Y to happen"). Through the construction and use of signs, **human beings live forward toward the future** as they are involved in meaning-making on the border between the past and the future.

Specific generalized signs—in the form of social representations—enter into the flow of living toward the future by providing specific directions to the generalization process. In Fig. 2.11, we can observe two different trajectories of generalization starting from the same hyper-generalizing pleromatic field—an allegorical painting—leading toward two different outcomes in the activation of the interpreter's feelings.

Figure 2.11 uses the reproduction of Bartholomeus Spranger's (1546–1611) painting *Mars, Venus, and Cupid* (1597) in two functions. In part 1, it is a scene observed—that gives rise to the simple verbal sign "abuse" and its subsequent generalization about the world. Yet the same painting can emerge as a sign—field-like sign—in the sexual imagery of a person. Recognition of it as a painting reduces the sexual tension as it delegates the sign to the aesthetic world. The context ascribed to the painting—"without Bacchus and Ceres Venus will be cold"—fortifies the hyper-generalization pathway of the allegory.

Life of Signs Signs are dynamic. They emerge when needed, take any form (point or field), and set up the constraints for anticipation of the future. However, they can also be abandoned when no longer functional or inhibited by other signs. The more generalized the meaning captured by a sign becomes the more powerful are its inhibitory potentials. Thus, the potential for field-like signs of generalized or hyper-generalized kind to "silence" or eliminate lower-generalization level point-like signs tells us the story about the power of sign fields in the semiotic mediation of the psyche. Religious, ideological, or personally obsessive sign fields (describable by oceanic feelings of love, dedication to deities, and to hyper-generalized feelings of duty and justice) can override all lower-lever constructed meanings.

Figure 2.12 depicts the hierarchy of generalization of signs in the flow on irreversible time. The hierarchy starts from the lower level physiological bodily feeling (Level 0) that is directly triggered by some ongoing life experience. It triggers the

1. Simple verbal sign standing in for an unfolding complex event (with generalization)

„OUR DAILY WORLD IS VERY DANGEROUS AD IMMORAL!"

„It is SEXUAL ABUSE!!"

„I see this... it seems to be..."

TIME AS IT FLOWS WITH CONCURRENT MEANING-MAKING

2. Complex sign field standing in for a simple event

„... but this looks like Mars, Venus and Cupid"

„I imagine a sex scene".

TIME AS IT FLOWS WITH CONCURRENT MEANING-MAKING

Fig. 2.11 Signs and their focus on turning possible futures into real presents

creation of proto-signs (Level 1) where the bodily feeling gain an approximate meaning ("I feel something but I cannot name it"). Further experiencing can lead to signs that specify emotion categories ("I feel anger") and re-verbally expressible through categories in ordinary language. Further advancement of generalization of

Fig. 2.12 Sign hierarchy in affective relating with the world

the mediation process leads to verbal argumentation—within oneself and with others—in generalized increasingly vague but powerful "philosophical" context (Level 3).

Finally, at Level 4 as the field-like signs of Level 3 become hyper-generalized, the verbal accessibility to the meanings vanishes and the person here-and-now feels understanding of the experience in deep intuitive ways which transcend the boundary of the present toward the future. This possibility of anticipating one's feeling into the world in the future is unique—it can happen only at Level 4 with hyper-generalized signs, but not at Levels 3 and three verbal discourses that in their explicit reflexivity from past to present in verbal and nonverbal sign systems cannot cross the border to the future. Level 4 signs can—and do. They are the base for all approximate but experience-based feelings into the future events. In general terms—our life course is constructed at the highest, hyper-generalized level of meaning systems since these can preemptively penetrate the imaginary future. Through hyper-generalization, the meanings that emerge in strictly contextualized circumstances expand in space and time—even beyond the border to the future—and become our meaningful ways of anticipating and flavoring the emerging new present coming out of the future. The acontextuality of the feeling of *rasa* in the Hindu affect system (Menon, 2017, pp. 124–128) leads to that feeling to guide the next up and coming experiencing contexts (Fig. 2.12 Level 4 downward arrow in the future).

All phenomena of wishful predictions of the future are operating at the Level 4 meaning fields.[5] Our beliefs in "luck," "chance," "justice"—themselves labels at Level 3—operate as large fields (SWIBs in Fig. 2.8) so that we provide ourselves approximate but determined and affectively desired (or feared) future life scenarios. Thus the process of affective hyper-generalization makes continuity of the *psyche* in principle possible. Our communication efforts—with others and within ourselves—involve negotiations of Level 3 (vague nut important words) and Level 4 (important feeling fields to which words cannot be attached). At times the words are inserted to guide the dialogue between these levels—with the result of seeming clarity that may remain vague. *Allegories* are example of such vague clarity.

Allegory as Direction to a Hyper-Generalized Sign Field

Figurative communication messages in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were allegorical in their nature. The notion of allegory entails symbolic remove (as will be described below) with the intention of changing the meaning of the whole—text or painting—by adding details that undermine the formation of the Gestalt understanding (THIS <whole> IS X) by forcing the interpreter to go beyond the manifest meaning (THIS <whole> LOOKS LIKE X but THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE in it). That "something else" is to be constructed by the interpreter based on the whole scene, sometimes on the basis of the direction for interpretation in the whole, but often without it (Fig. 2.13).

Figure 2.13 is an example of artificial direction of the interpreter to create meaning of the simple geometrical object in the direction of hyper-generalized feeling field (Level 4) that is designated by general Level 3 word ("love"). It is a pathway of social power assertion—a particular meaning suggestion is inserted into the flow of everyday living so as to assertively guide the direction of the recipients' personal meaning making.

How does it work? By providing the authoritative suggestion through power assertion:

**Fig. 2.13** Allegory of love

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Fig. 2.13 Human communication in goals-oriented setting (after Karl Bühler)

$$\text{HERE in this object X}$$
$$\text{and here is THE ABSTRACT MEANING}\left(\text{"love"}\right)$$
$$\left(\text{power assertion}\right) \rightarrow \text{this meaning } MUST \ BE \ FOUND \text{ in the object X!}$$

the meaning maker is directed toward projecting into the simple drawing one's own complex understanding of the abstract notion and feeling the particular affective state. Such declarations of allegorical meanings inherent in images become social guidance system—a kind of socially mandated abduction.[6] Allegory is the enforced abduction ("this yellow oval *must be* love," "this depicted battle scene *must be* imperial glory"). It is a meta-communicative message that directs the recipient's interpretation of the message.

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[6] *Abduction*—as an alternative to both induction and deduction—is the third way of creating generalized meaning (Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010). Coming from the legacy of Charles S. Peirce, it takes the form: usually events A, B, C happen but now D happened as a surprise. A-B-C can be explained by X and Y but not D. Yet—if Z were the case, the appearance of D would be no surprise to us.

Human Communication as Co-Construction: Beyond Mechanical Models

In terms of communication process, a claim for allegory is an act of goals-oriented directing human meaning-making. This is an extension of Karl Bühler's basic model of human communication (the "Organon Model") that is presented in Fig. 2.13. The Organon Model is the basic model of any human communication (in contrast to communication between technical systems[7]) as it accepts the basic co-constructed ambiguity in the message (the triangle versus circle contrast in Fig. 2.13). The sender's message is not received as sent, but as co-constructed by the receiver. This feature allows for creativity in the communication process—going beyond the full accuracy (100%) of the sent message in the reception. The receiver reconstructs the original message in ways that go "beyond the information given"—thus creating new understanding under the suggestions of the sender's message (> 100%). This feature makes innovation possible and guarantees open-ended meaning construction within and between communicating minds.

The introduction of an allegory can happen both by the sender (who insists ***this is allegory for tha*t**—Fig. 2.13) or by the receiver interpreting the message in abstracted terms and considering it to be an allegory. The latter is the case in our (impoverished) interpretation of Renaissance paintings—most of these were meant as allegories for something else—understood by the painter and the audience. Now, four centuries later, we in another societal context lack the tacit knowledge of the times back then in our understanding of how a particular painting was an allegory for some hyper-generalized meaning. A pleromatic sign (as a painting is) presents a hyper-generalized feeling field that is directed by assertion of an allegory label.

Thus allegories are complex signs. Figure 2.14 is a simple and non-real illustration of how suggestions for allegory work. The real allegorical texts or drawings the direction for interpretation ("faith," "envy") are given together with hyper-complex sign fields where various functions of the communicative intention were merged into one whole (Fig. 2.14). That whole is exaggeratedly rich in details each of which somehow fits the general label ("lust") no matter which part of the detailed image one concentrates in viewing. The viewer is kept within the field of visual experiences that are all united by the allegory label.

The visual scene in Fig. 2.14 is an example of communicating moral direction messages with engravings based on artists' paintings. These engravings—usually produced in series of about 4000 in the printers' shops in sixteenth-century Europe—would appeal to the affective (pleromatic) side of the experiencing person.

Even if an allegory is set up ("this is lust"), there exist various trajectories of interpretation—ranging from mundane total feeling to rich reminding of the

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[7] Which are characterized by the Shannon-Weaver model (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) that is focused on maximum 100% accuracy of communication but leaves no place for innovation. This model fits mechanical (electronic) communication systems but not any communication efforts in open systems of biological, psychological, or sociological systems.

Fig. 2.14 Allegory of lust (*luxoria*)—Peter van der Hayden 1558 after Pieter Bruegel

dangerous border to the demonic world that the unmoderated lust might bring. The allegoric label is directive but not determinative. It is an example of the centrality of pleromatic *affective aboutness* of the created meaning. Such aboutness is needed for generalized orientation toward the future. We live in the present while constantly preparing for the future—which by its nature cannot be pre-known.

The Power of the Whole Field: The Chronotopic Structure creating highly saturated allegorical scenes illustrates the relevance of the field control—capturing the *Ganzheit* of the whole—in the efforts to guide people's feelings. Whether the media are sixteenth-century engravings with allegorical messages, or twenty-first-century television commercials, the principle of overcrowding the message remains similar. Abundance in the message is the general rule—as Edmund Leach succinctly remarked "the jumble is the message" (Leach, 2000, p, 126). Walls of the Khajurahu Temple[8] in India are covered by abundance of figures involved in everyday mundane activities. Entrances to churches are decorated by groupings of meaningful figurines who are not examined while entering a church. All over human history and across all religions ornamentation has been crucial in decorating objects—from mundane to sacred (Valsiner, 2018). We create oversaturated fields of cultural *Umwelt* for our living and then live on under the support and guidance of these constructed meaning fields.

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[8] Desai (1985)

Furthermore, allegorical meaning construction process takes place in time—and my Fig. 2.15 is an effort to give it a form as a *chronotopic structure*.[9] In Fig. 2.15, the four components of the allegorical sign-making are represented. First, the sign (S) that emerges in the flow of experiencing—framed by existing social representations— becomes the *literary meaning* of the present moment situation ("this is S," e.g., "this is an act of envy"). It becomes verified by backwardly oriented *typological recall* (checking the past), from where two directions of anticipating the future are derived. The descending trajectory provides for the *tropological normative system* for ways of being—moral imperatives that follow from S (e.g.," this is an act of envy *and this will lead to bad consequences*"—these should not be). The ascending anagogic generalization can lead to personal life philosophy of not succumbing to the dangers implied by sign S ("I am not an envious person"). The emerged sign S sets up in four affective domains simultaneously—linking past and future and triggering the affective tension in the moving toward the future.

Allegories are the main mechanism of the regulation of the upconscious domain of the *psyche*—as they create a tension on the transition process between Level 3 and Level 4 of the affective system (see Fig. 2.12 above). This parallels the concerns of psychoanalysis about the border of the unconscious with the conscious. Cultural psychology and psychoanalysis move in parallel in their efforts to make sense of the complexities of the human *psyche*.

Fig. 2.15 The chronotopic structure of allegorical communication

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[9] I use this concept here—in extension of Mikhail Bakhtin's (1986) use of the idea of ***chronotope***— to emphasize that all psychological structures necessarily have temporal form. Bakhtin developed the notion after 1925 lecture by A Ukhtomsky in Leningrad. This is a major departure point from other psychodynamic perspectives where the "dynamic" is not situated in the flow of time. For the latter, the "dialogues" between PAST, PRESENT, and FUTURE are obligatory.

Two Functions of Allegory: Anagogic Ascent and Tropological Guidance

The allegorical insertions upon a sign—point- or field-like—operates in two directions. First, in its **anagogic ascent**, it gives further direction to the hypergeneralization process, turning some of the overwhelming human sentiments in one or another societally valued direction while disallowing counter-directions. The processes of doubting are first victims to such anagogic ascent—the hypergeneralized sign field becomes monological at the times of religious or patriotic fervents. In the beginning of World War I, the younger generations of all the countries that were soon to be at war with one another glorified the upcoming carnage in deeply poetic terms/"the Great War"). Doubts about the value, feasibility, and reasons for the war were not surfacing in the war fervent.

The second line of allegorical impacts—**tropological guidance**—involves setting up top-to-down moral imperatives for particular conduct in the future. The allegorical engraving above (Fig. 2.14) is a moral complex pictorial narrative about the dangers of luxury. The person getting the message is not supposed to doubt or question it—both the anagogic and tropological functions are given in dicisigns. Human sign creation involves the simultaneous marking of an emerging sign by rules "this is X and it cannot be doubted" or "this is Y but it could be Z." Allegories that can be found in art and literature over centuries are paleo-semiotic markers of the efforts at different periods in history to control the minds of ordinary persons which necessarily mostly necessarily fail (due to the co-constrictive nature of communication—Bühler's Organon Model in Fig. 2.13).

Most of human societal texture is allegorical in its form. This grants the social representations—in their hyper-field forms—the widest possible access to persons in any domain of the society. Allegories are "carriers" of ideological "viruses" that come to be delivered to the personal selves through the dramatization of the allegorical scenes.

Ontological Structure of the Semiotic Whole: The Semiosphere

The *semiosphere* is the concept introduced by the founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics Juri Lotman (1922–1993) in 1984.[10] Based on analogy of the notion of *biosphere* (introduced by Eduard Suess in 1875 and developed into a

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[10] The basic idea of the spheric metaphor was slowly emerging since the beginning of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics in the late 1960s but found its theoretical elaboration only by the early 1980s. It represented the departure from the original structuralist view on sign systems to that of structural-dynamic view (Nöth, 2015). The original dependence of Lotman's semiotics on the first version cybernetics and binary codings became replaced by the focus on the borders (Lotman, 1990 p. 131–142) between the unified opposite in the binary code (Gherlone, 2013; Kull & Velmezova, 2018).

comprehensive theory in the 1920s by Vladimir Vernadsky), it involves the whole of the signified life world of *Homo sapiens* as a species. Ecology is the science of bio-sphere—an interdisciplinary fields of biology, astrophysics, geology, hydrology—and all other sciences that study phenomena of life. It is a meta-level synthesis of knowledge of phenomena of life.

In a similar way, Lotman's semiosphere is a hyper-synthetic concept that unifies all human sciences linked with the meaningfulness of human sign systems—lin-guistics, psychology, anthropology, history, and literary scholarship. This is defined as the "semiotic space" where texts (contextualized, cohesive strings of signs) are active and related to other elements within the same space. Thus the notion of semiosphere is a generalized whole. So it is a conceptual *Ganzheit*—a general term that unites into one field of a self-confined whole (which a sphere is) all the phe-nomena of meaningfulness of the human world. The use of the image of a sphere—with surface that has no edges—allows for new conceptual forms of integration:

> A question that may arise in this sense is the exact value of adopting the metaphor of semio-sphere. Its clear productivity aside, the usefulness of the concept seems to be dictated by a change in the way semiotic systems are thought of. *The process of replacing one-on-one correspondences with an interrelated, dynamic system of multiple possibilities of significa-tion within culture comes metaphorically informed*, but it also develops into a technical concept that informs the thinking about semiotic systems as, perhaps, natural, intercon-nected and active. In this sense, the concept itself builds a different picture for semiotics (Rodriguez Higuera, 2018, p. 8, added emphasis).

The notion of semiosphere as the overwhelming manifold of "metaphorically informed" multiple relations between parts of the given system opens for the New General Psychology new opportunities after the properties of this topological object are clearly specified. First of all, a sphere is a self-confined three-dimensional struc-ture in which the universality of the border between its interior (inside of the sphere) and exterior is precisely defined. The border of the sphere belongs to the interior (as its most external layer), yet it is simultaneously the membrane—transfer domain—with the exterior of the sphere. In the latter, the border is the relation between the exterior and the interior, hence universal. In contrast—any distinctions introduced on the surface of the sphere are local—a "scratch" on the surface may locally distin-guish the "left" and "right" side on the sides of the scratch, but moving around the sphere that distinction stops being of universal relevance—what is "left" becomes the same than that what is "right" (locally) when the move around the sphere is accomplished.

The best example of this locality of the distinctions made on the surface is our usual discourse in cross-cultural psychology in terms of the distinction "West" ver-sus "East." Our common reference is to the "European" (including the America) in contrast to "Asian" societies. Looking from Europe, Japan looks to us distinctively as "East," but looking at Europe and the America from Japan would make these two continents "East" when the view continues in the same direction. So the "East-West" distinction on a sphere (which our Globe is) is not universal but relative to the given vantage point. Japan viewed from the America over the Pacific Ocean is clearly a "Western country."

The unity of the universality (inner-outer relations in the spheric model across the surface border) and non-universality (distinctions made on the surface of the sphere) can be seen as the theoretical value of this (and other) spheric or general topological forms as models for holistic processes. The universality of meaning construction in the human higher psychological functions is guaranteed by the inner <> outer relations—here William Stern's "inner infinity" <> "outer infinity" personological scheme (depicted in Chap. 1) maps very well onto Lotman's semiosphere notion. Allegories in this mapping would be hyper-generalized semiotic fields that are made to cover the external surface of the semiosphere giving that surface (as the transition zone between the inner and outer infinities) a direction for affective relating with the world by a person who acts within a given society. These sign fields can partially overlap (allegorical fields have no borders) and contradict one another.

This way the process of allegorical signification would take our conceptualization of the human meaning making to its logically final end. As the sphere has no borders on its surface, there is no part of human higher psychological functions that is *not* in its nature semiotic. The mapping of networks on the sphere allows for full account of interconnections on the surface—but no innovation of the sphere itself. Semiosphere is maintained by the allegorical confines—a meaning-making system "dressed" in allegories and ill at ease to reveal its virginal skin underneath such fashionable clothing.

Thus, the original notion of semiosphere is a metaphoric concept of a whole that is stable and fixed in its form. In reality human meaning making is open for reorganization and innovation. This became an obstacle for Lotman's semiosphere model—there needed to be some mechanism that would allow the sphere to change. By the very end of his productive life as a literary scholar, Lotman reached the understanding of incorporating phenomena of explosion (*vzryv*) into the basic theory of semiotics.[11] The incorporation of the notion of breaking of the holistic structure introduced the dynamic feature into Lotman's otherwise holistic-structural system of semiotics. The specific ways in which such qualitative innovation occurs have not been worked out in semiotics as it has largely remained an ontologically focused discipline.

Conclusions: Semiosis of Hyper-Generalization in Life Course Construction

The New General Psychology operates at the highest level of psychological functions—which are vague in their subjective forms yet powerful in the human *psyche* as organizers of the life course. Traditional psychology has missed the point by

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[11] Lotman (2010). The elaboration of the idea of explosion came with the introduction of Ilya Prigogine's non-equlibrium thermodynamics ideas into the functioning of the semiotic modeling systems (Gherlone, 2013, p. 333)

trying to reduce these hyper-generalized field-like signs to general point-like signs (categories), followed by a myriad of efforts (correlational, combinatory, causal) to make claims about their mutual relationships. These relationships stop being processes and become de facto things. As an example, a correlation coefficient found in the empirical investigation of variables X and Y—supposedly representing the dynamic side of the relation—becomes established in a static form ("X and Y are *strongly related* with r= 0.78"). The insertion of value ("strongly," "significantly" etc.) to the depiction of otherwise purely formal relations obtained empirically is part of the transition of our knowledge from exploring dynamic processes (of the *relating* of X and Y) to the static statement of a "fact" ("relation"). The translation of variability of phenomena into static signs that are supposed to depict them is a fundamental inferential error (Valsiner, 1986) which is encoded already into our use of language. We are biased to translate ongoing processes into entities.

The direction taken in the New General Psychology—building on the semiotic look at ongoing psychological processes—is different. The processes of generalization lead to the qualitative shift to hyper-generalization which are the pathway to freedom from the inevitable uniqueness of the ongoing flow of experiencing. Hyper-generalization generates wide field-like signs that maintain themselves in the mind over time, this letting the person to escape the contextual bounds of any here-and-now setting. Semiotic general psychology focuses on the processes of upgrading (generalization to hyper-generalization) and recontextualizing (hyper-generalization to generalization to action) processes.

Questions for Further Thought
1. Explain the relevance of uncertainty for the invention of signs.
2. What is a bifurcation point?
3. How is *fairness* difficult to live up to in decision making?
4. What is *corruption*?
5. What is a *sign* according to C. S. Peirce?
6. Describe the function of similes and metaphors in human meaning making.
7. Explain Peirce's sign types of representation: ICON, INDEX, and SYMBOL.
8. Explain the relations between RHEMA (possibility) and ARGUMENT (reason) in the making of the DICENT SIGN (fact) in Peirce's system of Interpretation.
9. Explain Vaihinger's AS-IF and AS-IS contrast.
10. Explain double function of signs—for the present and for the future.
11. Explain the notion of sign and transformations between point-like and field-like signs.
12. Describe the relations of *schematization* and *pleromatization*.
13. Explain the hierarchy of signs (Levels 0 to 4).
14. Explain Karl Bühler's Organon Model of communication and its importance for human communication processes.
15. Explain tropological guidance and anagogic ascent in allegories.
16. Explain Lotman's semiosphere.

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Chapter 3
Mediating Mind: Making Values

Check for updates

Jupiter's Loves: Danae *(Antonio Allegri de Coreggio, 1531)*

Contents

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The golden rain that Jupiter sent into the confinement of Danae in the Greek legend constituted the impregnating power that gold in human history has regularly even if metaphorically done. Danae's subsequent giving birth to twins—one mortal the other celestial—further indicates the value of human reproductive persistence. Gold, babies, and gods are kept in high value in the human history. Even gods are interested in investing their resources into the new generation.

Values are the highest level organizers of human lives. Yet they are ephemeral—as all non-existing objects[1] they *subsist* (rather than exist) and therefore can play their overwhelming role in everything human beings feel, think, and do. We are guided by our own generated meanings that have lost real material existence by way of becoming hyper-generalized sign fields that get hold of the whole of our *psyche* and control our personal integrity. The power of semiotic mediation (explained in Chap. 2) is created by the control of the person over one's own conduct. While this process of self-control takes place the opposite—letting oneself free from overdetermined meanings—happens in parallel.

The Birthplace of the Feeling of Value

Where do values begin? This question can be answered through the inherent feelings of refusal to depart from an appropriated object. In the beginning is the act of taking:

I take an object

Once this has happened, I may hold on to the object until I deposit it somewhere else—a special depository in the form of a safe, cupboard, bag, or garbage bag. I can also give the object to somebody else to have—as a donation, or a present. In all cases, I either preserve the object, or give it away. My handling of the object—briefly or for long time—leads to the creation of value of the object, in one version (garbage bag).

I *throw* it *away*

The object here becomes irretrievably lost for me. The feeling of value is detected once I cannot throw the object away—I have taken an object but after that I feel I cannot easily throw it away. **A new value has been born in between my taking the**

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[1] In the sense of higher-order objects (*Gegenstande*) that Alexius Meinong and his colleagues in Graz discussed at the end of the nineteenth century (Meinong, 1904) cannot be located in any spatiotemporal place of existence. It is precisely because of the reality of the non-reality of such concepts that they play central role in the human psyche and society (further covered in Chap. 10). All of psychology's concepts belong to the non-existing objects—they **subsist** (*Sosein*) and are particularly important in that role. The question of values is in the very center of our contemporary cultural psychology (Branco, 2012), and the nature of values is located in the realm of hyper-generalized sign fields.

object and the moment of intending to throw it away—but with feelings that either do not allow that act[2] or at least make it psychologically difficult.

The simplest example of this is the making of an ordinary stone pebble on a beach into a personal souvenir from that visit to the beach. I pick up a pebble among hundreds of similar ones, carry it home as a memory from the visit, and am reluctant to depart from that by now meaningful stone. So:

<p style="text-align:center">I take an object and ⊃ feel I cannot ⊐ throw it away</p>

The birthplace of value is exactly in the feeling of subjective "I can not give it away." In the clinical extension, it becomes chronic as a *hoarding disorder*[3]—which in terms of general psychology would equal to breakdown or nondevelopment of value hierarchies and sign systems that regulated both the maintaining and changing the objects of value. Hoarding manifests itself in departure from objects that is psychologically difficult to the extreme case of being impossible. Values are relative—something is felt as valuable in contrast with others (non-valuables). That relationship may change—a used object may lose value and becomes garbage… or if it survives that state—returns to the realm of values as a "relic."

Semiotic Regulation of the Relations with Objects

The handling of the emerging, maintaining, and dismissing the feeling of value is organized by the sign hierarchy where the two opposite directions of desire—possession, and dispossession—are mutually feeding into each other:

This is X
I *want* X
Does X *belong to* somebody?
I take X (*take, rob, steal, get by request*, etc.)
Now X *belongs to* me
Somebody else *wants* X
I want X as it *belongs to* me   or   X *belongs to* me but I *do not want* it (any more)
I *protect* X

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[2] Certain personally relevant objects are particularly difficult for the persons to give up: birthday and holiday cards, and emotional talismans. People are known to collect these items over years (Jaffe, 1999), and the very idea of throwing them away is resisted strongly. Tools one uses constantly—a pen for a writer (Bastos & Coutinho, 2019) becomes personified. At the same time, these to-be-personal messages become commercially mass produced (West, 2010). It is in the domain of the creating, maintaining, and demise of greeting cards where the personal value systems can be directly studied.

[3] Hoarding disorder has been added to the DSM diagnostic system in 2013 and is estimated to be present in 3–5% of the population.

        or
I give X away (*gift, donate, sell*, etc.)
I maintain X   or   I maintain memories of X

This process of possessing and dispossessing is organized by meanings (italics) of various levels of generality. The field-like sign *belonging to* is central for all human relations with the world (see Chap. 2). It is the human beings who have created the notion of **property** (something *belongs to* somebody) and use that sign field to organize personal and social lives.

The Roots of *Property*

Where does property begin? It requires reflection upon the reality by the person that generalizes from the ordinary reality. We live in ways where we establish the value of different objects that we consider as belonging to us. My car is my property. So is my nose (and other body parts). I may invest in my body to increate its value by< way of rejuvenation cremes or heir coloring devices. Yet I do not sell my nose after many plastic surgeries on it as I might sell my car.

Making and maintaining value involves ordinary bodily actions—like our closest relatives among the higher primates we as human beings act with our bodies to the demands of survival in the given environments. Yet we do it differently—starting to reflect *upon my body as it belongs to me*. My mother can say—"your body belonged to me until you were born"—which is a biological reality that leads to lifelong psychological bonding with the mother. A mother who tries to keep the child from becoming autonomous is involved in a special king of hoarding activity.

The breakthrough that the human species have achieved—my body is my property—leads to the development of all economic relations within the self and the society. Personal relationships with getting the possession of objects (take, buy, rob, steal, beg, etc.) are all generalized meanings that organize our lives. So are the meanings of dispossession—give, donate, abandon, recycle, etc. Navigating this system of meanings is the main activity of human ways of being.[4] We think of

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[4] Various pathological conditions demonstrate the generality of this semiotic possession-dispossession process. The hoarding syndrome described above is an example of the sign hierarchy where the processes of dispossession have not developed (or are blocked by the possession processes). A person takes but is unable to give away—hence accumulates objects without meaningful organization. If there is a meaningful organization added, the pathology ends, and we can view the person who is a collector. People collect all kinds of objects—stamps, cars, miniature alcohol bottles, and souvenirs—and such collections are valuable precisely due to the inhibition of the dispossession tendencies. On the other side of the hierarchy of possession is the pathological discounting of the DOES X BELONG TO SOMEBODY—kleptomania is the result of such discounting, contrast it with stealing—pickpocketing is a strategic and highly organized psychological skill

donating our blood, semen, or body parts to others or refuse the option of sharing my breast milk with a baby who is not mine (except for extreme circumstances). We can hire out our body (and mind) for economic benefit by becoming employed by others. We can donate our bodies (and minds) to the patriotic duties to fight (and die) for higher meanings of the fatherland, a deity, or a common cause.

Symbolic Extension of the Present into Future: The Concept of *Ownership*

Human lives are dominated by meaning construction in terms of ownership. It is a very precarious concept as it breaks out of the flow of human actions in irreversible time and links the past (establishing the given ownership—when did I buy, or steal, object X that is now "mine") with future (as X is mine, I can act with it in the future- donate, sell, give as gift, or just throw away). Yet all relating with objects happens in the here-and-now context—and its meaning in the form of ownership applies to indefinite future time frame looking forward from the present moment. As Georg Simmel pointed out:

> The child wants to "have" every object that interests him; one should "give" it to him. This only means that the child only wants to do something with the object, frequently only to look at it and touch it. The concept of property among primitive peoples is not at all characterized by the *permanence or the fundamental timelessness* of our concept of it. Rather it encompasses only a momentary relationship of enjoyment and action with the object which is often, in the next instant, given away or lost with complete indifference (Simmel, 1990, p. 304, added emphasis).

Permanence and fundamental timelessness require meaning construction that crosses the barrier of irreversible time ("I have X in the present moment and as X is my property I will have it as long as I want"). I protect that permanence by barriers to the transfer of the property to others—by building walls around it, or by locating it in a bank safe or a secret location I only know. Or in case of potential time-based or event-based loss of the value of the property, the way to guarantee the timelessness of the ownership is to buy an insurance policy for it. It is interesting in this case that in the times of slavery (in the United States), it was the slave owners who established life insurance policies *for their slaves*, and not for themselves. The value of the owner was not to be threatened by his loss of life, but that of his slaves.

Ownership is thus a human-made abstract concept that becomes established both in societal history and in human personal life course. It is tied to concrete objects—yet it is an abstraction that surpasses all of the objects involved in the hyper-generalized field-like form of a sign. The child claims about a toy just conquered from his brother "this is *mine*!" while the mother says "no, this *belongs to* your

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with full knowledge of "this wallet belongs to this person" with the goal of transferring it to one's own possession.

brother"—all that ownership-socialization episodes taking place in the ordinary life through presentations of objects by self to the others.[5]

> Every higher form of ownership develops as a gradual increase in durability, security and permanency of the relation to the object. Mere momentariness of the object transforms itself into a permanent possibility of falling back upon it without the content of the realization of the object meaning anything other or more than a series of individual undertakings or fructifications (Simmel, 1990, p. 304).

The person acts with an object one owns differently from other relations with similar objects that one does not own. This can include both extremes—those of care and those of destruction.

The Meta-Value: Money

Among all inventions that human beings have introduced to regulate their own lives, it is the meta-level value of money (and its equivalents) that has become central for our ordinary lives. Money accomplishes a number of interesting changes in human lives. As Georg Simmel pointed out:

> …money produces both a previously unknown impersonality in all economic ownership and an equally enhanced independence and autonomy of the personality, and the relationship of personality to associations develops similarly with that of property. The medieval guild included the entire person; a weavers' guild was not an association of individuals that only pursued the mere interests of weaving. Instead, it was a living community in occupational, social, religious, political and many other respects (Simmel, 1991, p. 18).

The uses of money are in contradiction with human personal uniqueness:

> Money offers us the only opportunity to date for a unity which eliminates everything personal and specific, a form of unification that we take completely for granted today, but which represents one of the most enormous changes and advantages of culture (Simmel, 1991, p. 20).

However, this unification tendency has its counter-tendency of resistance to such elimination. One can observe this when people refuse to put a monetary value on some personal life characteristics (e.g., a question "how much does your love for your fiancé cost?" may result in a fistfight) or of territories ("Alaska is no longer on sale"), as Simmel pointed out:

> The streams of modern culture rush in two seemingly opposing directions: on the one hand, toward levelling, equalization, the production of more and more comprehensive social circles through the connection of remotest things under equal conditions; on the other hand, towards the elaboration of the most individual matters, the independence of the person, the autonomy of its development (Simmel, 1991, P 21).

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[5] Koji Komatsu (2019) has advanced the theory of presentational self—locating the self in the constant flow of presentation of objects in social encounters that through these presentations acquire meanings that make up the network that is the self.

Both supported by money economy—money makes the autonomy of the person possible. Yet at the same time, it sets up conditions where persons subjectively see money—coins—in terms of particular subjectively featured value. Paper money can be maintained in forms that are purposefully clean (in Japan—Sato et al., 2019), and the cleanliness of the bills adds to the generalized subjective value. Furthermore—as a symbolic object money has the social and legal *status of unalterability* to it—it cannot be violated (Fig. 3.1) nor counterfeited by skillful artisans (forgers). What counts as money may be open to convention—but its special status once established as money is strictly in place.

History of Money as Sign of Value

Cultural history of money gives us clear indication of the sign functions of the measure of value. It starts from the making of an interpretant (as reflected in Fig. 1.1. in Tateo & Marsico, 2019 p. xvii Tateo, 2017 p 8) in terms of Charles S. Peirce. The rapid movement of interpretants over interpretants allows for distancing of the meaning construction from the original emergence of sign. Yet in Peirce's scheme, the hierarchical generalization of value is not given; hence, the structured communication model of Karl Bühler (see Chap. 2 in Fig. 2.13) is a way to capture this move toward generalization.

The making of money requires a meta-communicative marker to the initial offer ("I offer X to you")—that indicates the conditions that the owner sets for the transfer ("I expect to get Y from you for this"). The potential recipient responds with another meta-communicative marker ("I can give you Z for it"). Note that both parties agree that X has value in principle—without such shared contract of meaning the negotiation of value would be impossible. The recipient can violate the contract ("even if it were free I would not want it"), or the offering person can block the accessibility completely ("I do not want to give it to you for any price you might pay") or in a way of teasing—"not for Z but…". The latter is the basis for objects transfer via auctions where the value of X is open to upward bidding. Art auctions are examples of such teasing—where competitive buyers are expected to tease out higher and higher values for the object by sequential bidding.

The social importance of such upward teasing in creating actual value is the generalization of value of the kinds of objects. The news stories of some paintings sold by auction get public attention and fortify the generalized value of art. The trading in futures in the energy markets has direct relevance for the well-being of the societies dependent on energy. Monetary trading results lead to generalized feelings about value—which may be central in the personal life worlds of the owners of the acquired property. Thus, homeowners may *feel rich* as they learn the monetary value of their home has increased for many times since they bought it—forgetting that as their primary home, it is not up for sale, and if one wanted to buy a new house, its costs may have increased as much (Fig. 3.2).

Fig. 3.1 An "Euro-ruin" (This display of violated 50-euro banknote illustrates the affective power of the inviability rule of monetary means. It was generated by making a paper copy of the bill then tearing it into pieces. A colleague of mine was agitated when it was shown on screen—until he learned about the artificial way of making this ruin without actually tearing a real 50-euro bill into pieces)

A sign indicating value that is operating on another object indicates the possibility of either making this object open to exchange ("the value of X is Y units of value-sign"—"This elephant costs 50 thousand euro") versus it is made closed to exchange by disallowing the monetary sign to be attached to it as a predicate ("X is not available for money"—"my love for my child cannot be expressed by any amount of euros").

Thus, money as a meta-sign emerges in human history in direct link with the processes of exchange of objects of different categories that cannot be directly compared with one another. If a person says to another "I give you 12 sheep this year but you must give me back 15 next year," the loan is negotiated within the same category of objects, and its functional value can be determined without the mediation of money. The situation changes if the objects in return are of different category—"I give you 12 sheep but want in exchange 5 cats, 18 chicken, and 3 elephants"—here the finding of common measurement system to evaluate the offered deal becomes important.

Fig. 3.2 Meta-communication in the making of money

Objects that take over the function of money have been diverse—starting from cowry shells and (later) gold, ending with pieces of paper or plastic in one's pocket—the latter labeled "debit" or "credit" cards. What unites them all is that the substances that can be made into monetary equivalents have no direct usability in everyday life (Godelier, 1999). All these value-carrying devices are signs that have temporary stability—as is well known from human history different currencies can become worthless overnight. Likewise, different commodities—salt and tobacco at wartimes—can take over the role of the money.

Emergence of Money in Contact Between Societies: The Tolai and Their Currencies

The Tolai are an ethnic group in New Guinea, in the faraway corner of its territory on the Gazelle peninsula of the island of New Britain—facing the island of New Ireland in the Bismarck Sea. The place names here give us a hint of the history of the area from European perspective—as the rest of New Guinea, it has been the target of colonial captures, releases, and recaptures. The main colonial powers involved were Germany and England, with further participation by Australia and (briefly) Japan.

First getting into contact with Europeans in 1800, the area went through German colonization (from the 1870s to 1914), followed by British takeover and subsequent transfer of control to Australia. In the years of World War II, it was occupied by the

Japanese, later again by Australia, and, finally, in 1975 gained independence as part of the state of New Guinea.

As has been the case in many societies in their pasts, the first objects to become used as money were cowry shells (*tabu*)—that could be counted and amassed (Fig. 3.3). The use of cowry shells—especially originating on the Maldives—as currency was dominant in the world until the nineteenth century, gradually being changed to reliance to precious metals. The shells can be beaded together into long strings and carried as personal jewelry.

In New Guinea, this currency has been historically prevalent in dealings between coast dwellers and inland people. The interesting aspect of the Tolai money system is the introduction of new forms of currencies in addition to the cowry shells. Thus, in the late 1800s, the trading with the Europeans led to the use of tobacco as currency. The German colonial administration introduced Reichmark (1887) with little effect, then the New Guinea Mark in 1891—but it failed to take over the monetary value carrier role from the *tabu*. The limitation of *tabu* to inland road building payments continued as an external value measure until 1911. The transfer of control from Germany to Britain in 1914 led 2 years later to introduction of the Australian pound as official currency, which lasted until the Japanese occupation in World War II in 1942–1944, followed by Australian pound again until *kina* became the currency of New Guinea in 1975. Yet the links of the new currency with the cowry shells continued—in Pidgin *kina* refers to the pearl shell.

The use of cowry shells as the form of first money in human history is widely known—that practice included both the Eurasia and the Americas. What is interesting in the New Guinea case is the survival of the use of the indigenous currency—albeit in local exchanges—to our present time. The kind of economic activity—copra production and coconut harvesting—made wider economic tools not necessary in the local settings. The sign system of value marking that took various forms in parallel—the relationship of various currencies—created a simultaneous "safety net" for the local economic activities. An example of failure to develop such "safety net" comes from the history of money in the British North America between 1620 and 1789 (McLeod, 1898). Here the supply of the sign medium (coins) from the source (England) was sporadic and the locally invented paper equivalents inflationary.

Money as a Tool for Alienation   The introduction of money in human history enters into the general cultural process of alienation of the person from one's own


Fig. 3.3   Cowry shells that have been used as currency (*Cyprea moneta*, 1742)

production and consumption processes. It starts from psychological distancing—our acts in everyday life stop being related to our concrete actions—"I spend X hours in working on Y"—to generalized and time-liberated notions of "my work is valued 100 euros per hour"—independent of what kind of work it is.

Signifying human actions by way of secondary valuation—by money—distances the self from the action itself and is an act in the hyper-generalized process of alienation. The task for New General Psychology is to make sense of the process of such alienation[6] in relation to its opposite—counter-alienation. The latter process can lead to a state of distancing where the development of alienation is inhibited while the distancing proceeds. Parents of grown-up children can feel very close to them (non-alienated) while living geographically very far and having minimal interactions (distancing). A person can feel close to one's great grandparents as parts of the family tree without even having an image of their appearance. When applied to the making of values, it is the aesthetic value I may feel very close to some painting or sculpture in its meaning (no alienation), while I am completely distanced from it in its ownership. Alienation can be overcome under different conditions of distancing.

Voluntary and Involuntary Transfer of Valued Commodities

Objects of value are prime targets for changes of ownership. Exchange is the first means of combining justice with changes in ownership (Simmel, 1990 p. 291). The process of exchanging the meaning of the object acquires a changed meaning—ordinary things become extraordinary as their exchange history becomes added to the present value.

The construction of meaning of value can proceed outside of the field of monetary value and its equivalents. In the framework of religious convictions of the Middle Ages in Europe:

> Relics of saints, whether particles of clothing or objects associated with them during their lives, particles of dust or vials of oil collected at the site of their tombs, or actual portions of their bodies, had no obvious value apart from a very specific set of shared beliefs. Such relics were of no practical use. Once removed from their elaborate reliquaries or containers, they were not even decorative. The most eagerly sought after relics in the medieval period—bodies or portions of bodies—were superficially similar to thousands of other corpses and skeletons universally available (Geary, 1994, pp. 200-201).

Objects that were of such kinds of relics—body parts of cadavers—acquired meanings to the extreme opposite of the normal case—where handling of bodily remains was abhorrent. In the case of persons considered as saints, their body parts after

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[6]The sociological and political science treatment of alienation (*entfremdung*) was given by Karl Marx in the 1840s, following Georg Wilhelm Hegel's philosophy. For New General Psychology, philosophical concept allows the possibilities to think of psychological distancing and its modulation.

death acquired miraculous functions and deeply positive value. The question of authenticity of the relics became an important task for experts to specify.

Different Ways of Exchange: From Society to Personal Values

Persons are involved in exchanges of objects in their possession in all societies. Different social forms of such exchanges set up the matrix for persons' adaptation to the societal value systems. A person may trade X for Y from another person (trader) and then give Y as a gift to one's mother-in-law, who would then either keep it as a relic (gift) or pass it on in her will to her grandson (inheritance) who sells Y to some nonkin buyer who might then give it as a gift to his girlfriend or donate it to a public museum.

Trade is the main mechanism of relating persons and societies under conditions of peace. Developing trade relations on a systematic scale can prevent wars—the absence of wars in Europe after 1945 can be linked with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951[7] that grew into the united Europe in the form of the European Union today. It involves move from direct appropriation of things (robbery) to negotiation of the exchange value of objects. As Marcel Mauss has remarked:

> In order to trade, man must first lay down his spear. When that is done he can succeed in exchanging goods and persons not only between clan and clan but between tribe and tribe and nation and nation, and above all between individuals. It is only then that people can create, can satisfy their interests mutually and define them without recourse to arms (Mauss, 1954, p, 80).

Trade is built on the assumption of reciprocal exchange of objects providing satisfaction of different needs of different trading partners. Since the history of human societies is primarily that of wartimes, it is crucial to observe the adaptation of the human *psyche* to the changing conditions of trade as the transitions from war to peace and vice versa take place.

Gift is a form of social transfer of valuable objects with assumption of reciprocity—a gift given now is a message to the future return of a comparable one in value. This creates the subjective range of acceptable values of gifts—for the occasion X gifts of the value from P1 to P2 (price range) are appropriate. Any gift seen as lower than P1 may be viewed as a joke or an insult, and above P2 would be ambivalently accepted (as the obligation to reciprocate is this way accepted) or refused.

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[7] established by Treaty of Paris at the initiative of French politician Robert Schumann whose idea was to make further wars between Germany and France impossible by economic unification of interests.

> Much of our everyday morality is concerned with the question of obligation and spontaneity in the gift. It is our good fortune that all is not yet coached in terms of purchase and sale. Things have values that are emotional as well as material; indeed in some cases the values are entirely emotional (Mauss, 1954, p. 53).

The focus on *obligation* and *spontaneity* here sets up the act of gift-giving as a theatrical act. A person knows she or he is obliged to give a gift to some other person with whom relationships have been mutually far from amiable. Not doing this is not an option, and neither is doing it in all positivity. The gift-giver has to preemptively think of how a particular—spontaneously decided upon—gift might complicate the already complex relations further. A neutral solution may be that of monetary gift of equal size.[8]

A special case of gift is the transgenerational transfer of property—inheritance. The stories of how parents unequally divide their inheritance between children who expect something different abound in novels and detective stories. The critical difference in this form of gift is that the reciprocity rules do not apply any more—the donor is dead. Yet the institutions of the given society join in taxing the inheritance.

Donations Donations are a version of gifts given for some social cause, rather than to some concrete person as the recipient. The starting point for donations is the hyper-generalized value for the acts that the donations might produce. It is an investment with potential returns for the designated others. The first form of donations in human life is the "pocket money" that parents give to their children—the latter will benefit in their (child-relevant) ways, while the parents gain no benefit.[9]

Donation as a form of transfer of objects from one agent to another can involve any object needed—including bodily resources in the form of donating blood, ovum, semen, or mother's milk, or organs. Psychologically, donations require a generalized reason of value for the giving away one's objects—the notion of benefit for the Other. That notion of benefit can feed into rule system of reciprocal gain—in which case a donation becomes part of a trading act. Donating one's extra kidney for monetary reward—for the benefit of a survival of another person who needs it—becomes trading in human organs for transplantation.

Stealing as Clandestine Transfer This version of transfer of valuables where the participation of the donor is neutralized—at least for the duration of the process of transfer. Stealing involves the recognition of ownership by the Other and the unwillingness by the Other to volunteer to give the object away directly. One cannot steal an object that can be taken "for free"—but stealing an object to which a price tag is

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[8]As an example consider a confession from a middle class man: "Every Christmas we give a gift to my in-laws—I put a 100 euro bill into a nice envelope and add a pre-messaged card. They seem happy to receive it and give us also an envelope with their gift. When we open it we find there … a 100 euro banknote and a pre-messaged card."

[9]The most extensive comparative cultural study of children's "pocket money "systems in four Asian countries can be found in the volume by Yamamoto and Takahashi (2018) and Takahashi and Yamamoto (2020). The child-relevant functions of these donations—buying something for oneself or for treating the peers—set up the social relationships pattern for the life course.

attached becomes possible. Secondly, stealing happens without the knowledge of the owner—otherwise it becomes an act of direct robbery. Likewise one cannot steal an object that belongs to oneself. Thirdly, stealing is a morally outlawed act—yet there can be moments (see Chap. 7—analysis of the Babaji case of the immorality of stealing) where stealing can be morally legitimate. Finally, stealing is closely related to trade. This is exemplified by the further movements of the stolen goods in a society—stolen cars, computers, and cellular phones are further sold on a second-hand goods market. Paintings stolen from art museums may end up being sold back to the very same art museums for some ransom, or persons kidnapped are returned to their families after a ransom is paid.

From the perspective of the skills needed for good performance, stealing is a masterful task which requires highly skilled psychological understanding of the setting. Pickpocketing—stealing objects in public from pockets or bags—involves decision capacities using the moment of the donor's psychological preoccupation with some other task, as well as competent dexterity (von Hentig, 1943). Burglarizing homes or safe deposit boxes requires skilled understandings of locks and security systems and how it bypass them. Last—but not least—our twenty-first-century stealing becomes virtual and involves the mastery of computer hackers. The psychological effect on the unwelcoming "donor" of the stolen goods is understandably that of distress, anger, and remorse.

Power Assertive Transfer of Value Objects This transfer of objects of value is in common language terms considered to be robbery. In contrast to stealing where the donor of the valued object is kept unaware of the transition of the object when it happens, here the act of transfer takes place directly under the direct encounter with the demonstration of the superior power of the recipient. In another contrast with stealing, robbery requires no specific professional skills of gaining access to the object but is predicated upon the social power differential—often granted by armament—that forces the donor to give up the valuable object (Fig. 3.4).

Paintings that reflect acts of violence—robbery, looting, and massacres—were notable in the Renaissance art world of Europe, indicating subjective reflection upon social realities. The military conflicts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries involved also systematic collective robberies by the victorious armies—looting and killing of ordinary population in captured towns (depicted in Fig. 1.3 in Chap. 1). It was accepted practice to let the winning army's soldiers loose to kill and rob properties of the killed for precisely 2 days[10]—after which they had to return to the rules of military discipline.

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[10] The rules allowed the looting to be avoided if the community under siege surrendered voluntarily and agreed to pay ransom. The warlords made use of either the ransom or results of the looting to pay their troops at the expense of the conquered population. The military units operated elaborate collection and reselling systems for the conquered properties. At times the warlords needed to accept soldiers'—who were mercenaries—demand for conquering a rich town solely for the purposes of economic gain—the sacking of Rome in 1527 happened by such demand by underpaid soldiers of Charles V. (Kunzle, 2002).

The reverse organizational structure to robbing is begging. Here the recipient takes on a subservient role eliciting feelings of pity and duty of giving alms among the donors. It can work under conditions of believability of the beggar's self-presentation and the internalized belief system of the donor that giving alms is his or her duty[11] or touches the feelings of the donor so as to lead to efforts to help.

Legal Power-Based Transfer of Value: Taxation   A societal transformation of the act of robbery into a positively valued event exists in the form of taxation. The recipient here is Generalized Other (in the sense of George Herbert Mead)—an institution that claims to have the legal right to take away from the donor a certain amount—usually in monetary equivalents—of the latter's owned value. Correspondingly, the donor is required to treat one's duty to give away the specified tax. The specific amount is adjusted to be somewhere between 0% (n taxation) and 100% (the institution who taxes the donor takes away all his or her belongings). The latter extreme makes taxation equal to robbery. A tax rate of 100% would generate no revenue on a longer time scale as such robbery equals lowly motivated slave labor. Hence the tax rates are adjusted to some middle ground of expropriating the

Fig. 3.4 Forceful takeover of belongings (David Teniers the Younger, 1648)

donor's belongings so that the motivation to continue participation in the economic system is not hindered, yet the institution gets its desired resources which are used for its own maintenance and providing some social services back to the collective recipients of tax benefits.

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[11] In many societies, social norms exist about giving a certain per cent of income to the needy (zakat in Islamic contexts—2.5% of income) and provide food for the monks (Theravada Buddhism). Alms giving is socially expected in all major religions of the world.

Taxation has been historically established since the time of Ancient Egypt (3000 years BC). It has led to the need for accounting systems in administrative practices, and the setting up encounters between the administrative officials (tax collectors) and their corresponding social role carriers (taxpayers). The latters' role includes the invention of tactics to avoid or diminish tax payments—the act of tax evasion. The negotiation between the two is complicated (Fig. 3.5), yet the power differential is clear—the tax charger asserts one's legal dominance (the right to collect tax) if necessary by punitive force.

What happens in the tax collecting process is technically similar to *robbery but making a parallel with it is strictly prohibited* by the social power holders themselves. The power holder creates an inhibitory sign field ("*our right and duty* is to collect taxes") together with the meta-marker that this declared power assertion cannot be doubted. This technique of enforced monologization of societal discourse is put into practice on many occasions where social obedience is demanded.

What has been collected as taxes varies across history and societies. History of taxation shows its gradual move from actual commodities to their monetary equivalents. In 1877 in Japan, all taxes were either paid in rice or calculated in rice and paid in money. Different version of tax names already under monetary payment continued to reveal origins—kitchen tax, honey tax, window tax,[12] etc. The move from relinquishing goods or services to paying tax in money had a social effect:

> The substitution of a monetary tax for service immediately releases the person from the specific bondage that he was imposed by that service. The other no longer has any claim to direct personal action, but only to the impersonal result of such action (Simmel, 1990, P. 22).

In our twenty-first century, we may need not make our pleas for tax reduction in the tax collectors' office, but our computer-mediated transactions in their impersonal nature still rely upon the same internalized values of rights (of the Other to collect the taxes) and the duty of ours to pay them. Once we pay our taxes, the money thus spent is technically no longer ours—yet it still become referenced in societal rhetorics as "tax payers' money." The illusion of ownership lingers on as a social shield used on opportune occasions.

The general psychological process involved in the act of taxpaying is a version tension between having and non-having an object of value. First of all the tension between having and <> non-having can be organized by dominance of either of the poles.[13] The usual version **HAVING <> > non-having** leads to the notion of

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[12] The window tax was introduced in England and Wales in 1696 (lasted until 1856), and in France established in 1798 (ended in 1926). It was a version of property tax based on the number of windows in a house. It was a regulator of social and economic life in England, France, and Scotland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It left publicly visible mars in architecture—as a countermeasure to this taxation some houses from these centuries period can be seen to have closed-up window spaces from the beginning. These could later be opened, but at the outset building them as closed was a tax avoidance strategy.

[13] Psychoanalytically, the tension is trained ontogenetically in other bodily processes that involve the tension of maintaining or expelling bodily products (Ferenczy, 1956, pp. 270–272).

Fig. 3.5 The tax collector (Marinus van Reymerswaele, 1542)

ownership ("this belongs to me," "this is my property") and constitutes the basis for the capitalist economic system in all of its efficiency.

The reverse dominance distribution—**NON-HAVING <> > having**—would lead to a social system where gaining hold of an object becomes easily shareable (as in communally oriented societies) or to rapid and unproblematic transfer of the objects to others. Parents may enhance the focus on sharing in upbringing of their children and in the highly dynamic setting of stock trading the readiness to sell a stock needs to be at par with the readiness to purchase it.

Yet human lives include not only temporary dominance in the relation of the opposites but the conditional nature of the transitions between the two dominance poles. These transitions are highly affective. The taxpaying role is socially normatively organized to lead all parties accept the act of right to tax <> duty to pay tension. Not so if a similar predicament is put into practice by an alternative taxation system—the informal but powerful demand by a mafia for the "protection money" in exchange for security of the enterprise of person in the local community. Such "second taxation" is a form of continuous regular robbery. Acceptance of it is hardly a great pleasure for the payer but feels as an act of violence. Similar negative sentiment—a hyper-generalized feeling of being personally violated—is the case for burglary or pickpocketing.

Different forms of object transfer are derivates of one another. The following imaginary description of the transfer event between the "Donor" (who initially possess the object) and the "Recipient" (who organizes the transfer from the donor to her or him) illustrates how one form can turn into another:

Recipient: (Pointing a gun at the Donor) "Take off your Rolex watch and give it to me!"
Donor: (Takes off the watch and gives it over) "Here you are! I was planning to give it to you anyway. Please accept it as my gift to you!"
Recipient: "Oh! But I cannot accept it as a gift! It is too expensive!"
Donor: "I see… maybe you can accept it as my inheritance to you".

Recipient: "Oh… but you then need to write me into your will.. and I must kill you".

Donor: "I will be happy to write you into my will…".

Recipient: "But I do not know how to kill you… this gun is just imitation gun… I have never killed a human being! This is immoral!"

Donor: "I can add also my mansion, my Ferrari, and all the jewels in my bank safe. I need to give my inheritance to somebody, you look trustable enough."

Recipient: "No! I cannot accept this! The inheritance taxes are too high!"

While this unsuccessful negotiation has been going on, a Pickpocket has skillfully alienated the Donor's wallet from his or her pocket to the Pickpocket's possession. He (or she) opens the wallet and finds 1000 euros with a note:

"Dear Pickpocket,

You have done a masterful job stealing this wallet. As a payment for your job I have specifically included 1000 euros as your salary for the job well done. I wish you all the luck in the continuation of your professional career! Sincerely, Donor."

Pickpocket (approaching to Donor): "Let me return your wallet and your money to you. I had appropriated it from your pocket, so now it comes back to you."

Donor: "But did you not read my letter? You deserve your salary for your highly skilled job."

Pickpocket: "I am not an employee of yours, and I steal not for the money but for the thrill of feeling accomplished. So—here you are" (and puts the wallet back into Donor's pocket).

As this absurd imaginary dialogue demonstrates the move from one social norm, system to another makes the transfer of objects a complicated task. An object of robbery turned into a gift evokes reciprocity rules that the recipient does not want to accept. The act of robbery is simple—but its aftermath complicated. Insulting the pickpocket by way of considering his or her special performance as ordinary skilled labor to be rewarded by a salary eliminates the adventure from the act of stealing. Economic rationality of human beings is a wonderful fiction that keeps the makers of human exploitation of one another alive to invent ever new forms of trying to become rich.

Overcoming Value Loss

Coping with acts of social violence that bring about value loss depends on the semiotic system of endurance—creating sign hierarchies that neutralize the overwhelming feeling of loss, look for avenues of action (possible counter actions), and create the meaningful scenario for "living on" compensating for the loss. Here the destruction (loss) needs to feed-forward to construction ("living on")—if that feed-forward sign system is blocked or underdeveloped, the outcome is prolonged grief or depression (Fig. 3.6.).

What happens in the transition phase from the moment of loss of an object and to the move toward further constructive gaining of other objects is organized by the time-linked work of a system of three signs (the minimum functional configuration). First, the A-sign (attenuation sign) in the figure sets up the grounds for affective distancing from the lost object. Such distancing is necessary for the creation

and activation of the promoter sign[14] (P-sign in Fig. 3.6.) that guides the construction of a positive scenario for "living on." The promotion effort for overcoming the feelings of loss and calamity may be supported—or hindered—by the specific semiotic catalysts (CATALYST-sign) that give the hyper-generalized flavor to the efforts to overcome the loss.

Can the overcoming of the loss happen without any sign mediation? The answer to this question is "no"—since that object lost is previously carrying established meaning upon which the neutralizing A-sign operates. If there were no P-signs, the person who has experienced the loss would linger on as a victim of the loss. The general atmosphere (CATALYST sign) would give the flavor to the recovery process (compare two opposites—"the world is unfair" versus "in any situation I find a way." All of these scenarios depend on the initial feeling of value of the object lost or previous state of affairs of the Self in hyper-generalized state (e.g., the loss of a job, due to dismissal or retirement). Human beings organize all their lives around values that operate as hyper-generalized sign fields.

Fig. 3.6 Sign regulation in overcoming loss of value

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[14] The notion of promoter sign was introduced back in 2004 in the context of the Dialogical Self theory (Valsiner, 2004, published as Valsiner, 2018). It is a functional category—any sign can become a promoter sign if it operates to set up a direction for further construction of meaning in irreversible time,

Paradoxes of Money: The Most Flexible Value Marker Is the Enemy of Value

Money is paradoxical. On the one hand, it provides all the understanding of the value of objects—everybody is equal to others in knowing the value of monetarily stated presentations of objects. On the other hand, its uneven accumulation creates deep inequality among the persons who own money-valued objects:

> Money is "common" because it is the equivalent of anything and everything. Only that what is unique is distinguished; whatever is equal for many is the same even for the lowest among them, and for that reason it pulls even the highest down to the level of the lowest. That is the tragedy of every levelling process: it leads directly to the position of the *lowes*t element (Simmel, 1990, p. 24).

Humans are the only species who have invented economic relations and use these for organizing their ways of thinking. Georg Simmel emphasized the liberating power of money:

> … value in terms of money form has made itself independent of its own roots and foundation in order to surrender itself completely to subjective energies. Here, where speculation itself may determine the fate of object of speculation, the permeability and flexibility of the money form of values has found its most triumphant expression through subjectivity in its strictest sense (Simmel, 1990, p 326).

Probably the most extreme example of the flexibility of money is the speculation, interest in trading stocks. Here the value of particular commodities is being changed at an instant (in computer-based trading). The constantly changing price is a meta-sign (sign upon signs)—that governs the meaningful actions (buy, hold, sell) and creates a complex hierarchy of meanings that are meant to organize our stock market actions in the desperate efforts for gain rather than loss in the constantly changing situation.

Basic Higher Psychological Processes in Value Transformation

Everything in human lives that relates to the notion of values is organized through the manifold of hyper-generalized sign fields that are in difficult dialogues between themselves. Commoditization of potentially everything in human life—but in real practice only something—illustrates these difficult dialogues. We reject the idea of "sale" of our labor to others and then are not disturbed when one football club "sells" a valuable player to another one for astronomical sums of money. As university professors, we do not consider ourselves as commodities and forget to recognize ourselves as such when another university lures us over with doubling of the salary. The shadows of commoditization are everywhere in our twenty-first-century lives—but we can easily bypass them or de-emphasize their individual relevance.

Commoditization as a sign field is a hyper-generalized value that finds its place in the hierarchy of values in the given society. Its focus on economic utilitarian

feelings ("value *can be* expressed in some measures of value exchange") makes it possible to contemplate about attributing specific price-based thinking to concrete objects. Its opponent field is the field of absolute value (value in itself) that is a hyper-generalized field that can be dominant (or not) over its utilitarian counterpart (field X > field Y in Fig. 3.7.)

The specific personal need in question is the *lowering* of the personal need from the state that transcends all moral norms (A—Level 4 phenomenon) to the needs that can be expressed in categorical verbal terms (B—Level 2 phenomenon). In real-life terms, the question of acting in concrete economically feasible and profitable ways would compromise the person's "honor" (Level 3 label for the need beyond moral terms—A).

An interesting example comes from an example about taking off one's shoes while entering into a courtroom in India in 1862. In 1854, the British colonial administration had introduced the "shoe rule"—forbidding natives to enter into government buildings in their shoes. This practical demand became instantly fielded in the hyper-generalized value that could be labeled (in Level 3 terms) *human dignity*. The mundane act of exposing bare feet became linked to the field of such dignity. A man—Manockjee—in year 1862 is invited to the legal court but refuses to take off his shoes. The judge becomes irritated (Panikkar, 1998, p. 33):

> Judge: Take your shoes off and get in.
> Manockjee: I humbly submit that exposing one's bare feet is something below human dignity, and contrary to the sacred ordinances of our scriptures; besides, I have been bound over not to suffer myself the indignity of a pledge, which, as long as it does not interfere with the laws, can be respected.

Here the hierarchical supremacy of human dignity over colonial law, yet leaving it, opens for the judge to attempt to reverse the value hierarchy. The judge resorts to simple command style:

> Judge: Nothing of that here. Take off your shoes or it will be the worse for you. The great Nawab of Sucheen just visited me, and I saw him taking off his shoes. Are you a greater man than him?
> Manockjee: I am only a poor British subject.

Example of another—declared to be more prominent—person obeying the "shoe law" enters as a token of mundane explanation for the demand. But for Manockjee, it is the field of *personal dignity* that is to remain intact:

> Judge: Then you do not obey our orders.
> Manockjee: Your order I bow to, with the greater deference… but your Honour will oblige by quoting the authority of some law.
> Judge: Law! It is not a matter of law. Don't talk of laws here.

While Manockjee leaves the possibility of resolving the conflict—dominance hierarchy of dignity and law—open, the judge closes it by his assertion and resorts to order. The negotiations continue a few more turns, without change. The notion of personal disgracing is brought in then.

> Manockjee: I respect your order with all the obedience but only on the understanding that by ordering me thus, you disgrace me, would my feelings and interfere in the discharge of what I take to be a religious objection.

Fig. 3.7 Value hierarchy guiding the needs hierarchy: From the up-conscious to the conscious

> Judge: I don't care. Beware you interrupt the court's business, and you will be dealt with accordingly. Do you obey us or no?

Manockjee stands his ground and does not follow the orders. The episode demonstrates to power of values—operating as hyper-generalized fields internalized into the mind—that make human conduct operate in resisting and personally integrated manner.

Conclusion: Value and Freedom

Perhaps the value that dominates all others in the human hierarchy of needs is the *need for freedom*—the motivating sign field for both ascetic seclusion and revolutionary martyrdom. Yet freedom is not "free"—it is a new state of affairs in the large social matrix of rights and duties.

> The development of each human fate can be represented as an uninterrupted alternation between bondage and release, obligation and freedom. This initial appraisal, however, presents us with a distinction whose abruptness is tempered by closer investigation. *For what we regard as freedom is often in fact only a change of obligations; as a new obligation replaces one that we have borne* hitherto, we sense above all that the old burden has been removed. Because we are free from it, we seem at first to be completely free—until the new duty, which initially we bear, as it were, with hitherto untaxed and therefore particularly strong set of muscles, makes its weight felt as these muscles, too, gradually tire. The process of

liberation now starts again with this new duty, just as it had ended at this very point (Simmel, 1990, p, 283, added emphasis).

Striving for freedom is thus constantly in the process of negotiation with its opposite (non-freedom) and thus keeps us all actively moving ahead in our personal life courses, in participation in the societal dramas of peace, war, revolutions, and counter-revolutions—ending up in the very universal outcome of having lived our lives—as we did. Here there is no difference between the prince and the pauper, the millionaire and the person in deep poverty. Humanity is shared at moments of birth and death—the first liberates us for lifelong experiencing, the other—from it.

Questions for Further Thought
1. How is *value* a non-existing concept?
2. How does a neutral object acquire a value?
3. Explain the making of the condition of ownership.
4. What is money?
5. Cowry shells as money.
6. What is trade?
7. Explain the social relations involved in gift-giving and gift-receiving.
8. How is donation different from alms?
9. Discuss robbery and taxation as two parallel ways of embezzlement.
10. How is stealing a higher order psychological skill?
11. Explain the psychological process of overcoming loss.
12. How is money an enemy of value?
13. How is hierarchy of needs linked with hierarchy of values?
14. Explain the value of freedom.

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
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Part II
The Depth of Human Subjectivity

Chapter 4
Silent Screaming: Voices Within the Self

Carl Gustav Carus *Allegory of Music*

Contents

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Our lives consist of making many noises—and trying not to make them. But what is a *noise*? A *sound*—something audible. But it is not some*thing*—as it is ephemeral. Sound has no materiality—but we can hear it. Its only materiality I created by the work of our auditory system to record the sound events. By calling a sound *noise*, we add to it an affective value. Stravinsky's or Schönberg's music is noise for those hearers for whose socially prepared acoustic receptive systems reject these from the first instant. Their understanding of *music* excludes these composers' ways of creating Gestalt patterns that could be perceived as musical harmonies. What is horrifying noise for some is enjoyable music for others.

Our attention to various sounds is selective. We pay attention to some sounds—but not others. We create some sounds—and avoid making others. How have we got to such acts of silence-breaking and—on to enjoyment of various sound patterns as we produce them? How would a sound—a neutral event—become affectively valued—between the designations of *noise* and *music*? How would some sounds from the environment—birdsongs—become felt as enjoyable, while others—police sirens—make us apprehensive?

Sounds that Become *Noises*: Social Normativity in Subjective Experience

The best example of the meanings dependency of the human beings is their instant attribution of meanings to sudden sounds that occur—or are produced by themselves—in the environment:

> Such phenomena in the inanimate world are powerful symbols of living form, just because they are not life processes themselves. The contrasts between the apparently vital behavior and the obviously inorganic structure of ocean waves, for instance, emphasizes the pure semblance of life, and makes the first abstractions of its rhythm for our intellectual intuition (Langer, 1953, p. 128).

The instant meaningfulness of storm, lightening, and day-night cyclicity are all turned meaningful by the human beings as reflection upon their environments. Lightening easily becomes a sign of the will of the deities, and watching clouds a favorite pastime for romantics.

Sounds are special—differently from vision the arrival of sounds into our *psyche* does not depend on our act of turning our body into a new position. There is a temporal order of distance in these encounters.[1] The central place in this distancing process is the transitional zone that covers parts of social and inner sounds which is the location for personal construction. In one's realm of relating with sounds, imagination plays a central role—a sound that is being heard becomes instantly subjectivized. We wake up in the middle of the night and feel our heart pulsating at more than

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[1] Zittoun (2016a, b, c, p. 29) specifies a zone structure in human relating with sounds: ignorable sounds, socially shared sounds, and sounds in inner experience.

usual tempo—the noise of the heartbeats is leading to the worry about one's health. We hear of police or ambulance sirens outside—with instant meaning construction based on the noise, immediately attaching a context to it. And every day we may be annoyed by the noise the alarm clock(s) make at a time of our best sleep—despite the fact that we ourselves had set them up the previous night to make that noise precisely at that minute in the morning. Sounds become selectively signified—as noises, messages, or music. Hearing somebody singing in front of my house I might interpret as a serenade to me and feel enamored like Julietta—or consider it an unwanted rape of the serenity of the quietude of my bedroom.

The meaningful sounds of one society are surprising and uncomfortable noises for people from another. A Russian soldier stationed in Afghanistan as part of the Soviet occupation force commented on the feeling of being an unwanted foreigner when hearing the regular calls for prayer from the loudspeakers of the minarets of the mosques (Seniavskaya, 1999, p. 315). In a similar vein—French local communities in the nineteenth century went through various local tensions, and at times conflicts about the ways in which church bell sounds would enter into the lives of the agricultural communities.[2] While traditionally ringing a church bell was a means of announcing times for prayer and events of funerals, by the nineteenth century, the tasks of public time-keeping began to be added to the public soundscapes (Corbin, 1998, Chaps. 7 and 8). The social demand for publicly knowable (hearable) regular time-keeping in small communities became well established by the 1830s in French countryside. It created power struggles between clergy (who had for centuries monopolized the access to church bells—and determined how, when, and for which occasions these should be used) and municipalities which now demanded regular soundings of some bells to keep time for the public. The use of the latter (less dramatic) public bells were seen as intervening "noise" by the clergy and the parishioners in the middle of the church service. The same mechanism (bell) could produce "noise" (when sounding in the middle of a service) or a positive marker of the social or religious event (if rung properly at proper times). But who determined what is "proper" way (and times) was up to vicious local political disputes.

Human Beings Breaking Silence: Transcending Nature

When will silence be broken, and how—by noise, or by a melody? Why is a melody different from a noise? Music is a basic invention by human beings as it surrounds them in full. But how would it emerge from amidst the very many sounds a developing protohominid starts to recognize various recurrent acoustic patterns (bird songs, animal courtship cries, etc.) and how does the developing human being start to make

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[2] Bells – big and small.. have one joint feature.. they make sounds. Aside from large church bells one finds small bells as amulets—to protect against evil eye. Specific number of bells was attached to Russian horse harnesses Ryan, 1999, p 240)

purposeful sounds—with mouth or with invented first instruments—drums, whistles, string instruments, etc.

How could music emerge in the history of human species? It required joint work of both action processes (ways of producing new kinds of sounds) and the emergence of aesthetic appeal. The latter needs to feed-forward into the former—guiding the process of new technological innovation. The history of string instruments—of which violin to our days is the best representative—needs to have begun from incidental plucking of the string of a bow—an instrument for hunting by releasing an arrow rather than making music. Thus the functional values of the use of the same object must have differentiated from the outset:

> A primitive hunter might easily have noticed the peculiar sound of the bow string on shooting, but it probably needed a moment of relaxed playing with the bow to make him discover the *aesthetic* quality of the plucked string; to observe the different pitches of strings of different length and tension was needed next, but it was only after discovering, finally, that sounds could be amplified by connecting the strings with a hollow object, that the plucking string instrument would have been invented (Boesch, 1993, p. 70).

Technological innovation is based on aesthetic experimentation with the properties of sounds that unite into melodies. The capacity to create melodies entails the unification of memory of the past with anticipation of the immediate future—cutting across the present line. But how can the human mind accomplish this? The answer will be in the hyper-generalized nature of Gestalt qualities operating in irreversible time.

Gestalt Quality as Flexible General Schema

Christian von Ehrenfels' classic introduction[3] of the notion of Gestalt quality started from the phenomena of melodies in music (Ehrenfels, 1890/1988a, b, 1932). A melody unfolds in irreversible time—following the notes already played need to come others that would fit the melody pattern—but this means that the pattern as a whole needs to be recognizable across time.

More importantly, the Gestalt quality was a qualitatively higher organizational form (than complex structures of elements) that opens for the human *Psyche* the openness for creating new versions of the wholes—the Gestalt could develop to further—higher—level of organization rather than allow for recombination of

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[3] Ehrenfels introduced the notion of Gestalt quality in 1890 (Ehrenfels, 1890/1988a in German, 1988b in English version). He was eminently prepared for this—being a musician himself (follower of Richard Wagner and studied with Anton Bruckner) as well as a composer, he also was a philosopher of highest order (student of Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong) he set the stage for both *Gestalt* and *Ganzheitspsychologie* traditions in the German language room (Diriwächter & Valsiner, 2008).

previously known elements without innovations.[4] This characteristic is precisely the starting point for emergence of musical compositions and affective communication channels—love poetry. Such poetry—as well as is counterpart in music—is a result of human goals-oriented subjectively overwhelming activity focus—*devotion*. Our societies are filled with people who most adamantly pursue some of their goals with complete dedication—searching for oneself, or for love, or for a rich spouse, or fame, or trying to reach the top levels in performing arts or sports—all require the unifying totality of devotion to "the cause."

Human Devotion: Silence that Screams

Human complete dedication—devotion—unifies the meaningful nature of silence and sound. It can be viewed as a longer-term state of the *psyche* that acts as a total catalyst for all the person who strives for. It begins from the minimal form of transitory kind—a moment of *poetic resonance* of the person in a here-and-now encounter with the world.

Even the most ordinary activities can lead a person to feel a special moment. While walking on a seaside

> The polyphonic melody of this night surprised me with a poetic instant where I came fused for a few seconds in the dance of the water with the wind. Steps and words were frozen and every single sphere of me was a sound of the night and the immensity of the sea (Lehmann, 2019, p. 56).

Such moments of *poetic resonance* contrast with the monophonic nature of ordinary speech and thinking in mundane everyday life contexts. These moments are the basis for poetry and other forms of affective creativity—even if for most people they merely pass by as meaningful moments of personal lives. The high multitude of unwritten poems indicates the basic creativity of the human psyche. This takes the form of decisions to act in a way that is "surplus" to the mundane nature of ordinary living—a person may start singing in the middle of boring activities or invents an imaginary scenario that gives meaning to the ongoing action. Transitions from speech to music and back—creating affective hybrids (Lehmann & Klempe, 2017)—constitute the usual flow of our subjective relating with the world. This flow entails constant tension between being-in-the-current flow of experiencing and uncoupling from it (Pelapart & Cole, 2011)—by way of distancing from the here-and-now setting.

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[4] In the words of Ehrenfels: "Psychic combinations never repeat themselves with complete exactness. Every temporal instant of the every one of the numberless unities of consciousness therefore possesses its own peculiar quality, its individuality, which sinks, unrepeatable and irreplaceable, into the bosom of the past, while at the same time the new creations of the present step in to take its place" (Ehrenfels, 1988a/1890, p. 116).

Intentionality of Silences and Breaking Them: Dialogue of Silence and Expression

Human beings are intentional agents—they want to act in some direction—and often inhibit their own efforts. This is particularly the case in the ongoing flow of breaking silences, taking a number of forms (elaborating Lehmann, 2016, p. 293—Table 14.1):

I want to say something *but I cannot*—the intention to say is blocked by some self-generated reason: social normative (it would break a social rule), intra-personal (I just cannot find appropriate words for the situation).

I want to say something and I do say—this can lead to various outcomes. I want to say… but say something else (i.e. am not sure how my original intention fits), or say what I mean not considering its fit.

I do not want to say and I do not say—I may be invited to "express my opinion" which I prefer not to reveal, or I do not feel there is a need to break the silence—there is nothing to say. This often leads to the next state:

I do not want to say *but say something*—I feel that the silence need to be broken but there is nothing to say—the result is talk about trivialities. "Saying something" is the vocal equivalent of "noisy silence"—empty talk. It pretends to be talk but it is actually a way to leave the impression of talk while remaining in silence.

All these intentional breakings of the silence create for all of us a tension between the current I-position (still silent) and potential—desired or feared. The moment of breaking the previous silence by beginning to speak is the key transition point in the act of speaking. In terms of the Dialogical Self Theory, we are looking here at the moment of transition toward a future state of affairs. It is through constructing I-positions that one

> … can imaginatively *move to a future point in time and then speak to myself about the sense of what I am doing now in my present situation.* This position, at some point in the future, may be very helpful to help me to evaluate my present activities from a long-term perspective. The result may be that I disagree with my present self as blinding itself from more essential things (Hermans, 1996, p. 33, added italics).

Such intrapersonal tension about breaking the state of silence unifies the silent and non-silent states of affair. It is at that intersection that involves risk-taking: what if I do break the silence and say X, only to feel bad about having done so (e.g., an attempted but failed effort to joke)? Or I say X and feel that X is trivial—even if all listeners claim the opposite?

Silence plays a central role in human communication. It creates the basis for hearing—and its agentive elaboration in the form of listening. At the same time, silence can be a source for not-saying and not-listening.

Saying Much: The Overpowering Role of Musical Expression

A parallel opportunity to break out of silence to the monovocality of speaking is the polyphonic expression of creating sound forms that we—by social consensus—call *music*. Music accomplishes something no other auditory input can do—it sets the

structured stage for our immediate co-construction of complex affective meanings. Music is jointly created by our higher feelings and the texture of sounds we hear:

> …music spreads out time for our direct and complete apprehension, by letting our hearing monopolize it—organize, fill, and shape it, all alone. It creates an image of time measured by the motion of forms that seem to give it substance, yet a substance that consists entirely of sound, so it is transitoriness itself. *Music makes time audible, and its form and continuity sensible* (Langer, 1953, p. 110).

Baroque music of the seventeenth-century Venice is a good example of the affective personal screaming encoded into composer's deeply felt higher feelings about the world. The following example gives us a glimpse of the subtlety of the affective encounter of the soul and body with the world of desire. The example of the unity of text and music[5] of *Beautiful Eyes* gives us an overwhelming account of the avalanche of feelings toward another:

Voi pur, begl'occhi, sete	Beautiful eyes, you are indeed
porte d'un paradiso,	doors to paradise:
voi tra le scherzo e 'l riso	with a tease and a laugh
in ciel m'introducete	you take me to heaven.
Ma tanto il cor m'ardete	But my heart burns so fiercely
che dal mio foco eterno	that my everlasting flame causes me to run,
per le porte del ciel corro all'inferno.	from the doors of heaven to hell.
Sì, bel seno, che tu sei	Beautiful breast, you are
una neve animata,	living snow.
sì che tua giogia grata	O how your graceful throat
consola gl'ardor miei.	feeds my passionate fire.
Ma tanto alfin godei	Yet so sublime is my delight,
che grande a poco a poco	that as it grows, little by little,
fra le falde di gel provo il mio foco.	my fire burns amidst the snow.
Voi pur, bei crini, adoro,	I adore you, beautiful hair,
cari dolci legami,	dear sweet bindings,
voi, preziosi stami	precious threads
del mio ricco tesoro.	of my rich treasure.
Ma della selva d'oro	But if you won't give me
se non mi fate un dono,	some of that golden tangle,
fra le miniere d'or povero io sono.	I'm impoverished amid these goldmines.
No, no, pomi e rubini,	No, no, apples and rubies,
che voi non pareggiate	you don't compare with
di quelle labbra amate	the divine corals
i coralli divini.	within those beloved lips.
Ma non mai ne' giardini	Yet never, in the garden
di quella bella bocca	of that beautiful mouth, could I
coglier quanti vorrei baci mi tocca	gather enough kisses to satisfy my yearning

Source: https://barbarastrozzi.blogspot.com/2008/10/opus-2-texts.html

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[5] For listening: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jl-yzeqpJOw

The elegant poetic eroticism of the lyrics gets further enhancement form the singer's voice. Deep sensuality with allegorical referencing of the pleasures of loving sexuality but oriented toward higher levels of spirituality was the rule of the loving relations in the seventeenth century.

The composer of the *Beautiful Eyes* is Barbara Strozzi (1619–1677)—one of the first Venetian composers well known for her madrigals in the sixteenth century. Living her life course as profoundly independent woman—bearing four children aside from composing eight volumes of compositions between 1644 and 1664, remaining out of wedlock[6] all of her life. The traditional marriage roles for artists were then—as now—an exception rather than a rule. She managed to live an autonomous life in Venice earning money through her own singing and publication of her compositions. She inspired her audience by elaborate voice and charm as the discussions leader in the group of Venetian intellectuals debating philosophy, art, and love (Fig. 4.1). She became one of the best known composers in Europe in the sixteenth century.

Strozzi's portrait indicates her expectation for playing a duo (indicated by *two* instruments in the painting—viola de gamba and violin) as well as her leading status in the society of the *Academia Unisoni* (the flower decoration in her hair). Her musical compositions were mostly—like others in the Baroque environment of the seventeenth century—of topics of love, with rare excursions to religious themes (Kendrick, 2002) which were very close to those of her peers at the time, while her love songs were uniquely hers.

Fig. 4.1 Bernardo Strozzi *Woman with la gamba* (portrait of Barbara Strozzi—Rosand & Rosand, 1981)

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[6] Barbara Strozzi was the daughter of the Florentian-Venetian opera librettist Giulio Strozzi who since her childhood prepared her for singing and composing. Her life course as an independent woman has been well documented (Glixon, 1997, 1999; Rosand, 1978) as a key figure in the intellectual group of the highest *literati* of the Venetian society.

Poetry and music are closely embracing each other. As Zittoun (2017, p. 82) has pointed out, music and poetry have similar roots—poems were sung, with or without instrumental accompaniments. They became separately performable only in the eighteenth to nineteenth century. Love poetry and music have been present in human societies across their histories. The societal context for it is present in personal and sometimes collective directionality of devotional acts in religious domains. The triggers for the outburst of poetic sentiments are often locally personal—misery for a non-responded feelings by another, the act of the other in abandoning the self, etc.

The Bhakti devotional tradition in Bengal and all over today's India has for centuries linked deep poetic sentiments with total affective immersion in the ongoing flow of living. Of the numerous poets who stands out among others is Mirabai (first half of the sixteenth century) who has become a legendary mythical figure in Indian history. Born in the last decade of the fifteenth century and married against her own will to a local king, she became defiant in her deep religious commitment to Krishna ("Dark Prince") and opposition to her prescribed marital role. An example of her poetic expression demonstrates the deep interweaving of experienced moments (thunderstorm) with her deep inner feelings of abandonment:

> Drunk, turbulent clouds
> Roll overhead
> But they bring from the Dark One
> No message
> Listen
> The cry of a peacock
> A nightingale's faraway ballad
> A cuckoo!
> Lightning
> Flares in the darkness
> A rejected girl shivers
> Thunder, sweet wing and rain
> Lifetimes ago
> Mira's heart was with the Dark One
> Infidelity spits
> Like a snake
> (Schelling, 2011, p, 148)

Mirabai's feelings about the infidelity of her imagined Dark Prince would resonate well across societies as the gap between desire and reality is the central locus for inner motivation of human psyche toward symbolic (and sometimes real) actions. Poetry encountered in the street songs of bards, later written down in books and thus separated from music, become cultural resources for personal life courses.

Love is central in human lives—yet its psychological nature has remained ungraspable by science. Perhaps that is better for the survival of the phenomenon—the possibility of eradicating the deep feelings of love by making it "measurable" by some "standardized method" would be a travesty to humanity. General psychology—if it is to give credit to the depth of human feelings—needs to explain the phenomena of loving discreetly—never claiming it has reached a rational explanation of the important and beautifully irrational feeling.

Perhaps the most important human feature in the affective domain is the possibility of rapid change of reflexivity between here-and-now setting (no reflexivity, complete immersion) and there-and-then imaginary setting (maximum reflexivity with no ways of immediate rooting it in reality[7]). This rapidly moving reflexivity builds on the general affective processes of *Einfühlung*—without that no imagination is possible. We feel into a particular setting we are in—that feeling triggers its opposite (out-feeling—in the systemic unity of opposites of A and non-A), at the intersection of which the process of imagination (move from AS-IS to AS-IF—in Vaihinger's terms) is activated.

A similar feeling-in <> feeling-out trigger can be found in the interior of the psyche.

It is basic for the structure and functions of all music (Klempe, 2016). Music is organismic—a dynamic whole. Borrowing from von Uexküll's theoretical biology of organisms—the notion of **I-tone** (*Ich-ton*), the Finnish musicologist and semiotician Eero Tarasti provides an illuminative account of the holistic functions of musical Gestalts—both as operating in the minds of the composers and of the performers:

> …each organism has its own Ich-ton, which determines the kinds of messages it receives from the outside, from the Umwelt that surrounds it. If this concept were to be applied to music it would appear that every composition would be a kind of "model" of a living organism, the latter understood in a certain "as if" sense- The life of such an organism, its "being" and "doing", is guided by its view itself, which helps the organism to choose according to its "inner" score those signs which it sends and receives. If a musical organism consists of motives, these motives constitute the kinds of "cells" that communicate with each other, as happen in living organism (Tarasti, 2015, p. 300).

This organismic analogy may lead us to slightly comic other analogies. For example, we might be tempted to consider people who go to concerts as similar to others who visit zoos. Watching and hearing the organismic work of an orchestra and observing the animal organisms in their constrained habitats may look similar in a strange way. Beyond the comic moment stands indeed the basic need for immersion in a field—of sounds (in music), or waiting to see the barely observable acts in the lives of species other than us. Pandas are well known for their "laziness" of not moving around much—and one can encounter a tribune filled with panda-watching humans in a zoo ardently waiting to see a slight move by the known to be "lazy" animal.

The comic moment can be dramatic when performance artists act out their art messages in public in violation of social norms (Lordelo, 2017). Ambiguity inherent in art triggering its relevance as art becomes a different ambiguity when de-framed and situated into ordinary activity contexts ("street art"—see Awad & Wagoner, 2017). Human beings mark their environments symbolically—and fight for the dominance of their symbols with other human beings in the public domain.

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[7] This is so because the reality to which the reflexive process pertains is not yet in place—given the irreversible time in which this process unfolds.

The Surrender to Music: Totality of Higher Affective Experience

Encountering music is a potential pathway to personal affective explosion within the constraints of the form of the particular musical form. It has been used in efforts to socially guide persons out of their ordinary mundane ways of being—by instituting military marches, dance-inviting tunes, wedding, and funeral tunes in specific societal contexts. Specific ritual settings—churches, concert halls, and festival grounds—are set up to support this guidance of the person of total surrender to one's subjective escalation of feelings under the catalytic conditions of the heard tunes. The hearing of music can lead to listening to it—which in its turn entails an act of resistance (*Gegenstand*). One of the outcomes of that resistance is surrender—letting the flow of the music take over the subjective interior of the person and accept the new subjective formations that are triggered in the psyche by the inflow of the musical field.

The phenomenon of surrender can be a productive tool in music therapy, using guided imagery in music listening. An example from interview with "participant 7" after the session illustrates the dynamics involved:

> P7: What stands out as the strongest to me is that the music becomes part of me and I become part of the music…and we become colors…and the strongest…are the images/experience I got of **becoming an eagle**…[shows with arms] … yes
>
> T: Yes!!
>
> I: That was the strongest.
>
> P7: **I am a huge bird, and I have wings with 2-3 meters in width…and I have an overview and I have freedom and I can fly**, and !!
>
> T and I: Ahhhhh?
>
> P7: (deep exhale) … It is so strong… I think it might be the trust I had in T…and in the project we were into… it… there comes a freedom… I am set free by the music.
>
> I: You were set free… and what is T's contribution to that?
>
> P7: It's that I have trust in T that this is something she knows something about… how its supposed to be… she knows the framework (Bondi & Blom, 2016, p. 227, added boldface).

This small episode from the realm of music therapy exemplifies the basic ways in which music operates in the lives of any human being—in any corner of the world. The notion of *surrender* is in some sense inappropriate. Rather, the overwhelming immersion in the flow of the music ("surrender" indeed) leads to the construction of new imagery (the big bird) that invigorates the Self to feel different ("free") in the setting where one is confined to the place where the music reached the person—therapy room, concert hall, one's own earphones, etc. In terms of the classical tradition of *Aktualgenese* (microgenesis), it is the explosive low of intermediate Gestalts of imagination that the music makes possible.

The particular imagination-enhancing characteristics of different kinds of music would certainly be different, but the basic meaning-making process remains the same—socially and contextually supported (catalyzed) escalation of the affective synthesis (through imagination) beyond the borders of the immediate real-world perception, with affectively based hyper-generalized feelings ("freedom"), and it

carries images ("huge bird") supporting the subjective exodus from the here-and-now situation. Some of such musical experiences may be operating as further catalytic devices of the psyche over decades. Paul Hillmann (2018) describes a case of a particular song experience remaining important for four decades—leading us to prioritize strong emotional encounters as path setting for the whole life course. The unity of the unique instance and its role in the whole continuity of human life is the process of generalization that needs to be understood.

Turning Cultural Objects into Symbolic Resources

Music is available to anyone who can and does listen. It is a shared cultural resource—yet its functions are deeply personal. Like many similar cultural objects, it becomes important for a person at some "time windows" in the life course. How do we use cultural resources in the personal lives under conditions of ruptures?[8]

The transformation of cultural resources into symbolic ones—making the external cultural objects (books, films, ice cream, wine, beer, dress of latest fashion model, etc.) into one's own involves its becoming symbolized personally ("my *favourite* book," "that *awful* film we saw yesterday," "the fancy Armani suit *I cannot afford to buy*") takes place under conditions of uncertainty. As such, the cultural objects ("cultural elements") when they are brought to person's life course to be used as symbolic resources, they

> …can produce meaning or action about self, about others, and/or about the socially shared reality (Zittoun, 2007, p. 346)

Symbolic resources are cultural resources (elements) that are internalized, given their functional role in the Self system, and potentially externalized to others. They are not merely "taken in" from outside of the Self into its inside—they are "glued" into the inside by the ties of personal deep sense.

Symbolic resources are constructively internalized cultural elements (semiotic resources) that are being functional in *two* directions—into the internal infinity (cf William Stern's scheme in Chap. 1) and simultaneously into external infinity—they are constructively externalized personal inputs into the societal domain. A book I occasionally pick up and read, find it fascinating for myself, and strongly recommend to my friend becomes the book that is "wrapped" into my fascinated recommendation. The book remains a cultural resource as it was, but my recommendation of it adds my symbolic value to its cultural object status.

The act of personalization of a cultural object into symbolically relevant personal one is relevant not only for the person's development but feeds into that of society.

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[8] The history of the ideas of cultural elements turned into symbolic resources covers the first two decades of the twenty-first century and is described in Zittoun (2007, 2018). The notion of ruptures has been elaborated in Zittoun (2006)—the flow of human experiencing at times comes to the breakdown of previous structural forms and their re-constitution into new ones.

That is why the externalizations of personal symbolized objects in public become immediately normatively scrutinized when any novelty happens in these—the person may proceed nude in public or just to the opposite—fully covered—in both cases it becomes viewed as social norm violation that—like virus—is assumed to be dangerous for others on some vaguely specified "moral grounds." Externalizations of symbolic resources—their taking on a new form of semiotic resource—are carefully monitored and guarded in the societal systems.

Cultural resources are inherently dangerous for social systems. Hence, all societies have developed their censorship systems. On the basis of such resources, it is the possibility to reorganize experience—and particularly radically (with a psychological "explosion"—Lotman, 2010—elaborated in Chap. 2 above)—that makes imagination the central process in human psychological functioning and extends to societal processes (Tateo, 2016, 2018a, b). The generalized notion of "the nation" can be a tool to unify the personal life perspectives of many individuals. Social movements in societies lead to creation of heterotopic states in the very societies in the name of future ideals (which turn out to be utopias). Yet at the moments of such "social explosions," persons volunteer to fight for imagined better states of affairs in the society as a whole (see Chap. 6).

How Does Imagination Work?

Whether in the *psyche* or in the society—the basis for these sudden "breakouts" is simple. The very moment an organism can move from relating to the present context in terms of AS-IS to creating some version of AS-IF—creating a situation where what is not starts to modify what is:

AS-IS|with distance to|AS-IF

It is through this relation AS-IF to AS-IS—a feed-forward function—that it becomes possible to modify one's Umwelt through innovative *but not adaptive* action. This means that complete adaptation to the conditions of the Umwelt as it is cannot be the goal for human psychological functioning but that adaptation needs always to be broken in order to anticipate what might happen in the future. The head of the snake of future possibilities bites the tail of the presently well-adjusted state of being, triggering the urge for innovation.

Imagination is possible only if distancing from here-and-now setting can be created. The ongoing flow of the experiences in the human life course (A) is surrounded by the layer of its opposite (non-A) that constrains the current flow of experience (Fig. 4.2). The non-A domain is the location of the constraint ("this is not possible") that normatively channels the ongoing here-and-now flow of experience. Human beings regulate themselves personally by setting up social norms within their own minds.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the ongoing tension about the negotiation of the current experience—while living on there is constant tension toward breaking out of the present flow. Two hypothetical examples—of an effort to break through that failed (lower left portion of Fig. 4.2) and another that succeeded (right upper side of the figure) illustrate the tensions of distancing and their marking by signs. Signs of hyper-generalized kind ("this DOES NOT FEEL good" and feeling good at distancing position—in case of the success) give us the generic example of equilibration (return to the ongoing flow) and disequilibration (that leads to innovation of the flow of experiencing).

The breakthrough from the ongoing experience is mandatory for all innovation and can happen only through (1) distancing and (2) the making or importing a semiotic mediating device. Through that device, one can reposition one's Self to an outside position while leaving the experiencing person in the flow of ongoing experience (the upper right side "breakout" in Fig. 4.2). I contrast the "breakout" on lower left side of Fig. 4.2 does not produce distancing—as no sign of difference was generated. Instead, the sign of self-feeling ("does not feel good") guided the Self to return to the ordinary here-and-now flow.

An example may be interesting here. While busily exchanging pleasantries during a cocktail party, I may internally feel "*am I behaving politely in my joking here?*" (worry about breaking out of the normative system of the occasion—left downside of Fig. 4.2). But others seem jovially laughing as I keep making my silly jokes, so it must be that all is fine. But suddenly feel a "voice" in the back of my mind to tell me "but this is so utterly boring" (reflection upon the here-and-now from an outer position—right up side of Fig. 4.2)—and I may say farewell, go home, and immerse myself in reading a good novel. Yet this course of action was

Fig. 4.2 The tension of distancing in the flow of life course

possible only once the notion "boring" is set between my ongoing acting and my distanced look at what I am doing.

Distancing Makes Self-reflexivity Possible

The act of sign-making is what human beings do instantly, and all the time. Distancing hence becomes easily possible—and so does self-reflexivity. This is different in other species—when an object from the environment is taken and understood as a functional resource. In the lives of higher primates, this moment may arrive when ordinary objects—stones—are taken to enter into an act of obtaining food (cracking nuts). This act makes stones into furs functional hammers. An object (stone) has become a cultural object (potential nut-cracking tool), but it is not yet linked with the Self of the nut-cracking chimpanzee. It would become so when the developing protohominids develop the meaning of reusability of a particular object (stone chopper) and start carrying these with them.

However, even the event of a chimpanzee carrying reusable tools around is not sufficient for the emergence of a *symbolic resource* out of a cultural object. It would take the act of special meaningful marking of the object—decorating hunting tools and war weapons. The functional resource has become cultural resource. At every step in this development, the object of environment—having become part of Umwelt—becomes distanced from its original affordances. This is made possible only through semiotic mediation of the distance:

> Distancing is made possible thanks to one's internalized semiotic means, among which language, but also other semiotic modes (music or visual arts), function. As a consequence of this, first, *imagination can be seen as always and necessarily social and cultural;* and second, it can *radically allow new perspectives* (Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013, p. 321).

Human agency is based on this functional feature of adaptation-by-non-adaptation (we adapt to conditions of AS-IS by not adapting to them):

> … agency entails acting on the basis of what does not, or does not yet, exist…[it is]..the will to try and actualize an imagined possible future… without imagination, without any vision of alternative, the person's environment would be bereft of possibility. A person without any imagination would…be trapped by the immediate environment, merely responding to this environment, rather than mastering the environment (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016a, p, 53).

Imagination being social (i.e., societally guided and framed) and cultural (made possible by semiotic invention of signs) is by itself not yet sufficient for preadaptive efforts to cope with the uncertainties of the next moment. The sign-making and using process need to be precisely located in the flow of irreversible time.

The Looping Model: Imagination and New Sense of Action in Life That Goes On

The looping—uncoupling from the state of AS-IS to an invented state AS-IF and then recoupling with AS-IS triggering its transformation—requires triggers, resources, and the use of the resources in recoupling (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016a, p. 38). The triggers for uncoupling are of various kinds—nonvoluntary (something—a rupture—happens in the person's *Umwelt*, or the person is exhausted by either boredom or overstimulation and feels one needs to "break free"), or voluntary. A person decides to become a medical doctor or nurse to help others—knowingly accepting the risks for one's own health. Young men volunteer to go to war in places far from home—likely never to return. Yet they go—naïve and patriotic.

The Looping Model[9] of human affective functioning is a constructive solution of systemic integration of the solid reality of human life course[10] with the situation-specific acting by the person in moving from past to the future. The need for the model emerges from the theoretical need to understand how actual and imagined experiences relate with one another. The key feature that makes the Looping Model unique is its framing within the reality of irreversible time—imagination is a basic process that is demonstrable only in its locally concrete functioning in leading the productive non-fit[11] (some of with the current real situation).

Rapid transitions in experiences—ruptures[12]—have their structural forms. They break the previous structure of person-environment established relations. Imagination plays important role in the repair of ruptures—in developing new ways of relating with new reality.

> Disengagement from socially shared reality renders imagination both powerless and powerful. It is powerless because remembering one's holidays will never refresh one's suntan. But, equally, in conditions of extreme social control, such as imprisonment, the imagination is one of the few things that cannot be controlled (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016a, p. 39).

Disengagement expands in various directions from the particular moment n irreversible time—both forward into the future to consider various future possibilities and to the past to find analogues to the present situation as seen from the disengaged distance. This makes imagination work similarly to the model of Trajectory

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[9] The model was developed by Tania Zittoun with her colleagues (Zittoun, 2017; Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016a, b) in order to situate the cultural objects → symbolic objects transitions in the flow of human life course. Personal making of symbolic resources—out of the environmental possibilities many of which (but not all) are suggested as cultural resources—is the linking zone of person and society. A person participates in society by way of creating one's own symbolic resources and using them in societal contexts.

[10] Described in Zittoun et al. (2013), Zittoun (2016c).

[11] Much of which is equal to creativity—see further in Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016b.

[12] See Zittoun, (2006), for elaboration. The focus on ruptures as centrally relevant for human lives is a major breakthrough in developmental psychology by making the nonlinear nature of development the meta-theoretical axiomatic stance.

Equifinality Approach.[13] The Looping Model is applied to the life course analyses—it operates both in immediate processes of generating the actual (*Aktualgenese*) out of the imagined possible and through the macro-level reflections over the life course.

Reflexivity is possible not only through distancing but also by maintaining the results of such distancing in longer-term code that preserves what had been understood from the experience. The reflexive process enriches the personal life philosophy by generalized wisdom of my-being-myself (Zittoun, 2016c)—involving subjective synthesis of the various experienced situations.

Figure 4.3 demonstrates how the Looping Model operates as uniting the ruptures into the ongoing life course. It indicates that the process of *rupture repair* after an explosion is the central organizing feature in human life course.

The moment of generalization that happens in the present moment leads to affectively hyper-generalized sign field that is an affective rupture—leading to the affectively orienting message that can in the future play a catalytic role (see Fig. 8.2 in Chap. 8). This message crosses the border of the present into the expected future because of its field-like form that extends both in space (over all of the psyche) and over past and future. It plays central role in the making of the personal life philosophy.

Fig. 4.3 Elaborated Looping Model with rupture and its repair

Emerging hyper-generalization of affect field that temporarily overcomes irreversible time in subjectivity ("time stopped")

RUPTURE REPAIR

RUPTURE: AFFECTIVE EXPLOSION

AFFECTIVE EXPLOSION

PAST   present   FUTURE

IRREVERSIBLE TIME

---

[13] This approach—TEA (Trajectory Equifinality Approach)—is a direction developed since 2004 by Japanese researchers (in English—Sato, 2017; Sato et al., 2016) that considers both imaginary and real pathways in human life course in the understanding of the human psyche. The Looping Model intersects with the TEA model in concrete places in the loop (Zittoun & Valsiner, 2016, p. 13, Fig. 1.4).

Living Toward the Future: Silent Pre-organization
of Intended Events

Many people like pyromaniac experiences—the sound and beauty of firecrackers leading to the colorful illumination of the dark sky are fascinating to the awe-searching human psyche. Firecrackers—in comparison to lightening in thunderstorms—are cultural inventions precisely for producing the affective sublime[14] in the experience-hungry viewers. Likewise we are fascinated by seemingly mortal tricks performed by circus artists. Human beings purposefully move themselves—physically or imaginatively—into settings that make them feel into new and overwhelming experience contexts. They set up sublime encounters with their Umwelts—to gain affective experiences that are on the border of the usual and extraordinary.

Human beings often purposeful set themselves up for an affective experience that is expected to "explode" beyond any borders—and is thus not predictable in its concrete manifestations. The person *purposefully unbalances* oneself by some act—knowing in advance that would lead to affective turmoil—expecting that experience to end up in some desirable outcome. Such ruptures—purposefully produced to lead to affective turmoil in the hope of arriving a new state of affective being—act in the self-reflections as cathartic moments that can transform the life course.

Even if the affective quality of such self-produced experiences cannot be predicted, their direction can—as the person oneself seeks out the particular opportunity to let oneself be "captured" by the experience that goes beyond the present borders of the ordinary. Some need to climb a mountain or go on an ocean voyage on a yacht, others to go to a disco, or to a regular concert. The latter involves a sequential structure of entrance—physical of symbolic—into the place where the purposeful rupture is to happen. For instance, to preplan to *enjoy* a musical experience, a person may go through a sequence of trivial everyday actions.

> The threshold is, in the most ritualized experiences, the entry in a colossal building, the abandonment of one's coat to cloakroom attendants, the pleasure or pain of finding a spot from where to see or hear the coming performance, the perception of the changes of light, the temporary renouncement of judgment so as to enter in whatever experience a musician, a band, or an orchestra will offer us for a definite period of time. There is also usually a closing threshold, for instance when the public fondly manifests his or her gratitude for that experience (hand clapping, whistling, etc.) (Zittoun, 2016a, b, c, p. 30).

Such bracketing of the setup for affective generalization to emerge constitutes the normative support for the public event for concert or theater goer. The music experienced can equally well be encountered at home over radio—but without such ritualistic framing. The intentionally setup musical experience can be turned into a constant background of activities similarly to artistic creations in paintings which become ordinary if replicated on one's wallpaper or wall carpets.

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[14] See further Valsiner (2020) on the central role of the role of sublime moments in human affective lives—human beings create for themselves "little dramatizations" that in their sublime function create the affective context for further development.

Synthesis: Theoretical Implications of Human Breaking of Silence

In this chapter, I outlined the core processes of human psychological functioning, working on the phenomenological intersection of silences and sounds. These can be summarized briefly:

- The absolute given condition for human experiencing is irreversibility of the lifetime. As a result, all psychological phenomena are unique—they can occur only once on the border of the past and future in the here-and-now context.
- The uniqueness of the psychological phenomena is generated by the universal general meaning construction system that operates on the border zone of the present, integrating the future projections with constructive retrospects—both made possible by the imagination—into the meanings with which the person anticipates the immediate future. This is accomplished by the three-directional looping processes—to the future, to the past, and toward abstraction from the present.
- Imagination is a process that is possible only if psychological distancing from the here-and-now setting is possible. It is made possible by the abstracting process that is affectively triggered and supported in its process by the creation of signs. Signs that specify a particular state in the abstraction process make psychological distancing possible, thus enabling the imagination processes in integration of the past and the future in the present.
- The abstraction process proceeds by way of hierarchy of signs of different generalization extension—from the point-like signification ("this is X") through generalized fields of approximations ("X, Y, Z are all parts of field V") to hypergeneralized affective meaning fields that "capture" the whole of the human psyche and serve as encoding devices of the past experiences for the indeterminate future.

We can thus posit a process that involves a sequence of ongoing experiencing: RUPTURE →AFFECTIVE → GENERALIZATION →DISTANCING → IMAGINATION (past and future) → NEW EXPERIENCE. The world of sounds—perceived and produced, signified and adored, rejected, and suppressed—is a particularly potent realm for the dramatic life worlds of all human beings in any corner of the world. Music is not merely a background for our ordinary activities, but an arena where we create our own selves, not even noticing that this basic process I'm going on.

Questions for Further Thought
1. Explain the psychological creation of music out of sounds.
2. In what ways is human devotion an example of Gestalt quality?
3. How is human reflexivity dependent of feeling-in (*Einfühlung*)?
4. What is the psychological relevance of *surrender* to music?
5. How does imagination work?
6. Explain the process of distancing in life course dynamics.
7. Describe and explain the Looping Model.

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Chapter 5
Disquieting Societies

Edvard Munch *The Scream (1893)*

Contents

Societies make human beings scream. Sometimes in horror, other times in excitement, but ordinarily by habit or by scripts for local dramatizations. Jealous spouses scream at each other and find satisfaction in such expression of love through infighting. Parents scream at self-searching adolescents who in their turn are involved in the total scream about the injustices in society. Yet much of such expression of total feeling is subdued—in the form of feeling agitated about something that might come in the near future, something that would be disturbing—yet there is a chance it might not come. People live in a state of perpetual disquiet.

The Basic Affective State of the *Disquiet*

The notion of *disquiet* is obviously a version of opposites of *quiet*. It has major philosophical and epistemological implications for our knowledge.[1] What is important here is its *aboutness*—a basic feeling that the present state (*quiet*) may at any moment launch to some version of its opposite—a scream, a song, an utterance, or a dance. Yet before the scream is the pervasive feeling of disquiet—the aboutness that something is about to happen, but it has not yet. Persons live in their ordinary conditions yet apprehensively expecting the future to bring changes—hoping for better ones but often ending up with worse. Epidemics, wars, and robberies can roam over their ordinary lives. Famines can dry up the crops, and collapsing values of money—their livelihood. Life is hard—yet people keep living.

How is psychological resilience—despite all the traumatic life events—possible? Their higher psychological functions—for creating meanings—make human beings capable of surviving under many calamities. **The role of higher psychological functions is to create possibilities to cope with the <u>whole range</u> of expected ruptures in personal lives**. That means that the ordinary functioning of the *psyche* operates in anticipation of various extraordinary conditions. The *psyche* is constantly in a state of internal disquiet—apprehensive of what might happen but need not do so. At the same time, the society in which the person operates is constantly in a flow of its own disquiet. Various societal turmoils brought in by famines, epidemics, religious conversions and political revolutions, and economic crises are all expected but unpredictable states of affairs.

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[1] The notion of disquiet is developed in full in the work of Livia Simão (2012, Simão & Valsiner, 2007; Simão et al., 2015). This notion captures well the basic human condition of constant uncertainty that becomes temporarily overcome by moments of certainty.

Development of Human Societies: Testimony of Human Resilience

Human lives are remarkable in their capacities to resist all the calamities of societies. Individual life courses are embedded in the histories of the societies which they inhabit: births, marriages, psychotherapy sessions, love affairs, and funerals are surrounded by prosperity of living—which is interspersed with times of cholera or falling bombs—and recoveries from all. Calamities can happen at any moment—breaking the course of happy and successful life courses.

Psychology becomes relevant—both theoretically and practically—exactly on this border of the quiet and disquiet state of affairs. It enters into the transitional state in three directions—which are in many ways in contradiction. First, *the personal psychological anticipation* of the impending calamity involves personally escalated fears (of death, of disability, of loss of economic support, etc.). Secondly, at the societal level, psychology enters in the domain of *preventive measure*s—many of which are in contradiction with the anticipatory fears. Finally, the psychology of *meaningful framing* of the transition into the disquieting state between the personal and societal levels makes it possible to find a wider explanation for the happenings. The question of trust in the societal institutions emerges as crucial. Any public prevention measure is an intruder to the personal anticipation and can be interpreted as violation of personal and human rights. The function of the use of psychology for the meaningful framing tasks is to reconcile the personal rights violation with the societal development scenario of "common good."

Between the "Black Death" and the Paradoxes of Prevention

Plague—the "Black Death"—had been around in Europe since the major wave in 1347–1353 when its devastations were major.[2] Its arrival in Florence in 1630–1633 from the North[3] claimed the lives of one sixth of the city's population. The local authorities introduced a variety of measures to protect the city—but at that time, the

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[2] This was the Second Pandemic of the plague known in history—the first being in the sixth century AD in the Byzantine Empire (the "Justinian Plague"). In the fourteenth century, the bubonic plague killed 60–80% of the population in places in Europe where it proliferated (Hays, 2009), from the highest epidemic of 1347–1353 onward until the eighteenth century, followed by smallpox (15–20%—Jones, 1996, p. 100) and the "Asian import" of cholera in the seventeenth to twentieth century. In contrast to such calamities, the 1918–1919 "Spanish flu" and the 2020–2021 "Covid pandemic" are relatively minor devastating events.

[3] Plague moved slowly South, started from the Austrian army's action against the duchy of Mantua in 1629 (Nussdorfer, 1992, p. 146). The agents who transmitted it to humans—fleas feeding upon infested rats and then carrying these to humans—were not known until the end of the nineteenth century. Instead, it was attributed to "bad air."

Fig. 5.1 The Plague (engraving by Marcantonio Raimondi, 1487–1534, after Raphael)

crucial role rats and fleas played in infecting people were not yet known. The deep disquiet that epidemics brought with it were ordinary life experiences (Fig. 5.1).

Individual suffering from the illness is of course not well documented, except for rare cases of recovery and its public presentations. The case of Lisabetta Centinni is one of these few.[4] Lisabetta belonged to the prosperous families of Florentinians—which made it possible to try to avoid contagious diseases at first signs of possible epidemic. However, she was not so lucky—she was infected before the news of the plague hitting Florence had started to spread. She was also 4 months pregnant at the time.

Lisabetta's husband Ottavio decided against reporting her illness to the authorities—fearing that the latter would take his pregnant wife away and as a result of that she would die. He invited a medical doctor to treat his wife's fever but concealed the sign of the plague (the bubo in her thigh) from the doctor. Bloodletting did reduce the fever, but the (secret) swelling of the thigh stayed. Ottavio's lack of trust in the public health measures of the city was justified—the fight for survival of anybody under the circumstances became the matter of the family only—under the threat of the illness and of the public health measures. Both the actual plague and the

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[4] Described in full in Kastenbaum, 2004, pp.224–227.

administrative measures to curtail it were dangerous for the survival. The family was left to its own resources in the fight with the disease.

In contrast, it was the religious framework of promises for survival that Ottavio accepted. He gave his wife a blessed object (a bonnet that had belonged to a local saint Sister Domenica)—in the general context that only the religious miracles could save his wife and all houses from the upcoming disaster. There were no miracles—in about 20 days, the swelling declined and the bubo found its way out of the skin, with a painful drainage of liquid that lasted for another month. So Lisabetta was fortunate—the devastating illness passed, even after much suffering in the seclusion. Ottavio was the only person in the family who knew the whole story—as not reporting the plague case could have led to severe punishment. In fact, the secret became revealed only after the religious authorities had demanded that Lisabetta report the miracle—recovery—which was obviously attributable to the sacred bonnet of Sister Domenica.

In psychological terms, the situation of danger to Lisabetta's health activated the basic distrust in the public authorities (including the medical doctor) and an upsurge of trust in the religious hopes for miracles. The indeterminate dangerous situation—an impending epidemic or war or economic collapse of the society—leads to the *local mobilization* of all resources—action potentials and symbolic resources—to cope with the problem within the knowledge structure currently available for survival. The making of *symbolic resources* out of the available set of semiotic resources[5] is in the hands of the meaning-maker. This opens the possibilities for construction of both pragmatic and symbolic efforts to cope.

The coping devices that include supernatural components are often believed to be more powerful than concrete functional devices. The uncertainty of the problem situation leads to the belief in the certainty of the coping devices. The value of all such devices becomes fortified by deep beliefs. As a result, in a crisis situation, any collective measures that are avoided by individuals become targets for viewing their avoiders as "enemies" of the survival of the community. Ottavio in the example above risked being considered such enemy if Lisabetta's real illness was to be known in public. The conformity control is added to the administrative control strengthened under the circumstances.

For persons trying to survive, the trust in public leadership becomes doubtful, and the efforts to survive in one's own ways become covered by veils of secrecy. The existential personal question—*will I die or will I survive*?—is left to the person, as the body of the person has to handle the illness. Yet, the social role of the person considered "sick" may require surrendering to the collective austerity measures

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[5] Zittoun ([2006](#), [2012](#)) distinguishes *semiotic resources*—meaningful cultural objects and events in human *Umwelt*—from *symbolic resources*—the personally senseful ways of acting upon the environment. We can consider the symbolic transfer—the act of taking and using selected semiotic resources for personal ways of adjusting to the world. When the bonnet of Sta. Domenica was given to Lisabetta on her sickbed, it entailed the taking of a semiotic resource (established miraculous beliefs in the saint) into the personal life of the plague-suffering Lisabetta as a symbolic resource.

which advertise themselves as needed for "your health." The "your" here is a fused version of public (community) and personal (individual) interests. In such fusion, it is the societal institutional control that is being enhanced at the expense of the interests of the particular individuals.

The Disquiet of the Impending Danger: Rome in Anticipation

At the same time when Ottavio in Florence was hiding his wife's real bubonic plague case from the local authorities—for reasonable fear that she may die not from her illness but from the action of these authorities—over 200 kilometers to the South the Papal State in Rome were undertaking measures against the impending plague.

In Rome, all the resources of the Papal State under Pope Urban VIII were mobilized to avoid the plague reaching to the city. The Papal clerics had only one means of independent fight against the illness—prayer. This they used, but at the same time, they recognized the need to mobilize the local populace into concrete prevention acts. Unifying the different persons—rich and poor—to prevent plague was a social-psychological task of unification of various interest groups in the service of public protection.

The protection entailed interference into the economic activities. On November 14, 1629, the Romans were ordered to stop trading with regions where the plague was known to be present. All the 12 entrances to the city were furnished with volunteer guards from different guilds[6] to check the health and travel histories of the arriving travelers. The latter had to produce stamped itineraries of their travel through villages and towns, on the basis of which their admissibility or need for involuntary quarantine was determined.[7] Special camps for quarantined non-allowed arrivers were created off the city wall. Inside the city, special feeding stations were set up for the poor, and the "home poor" (who did not beg in the streets) were channeled to newly created job programs. The beggars were captured from the streets and sent to work camps. The full sanitation effort of the city was in full swing.

The efforts to explain the plague included a variety of theories—from God's anger to that of "bad air" (*miasma*). The actual reasons for the spread of the disease were not known for another three centuries—so the construction of plausible common sense meanings for the danger could reach high levels of panic and protection methods. Garbage was to be eliminated from the streets and thrown into the river

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[6] The Papal State trusted the members of the artisans' guilds enforcing on them the civic duty to guarantee manning of the city gates every day, taking turns. They were checked not to hire replacements. Not surprisingly the regular duty became a burden on the guild members who after 2 years of the routine tried their best to avoid the duty (Nussdorfer, 1992, p, 148).

[7] If the arriving person had no certificates of health, or had come from an infected region, she was not allowed. This created social tensions between powerful local aristocracy and the guards at the city entrances controlling certificate.

("being careful that the stuff did not remain to give off a stench on the Tiber banks"—Nussdorfer, 1992, p. 150). The distancing effort of getting all "stuff" that created "bad air" as quickly and as far away as possible from the city was profound. The social system relied upon the hierarchical social order in distributing the duties of control over the measures introduced—the members of the guilds manning the city entrance gates were trusted more than any other male of the servants, while they were controlled daily by the sanitary committee members. For instance, recruiting another person by a guild member to take on his guard duty was not allowed. The guild members were committed to their "civil duty" as guards—while letting their trade of skilled productive work idle. The symbolic fight against the impending illness was first of all a hit upon economy.

In parallel to the practical border-building and internal cleanup efforts, the danger of the anticipated plague was utilized as an occasion for building social cohesion—within the city and with the divine forces to whom the Pope could turn for protection of the whole populace. During the 2 years of intensive fearing, the arrival of the plague the activities of organizing massive religious processions through the city increased. The public view of the Pope walking with his entourage to one or another basilica for a sermon would be a regular experience for city dwellers. On June, 24 1630, the St. John's Day celebration brought out around 40,000 people to the celebration—estimated one third of the whole population of the city.

The plague failed to arrive, and by the end of 2 years of being involved in the whole mishmash of anticipatory efforts that had become inconvenience in their ordinary life and economic activities. So the set of measures were getting relaxed and eventually were eliminated—until the plague indeed arrived, only after 20 years (1656).

Plague hit not only major cities but also local communities. It could be claimed that the whole of Europe was under intermittent plague threat in the fifteenth century to the eighteenth (Jones, 1996). For human psychological survival, the adaptation to the anticipated disquiet of the possible disease was—and remains—a constant consideration among other similarly damaging life occurrences—famines, wars, economic calamities, and pandemias. The adaptation to the continuous long-term dangers that can hit any time is the test of the psychological resilience of human beings.

Human beings in any society have historically lived in the *anxious anticipation* of some calamities to emerge and restructure their lives. For example, in France every decade between 1500 and 1690, some local communities were suffering from the plague (Jones, 1996, p. 99). If not in one's own community, then in some neighboring one, the threat of the illness was lingering on. Such hyper-generalized anxiety was transferred from generation to generation—leading to inescapable total "capture" of the human personal life worlds. The simple word *fatalism* does not cover the complex nature of such wholistic relating to one's life world. Both the coping with and succumbing to that total anticipation were supported by the social systems in which the persons were fully embedded.

The Social Order of a Colonial Empire: The Plague in Bombay

Plague, cholera, typhus, and smallpox were not only raging in Europe over centuries—it was a recurrent menace worldwide. Cholera—first described in 1642 in Holland as a disease from India—spread over trade routes, and in the 1817–1961, the world has faced seven cholera pandemics, starting from Bengal in 1817–1824. The history of epidemics of various infectious diseases includes episodic escalations all over the world.

The plague epidemic in India at the end of the nineteenth century was an escalation of the Third Pandemic of plague that started in China in the 1850s, gradually moved to Hong Kong by 1894, and spread all over the world in the following two decades. In India, it was combined with another, social, menace—the British colonial rule and the dismissive thinking about the "natives," and their indigenous curative practices. Colonial thinking is always filled with inherent anxieties of the rulers—"we are in control" may be the belief of the rulers who simultaneously feel their "control" is fully dependent on the readiness of the "natives" to accept that hegemonic attitude. The latter need not—either indirectly by resistance and non-collaboration or directly by revolts and revolutions. The history of the plague epidemic in Bombay (1896–1920s) is filled with psychological phenomena of denial, scapegoating, military-style interventions, and turning declared culprits into heroes of disease control.

The first discoverer of the beginning epidemic immediately faces the wave of societal denial and its counteraction in terms of dismissal and accusations against the discoverer. Thus the Indian medical doctor in Bombay who on September 23, 1896, reported the cases of bubonic plague to the British colonial administrators was subjected to criticism for "scaremongering."[8] The reality of the proliferation of the illness proved him right—but the first psychological reaction to his discovery had already happened. The years to come were filled with plague deaths in Bombay (in 1903 the highest number was 20,788). The first reaction by the authorities in 1896 was that of the military metaphor of war—with bringing in military personnel from previous plague locations in Hong Kong. The Bombay authorities

> …directed plague control measures against property, persons, and even the deceased. While many of the measures had already been implemented during the Hong Kong epidemic of 1894, and must have had their origins in the distant public health past of medieval and early modern Europe, some were new and specific to India, especially those directed to travelers.

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[8] Echenberg, 2007, p. 47. Even more dramatic fate awaited the Ukraininan physician Waldemar Mordechai Haffkine who came to India from the Pasteur Institute to develop vaccines against cholera and then had to switch to finding vaccination against plague. His methods were initially successful, until a mistake occurred in administration in one locality for which he and his vaccine were accused of murdering people. His positive reputation was finally restored, and he was honored as a "savior" for whom an Indian postal stamp was issued. The medical personnel actually fighting coming diseases are under dangers from both the front (the actual disease) and back (the public stigmatization or honoring of their work).

> Just as the Chinese objected to the invasion of their privacy that most of these measures required, so too Indians protested vociferously (Echenberg, 2007, p. 57).

The colonial power was ready to attack the endemic in all of its military strength. On the assumption that the cause of the disease is in the dirty ground, they destroyed floors, wells, and demolished whole buildings in the infected areas. They poured huge quantities of disinfectants on the buildings suspected to carry the disease—without any clarity what actually caused the disease.[9] Such measure could drive the rodents—relevant participants in the disease chain—to further close contact with the escaping humans.

The attack by the colonial administration upon individual persons under the mask of "war on the disease" was even more disconcerting:

> The process began with search parties, often armed with information from spies and informants, who cordoned off districts looking for plague patients to remove to specially established and segregated plague hospitals. The potential for abuse was enormous. The Indian press, controlled by the Hindu upper classes, accused the British soldiers assigned to enforce plague control of using rough methods, including the public stripping and even rumored violation of women (Echenberg, 2007, p. 58).

The "war for public health" thus seems to result in two kinds of casualties—those to the deceased and those who stay alive (and supposedly for whose sake—preserving their health—the "war" is being waged). The picture we get from the public health measures in the Bombay plague is very similar to those in Rome and Florence in the seventeenth century as described above. Added to it is the hierarchical colonial power—colonized people relationship that appears in the picture as a participant in the social power struggle fought out on the "battlefield with the plague" where the casualties in the field became symbolic resources for societal power renegotiations.

Psychology of Anxious Anticipation: Totality of Actions Under Uncertainty

War is a war—and a "war on a disease" is fought as a military campaign. Only the enemy is here hidden—in the bodies that need to be defended by the "war." Yet this is rarely the case—the "benefactors" of the "war on disease" may end up dying of the disease unless (illegally) protected by individual actions (e.g., Ottavio's hiding

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[9] The first proof of the transitional chain that explained the causes of plague was demonstrated in 1898 by French scientist Paul-Louis Simond from Pasteur Institute in Paris who came to India to treat the plague. He showed the role of fleas—as the carrier of the disease from rats to humans. His theory was disbelieved by the British administration over the following decade—only in 1905 did the British specialists in India start to accept Simond's theory. Only in the 1930s, it was demonstrated—particularly one variety—*Xenopsylla cheopis*—is the kind of flea that was most open to be plague carrier. In the 1890s, that species could have been brought to India from Egypt with cotton imports (Echenberg, 2007, pp. 69–70).

his sick wife from the anti-plague authorities in seventeenth-century Florence, as described above). The coping with the endemic disease sets up two difficult to solve problems for the human beings who try to survive—to survive the disease itself and to manage to stay alive despite the dangerous actions of the "fighters" against the disease.

What are the general mechanisms of coping with uncertainties of *total* but *potential* dangers? In contrast to the dangers that are immediately perceived, such "remote" (but instantly possible) danger conditions "hang about" the human psyche leaving an atmospheric frame to otherwise ordinary conduction of everyday tasks. People go around their everyday activities with the potential calamity in the "back" of one's mind—a plague or cholera epidemic is approaching, tornado watch is announced for the given region, a local volcano is about to erupt, a war with the neighboring country (or not so close) country, a "jump" in inflation rate, a local revolution (bloody or "velvet")—is "feeling in the air." All these total situations *are about* to happen (but have not yet), if they do they will force the whole life world of the persons to change in ways unpredictable in details but clear in their general meanings (of calamity).

The counterpart of the personal *Abwehr* systems is the anticipation processes of the social institutions that take upon themselves the role of organizers of the human lives. The healthcare systems of a country are led by administrators who feel into the need to be prepared to the approaching epidemics, evacuation systems for tornado or earthquake, and are believed to be in place (but not tested in practice); the generals of the armies are confident of the fighting capacities of their armies. The highest governments—kings, emperors, presidents, parliaments, military juntas, and bank directors—have their institutional preparation for the possible upcoming calamity.

In sum, everything in the ordinary personal and social life seems as it has always been—yet some clouds of calamitous imagination are appearing on the personal and institutional horizons and provide the contextual catalysis for there here-and-now action. Ordinary activities become unexpectedly erratic—certain resources become collected to be available under altered living conditions, public noticing of social differences, and their stigmatization becomes increasingly present in the society entering into a pre-rupture anticipatory state. The upcoming collective atmosphere of disquiet is corroborated at the personal level where different persons without any particular reasons enter into feelings of nondirected anxieties.

When the first moments of the rupture emerge, the disquiet—collective and personal—rapidly leads to basic repositioning of social power relations (at the societal level) and of the structure of I-positions (at the personal level). The previous social structure gives rise to a new one—a democratic society becomes increasingly totalitarian, and the already autocratic regime becomes even increasingly so. In that process, different personal rights are eliminated or temporarily distanced, and new lateral social control systems introduced. As an example—consider the assignment in Rome in 1630 of different guild organizations to the task they were not meant (or prepared) to carry out—becoming sentinels at city gates to scrutinize the travel documents of all arriving travelers and to have the power (and obligation) to not let

through people who had no documents or who had travelled through areas where the plague was *heard of* being present. They had to abandon their primary skilled work to take turns as such border guards whose social power was elevated above the incoming travelers. Thus, a shoemaker could have the right and duty not to let a well-known local aristocrat to return to Rome from his summer palace as he had no documents of health. The way in which any bureaucracy attains and maintains its crucial social power is by slight realignment of power relations—elevated the powerless into the powerful social control roles, feeding into their understanding of their greater power roles than before.[10]

Such radical local transformation of power needs social legitimization—which is achieved through intense communication messages using social representations that fixate the stated reason for the change and eliminate all possibilities of doubt in the application of the representation. The latter condition is especially powerful if personal existential conditions add nonconscious feelings of fear to the cementing of the message. Any potential health hazard or possibility of being attacked by some enemy sets such conditions up in a believable *and non-doubtable* form. An approaching epidemics of plague, cholera, or devastating virus are a particularly powerful ways. The redundantly communicated monological message "X is coming!" with the immediate connection of its danger masks the power transformations of the social institutions under a legitimate, believable social representation that triggers societal conformity mechanisms. The result supports for the changed social power conditions by the recipients of these conditions through conformity mechanisms. The persons in a community accept the actions in power roles by designated community "specialists" on the given occasion and begin to believe that their control actions save them all.

The highest levels of the societal hierarchy attempt to gain symbolic capital from the altered state of social order. In the Roman context of 1630—while the guild member grudgingly were manning the checkpoints into the town—the clergy and top level members of the community organized public processions through the city to various churches to pray against the plague. That individual persons turn to prayer under uncertainty is no surprise for the general psychological system of human beings, but bringing that activity out from the personal to the social drama domain of religious processions indicates the use of the public appearances in the collective defense ritual for self-promotion purposes. The theater of processions in the seventeenth century can be seen as similar to TV appearances of opinion deliveries at times of threatening conditions.

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[10] This mechanism seems to be a minimal version of the power assignment given to soldiers for 2 days after capturing a sieged city—"go, kill, and rob!". The soldiers with weapons are in complete local power control over the civilians. Here in the case of institutional use of select persons for community defense, a similar principle—"go, check, and act!"—seems to be in place. A neighbor carrying a weapon becomes perceived as power-holder in the eyes of his or her neighbors. If that neighbor also wears a symbol identifying one's political or administrative group membership—a uniform or an armband—the power differential is further accentuated.

For the individual persons whose lives are jeopardized by the anticipated or arrived rupture, the question of resistance becomes crucial. Of course everything is done in the societal power alteration system not to make resistance possible. Ottavio's example from Florence in 1630—described above—illustrates. By circumventing the social duties of medical doctors under the circumstances, Ottavio was required to report any suspected case of plague to the social authorities whose regular action was to separate the patient from the usual environment to avoid infection. Ottavio did not follow that order—and even worse—asked a fellow doctor to back up his claim his wife's health trouble was not that of plague—while it was blatantly obvious that it was. By hiding his wife from everybody—personally created condition of "secret quarantine"—he blocked the "public health" measures of sending all plague patients to special concentration hospitals from where the expected next step was that of the grave. By resisting and deceiving the authorities, Ottavio created the conditions for possible individual overcoming of the disease—in this case he was lucky. The goals of individual persons and public action systems set up by societal authorities become divergent under conditions of ruptures. No surprise that at the times of societal ruptures, the conformity mechanism of "no doubt" in the measures socially undertaken is intensified.

The "no doubt" state of affairs of the mind becomes carried over to inventions of imaginary miraculous solutions to the crisis. In the proliferation of rumors about dangers, culprits becomes combined to invented recipes for miraculous cures—by saints, healing rituals, and triggered beliefs in the institutional measures to cope with the problem. The religious orientation to life and death becomes accepted by people who have previously been non-believers in any supernatural cures.

Promotion of trust in the social measures against the health danger is often supported by popular science presentations to public:

> Visual depictions of disease agents play a dual role, providing a visible evocation of an invisible threat, and celebrating the modern scientific power that allows this visualization to occur. Animations and pictures of pathogens—often rendered in a manner that highlights the scientific production of images, as if through the microscope's lens or in situ in a petri dish—*render an otherwise imperceptible risk perceptible to the viewer in a way that symptoms of suffering patients do not*. In the post-germ theory era, animations of agents provide evidence of disease and of modern medical science's ability to identify, manipulate, and destroy it It also confers a reality effect: these germs are real, they are there, we can see them, they move. *And if the germs are real, then they must conclude that the disease is real, the bioweapon is real and the threat is real* (King, 2015, p. 195, added emphasis).

New social representations become linked with previously available ones and fortify the social role of science in the crisis situation. Science becomes translated into popular forms with added affect to the social representations used in the coverage of the actual threat.

Institutional Inserts into Fields of Anxious Anticipation

Periods of anxiety are arenas for opportunity for the social ideologies to strengthen their grip of the minds of individuals. These ideologies need such self-fortification. Social power holders in any society—be it considered "democratic" or "totalitarian" —fully depend on the cooperation of the people who are subservient to them. Even the social role of such subservience requires an act of cooperation—the power assertion "you are my slave!" needs to be complemented by the corresponding "I am (happily-reluctantly-unhappily-hatefully) your slave!". Human power relations are asymmetric—yet the asymmetry depends on coordination of both sides.

This coordinated subordination is a fragile dynamic state—the power relations can easily be reversed through riots, revolutions, or legal-political power reorganizations. Hence the power holders need to maintain the current power status in the ongoing flow of everyday life. The regular maintenance systems of the existing power relations are bureaucratic institutions that set up the rules and regulations for neutralizing any minor possibilities for change and streamlining the possibilities of allowable social change. Yet that might not be sufficient—simultaneously, it is necessary for the power holders to detect and block the upcoming efforts to change the power structure. Secret services of any government specialize in these surveillance and neutralization acts.

However, some potential settings for power balance change emerge unexpectedly and may capture the whole societies. Epidemics, floods, famines, wars, and other events that involve the whole society and threaten the very basics of the survival of all lead to new necessities of the social power holders to enter into the catastrophic fields of societal survival in self-assumed leadership positions. Under the threat for health caused by the spreading of a virus, the government health services take upon themselves the leadership role in confronting the challenge. That role takeover is agreed upon by the anxious public and leads to the introduction of various "measures" that all fit the domain of rationality in the minds of the increasingly anxious populace (e.g., the efforts in Rome in 1629–1632 to prevent plague, described above). The "measures" are rational—yet their introduction involves a legitimate looking power assertion ("we do X for your protection!"). By such assertions, the role of the social power holder is solidified in ways that are not to be doubted—since the "measures" introduced are expected to work for all people at a time of heightened uncertainty (Fig. 5.2).

The institutional inserting of the social power takes place at the high times of felt uncertainties by way of obligatory following of new rules that lead to the establishment of new social rituals. All these are made socially and personally legitimate by subsuming them under the social representation of HEALTH that cannot be doubted in its value and existential importance.

The War to Capture the **Psyche**: *Destruction of Semiotic Resources*

There are two kinds of wars. First there is the explicit war—destroying human opponents directly by bombs, hellebards or automatic rifles, looting properties, and ending up control over populations and territories. These wars find their presentations in history textbooks as glorious wins for some generals under whose leadership in a particular battle large numbers of fighters perished.[11] This massive carnage is usually not given its existential implication outside of its political framing.

   The second kind of war involves attacks on symbols and worship places revered by some group of people that the current power holders attempt to capture. The war here is aimed at conquering the affective and subjective adherence of the populace to these symbols, and destroying temples, churches, mosques or their forceful limitation,[12] burning of flags, books, or book writers in public ceremonies are all examples of the captures of the territories of human subjectivities. We can call it a ***lateral attack*** on the subjective domains—a devastation of object, person, or tradition X that are deeply appreciated by people—in ways accessible to them by perception *but not directly* attacking them. The object of the attack is the internalized deep subjectivity that cannot be directly argued with by intruders. Instead, the

Fig. 5.2 Institutional inserts at moments of increasing anxieties

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[11] For example, the major battle of Napoleonic era—the *Völkerschlacht* at Leipzig between the French and the coalition of six European states (the "battle of the nations") on October 16–17, 1813, in 2 days resulted in 73,000 casualties the French (out of 225,000) and of the coalition lost 54,000 out of 380,000. These numbers speak of rapid major carnage of many human beings for the sake of glory of their generals whose role in the winning of the battles would be later emphasized in glorious ways in history books. War destructions are remarkably easily turned into heroic narratives of symbolic kinds.

[12] For example, limiting the height of the church or mosque towers to the level of other buildings in the locality.

lateral attack sets the stage for internally traumatized deep subjectivity—resisting, neutralizing, trying to forget (and failing to do so), and finally conforming to the superimposed social rules.

Making tragedies into public events is a widespread method of lateral attacks over centuries. Turning the acts of public executions—or gladiator games in Roman amphitheaters or human fights with bulls—into social events where the audience is expected to observe the act of *move from life to death of some others*—is a powerful psychological vehicle for the interior selves of the living. Not only is the act of killing perceivable—as it would be in case of occasional bystanders of bar fights, battlefields, or traffic accidents—but *enforced and encouraged spectator role* of the legal pre-legally prescribed loss of life (or premeditated murders?) in public contexts.[13]

The reasons for undertaking lateral attacks are usually ideological and political—but played out on the deep subjectivities of the ill-defined group of bystanders who are the targets. These attacks of devastation or modifications of the existing meaningful places or objects fit the nature of the assumed "enemy" the presence of whom cannot be precisely located. Like in the case of virus spreading in a population, a new religious belief system or political ideology may be spreading in a populace without clear borders of its proliferation. Its distribution cannot be stopped on the outer borders of the population as these borders are not known. What is, however, known are the central semiotic resources the new ideologies use—temples, insignia, images of deities, monuments, relics, books, and other encoding of the new ideologues into the public material world. These are revered by the new adherents to the new ideology—hence, these become the prime target for the lateral warfare. By devastating the symbolically relevant places, the ideologies of these places are traumatically subdued in the affective domains of their followers.

In Palmyra (nowadays in Syria) in years 385–388 AD, the Roman perfect of the Oriental part of the Empire devastated the "pagan" temple to Baal, where the lunar god Aglibol and Bel were worshipped. This was part of the Roman by now Christian campaign to eradicate the "pagan" religious beliefs from the minds of the local people. The ruins of the temple remained until the "Islamic State" in its own turn in 2015 demolished them (by now considered "patrimony of humanity") again in the fight for its own political control over the minds. It took the newly converted Roman Christianity further six centuries to consolidate its power through the negotiations of the role of religious images.

The Christian animosity toward the "pagan" cult of Baal had its roots already in the Bible and illuminated the discussions about religious transformations in the European societies in the sixteenth century. In 1565, in the middle of the

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[13] The public theatrical function of devastation can be enacted with purposeful avoidance of killing while destroying the non-killed opponent's property can be observed in the act of bulldozing the houses of the families of the "enemy." The latter is prewarned about the planned demolishing action thus giving the chance of the opponent and her or his family to escape, while their home is destroyed by the bulldozer sent in at the preset time as a purposefully traumatizing spectacle for all others living in the given neighborhood.

iconoclastic disputes in the low countries—but before the actual start of iconoclasm in 1566, the Dutch painter Martin Heemskerck recovers the topic by depicting the Biblical story of demolishing the Temple of Baal (Fig. 5.3). Like most of his contemporaries, Heemskerck with his preference for Catholic faith had to negotiate it in his public work with the upcoming Protestant sentiments in his native Haarlem. The Biblical story became an allegorical warning against the destruction of religious traditions.

Fig. 5.3 The destroying of the Temple of Baal (engraving by Cornelis Cort in 1565 after Maarten van Heemskerck—Saunders, 1978, p. 73)

It is not only the depiction of devastation but also that of humiliation of the deities in the temple that the artist emphasized here. To depict a boy urinating into the mouth of already decapitated sculpture (lower right corner of Fig. 5.3) adds insult to the injury. The depiction of the Temple of Baal 12 centuries after the event could have happened was of course an allegorical commentary on the religious infighting that happened in the low countries in the sixteenth century where the attacks on the Catholic religious icons were of central feature of the political fight.

Iconoclasms as a Public "Spiritual Health" Measures

Visual images have been ambivalent in the human history—depiction of the assumed image of a deity has at times been ruled out as dangerous to the powers of the deities. This *iconoclastic* attitude has been tempered by its opposite—focus on the visual images of the deities as enhancing their symbolic powers—*iconophilia*. If the former orientation refrains depicting the images of powerful supernatural beings so as to fortify their all-present role without a referent, then the latter accomplishes the same empowering function by way of creating and presenting to the public symbolic visual images that trigger belief in their power by imagination[14] and extended rituals. The latter may be scripted to take place in symbolic locations in churches, or through the processions of carrying the images of the deities through the public space.[15]

The paradox about the use of visual images of powerful deities is straightforward: as the believers believe in their omnipotency, they need to believe in their capacity to observe each and every moment in the believer's life. That would require an "invisible eye"—a potent device that cannot be located in the believer's visually observable surroundings. This invisible potency would be diminished if an image of the all-powerful deity is created and set up in that visual space. Two issues arise—since the deity is invisible, how can anybody know that *this particula*r image of the deity is authentic? Secondly, if it is at least in some sense close to reality (which no one can prove), it diminishes the invisible omnipotence of the deity because his or her invisibility has now been given a visible form. Such reduction of the potency of the deity amounts to undermining the beliefs of the believers and is thus considered unacceptable. Hence the created images need to be eliminated—and iconoclasm is the solution.

In the case of iconophilia, the opposite meaning construction leads the believers to honoring and defending the iconic images. Since nobody has directly observed the omnipotency of the deity, some version of linking an image of the deity with that of the believers is needed—not merely in imagery but also in actions. Hence, the various images of the deities—from Christian saints to Ganesa—are not only produced as images but also attributed the powers to make miracles. The images are honored in many ways—they are interlocutors in personal prayers; they are adorned with gifts, they are evoked as imaginary companions with concrete forms in everyday lives, and they can be carried around in public processions to both demonstrate their power in the present and enhance their power through rituals. The iconic visibility of the images works to fortify the powers of belief precisely because their visibility grants them the special place in the belief systems. Nobody is bothered by the fact that the deities have never been encountered in reality—the authenticity of their iconic forms is pushed out of consideration.

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[14] Martin Luther was positive about images—if these help the inner religious conviction by triggering imagination then they are useful. In contrast, John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli completely denied images.

[15] In the secular political domains, it is the military parades that take over the function of collective evocation of symbolic power.

As polar opposites in concrete actions, iconophobia and iconophilia were actually sharing the major goal—guaranteeing the religious-spiritual order of the omnipotency of the deities. Instead of accepting the possibility of two pathways of relations with the shared goal, the opposing but mutually united directions became disconnected and ended up in direct conflict—as an act of linearization of the normally curvilinear organization (Fig. 5.4).[16]

For example, John of Damascus (675–753) argued against the images:

> …it is impossible to make an image of the immeasurable, uncircumscribed, invisible God. You have not seen the likeness of Him, the Scripture says… Being therefore the offspring of God, we must not suppose the divinity to be like unto gold, or silver, or stone, the graving of art, and device of man (Acts, 17.29. cited via Gregory, 2011).

Ambivalent relations with images of deities have been present worldwide since the times of Ancient Egypt (3000 years BC). Different societal systems in China and India from ancient times to the present (e.g., the destroying of the Bamyan Buddhas by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and attacks on historical treasures by the "Islamic State" in Syria) have turned the semiotic resources into objects of destruction.

Two major waves of iconoclastic wars on images have taken place in the Occidental societies characterized by the religious framing of human lives by Christianity. First of all were the anti-pagan moves undertaken by Christian Roman emperors in the fourth century AD—in the societal turmoils of a civil war and power struggles. Secondly, we have evidence of the elimination of images of the deities in the Byzantine Eastern Christian history of the eighth and ninth century AD. Thirdly, the times of Reformation in Europe in the sixteenth century led to systematic devastation of the images in churches by the hordes of followers of the Swiss religious actors Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) and Johannes Calvin (1509–1564). The

Fig. 5.4 Linearization of curvilinear order leading to conflict

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[16] The notion of curvilinearization (Valsiner, 2018) pertains to systemic organization of nature and psyche that renders the presence of linear contrasts a rare case.

social purification of churches in the sixteenth-century European iconoclasms was on the one hand the ideological outcomes of the theological meaning constructions of what "the presence" of Christ means in the course of religious rituals, and on the other—it was a political power struggle.

The Byzantine Iconoclasms

The Byzantine Empire has given history two mutually related periods of iconoclasm—from 726 AD to 787 AD and 814 AD to 842 AD—during which Christian humanoid figures were removed from public domains and replaced by simple crosses. So for over a century, the internal politics of the Eastern Roman Empire led to the social actions of removing the images and restoring them to their places in the end—in both cases terminated by female Empresses coming to power.[17] The pope in Rome never supported the removal of the images—it was a topic in the development of the schism between the Western (Catholic) and Eastern (Byzantine) Christianity.

The Emperor Leo III has been viewed as introducing the anti-symbols actions in the 726 AD and following them later until his death in 741. His son continued the policy. The roots for the fight against symbols were not theological but sociopolitical—military losses to neighbors (attributed to ill will of deities), as well as intrasocietal squirmishes are the usual reasons for the lateral war efforts. The replacement and demolishing of icons comes first, possibly followed by similar efforts toward the persons who venerate the icons.

The second Byzantine iconoclastic period started quarter of a century later (814 AD) by the initiative of Emperor Leo V—again in the hope of restoring the military successes of his predecessors to the time of his reign. The internal disputes between iconoclasts and iconophiles continued during that period, leading—after two other emperors—to restoration in 843. Since then, the Eastern version of Christianity has been deeply iconographic—with all the sensuous nature of religious images emphasizing the imagery within the acts of believing.

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[17] In 787 AD, it was Eirini Sarantapechiana—the regent to her on Constantine VI who ordered the icons back to their places as a result of the Second Nicacean Council. Having been the wife of the iconoclast Emperor Leo IV but entertaining iconophilic beliefs in her private life, she had to hide from her husband. In 843 AD, the Empress Theodora—a secret iconophile after the death of her iconoclastic husband Theophilus. The iconophile <> iconoclast controversy seemed to find its place in the family lives of the highest—imperial—families.

European Reformation Iconoclasms

The sixteenth century in Europe brought with it a major psychological reorientation of the subjective worlds of human beings. While the religious system of the Catholic church that had dominated Europe from the fourth century onward had built its affective power on elaborate sensuous rituals that made use of imagination and externalized acts of devotion, the emerging varieties of Protestant Reformation transferred these practices inward into the subjective interiors of the believers.

The first iconoclastic movement happened in Wittenberg about 3 years after Martin Luther had started the Reformation protest. It exaggerated the Lutheran opposition to the Catholic creed—leading to Luther's own intervention to accept the images of Christ as cultural aids to intra-psychological religious meditation. Nevertheless, the iconoclastic fervent spread over Europe—aided by the reform efforts of Thomas Müntzer (1490–1525)[18] and Andreas Bodenstein Karlstadt (1486–1541) who in 1522 initiated the first iconoclastic removal of images from Wittenberg churches and led to the following destruction of icons all over the German-speaking area. Iconoclastic events took place in Zürich (1523), Basel, Strasbourg,[19] Copenhagen (1530), and Augsburg (1537), to be followed in the Netherlands in 1566 (with the *Beeldenstorm*—Fig. 5.5). The period between 1539s and 1560s was by no means quiet—the theological and sociopolitical interest groups negotiated the fate of religious icons from the perspectives of their social power.

Conclusions: Feeling Under Uncertainty

Human societies are theatrical arenas where uncertainty prevails. Such uncertainty is unavoidable—it comes from the regular recurrences of earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, epidemics, and famines on the one hand, and of wars, revolutions, economic austerities, and inter-religions squirmishes, on the other. Both the natural and social worlds are filled with uncertainties—which renders the permanently disquieting state of affairs in any society the norm rather than an exception.

Under these conditions, the adaptability of the human mind to constantly changing conditions becomes crucial for survival—not only psychological but also physical. Many aspects of everyday living are under control of the person—and the belief in their controllability is warranted. Yet the potential rapid and dramatic changes would not be—and the belief in their controllability would be grossly misplaced. The changes in society could be human-made (political power changes, religious conversions, etc.) or natural in kind—yet attributable to supernatural beings and forces. It is here where the necessity of coordination of different beliefs becomes

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[18] A Reformation preacher and leader of peasants uprising in 1525, fighting both the Catholic Church and Luther's Reformation

[19] Described in detail in Wandel (1995)

Fig. 5.5 *Beeldenstrom* (Frans Hogenberg, The Calvinist Iconoclastic Riot of August 20, 1566, in Antwerp—stripping of the Antwerpen Cathedral)

important—understanding of the limits of personal controllability of life events and conceptualization of the uncontrollable ones becomes important.[20]

The picture of controllability and noncontrollability looks a bit different from the side of societies—their hierarchies of social institutions. Social institutions can control political orders and religious rituals—but they cannot eliminate epidemics, pandemics, earthquakes, and famines. They nevertheless act as if they can—by introducing various "measures"—control over access, actions, and rituals—that are expected to capture the desires of persons for their existential certainty and—as a by-product—fortify the role of the institutions. The institutions also try—as they need to—to control the minds of the persons under their jurisdiction. Here they face the wall of resistances that ordinary persons use for the autonomy of their selves. Thus, the institutions need to use methods that can penetrate or bypass these resistance mechanisms. Since these resistances are affective in their core, the methods to penetrate them need to match their nature.

It is here where seemingly two different kinds of social dramas—fighting epidemics of plague (and other infectious diseases) and the lateral war on semiotic

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[20] In psychology, the individual-focused side of these processes is covered by Julian Rotters concept of internal versus external control beliefs introduced in the 1960s (see Bisgaard, 2020) and the two-process model of perceived control (Rothbaum et al., 1982) with the focus on primary versus secondary control beliefs.

resources in the iconoclastic fervents coincide. Both—from the institutions' perspective—are arenas for social action where their control over the souls of the persons can be fortified. By forcing persons to perform rituals to keep plague or other pandemics away and forcing person to observe the devastation of icons, they have been believing in creating the internalization "push" that disequlibrates the person's subjective domain forcing it to reconstitute in a new form.

Socially Pointed Obligatory *Einfühlung*—**Leading to Affective Surrender** How does the general process of affective surrender work? First of all, the social attention is directed toward a particular threatening object—an epidemic that is possibly arriving, ideologies considered "socially dangerous" that can spread in the given populace, or an "enemy" group to be socially stigmatized. That directed social attention is turned into monologized form—no doubt about the nature of the object as threatening is allowed.

Secondly, the presentation of the object is set in overwhelmingly threatening affective frame. The epidemic that might arrive threatens everybody; the morally wrong ideas that spread among the populace can debilitate the whole society, or the stigmatized outsiders are blamed for any heinous sins imaginable. The persons whose attention is in the designated object are expected to feel into it (*Einfühlung*) not only from a particular affective standpoint but from such standpoint of overwhelming affective opposition to the object. For that, the object is presented with exaggerated social dramatism— its dangers are exaggerated both in cognitive and affective terms—allowing the condemnatory affective tone only in the *Einfühlung* of the populace.

Thirdly, the persons are left to themselves in feeling through the affective conclusions from the dramatic experience. This happens in the innermost layer of their self-system (see Fig. 5.6) in which the hyper-generalized feeling of affective surrender is expected to become cultivated. This overwhelming feeling of surrender is expected to mark the move of the person from primary control beliefs to those of secondary control (Rothbaum et al., 1982)—the person, left at loss under the uncertainty, is expected to align oneself with the powerful authority of the institutions in the hope of survival from the danger. The critical issue here is the precise direction of control belief transfer to the secondary control mechanisms, rather than relinquishing control in general. The latter would lead to panic that breaks down the community, while the institutional goal is to unite the panic in the service of the actions provided by the institution. The health authorities during an epidemic provide a set of ordinary symbolic devices (e.g., "wash your hands!") that become mandatory ways to cope with the illness even if it is clear these can practically have no impact. The political authorities provide moral and political security to the populace by burning heretics and their books in public ceremonies.

Figure 5.6 provides a theoretical account of how the internalization-externalization processes of persons operate under pointed societal guidance. The scheme is a synthesis of the three-layer internalization <> externalization scheme with that of George Herbert Mead's focus of turning to the Social Other for feed-in into the Self. While in its usual form, the "Social Other" is presented as societal framework

Fig. 5.6 Achievement of human existential surrender under conditions of ritualization of affective uncertainty

without explicit direction toward the person (possibility, but not obligation, to take social roles), then here the social-institutional input is precisely directed ("you *must* act in way X and observe Y!"). The goal here is to provide an affective "shock"—disequilibrating the *psyche* of the person in the hope of letting it reconstruct its innermost (Layer III) subjective domain in the direction specified by the institutional interests. It is the secondary control belief mechanisms—aligning the personal control systems with the "powerful other" of the given society—that is at stake. Social institutions set up recurrent conditions for socializing the **primacy of the secondary control mechanisms** at times of personal feelings of uncertainty and fear. Despite the nominal proliferation of the value of the primary control beliefs, no society could function without such primacy of the secondary control belief systems. The societal ideal of the control beliefs is the case where the person oneself believes that she or he independently (=primary control) aligns oneself with the societal agendas (=secondary control). The production of hyper-generalized fatalistic affective field catalyzes the acceptance of power assertions.

Silent Fatalistic Obedience as a Secondary Control Mechanism Even if it seems paradoxical, obedience to authority is not a passive giving up of one's efforts to control one's life, but a sophisticated secondary control (Rothbaum et al., 1982) mechanism that turns one's alignment with powerful others into a way of enhancing

one's own power belief. Society is filled with examples of vicarious control as one aligns with others:

> … as the child who proudly asserts "my daddy is stronger than your daddy," the adolescent cult member whose perception of control rests squarely in the hands of his or her demagogue leader, the ultratraditional housewife who derives a sense of power from the union with her husband, and the regional chauvinistic follower of sports heroes (Rothbaum et al., 1982, p, 20).

The disquiet of a society is a necessary condition for its social control. Human beings are confronted with uncertainties—natural or socially created—to make their small scale affectively disequilibrated states to be directed in socially desired directions. The beautiful paradox of the personal freedom is its guidance by society—utilizing the moments of felt uncertainty—into which the meanings of social order are inserted.

Further Thinking Topics
1. Discuss the trust in public health authorities during pandemia.
2. Discuss the illusion "we are in control" during the spread of infectious diseases.
3. Discuss the importance of promotion of "no doubts" thinking for social control.
4. How do institutional inserts of social representations regulate both triggering and overcoming personal anxieties?
5. Social functions of iconoclasms.
6. Discuss linearization and curvilinearization of the human mind.
7. How does human existential surrender work in the human self?
8. The primacy of secondary control mechanisms in human adaptation to the disquiet.

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Part III
Societal Framing: Demand, Direction and Catalysis

Chapter 6
Constructing Loyalties: Dialogues Between Rights and Duties

Albrecht Dürer − Feet of a kneeling apostle

Contents

Human societies are complex webs of mutual obligations organized by the power relations between the participating actors. Yet behind their enormous complexities, all societies come to the simple basic hierarchical order (Fig. 6.1).

Figure 6.1 is purposefully simplified to its minimum. The "Supreme Leader" can be any person (emperor, king, queen, president, etc.) or social group[1] (parliament, party, "advisory" or "executive" board). The legislative branch sets up the system of rules by which the society is organized, while the executive branch carries out the legislation. The populace is the recipient of the governing rules that are promoted as their duties. In one or another form—from adhering to public discipline to paying taxes—the populace is expected to be loyal to the "Supreme Leader" (which could take a hyper-generalized form that includes "democracy" or "revolution" aside from any person in power). Social power operates through establishing rule systems that are required to be followed by the populace as their duties. At some moment in the histories of the human societies, a selective set of rights is made possible on the basis of the normative rules—duties relation. Sometimes the rights for something can be turned into duties to operate on these rights.[2]

By starting from the assumption of asymmetry in normal social power relations—a seemingly "undemocratic" stance where both "autocratic" and

Fig. 6.1 The minimal political order of a society

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[1] The "Supreme Leader" role can also be played by the New Global Super-Rich—who in the globalizing world acquire massive economic resources as they operate across countries and continents—with the grip of economic control that surpasses those of individual countries. Such social power is anonymous as it operates through guiding the façade democratic processes towards necessary but irrelevant societal decisions, keeping control over the crucial ones (Moghaddam, 2018, pp. 57-62)

[2] Consider countries where the right to vote in an election is turned into duty to do so (e.g., Spain)—also via making voting mandatory (e.g., Brazil).

"democratic" political systems are equally involved[3]—I here try to point to psychology's inevitable embeddedness within the social realities of societies, and the political interests within these societies. This is an area of no elaboration within psychology[4]—yet it is of basic necessity for a general psychology that starts from higher psychological functions.

Social Power in Its Emergence

How do social power relations emerge? Two otherwise similar persons need to enter into an asymmetric relation with each other—"I am I and you are you and I am not only different from you *but also superior to you*." If viewed from a trans-generational perspective, such asymmetry is already biologically preset—as the young offspring of the *Homo sapiens* require long time to learn the preexisting ways of their societies. These power relations constitute a complex variety of forms—for the same person these may differ inside the family (with mother, father, versus with siblings) and in the public domain (with the ice cream seller or beggar versus a policeman—in the street. The first episodes of "temper tantrums" of 2-year olds are in the beginning of negotiating power relations once one grows up, and adolescent defiance along the personal ways of becoming participants in street demonstrations later in life course. The personal feelings into having to negotiate such relations can vary—a mother may be in tears while punishing her revolting child, but a judge may send a dissident to a political regime to years in prison without any compassion. The whole spectrum of power relations is differentially affected.

In her childhood memoirs, the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi remembers how she and her brother struggled with the power of the parents to be given what to them seemed to be the basic human right—to go out to cinema. Her brother could achieve it by creating a scandalous local drama, but Fatima herself could not bring herself to join him in such extensive dramatization. Their mother herself taught her children to "stand out" for their own rights. However, that teaching was context specific:

> But whenever I threw myself on the floor and started screaming at her, she would stop me on the spot. "I did not say you ought to rebel against me! You should rebel against all the others, but you still have to obey your mother. Otherwise it would lead to a chaos. And in any case you should not rebel stupidly. You ought to carefully consider the situation, and analyze everything. Rebel when you know there is some chance you may win" (Mernissi, 1994, p. 117)

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[3] Social hierarchies exist in any society—"democratic" or "autocratic"—the difference is only how they are formed and how they can change (Toelstede, 2020).

[4] As Teo and Afsin 2020, p. 168) have pointed out, "Scientific psychology has hardly contribute to an understanding of power and its connection to subjectivity. Most of the work that addresses power differential that exists in the world, in structures, between psychologies, or even the power of psychology, individualization, responsibilization, or governmentality, has emerged from the psychological humanities and other social sciences."

There is much in political actions in societies that can be learned from the wisdom of Fatima Mernissi's mother. Her wisdom carries over from the family framework to that of political processes in societies. Of course there is uncertainty decision to act may be displaced and ends in failure. Many of the street demonstrations and lootings of the properties that happen to be on the way end up being inconsequential for societal change. Revolutions that topple previous authoritarian regimes in the name of liberation end up reorganizing themselves into yet another similarly authoritarian regime. This is the basic paradox of revolutions—toppling a king in the name of revolution ends up with an emperor, or that of a czar by the almighty general secretary of a party and eventually—a new czar under the label of "president."

Formation and Maintenance of Social Power

How are social norms maintained? Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harre have introduced the concepts *carriers* and *reductons*[5] to illustrate the subtlety of the maintenance process of maintenance of the social order by minimal acts of everyday conduct. Carriers—cultural tools that are meant to support social order—include multitudes of reductons in their action frameworks. An example of a formalized carrier is the Catholic mass:

> The mass consists of many different reductons, integrated in a way that is meaningful, but also dynamic in the sense that the mass may change, but the entire body of action/acts itself could still be recognized over generations. Ballet is another example of a fairly formalized carrier, of all sorts of conventions and assumptions not only about deportment but also about social role (Moghaddam et al., 1997, p. 132).

In a similar vein, all kinds of recurrent situated activity setting (e.g., dining out in a restaurant, watching football, going to a cinema or theatre, peripherally participating in street fiestas, etc.) perform the functions of carriers. They both solidify the social order and create arenas for its transformation.

Carriers often are symbolic objects with which our *Umwelts* are filled, like various relics, monuments (elaborated in Chap. 8), special books (the Bible, the Quran, the "red book" of Chairman Mao), and flags:

> The Stars and Stripes [US flag] is in presuppositions of service, 'duty to the republic' or 'duty to the country'. The cross is a symbolic carrier for a great deal of Christian doctrine and practices…
> … Revolutionaries are not unaware of the power of even the most seemingly innocuous symbol. For example the western tie and shirt was banished during revolutionary eras in

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[5] *Reductons* (in analogy with *protons* in physics) are minimal social practices that fulfill the maintenance of the social order (Moghaddam & Harre, 1996). Rules of politeness in everyday interaction perform that role. As reductons are very ordinary and habitual acts, they are overlooked in large schemes of social order maintenance and change—yet it is exactly the world of ordinary things where social change begins (Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997, p. 358). Our life environments are semiotically encoded and oversaturated to support the maintenance of the social order.

China and Cambodia and is still condemned in Iran decades after the 1979 revolution, (Moghaddam et al., 2000, p. 280).

Any object can acquire personal symbolic value—become a symbolic resource (in terms of Tania Zittoun)—and it is precisely because of that that social power holders attempt to capture the *psyche* of the person to make these objects ideologically salient. Thus,

> Physical entities, such as flags and standards, ensure that these values, attitudes, and norms are safeguarded and communicated across generations. At a basic level, these representations facilitate collective remembering since they anchor the present to the past by fixating on a specific symbolic aspect of our group's history…*These are concrete mechanisms through which macro societal processes become wedded to meso group-level processes and micro individual-level processes* (Jaspal et al., 2016, p. 272, added emphasis).

The move from macro-level societal ideologies through ideological flavoring of meso-level human activities to the micro-level personally felt-in constructions of themselves is the route via which loyalties are being negotiated. Symbolic inserts can be found everywhere in our societies. They are not limited to cloth and clothing. In the eighteenth-century Europe in conjunction with the opening of porcelain factories in various countries, France, Austria, and Prussia established their own trademarks in creating highly illustrated pottery and miniature figurines made out of clay (see descriptions of such small monuments in Chap. 8). Things very big and very small can become symbolic inserts in relation to which new meaning systems are developed and old ones maintained.

The Basic Unit of Psychological Functions: The *Gegenstand*

All the moves from macro- to micro-level in any society involve resistance from the adjacent levels. Resistance is the basis for all form emergence, and the basic notion of *Gegenstand theorie* of Alexius Meinong in the late nineteenth century Graz is the foundation for all gestalt-making. The basic notion is simple and takes the form →‖ where a particular direction (→) of movement encounters a resisting border (‖)—whatever might be its precise form. Figure 6.2 provides us with a structure of **Triple Gegenstand** that fits human psychological processes. This structure includes the direction toward and encounter with the border—together with reflection upon the act/the meaning of "triple").

The human case entails social guidance of the counterforce that maintains the barrier (red arrow in Fig. 6.2). The person is aware—implicitly or explicitly—of the social norms that represent the border and its possible crossing points (A,B). The borders—social norms—are built up and maintained in joint work of the person and the immediate social others around. This makes the borders both rigid and changeable all the time—structure and its change are organized in "liquid" way.

Fig. 6.2 The basic structure of Triple *Gegenstand*

Liquid Societies and Cultural Carriers

Symbolic carriers are signs which stand in for some particular—normative—way of organizing social life. Hence, it is not surprising that in efforts to change society, it is these carriers that are attacked, replaced, or desecrated first (see Chap. 5 on iconoclasm, and Chap. 8 for removal of monuments).

Globalization of the human collectivity leads to the transformation of the previously well-established forms of societies into "liquid" forms. As Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out:

> From the sovereign rule-setter, stern protector of the game's fairness and the sworn advocate of the victims of unfair moves, 'society' has turned into one of the players. Like the rest of the players, it keeps its cards close to its chest and hides the intentions behind a poker-face, cheating on occasion and deploying surprise as the most common strategy. *Society stands now for those invisible, untouchable and inscrutable entities that carry obscure names like 'world finances', 'global markets', 'international investors', 'competitiveness' of 'efficiency' and circle their orbits removed light years away from the field of daily practices*: entities that are able, nevertheless, to turn upside down, overnight, and without warning, the daily routines on which daily life foremost of us rests (Bauman, 2002, p. 23, added emphasis).

Traditional borders of societies have been penetrated—even if their political-administrative limits may remain intact. A "supreme leader" (see Fig. 6.1) may rely to the "needs of efficiency" or "global market demands" in substantiating one or another rule that is being introduced in society. The power structures become camouflaged by the dynamic flow of societal communication messages that Zygmunt Baumann has called *liquid modernity*:

> Liquid modernity may be characterized as a state in which the important oppositions which constituted the framework of early, solid modernity have been cancelled: oppositions between creative and destructive arts, between learning and forgetting, between forward and backward steps (Bauman, 2007, p. 121).

Bauman's focus on liquidity of our contemporary societies may fit the manifest hypervariable picture of all the people adhering to vastly different directions in the infotainment society. Yet in critical transition moment in societal crises, the basic rules of social power models return—the society in transition becomes *disliquified* and operates by the very basic military, legal, and propaganda rules that have been in place over centuries. Personally constructed ideations—beliefs and delusions— that during the liquid state of a society are left to the rights of the persons as part of their individuality, become in crisis times ideologically contested and appropriated to the use of societal transitions. Figure 6.3 illustrates that contrast. Under ordinary conditions of society, the border to psychopathological and ideological "otherness" is set up allowing ordinary worries to grow into various versions of delusions which may resolve themselves (Fig. 6.3a). A person who compulsively washes hands and cleans doorknobs before opening a door would pass under ordinary circumstances as a weird actor close to psychopathological states of affairs.

All that change under extreme conditions (e.g., epidemics or pandemics—Chap. 5). The social normative system now supports the compulsive psychological acts like repetitive handwashing, or cleaning of surfaces becomes socially normative (Fig. 6.3b). Ordinary people who have previously never acted in delusional way are now guided to act, thus, under the meaning system of "maintenance of safety" under the given conditions. In the COVID-19 pandemia in 2020, the propaganda for hand-washing, social distancing, and wearing of face masks led to the positive social normativity of forms of conduct that otherwise would be considered indications of compulsive psychopathology or just personal idiosyncracy.

Need for societally relevant delusions becomes obvious at the times of cries epidemics, wars, etc. The generalized anxieties of individuals that otherwise would be left to run their own course become mobilized in the service of the societal action— viewing somebody I do not know as an "enemy" is a delusion of my own during peacetime, while during wartime, I am guided toward finding out whether any new person I meet might belong to that category. Suspicion and vigilance are the results—my anxieties that lead to my personal delusions (Fig. 6.3a) are now brought into service for the society (Fig. 6.3b). Likewise, the propagation of identity feelings ("patriotism") is an example of such socially supported delusions.

How Social Control Is Possible?

The particular semiotic mechanism used in society to make such delusions possible is depicted in Fig. 6.4. The basic unit of human psychological functioning—the *Gegenstand* (Fig. 6.2 above and its simple form Fig. 6.4.1) involves active self-generated movement toward some objective (border)—is depicted as A. As

A. Under ordinary conditions

B. during perceived crisis times

Fig. 6.3 Extension of the societal control efforts over minds under ordinary and crisis situations (**a**) under ordinary conditions (**b**) during perceived crisis times

Fig. 6.4 Societal constraining of personal *Gegenstand*

Gegenstand, such direction always involves a counter-direction (non-A) that forti-
fies the border toward which A is striving. Very ordinary everyday, small dilemmas
("I want to open the window, but it seems too cold outside") or basic existential
question to myself ("I really want to marry that other person but I am not sure of his/
her intentions towards me") are our ordinary life dilemmas. Under socially sensitive
crisis situations, our conduct is such dilemma situations can be turned into decisive
monological personal perspective where either the non-A part is diminished or
eliminated (Fig. 6.4.2) or amplified (Fig. 6.4.3). In both cases, our minds become
controlled by the societal guided inputs on our own free will. We are the agents who
feel and act—but the conditions for A <> non-A relations—dealing with doubt—are
altered by the socially introduced norms and obligations.

Thus, when the possibility of doubt in Fig. 6.4.2. is eliminated by social blocking
of the generation of the non-A counterpart, the person marches courageously toward
A. Volunteering to enter the army during wartime ("it is my duty to defend my
country!") or a suicide mission squad ("it is my duty to liberate us from those infi-
dels!") are personal acts resulting from the removal of the non-A part of the
Gegenstand. The result is directly self-reflexive[6] following orders by the power

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[6] Harald Welzer in his analysis of a Nazi concentration camp leader reaches an important conclu-
sion—the atrocities committed were based on a strict and ideologically accepted moral codes
which—obviously—were diametrically opposite to our preferred peacetime and non-conflict
moral codes: "The question is not how the erosion or overcoming of moral inhibitions can explain

holders in the society or community and carrying out of atrocities against symbolic objects (see Chap. 5 on iconoclasms) or other human beings (holocaust, genocides, execution of captured war prisoners, torturing the "enemies," etc.).

Elimination of the doubt is the primary social pathway to social exploitation of individual human beings in the service of various goals coated in hyper-generalized ideological goals ("eradicating Anabaptists"-see Chap. 1; destroying objects of cultural value; "building communism," etc.).

The second—diametrically opposite—pathway to the control of the active personal mind is to amplify the non-A component of the *Gegenstand*—by suggestions that *escalate the doubts* so that the directed toward A becomes diminished or blocked so that the person actively gives up the initial direction. Most of the "social media" opportunities of today are widely available for that mission—gossips and "fake news" enter into the psychological system of already doubting person in ways that would lead to control of the person by way of such escalated doubt. To continue the examples from above, the everyday mundane action becomes fortified by linking it with a media message ("I want to open the window, but it seems too cold outside, *and I just heard winter storm warning on the radio*"). The life-existential example becomes elaborated as ("I really want to marry that other person but I am not sure of his/her intentions towards me, and *everybody these days talks of violence in married couples once people get married*").

What unifies the two pathways in the "mind control" by the societal power holders is the recognition that modification of the surrounding of the intention of the agentive Self ("I want to do A!") can happen only in the periphery of the A <> non-A system—in the non-A domain.

Thus both proliferation and elimination of personal doubts are the major mechanisms for achieving control over the person's free will through modification of the subdominant—yet relevant—part of the dialogical system (non-A). If A is socially wanted, the doubt in the opposite can be suppressed. Under the particular circumstances, the social norm system outlaws the right to consider an opposite possibility—when somebody is designated as "enemy," the populace is not allowed to doubt that designation. When, on the contrary, A is not socially desired, the doubt in it (non-A) can be fortified.

As a result, the *person feels his or her duty* to act in the socially mandated ways. The socially desired appropriation of the individual "free wills" into the service of the sociopolitical goals is thus accomplished—and new Verduns, Auschwitzes, or Srbenicas are ready to occur when circumstances call for those, in some parts of the world.

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perpetrator behavior; it is rather how particular moral commitments and principles gave the perpetrators a sense of moral integrity which enabled them to carry out the deeds they performed" (Welzer, 2004, p. 30).

Duties and Rights

Psychological focus on duties (Moghaddam et al., 2000) and rights (Moghaddam, 2000) is rather recent in the theoretical domain of the discipline. They are related—albeit in a complex way. Duties underpin and complement rights (Moghaddam et al., 2012) in a relationship that mutually compensatory. At crisis times, it is the rights that are easily suspended and duties made the central connection between society and persons. On the other side of relative affluence and seemingly egalitarian states of societies, the discourses of rights of various kinds are renegotiated. This dynamic of reduction and enhancement of each other in the rights <> duties system is a mechanism of societal organization.

The difficulty of developing these notions theoretically is their close connection to the everyday life terms. The legal concepts remain in-between the everyday and scientific uses, creating an illusion that a theory of duties and rights is transparent. The psychological mechanisms that lead to duty and discourses about rights (in persons) and their surrounding societal contexts are by far more complex than the simple labels we put at these phenomena. Table 6.1. illustrates the difference in the two kinds of organizational tools—while the rights are being claimed by persons in absolute terms (e.g., "I have the right to smoke!"), the duties become contextually circumscribed (e.g., "if you want to exercise your right to smoke you have the duty to do so in socially marked smoking cabins"). The interpersonally claimed duty to fight a duel if being offended was not supported by the rights to revenge in the nineteenth century (Fervert, 1995). This created a social tension in which the local *normative duties*—supported by implicit rules of honor that duel is a way to revenge—entered with the *black-letter duties*[7] that legally made dueling unlawful.

Table 6.1 Listing of rights and duties

Rights	Duties
Right to be	Duty to obey (conditional)
Right to live	Never to kill (conditional)
Right to play	Duty to study
Right to revenge	Duty to fight (duel, self-defense)
Right to eat	Feed yourself, children, and who is in need
Right for sexual satisfaction	Marital duties (conditional)
Right to be free	Respect others' needs
Animal rights	Not to harm animals
Human rights	Uphold dignity and respect for human needs

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[7]Moghaddam et al. (2000) distinguish between "…*normative duties*, which are informal and implicit, and *black-letter duties*, which are formal and explicit. Normative duties and their supporting carriers became an integral part of human societies well before the appearance of black-letter duties" (p. 282)

While it is possible to identify mutual pairs of rights and duties (as in Table 6.1.), from the perspective of finding out about the plasticity of the duties <> rights systems, it is those duties for which there are no corresponding rights, is important. A particular kind of duties of this characteristic is the *supererogatory*:

> These are duties an individual will be praised for performing, but not morally blamed for omitting (Moghaddam et al., 2000, p. 286).

From a developmental perspective, it is exactly those duties that are not yet fixed by rules and for which no corresponding rights have developed that are in the core of human social living. Under conditions of emergency in a society, these can be moved from "praised but nit required" category to the domain if "required and praised." The supererogatory duties are the area where the tightening and loosening of societal control over personal conduct takes place. The duty can become a socially emphasized and required right (e.g., rights of animals turned into law) which then becomes a socially fortified duty again—albeit at a new level of social demands.

Supererogatory Duties Turning into Normative Duties and the Role of Rights

The organization of duties includes a zone for "moral action"—acting in ways one is not required to but once a person does, it is praised for "doing good." These are supererogatory duties (Moghaddam et al., 2012)—they indicate the presence of implicit norms that have emerged in the history of the society and are "dormant guidelines" for innovative actions by persons on their own free will when such action is needed by somebody. These normative duties may become socially shared, get established as mandatory, and develop the evaluation system that not only praises these but also criticizes these if not an act is <u>not</u> carried out.

Consider a hypothetical example of passing by a beggar (Fig. 6.5) in an Italian old city. Your feelings under these circumstances enter into a deep—even if rapidly passing—dialogue "should I help this poor man?" <> "one cannot trust if the man is really a beggar." Let us assume the second voice wins, *and you pass by pretending not to see the beggar*—a very usual way of handling beggars and advertising promoters in public places.

You turn the corner and you are met by two local municipality workers who ask you:

> "Sorry, didn't you forget something?"
> —"No, what?" —
> "You missed the opportunity to make a donation to our city's suffering beggars' community."

You are probably surprised and offended by such municipal intervention into your private affairs. You continue your walk—but with less than complimentary thoughts about the town and the officials in it.

However, consider a second scenario. In that, the first part of your inner dialogue dominates ("I should I help this poor man!"), and I put a nominal sum of coins into

Fig. 6.5 A beggar in a street of a Southern Italian town

his outstretched palm. You move on, turn the corner, and are met by two local municipality workers who say you: "Thank you so much!"—"For what?"—"Your generous donation to our city's suffering beggars' community." You are socially— and institutionally (municipality)—praised for your <u>act which you did not need to do</u> (but did).

The completely hypothetical (and unrealistic) interventions by the municipal workers in these two scenarios indicate how the supererogatory duty is enacted based on the internal dialogue and doing good (Scenario 2) in contrast to turning the act of giving alms into a normative duty (Scenario 1).

Now, imagine that the evaluative tasks carried out by the "municipal workers" in public actually happened inside your own mind—with a third voice that enters into the unfolding dialogue being that of your personal "Supreme Leader"—who could be an imaginary authority figure—a parent, a deity, and a partner. By providing similar evaluations in these two scenarios ("you should have supported the beggar!"—"you did good by supporting the beggar!"), you are yourself setting the stage for a supererogatory duty becoming normative.

Are there counteractions possible to the move from supererogatory to normative duties? In the middle of this transition, you can invent a new right ("it is my right to donate my money to whomever I desire"). Formation of new normative duties happens through transformation of action plans following the supererogatory scenario to that of being normative. In the United States, in the twentieth and twenty-first century, adding a % of tip to the bill in restaurants had been established as a normative duty (even to the precision of 15%) as this was known to be major part of the waiter's income. In Europe, such tipping was for long time supererogatory (as the

waiters were known to have regular income) and completely up to the generous gesture of the client. Slowly, the practice of suggestion ("if you wish to add a tip, do X Y Z") enters into the interaction routines at the end of outings in restaurants. The result is similar to Scenario 1 above. Supererogatory duties become normative if that transition benefits the holders of social powers.

Making Supererogatory Duty into a Preventive Action

Supererogatory duties can become constructed as preemptive—based on predictions for the future. Becoming infected by a virus in the seasonal high time of infections leads the medical system to the duty of offering vaccination possibilities, and the patients' rights to refuse these. The latter rights are often violated when the social policies politically prescribe mandatory vaccinations of children against most likely dangerous diseases. Sometimes in political action, the notion of duties becomes used as legitimation of action based on power and dominance. If A dominates over B, it is possible to claim one's preemptive duty to act upon B to prevent some adverse effect from happening (the "Ahmadinejad effect"—Moghaddam, 2011). Here the borders of RIGHTS and DUTIES become purposefully blurred—the dominant (hence assured to act without counteraction) power can use the hybrid of DUTIFUL RIGHT to act in socially legitimized ways.

The making of the preemptive action based on the rights that become duties (and then are put into action) has been demonstrated in human societal history—from the decision of King Herodes to have all male offspring in his kingdom killed to avoid his assassination in the future (Fig. 6.6) to George W. Bush's launching of the 2003 Iraq invasion to eradicate the "weapons of mass destruction" that were believed to be in the armament of then dictator Saddam Hussein (Moghaddam, 2011, p.299). All the experts were sure, and the weapons were there. None were found.

Believing in oracles—and other experts—is dangerous. King Herod the Great (73 BC−4 AD)—according to the Biblical story included in Matthew (2,16–18)—gave the orders to kill all male children at the age of 2 or less in Bethlehem since an oracle had predicted that one of them will become the one to assassinate him. This preemptive act (even if is historical veridicality is in question) constitutes an example of how a despot can introduce a preemptive duty for destruction of growth potentials under the belief of potential danger in the future.

The theme of the Massacre of the Innocents remains present in the cultural history of Europe (Fig. 6.6) as an example of deep social injustice originating in "expert opinions" (oracles) and carried out by despotic social power. The social power creates and uses its own created right to act upon another social power—finding the cover of the rights to legitimize one's actions, if not escalate the social presentation as such as a duty.

Fig. 6.6 Massacre of Innocents (engraving by Johannes Sadeler, 1585)

Dynamics of Obedience and Non-Obedience in Society

Obedience is in all hierarchical social orders the duty for the subservient. It is a complex act that is based on temporary or permanent relinquishing of the control over one's own ways of living to those of somebody else.

> Society: YOU must do X! —it is your DUTY!!
> Person: Why must I do X ?!! (protest)—I have the RIGHT not to do X!

In this hypothetical example, we see resistance first—protest against the demand—which is then followed by obedience. The semiotic macro-organizers of DUTY and RIGHT enter into the sequence of actions as support for the claims of the will ("free will" of the ones with RIGHTS, and "determined will" for the one who uses DUTY as the rhetorical basis for demanding compliance. So, our hypothetical dialogue might continue:

> Society: You have the RIGHT to follow the DUTY to do X!
> Or even
> Society: You have the RIGHT to protest, but then you follow the DUTY to do X!

The person is left with very few options—(1) obey immediately, (2) obey by considering X one's duty, and (3) first protest—then obey. Societies differ as to how widely

the third option involving protest might be endorsed. The ones of "democratic" variety may allow it within a certain range of topics stopping on the border of the possible protests turning into revolutions. The "autocratic" kinds of societies may disallow public protests completely—while they cannot control intra-psychological resistances. The surveillance systems of secret services over the mindsets of citizens take the social regulation of opposition out of the public to the private domains.

Obedience is a socially non-neutral concept. In the history of psychology—social psychology in particular—we can find a number of empirical studies that allow us a glimpse into the processes that generate obedience in actions after varied presentations of the demands for it in the rhetoric domains. Here the classic trio of experiments by Solomon Asch (1956) on conformity to group suggestions (see detailed analysis in Valsiner, 2018, Chap. 7), Philip Zimbardo's "Stanford Prison Experiment" (Haney et al., 1973; Zimbardo et al., 2000), and Stanley Milgram's studies in the 1960s of obedience to civil authority (Milgram, 1974) constitute available raw materials for further investigation. Contrary to their authors' claims, these materials raise new questions for general psychology. First of all, these have been ethical—how could researchers like Milgram or Zimbardo subject their participants to conditions that defy human moral norms? Yet the bigger question remains—are their experimental studies revealing anything new in relation to what military and police commanders in any country in history knew in their practices already? Military discipline and cardinal punishments for its non-obedience have been central parts of making the fighting organizations function.

Experimental Social Psychology and the Study of Human Existential Phenomena Obedience and non-obedience are basic life features—moral stands and action possibilities—in any society under any circumstances. Ordinary life is filled with dramatic acts of both and equally accentuated ritual punishments of the non-obedient. Yet in the twentieth century social psychology that was obediently striving toward being considered "real science," such existential phenomena needed to be taken into laboratory context for "better control" of the "social variables." The concern with emulating "pure science" went through the work of Muzafer Sherif in boys' summer camps in the 1950s and in the classic laboratory study of conformity by Solomon Asch (1956). The research program on obedience grew out of this "take the world into a laboratory" tradition—as it resulted a sequence of studies on obedience, very active moral outcry about these studies, and the arrival of the studies in the status of "classics" in psychology. Stanley Milgram set up a laboratory setting of theatrical kind where one of the participants (the "naïve" person designated as "teacher") was instructed to teach the other—a confederate who acted out the role of the "learner") word pairs and administer punishment (electric shocks) if the answers were "wrong." The experimenter demanded that after each error, the size of the shock was to be increased independent of the feedback from the "learner." The setting was thus set up to bring the "teacher" increasingly into opposition with the unrelenting experimenter despite the possible harm the shocks were causing for the "learner." This way the microgenesis of the obedience<>non-obedience to the

authority figure (experimenter) could be studied.[8] Interestingly, it was not—despite the fact that relevant sequences of experimenter-subject interaction are reported in Milgram's classic book (Milgram, 1974).

When reviewed from the present perspective, the opposition obedience <> non-obedience remains only an external (and socially disputable[9]) feature of the microgenetic processes that we can see unfolding there. These processes are involved in negotiating the direction of actual action under the conditions of divergent demands. The demands here were set up by the experimental setting (demanding an act of bodily harm to the target "learner") and the meaning systems involved ("experiment," "free will," "heart condition"). Independent of whether a research participant followed the demands of the experimenter (around 70% did) or not—in both cases the processes of negotiating *under what conditions is it appropriate for me to carry out an act of causing bodily harm* to another human being. That negotiating process is universal—what is at stake here is not if I obey the authority figure's demand (or not) but how my Self reconciles such demands for action with my psychological system.

The particular person in Milgram's (1974, pp. 84–85) study selected for this example was a "non-obeyer"—a 31-year-old female medical technician—Gretchen—who had immigrated from Germany 5 years earlier. Her actions during the experiment were descried in this way:

> On several occasions, when the learner complains, he turns to the experimenter coldly and inquires "Shall I continue?". She promptly returns to her task when the experimenter asks her to do so. At the administration of 210 volts, she turns to the experimenter, remarking firmly, "Well, I am sorry, I don't think we should continue." (p. 84)

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[8] Milgram later revealed that he invented the experimental procedure as an extension of Asch's (1956) conformity study (where "naïve" subject was confronted with inadequate estimates of lengths of lines in a group setting, letting the subject either conform or resist) to a more existentially crucial aspect of following others in acts that may harm other people (Milgram, 1992, p, 12). It was only later that the idea of introducing social power hierarchy between the experimenter and "teacher" came to him. Modeling the obedience experiment after the conformity experiment—both in laboratory conditions—let Milgram to overlook the socially ordinary nature of the demands for obeying in everyday life. Instead of the around 70% conformity to the demands of harmful punishment in the experiment, any military commander would be expecting 100% obedience from his soldiers. Milgram's experiment demonstrated that military kind of obedience to authority is dormant in civilian populations in the United States and elsewhere. He did not analyze the precise mechanisms of the processes that led to the outcomes.

[9] Public reflections upon Milgram's experiment have been more than tumultuous over the past half century. Aside from recognition of these experiments as those few who belong to the classics of social psychology alongside of those of Muzafer Sherif, Solomon Asch and Philip Zimbardo, he has been post-factum criticized for ethical issues of the nature of the experiment and presentation of the findings (Nicholson, 2011; Russell & Gregory, 2011). These critiques do not reduce the value of the deep phenomena that were triggered by the experiment and therefore warrant further analyses.

The dialogue with the experimenter proceeds:

EXPERIMENTER: The experiment requires that you go on until he has learned all the
    word pairs correctly.
GRETCHEN: He has a *heart condition*. I am sorry. He told you that before.
EXPERIMENTER: The shocks may be painful but they are not dangerous.
GRETCHEN: Well, I am sorry, I think when shocks continue *like this they are dangerous.*
    You ask *him if he wants to get out*. It's his *free will*.
EXPERIMENTER: It is absolutely essential that we continue.
GRETCHEN: I like you to ask him. We came here on *our own free will*. If he wants to
    continue I'll go ahead. He told you he had a heart condition. I do not want to be *respon-*
    sible for anything happening to him. I wouldn't like it for me either.
EXSPERIMENTER: You have no other choice.
GRETCHEN: I think *we are here on our own free will*. I don't want to be *responsible* if he
    has a heart condition if anything happens to him. Please understand that (p. 85, added
    emphases).

And at that Gretchen terminates the experiment. If we analyze the processes
involved in this small interaction episode in the dramatic choice task, we can see
that is not the obedience (the original topic of Milgram's study) harming the other
(as set up by the experimental context) that is being revealed here. Instead, it is the
negotiation process of social participation in a context of aggressive (but neutral-
ized by meaning—"punishment") setting. In that negotiation, the meaning fields—
indicated by general level terms such as FREE WILL, HEART CONDITION,
WANTING, RESPONSIBILITY—are used in a complex of the decision "I will not
continue." Gretchen's developed resistance is as strong as the experimenter's
instructed rigid demand to continue, and the established "participation con-
tract" fails.

Yet Gretchen's case is an example of *procedural switch* based on semiotic medi-
ation. She obeyed the instructions up to a certain point based on her combination of
FREE WILL (+), WANTING (+, as both had agreed to participate),
RESPONSIBILITY (+, to carry out the procedure). When reaching to a critical
point (HEART CONDITION), she reverses the procedure to that of non-participation
based on the same generalized meanings that are applied in the reverse (FREE
WILL +, as she came on that she can leave; WANTING+, if the "learner" wanted
she could continue; RESPONSIBILITY +, she would not be responsible for harm).
Gretchen's situation interpretation of her duty shifted from that to the experimenter
to that to the "learner"—and, behind it all—to herself. The regulatory meaning-
activating mechanisms remained in place both before and after the shift. There is no
detectable ambivalence in the shift.

Other participants in Milgram's study gave more elaborate patterns of the ambiv-
alence involved in being part of the situation. A certain "Mrs Rosenblum" was
described in her actions in following terms:

At the beginning of the experiment she claims to know nothing about the electricity and is
    wary of the sample shock. In carrying out her task, she attempts to project an image of
    competence and social grace but is soon swept up in the experimental conflict. She
    maintains a pretentiously correct, almost authoritative tone in reading the word pairs to

the learner, which contrast with the weak, girlish comments she directs to the experimenter. She expresses increasing concerns as she moves up the voltage scale. At 270 volts she signals the correct answer to the learner by emphasizing it vocally. While continuing to read the word pairs with a show of outward strength, she mutters in the tone of helplessness to the experimenter, "Must I go on? Oh, I am worried about him. Are we going all the way up there (pointing to the higher end of the generator)? Can we stop? I am shaking. I am shaking. Do I have to go up there?"

She regains her composure temporarily but then cannot prevent periodic outbursts of distress. She mutters to herself "I am shaking here," yet her communication with the learner continues in the same officious tone. It is almost as if she were two women, one giving a competent public performance, and the other an inner, distressed woman unable to refrain from anxious utterances. She proceeds to the end of the board, administering the 450 volt shock three times (Milgram, 1974, p. 80).

Growing personal ambivalence is observable in this description—yet it does not stop the frame of accepted duty (the role of the teacher) to stop. Negotiation is attempted (the experimenter notices self-oriented comments about shaking and mild efforts to try to stop). The main focus of Mrs. Rosenblum is on her own Self—she needs to mildly protest and express her discomfort *yet continues to carry out her duty to the end.*

Mrs. Rosenblum's Self can be a good example of how masks operate in public life (see Chap. 7). A social role—such as an instruction to perform a particular scripted action—operates as a mask for the self. Mrs. Rosenblum was nervous—not because of the learner who received the "shocks"—but because of herself administering those. This concern for herself emerged visibly in the post-experiment interview when the theatrical aspect of the experiment is disclosed to her:

Mrs. Rosenblum (to experimenter): Every time I pressed the button, I died. Did you see me shaking. I was just dying here to think that I was administering shocks to this poor man.

[the learner is brought in. She turns to him]

Mrs. Rosenblum: You are an actor, boy. You are *wonderful*! Oh, my God, what he [the experimenter] did to me. I am exhausted. I didn't want to go on with it. You don't know what I went through here. A person like me hurting you, my God! I didn't want to do this to you. Forgive me, please. I can't get over this. My face is beet red. I wouldn't hurt a fly, I am working with boys, trying to teach them, and I'm getting such marvelous results, without punishment. I said to myself in the beginning. I don't feel you get anything by inflicting punishment (Milgram, 1974, p. 82).

What we can observe here is a discursive work to restore the Self from its ruin that was superimposed by her accepted duty (to perform the "teacher" role in the experiment). That work lingers on even after the theatrical reality of the procedure is revealed—she continues to apologize *to the actor* while all the apologies are directed to her own Self.

Milgram's own interpretation of the results of the obedience experiments used the notion of definition of the situation—interpretation of the meaning of the social situation:

An act viewed in one perspective may seem heinous, the same action viewed in another perspective seems fully warranted. *There is a propensity for people to accept definitions of*

action provided by legitimate authority. That is, although the subject performs the action, he allows authority to define its meaning (Milgram, 1974, p, 145, original italics).

For social psychology Milgram's explanation ("propensity" and "legitimate authority") may be sufficient,[10] yet for general psychology, we need to find out how that acceptance comes about in the process of meaning making. That two extremes of social power—military discipline on the one hand and anarchists' band on the other—give two diametrically opposite demand structures, ranging from instant acceptance of the situation definition to basically infinite process of negotiation of the situation. Yet in all versions, the subdominant partner is co-constructor of the situation definition—and the general features of such co-construction process need to be elucidated for the tasks of general psychology.

Conclusion: Duties, Obedience, and Rights: What Is There for General Psychology?

In most general terms, looking at the negotiation of rights and duties in the contexts of societal hierarchical power relations gives science the possibility to investigate general communication processes under conditions of inequality of power. One of the partners—society or person—is dominant over the other,[11] and the negotiation of meaning gets its start from that inequality of social power.

This feature of basic social inequality forces us to rethink the basic model of communication that fits human beings—that of Karl Bühler's Organon Model (see Chap. 2, Fig. 2.13). What is added is the constraining of the interpretation options of the Receiver—the negotiation of the message occurs within the Receiver (Fig. 6.7).

Figure 6.7 introduces an important correction to Bühler's model—**all social relations in a society are asymmetric in their social power relations.** The Sender assumes a dominant role over the Recipient if not by their initial social power relation difference than simply by being the first who begins to send the message. The situation of equality is a special case of power inequality.

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[10] Social psychology—mostly the North-American brand—has from the 1950s onward has operated with middle-level abstract theories which remain close to the common sense concepts treated as if they are scientific. This fits the discipline where complex existential human phenomena are modeled by simplified laboratory experiments.

[11] Even as the examples here have used the version SOCIETY > PERSON, it needs not always be so. In absolute monarchies, the King—a person with full power—is dominant over all of the society. Here, the person has the rights to do almost anything (e.g., Louis XIV declaring himself the Sun) with nobody in the society fearing to point out that the king is naked—literally or figuratively. That is the extreme case of negotiation.

Fig. 6.7 Model of communication under conditions of social inequality

In asymmetric power relations, the message ("This is X") is determined by the power holder and is presented without any expectation that the Receiver would project into its one's own co-meaning. Yet the Receiver resists the strongly promoted appeal of the message—so the actual synthesis of the insisted message and the Receiver's meaning system is delegated to the internal infinity of the Receiver. It can take many forms of sarcastic, humorous, or allegorical personal senses of the message that hide the resistance to the hegemony of the expressed and insisted ("understanding that this is X is your duty!") message.

Under conditions of social inequality, the renegotiation of the meaning of the message becomes hidden from public view. Both the Sender and the Receiver act as if such power differential did not exist. Yet this does not mean it is absent—it simply becomes relocated to the subjectivity of the Receiver. Its outcomes are multiple—proliferation of varieties of subtle forms of art, music, and literature of increasingly allegorical or humoristic kinds, as well as emerging public movements for specific rights—aside from the parallel generalized orientation to duties. Social power dominance can be very productive in triggering the emergence of clandestine counteraction strategies that cannot be detected. Communication processes become especially creatively multivocal when forced in some univocal directions.

Further Thinking Questions

1. What are CARRIERS and REDUCTONS of social order?
2. Explain the notion of Gegenstand.
3. In which ways is human conduct described by triple Gegenstand?
4. Explain how society is liquid (Bauman).
5. Describe social control efforts via escalating and reducing doubt.
6. Describe duties, rights, and their relations.
7. Describe supererogatory duties.
8. Explain how social power inequality frames the communication process.

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Chapter 7
Masked Morality: Theatrical Reality of Living

Remedios Varo—A Woman Entering *A Plastic Surgery Clinic*

Contents

Human ways of living are theatrical. People invent social roles, enter into these, decorate themselves with role markers, and act in accordance with the roles, the ease with which ordinary American students can take on the roles of prisoners and prison guards in an artificial experiment[1] and act toward one another forgetting the usual dignity of relating to fellow human beings. Inventing roles operates as a mechanism to modulate the normativity of human conduct.

The Dynamic Structure of the Self: Expanding George Herbert Mead's Model

The dynamics of Self in relation with the social roles was a persistent topic in the social philosophy of George Herbert Mead. In Fig. 7.1 that dynamics is summarized through the depiction of feed-forward loops of modification of the self-positioning in the role, and its feeding into the development of the core I<>ME system in the internal infinity of the person.

In Mead's self-system, the relation between the two components—ME (which is the connection point with external experience) and the I (which is the internal energizer posited to exist in the unreachable—by the person—it belongs to the

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[1] In the classic "Stanford Prison Experiment," it has been demonstrated that relatively short time is needed to guide ordinary American students to assume oppositional roles—of "prisoners" and "prison guards"—in an artificial experimental setting that required putting on role-fitting uniforms (Haney et al., 1973; Zimbardo et al., 2000).

depth of internal infinity) is dynamic. Changes in ME feed forward into I, modifying it, so that the new ME is modified for further encounters with the world in the assumed social role. This creates a dialogical relation between the "invisible" I and the entrance into the next act in one's social role is often filled with emerging or developing subjective frictions ""I really do not want to do X any more but I must"). Long-term frictions within the Self—centered on the ME component—can lead to phenomena of "burnout" in the given social role (job, etc.). These frictions bring ever new clients to psychotherapists and priests since the dialogical nature of the Self system calls for new solutions to one's life course problems for which the I<>ME system is resistant to transformation. Human development is a conservative process in which overcoming the existing normative limits is the starting point for innovation.

A person decides (or is "pulled" forward by others) to become somebody in a new social role. This entails new forms of acting within the new rule system. A kindergartener becomes a first-grader going to school and takes a role of a school-child. A pregnant woman is "pulled forward" by the biological course of pregnancy and societal role expectations to become a mother. A young man is recruited to become a police officer and puts on a uniform that marks—for himself and for others—what is expected from him in terms of conduct. These are all examples of assuming a new role by a person in a society. This role-assuming (and role-abandoning) happens constantly, and in parallel—different social roles can be taken

Fig. 7.1 The Self taking social roles: Non-neutrality of the act. (After George Herbert Mead)

with or without abandoning the previous ones. A pregnant woman becomes a mother but retains her role of herself as woman.

The man who becomes a policeman and starts acting as one starts internally feeling "I am policeman" and assuming the internalized meaning system of being a policeman. This can include the notion of social power, and the field of meanings of helpfulness to people as well as detection of criminal activities and one's right to use force to "restore order." It can also entail the feeling of being protected—a Danish policeman felt "I am safe in my role" until he got injured in a shooting incident, proving that his safety granted by his uniformed role was not granted (Nedergaard, 2016). The symbolic protection by the meaning of inviolability instigated by the role is not sufficient in reality.

The Hierarchical Organization of the Self: The Dialogical Self Theory

Hubert Hermans has introduced the Dialogical Self Theory (DST) in the 1990s and since then has continued to construct it further over three decades. Starting from the new axiomatic standpoint—what looks one (A) is a dialogue of itself with its counterpart. So—if a person repeated: "I am happy" followed after some time by "I am happy"—this indicates a dialogue within oneself ("am I really happy if I need to say that to myself?") rather than repetition of the same phrase. Coming from the perspective of *Gegenstandstheorie*, the unity of opposites (A and non-A) opens the realm of possibilities to conceptualize the self not as an entity but as a dialogical process. This focus on process has been crucial in the uses of DST in psychotherapy contexts.

The DST is a creative extension of all monological self-theories in which the ontological entity ("self") is posited to be present in the person and organize their conduct. Starting from an initial mapping of different sub-components of the self—largely based on the different social roles a person carries ("myself as a man"—"myself as a father"—"myself as a son"—"myself as a husband")—the DST focuses on the internal/external positioning of the components (center versus periphery[2]) via the use of the theoretical concept of I-position. DST operates on the map of I-positions including three zones—Internal, External, and Outside:

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[2] Importantly, some I-positions remain on the border: "Some I-positions are located in the vague and ambiguous border zone between self and non-self which can be characterized as "identity in difference"" (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 142). All masked performances and participations in various social events—processions, demonstrations, etc.—are examples of such moving of one's I-positions structure to the liminal zone uniting self and society.

The use of a structural map in DST creates a theoretical system where different I-positions relate with one another across the boundaries set up to separate them from one another. Thus, "I-as-MYSELF" is expected to be the central internal position—but its role in the Dialogical Self system becomes relevant only in its dialogical relations with other I-position some of which are also internal ("I-as MAN (or WOMAN," "I-as-YOUNG (or OLD)," others external ("I-as-STUDENT"—depending on institution outside home like school) or "I-as-CITIZEN" (could be mapped into either the external zone—if actually a citizen, or to outside zone—if not really a citizen but could ask to be one after some years).

The crucial relationship in ongoing relating with the world is the I-Position's "set of tools"—'voices'" that really create the basis for ongoing dialogues, dynamics which is that of many-to-many kind. Each I-position includes a number of sub-components that are phenomenologically observable as "voices"—a notion borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin's literary theory.

Each I-position is the basis for various voices—instruments of speech and sign use. The position is established before the voices emerge—a woman who has given birth is positioned as a mother ("I-as-mother") from where different voices—full dialogues—can emerge in relating to other I-positions (e.g., "I-as-Woman"). The set of voices emerging from the same I-position can be contradictory in itself (e.g., "I love playing with my baby,""I hate changing diapers" … "I would love to leave my baby and join other women for gossiping in a café"). The various dialogues between voices—both within and between I-positions—create the path for further transformation of the I-positions' field.

The I-positions form a dynamic hierarchy. The four central concepts relate to one another (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 138):

The I-Position links the process of positioning and repositioning of the I (which in Mead's terms equals ME). The basic feeling "I am → …" sets the core of the I-position, the predicates added to that basic core set up the tensions that characterize the dialogical self (e.g., "I am a woman"—in relation to either "I am young" in contrast to "I am old").

The METAPOSITION is an I-Position that makes distinctions of various lower-level I-positions. Thus the metaposition discovers variety of internal and external (or border) positions—allowing the Self to reflect upon its heterogeneity. For example, the metaposition "I as moving ahead in my life" allows me to

reflect simultaneously upon "I-as-a-woman" and "I-as-young" and act to maintain myself as *looking and feeling* "young" despite the obvious life course moving my real body toward becoming old (er).

The POSITION COALITION allows for looking at coordination of the various positions detected by metaposition. It is here where the ground is set up for possible modification of the Self—via living through societal turmoils or episodes of psychotherapy.

Finally, the **THIRD POSITION entails the synthesis of various I-positions**. It can be led by establishing a functional **PROMOTER POSITION**—a generalized or hyper-generalized sign that guides the position coalition toward a new configuration and is at this level where DST becomes dialectical as it leads to emergence of a new position out of the tensions between previous ones—within the whole texture of the coalition of positions. I may arrive at the position "I-as-ageless" which renders the tension about ageing irrelevant.

The theoretical benefit from thinking in terms of I-positions:

… is that it brings unity and continuity in the self, while preserving multiplicity. The I is continuous over time: in the process of appropriation and rejection, it *is one and the same I* who is doing this. At the same time, the I, located in time and space and intrinsically involved in the process of positioning, is confronted with a wide variety of new positions and possible positions (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 139).

Continuity of the Dialogical Self as *unitas multiplex* (see Chap. 1 to elaborate William Stern's perspective) is a crucial feature of the structure of the self that extends Mead's ME—making it heterogeneous. Mead's system does not specify the different parallel components of ME, and their dialogical nature. In linking Mead with Hermans, one could consider the ME as the field for all the I-positions to dialogue between themselves and utilizing Mead's notion of I as the "third position" (Fig. 7.1). Such mapping of Hermans' DST on George H. Mead's scheme elaborates and indicates the birthplace of innovations in the hidden "I"—the hidden yet agentively functional part of the constantly self-innovating system of the Self.

One can observe the creative impact of the I in situations where the ME *without any rational reason or trigger* acts in a way that breaks some aspect of the norms of entering into the social role. If ME introduces sudden changes into the routines of relations with the world of external performance (Fig. 7.1), it is forcing itself to confront the consequences of the feed-forward system. I *know* I should not act in an unexpected way in a given situation but *something in myself makes it appealing* to do so, even as it has risky consequences. James Mark Baldwin's notion of *persistent imitation*—experimenting with the given situation to change it—is at work here. Constant testing of the border zones of social norms is an act beyond the expected. It is an act of play—of serious kind. All innovators aside from children master that skill of trying a new action option, ready for the consequences.

Under some conditions of the Meadian interchange of the Dialogical Self with its social role-taking, a qualitatively new—even if temporary—innovation may occur. It is *shape-shifting*—it refers to a process whereby people believe that they are temporarily transformed, either mentally or physically, into another being (Hermans &

Hermans-Konopka, 2010, pp. 232–233). The masked dance acts in various ceremonies all over the world are social support conditions for such shape-shifting. Taking the form of a deity in a ritual dance temporarily moves the dancer to the position "I as deity"—similarly to the King putting on the costume of Apollo (Fig. 7.5). Our social norms are catalysts for our shape-shifting as a tool for transforming oneself.

Relating with Society: Do We *Participate*, and How?

Different personal life course constructions would lead to the assuming the same societal role. In one case, it can be based on the personal commitment to granting an idealized goal in a society, in another—the need to grant the means of income for the family. These different trajectories to assuming the given role differentiate the variability of acting in the role—from rigid following of the rules to context-specific use of the rules in accordance to the role.

Socially Demanded Entrances into Roles: The Theater of Living

All human actions are socially screened as to their direction—by others, and by oneself. The making and performing social roles are supported by specific activity settings within which different roles are prescribed through normative actions. As a person of "kind X," you are expected to do A, B, and C, which are activities not expected (and sometimes disallowed) for people of "kind Y." Thus, the highest aristocracies living around the rulers in European royal course were supposed to know how to fight on a duel, dance on a court ball,[3] and enchant women with gallantries. That roleplay was supported by costumes and masks.

The theatrical ways of living of the affluent social classes involved clear architectural distinction of their living quarters from ordinary people. Castles and manors would accentuate their power role in society. Even gardens become arenas for social role suggestions—organized through the social power hierarchy in the given society. Historically, this means the dominance of at first aristocratic (and religious) top actors— kings, princes, popes, cardinals, sheiks, etc.—who would set up the specific settings for the people to enter into socially prescribed roles. Such settings include public processions where different images of deities are carried around in the environment and then returned to their usual holding (or hiding) places. Likewise included are religious ceremonies in designated places—churches, mosques, temples, prayer houses, etc.—not to overlook roadside monuments to the occasionally

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[3] In 1636, a French choreographer was brought to Stockholm to teach the Swedish courtiers in the court of Queen Christina how to dance so that they could participate in court dances. The knowledge of how to dance was viewed as a *discipline for the upper body* and fitted the monarchical order prescribed in the royal court (Rota, 2018).

perished travelers. The outer infinity (see Stern's notion in Chap. 1) is not only structured meaningfully but also visited by some social organization of movement around—public procession, pilgrimage, and garden visits.

Gardens as Communicators

Most European rulers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries developed the fascination with building gardens next to their residences—the grandiosity and planning of which were to set the visitors up for the subservient social power role in relation to the owner of the grandiose and richly decorated garden.

The gardens are theatrical stages where the actors and spectators smoothly change their roles. The King—suggesting that his visitors stroll the lavish garden next to his or her palace—sets up the stage for unfolding of possible dramas of the participants in these theatrical events. Some stroll the garden to be fascinated by the royal power—which may be the result of gross misuse of the state budget by the King for personal purposes to build the garden. Others will find a place for acting out new amorous events of their lives hiding in the labyrinth of the carefully planned hedges in the garden.

Gardens were also arenas for other performances. Louis XIV had a critical role in the development of festive occasions in European palaces. He organized large festivities in the recently built gardens of his Versaille residence starting from the 1660s. He

> … considered the performing arts of music, dance and theatre to be a vital part of these celebrations. Performances were well integrated with the other social activities such as collations and fireworks, in fact embodying the harmony that Louis claimed pervaded in his kingdom. (Coeyman, 1998, p. 267)

The function of the ceremonies—and of the theatrical, musical, and choreographic elements woven into them—was the demonstration and proliferation of the power of the absolute monarchy. The basic principle of psychological impact making—keeping the target persons within field—was obviously intuitively known in the seventeenth-century France. The King's court was the place where the political power relations were negotiated in places what directly had no explicit roles in politics—dance floors, music performances, private art galleries, and lavish beds set up for intimate encounters with the favorites.[4]

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[4] Similar functions of aristocratic gardens were present in non-European settings, marking the role of gardens as heterotopias that rulers used to proliferate their status and demonstrate their power. Gardens in precolonial Indian court life were places to show the ruler's power—as well as to hide activities of personal kinds into the romantic alleys of the garden, especially at moonlight (Ali, 2003).

Regulating Social Power Hierarchies: Dance as Political Activity

Court dances were a concrete setup for display of the hierarchy of social positions. The king and the queen started the dance, then letting the next-in-line couples to show their mastery of the dance movements. The whole (large) participating group had the possibility to observe their superiors in their elegant clothes on the dance floor. Luxury then—as well as now—is the best everyday means to build up and maintain social stratification boundaries.

Differentiating oneself from other social strata is accomplished by focus on stylistic display of luxuries—owning and social display of luxurious objects in specific glimpses of everyday life maintains a social hierarchy of roles within a society. This function is similar across historical time—from Marie Antoinette's uncomfortable but presentable dresses to our contemporary wearing of Rolex wristwatches. The negotiation of the Self in the public domain is the process of maintaining or gaining social status.

Luxury is a universal marker of the social status. Objects of the functional value are precisely the same—like watches showing the very same time—and distinguish their wearers' self-presented social status by the estimated monetary value of the watch. Within the social strata operating in their presentational Selves (Komatsu, 2019), the value of the watches feeds into the meaning construction of the Self ("I am wearing a Rolex") and to others' input ("Oh, you have a Rolex" in contrast to discriminatory "he is not wearing a Rolex"). The massive price differences of luxury products from their ordinary household counterparts buy their owners the imaginary social status differential—such luxury objects are masked presentation of the Self to oneself and to others.

The Roles of Fashion

Fashion is inherently ambiguous. As Georg Simmel has captured it:

Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation; it leads the individual upon the road which all travel, it furnishes a general condition, which *resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example*. At the same time it satisfies in no less degree the *need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast,* on the one hand by a constant change of contents, which gives to the fashion of today an individual stamp as opposed to that of yesterday and of tomorrow, on the other hand because fashions differ for different classes.. the fashions of the upper stratum of society are never identical with those of the lower; in fact they are abandoned by the former as soon as the latter prepares to appropriate them. (Simmel, 1959/1904, p. 296, added emphases)

The constant tension I WANT TO BE FASHIONABLE with I WANT TO BE UNIQUE is the dialogical driving force within personal selves, as well as driving force of society to generate and consensually fixate ever new forms in fashion. It is here where the direction toward conformity in form (imitation of valued models)

Fig. 7.2 A lavishly
decorated dress design for
Marie Antoinette. (From de
Chennevieres, 1886, p. 3)

feeds into its opposite—developing a form that goes beyond the conformist one. James Mark Baldwin's notions of imitation in its simple form and persistent imitation—that experiments with the suggested form, going beyond it in some imagined way—are usable (Fig. 7.2).

Similar functions of excessive luxuries can be seen to be at work in our contemporary fashion design, the public shows of whom are meant to provide examples of exotic but hard to wear ever new models. Their high price tags set the meaning of the products of the given fashion house up as that of valued luxury. The person eager to strive for that status can purchase much less expensive and practically usable objects of the same fashion house in selective boutiques. The special feeling of "going out" to be seen in public fortifies the economic survival of the fashion industry.

Operas: Taking Music to the Stage of Dramatization

The first opera in European history—*Dafne*—dates back to 1597. The libretto—written by Florentine court poet Ottavio Rinuccini and based on the story of love of The Greek god Apollo toward the nymph Daphne—is taken from Ovid's

Metamorphoses. It signified the search of identity of turn of seventeenth-century European humanists to locate their roots in Ancient Greek mythologies. The music was written by Jacopo Peri. The librettist Rinuccini later commented "*Dafne*, written by me only to show in a simple experiment, *una semplice prova*, what music could do in our age, was set to music so gracefully by Peri that it pleased incredibly those few who heard it." Peri's music is mostly lost, the updated version (of 1608) by Marco di Gagliano is known to us today.[5] The first opera separated oral recitals (also sung) from orchestral presentations.

The ideological context for invention of the new public performance form was the discussions by Florentine humanists—Florentine Camerata[6]—of the search of identity in the Ancient Greek ways of living. *Dafne* was first performed at the carnival of 1597 at Palazzo Corsi in Florence. It was an experiment in creating new unification of poetry and music—together with promotion of the idea of European culture rooted in the Ancient Greek ways of being.

The story of Apollo and Daphne is one of the Ovid's stories where one character (Apollo) seeks the love of the other (nymph Daphne) who escapes from him, in order to make herself unavailable becomes turned into a laurel tree. Apollo makes the laurel tree the symbol of his life—and of all Ancient Greece. The story is of deep affection and its tragic results of turning one of the actors into a tree. It indicates the ambivalence inherent in deep feelings for others. The transitions between the states (I-positions) of gods, mortals, and natural "others" (trees, animals, wind) exist in the mythologies of any society.

The efforts to emphasize the historical continuity of Ancient Greece and sixteenth-century Europe started from the top of political power games—the celebrations of events of high royalty. The ceremonial nature of these games led to new style music performances—operas were created for large public events (royal and other aristocratic weddings)—hence they were not for regular recurrent performances for the public. The first specifically erected theater building for performing operas dates back to 1637 in Venice, yet the public it served remained that of "high society" for the next century. In the eighteenth-century Europe, this exclusive "high society" function of operas continued, and its widening of the spectator base and recurrent nature of performances in theaters happened basically in the nineteenth century when newly developed bourgeoisie started to emulate the ways of the higher social classes.

Opera was an event of high concentration of social guidance of the thinking of the people in the audience—fortified by the musical frame. It combines the

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[5] Hear https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxL2iQ6SoOY

[6] Camerata was the label given to a group of intellectuals who from 1573 onward gathered around Count Bardi for seeking the Ancient Greek roots in identity and criticizing at that time prominent polyphonic music. They assumed that Ancient Greek tragedies were poetry to be sung (and developed the style of recitals) and initiated new style of music and its performance that gave the start to the music genre of opera. The line of recitation of a poetic text by singing, accompanied by a single instrument—*monody*—became a way to unify music and poetry in the supposed line along with Ancient Greek traditions.

pleromatic affective construction of the *Einfühlung* of the audience with the theme of the libretto (as a rule it is an exaggerated drama that leads to tragedy) with the pleromatic encoding through the music. The unity of affective presentation of the textual theme and the music in the guidance of the *psyche* fortifies the schematized message. This synthesis of artistic expression forms can lead also to social upheavals. In 1830, the revolution in Belgium started as the public attending an Italian patriotic opera[7] especially one duet that led the audience to the streets in a fervent effort to change the current political order.[8]

The catalytic role of music in framing human activity settings has been utilized widely in human history, but events like opera performances or (in our times) rock concerts create settings for actions that can lead to societal transformations.[9] The basic mechanism of such public actions is the same—joint presence of a large group of similarly oriented people (a crowd that shares basic meaning orientation) who are completely captured in the field (music for the crowd is everywhere to be heard) and focal action suggestions (by the text of the verbal component) provide the allegoric or direct orientation for the social actions. By way of such wholistic capture, the audience can be turned into the collective social actor.

Puppets as Proxy Communicators

Using manipulable objects to play out role taking and role relationships in dramatic staged accounts has long history of at least five millenia—in parallel both in the Occident and the Orient. In the European and African traditions, the use of manipulable figures for enacting of dramas are found in Egypt 3000 years BC and proliferated both to Europe and Africa. The Oriental societies have developed their distinctive forms of puppet theaters. Japanese *bunraku* is a special form of puppet play that originates in Shinto religious rituals and became incorporated into kabuki theatrical contexts. *Wayang kulit* in Java is a form of shadow making by puppets. In China, puppetry is present in "lantern shows" for all social classes. Vietnam's

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[7] The opera performed on August 25, 1830, in the Royal Theatre of Brussels was Daniel Auber's The Mute Girl of Portici (*La Muette de Portici*)—a sentimental patriotic opera. The duet *Amor sacre de la patria* (Sacred love for Fatherland) was the particular trigger. In our contemporary version, hear it at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwN4Wx2kdco

[8] After the performance, the audience swarmed out to the streets after the performance shouting patriotic slogans and taking over government buildings (under control of central Dutch Royal government). The following days the workers joined the movement. The King (William I) sent his sons to calm the uprising in the Southern Province, but already by September 1, it was clear the power of the North could not be restored. Efforts of military take-back of Brussels on September 23–26 of 1830 by the Northern forces failed, and on October 4, 1830, Belgium declared its independence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. By the end of 1830, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was declared dissolved.

[9] The marathon activity of choir singing in the Estonian "singing revolution" of 1991 that led to the restoration of independence of the country is a recent example of such catalytic function.

puppetry-in-water developed from the flooding of rice fields and the storytelling by puppets on poles above the flooding. In all cases, puppets have been invented—and they are made to tell the stories of their inventors.

The general notion involved here is projection of the positions of the person who creates the communicative message with puppets that act at some distance outward from one's own body. This projection is historically linked with the ordinary and spirit worlds.[10] By human puppet creators, creating an arena between themselves and the supernatural world of spirits and gods gives rise to the sublime nature of the puppet shows—both for children and for adults. This subliminal zone between reality of the audience and the imagined events on the stage—enacted by seemingly human characters which are still sufficiently different from their real analogues—allows for the combination of mystique and reality that can be taken further from the subliminal world of puppet theatre to the real world of the audience. The images of puppets—for instance, Pinocchio (Tateo, 2019)—create imaginary extensions that real human actors cannot do.[11]

Puppets are carriers of the communicator's messages. An actor in a regular theater play uses the expressive features of one's own body to enact a role. In contrast, the puppet master operates behind the puppets—sometimes visible, at other times hidden from the audience. The actors—puppets—do precisely what the director wants—yet the *actual doer is at a distance* and maintains the separated I-Position ("I-as-Puppetmaster") from that of the actors (puppets) who are telling a story to the audience ("I-as-<this character>"). The audience attributes the story to the characters moving on the puppet scene—while the actual story is being told by the director who activates the puppets. Puppet theater is an analogue for human societal organizations where the leaders of such organizations pretend that it is not them, but the populace (i.e., the human puppets who think they have agency), who is acting in society. The shadows used in the puppet shows can be very real in societal theatricality.

Puppet performances can be created in many different ways. Finger puppets can allow the performance of different actors being the director's own fingers. Hand puppets reduce the number of actors for a director to two. Puppets that are operated by strings can require the motor dexterity of both hands of the director—so the puppet is in 1-to-1 relationship with the director. The movement of the puppets in all cases is of different kind from those of human actors—hence creating a psychological distance that makes different moral stories easier to perform.

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[10] For example, in the ritual prelude to a Chinese puppet show, the ritual of visiting the shrines of the patron saint of the puppets (Chief Marshall Tian in Quanzhou) has to take place before the shows (Ruizendaal, 1995, p, 15).

[11] Furthermore—a theater director working with human actors needs to constantly negotiate the ways in which the actors interpret their roles. In contrast, the puppet master gets one's communicative message to the audience by way of pulling the strings of the puppets—the message and the medium are united by the same agent.

Human Lives as Masked Presentations

Human beings are the only species that utilizes masks in organizing their lives. These masks range from the minimal (modifying skin appearance by make-up and creams) to maximal (the tradition of ritual costumes in various ceremonies where the whole body and the face are covered by a symbolic presentation of some meaningful Other image). Masks are used in moving around in society in ordinary settings with danger (face masks to limit the traffic of viruses or gas masks for that of not being affected by unfriendly gases), in dance event (masque balls tradition in European aristocratic courts), at yearly festivals (the masking of a relative to play the role of Santa Claus to fascinated and slightly horrified children). Masks help us to enter social roles—yet we may be relieved once a masked performance is over and we can relax in our natural human state in our privacy (Fig. 7.3). The masque is dropped to the floor as the rays of the sunrise reach the relaxing body.

The act of masking starts from covering some part of the Self followed by uncovering. The peek-a-boo game parents happily play with infants is a starting place for the construction of masking—any object can be used for temporary hiding one's face from the infant's view and then dramatically dropped in the phase of reentrance into the eye contact.

Fig. 7.3 Girl after the masked ball. (*Le Petite Masque* by Jacques-Emile Blanchet, 1906. Städel Institut, Frankfurt-am-Main)

The social practice of masquerade balls has emerged in the European societies in the context of carnival traditions—starting in Venice in the fifteenth century. The hiding of the identity of the acting participants behind a mask (and costume in full) made the acting out reverse social roles—the major characteristic of carnivals as temporary suspension of social orders—more easily possible. Masking extended the zone of privacy ("this is ME on myself") from the secluded home to the carnival setting ("this is ME as MYSELF in the middle of all others, WITHOUT SOCIAL CONTROL"). This carnivalesque freedom granted both genders new opportunities for exercising their secret desires out in public. No surprise that efforts to regulate the masking conditions for masquerade balls came into practice. By 1830, Paris police introduced the law that only women could wear masks at balls (Clark, 2005, p. 211)—thus unbalancing the social visibility equilibrium of the participants (Fig. 7.4). When Edouard Manet painted his painting in 1873, it was only women who wore the face masks while men surrounded them in ardent inquisitiveness.

Fig. 7.4 The mask ball at the opera of Paris. (Edouard Manet, 1873)

Mask as a Social Guidance Device

Masks were understood as crucial conditions for social guidance of affect and action—from manufacturing jealousies to detecting responsibilities of actors in reality.

Mask is a distancing device that introduces Otherness into the relation of the person with oneself. In the cultural rituals around the world:

> The mask is made not to hide or to conceal, but to expose. As *an instrument of metamorphoses, the mask permits man to lose his identity and allows the gods to manifest themselves with an uncovered face*. To mask oneself is to give life to a superior being. Except for some theatre masks (clowns, servants), the immense panoply of masks in southeast Asia are essentially representations of mythical heroes, of all-knowing gods and of spirits of the earth. (Brunet, 1982, p. 68 added emphasis)

The metamorphosis aspect of masks indicates their relevance in human lives. Masks are inevitable part of amusements in European aristocratic courts. The court balls of Marie Antoinette:

> Every Monday in January and February of 1775, a ball was regular an occurrence at the Queen's palace at the theatre or the Hall of Hercules, the household had charge of all arrangements and decorations, and every one was pleased. (de Chennevieres, 1886, p. 3)

Keeping up the games the courtiers play in royal courts had an important social function—to make the hedonistic games of the rich to maintain the social class differences. This was encoded already into the order of the ball dancers appearing on the dance floor—with the king and the queen first, followed by others by rank. The evoking the God of Beauty in daily wearing of minimal make-up by women in any society is an act similar to the Sun King Louis XIV wearing the costume of Apollo in entering onto the floor of his court to initiate the dance (Fig. 7.5). The metaphoric ways of unifying the person with the powers of deities and ancient mythological heroes are a standard vehicle for symbolic expanding of ordinary social roles into an extraordinary state.

The mask stretches our imagination—both as wearers and as spectators—by bringing into the encounter a moment of play—a state of move from the AS-IS to the AS-IF (by Vaihinger) state of being. According to Mikhail Bakhtin:

> The mask is related to transition, metamorphoses, the violation of natural boundaries, to mockery and familiar nicknames. It *contains the playful element of life; it is based on a peculiar interrelation of reality and image*, characteristic of the most ancient rituals and spectacles. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 40, 1990, p. 48, added emphasis)

Masks range from minimal to exaggerated. Any goals-oriented body modification for some goal (e.g., "beauty") creates an act of masking—putting something on my body that would, for me and others, make me "more beautiful." Cosmetics worn to the border of external detectability—where others cannot see I am wearing cosmetics (but I actually do) constitutes a minimal mask. Without putting it on, I might feel "naked" in public—even as others cannot distinguish minimal cosmetics use from no cosmetic use.

Fig. 7.5 King Louis XIV
of France costumed as
Apollo prepared to lead the
dance event of his court

Masks create distance from the Self (ME in Mead's scheme—Fig. 7.1 above) and "I-as-Other" (in terms of Hermans' DST). That distance can move from being minimal ("I-as-Other" equals *beautiful* and feeds forward into ME) to middle distance ("I-as-POWERFUL Other"—e.g., taking on the role of an Ancient Greek god or goddess). The latter was an important social message that kings, queens, and other high aristocrats in European history utilized in regulating their hierarchical social orders. It is not surprising that a king—Louis XIV of France—assumes the role of Apollo in his entering onto court dance floor dressed in a specially prepared Apollo costume (Fig. 7.5). The efforts to link European societies of sixteenth to nineteenth century with the powers of Ancient Greek mythologies were persistent.

On the extreme end of masking, the person assumes—thanks to the mask—a power role that goes beyond the ordinary I<>ME relations. Various kinds of "monster masks" provide the basis for acting in ways that transcend the ordinary social roles and provide the self-system with overwhelming feelings of power.

The functional role of a mask—in terms of violation of the natural presentability of the body—includes that of clothing. Keeping our natural bodies dressed is an act of socially obligatory masking the deviation from which can be heavily socially

regulated.[12] Clothing—dependent on climate—is organized in layers in which the meaning construction of the position of the particular object of body coverage acquires meaning according to the layer ("underwear" versus "overwear"—Valsiner, 2019). The exterior of the clothes can take massive, heavily ornamented and uncomfortable to wear a shape (Fig. 7.2 above), yet for the purposes of mask function of the clothes, the inconvenience is heroically tolerated and at times cherished.

Masks as Secret Bearers

Despite being purposefully visible during specific rituals, their full meanings in the social texture of a given society may be carefully hidden from outsiders. As long as masks play a central role in key ceremonies (e.g., initiation of youth to adulthood), their meanings may be kept secret from outsiders as proliferation of such knowledge might damage the ritual power of the masks.[13] Such secrecy—together with developing trading of masks as "art objects" between the colonized and the colonizers—created aesthetic fascination with masks that is completely separated from their cultural functions as symbolic tools (Fig. 7.6).

Adding almost a meter on top of one's head for night-time ritual dances would enhance the subjective power feeling of the wearer and create a sublime environment for the event itself. Putting on a mask can be compared with the use of a uniform—a particular power and distancing act in the particular ritual context. Such contexts are crucial for organizing the life course—usually involving initiation into the secrets and status of adulthood and fertility in the maintenance of the human line.

If we investigate the role of masking within the Self, then it is easy to see how masking as valuable first of all in relation to oneself. If one wears a mask of a circus clown, the assumed I-position allows one to act in ways different from usual roles—liberating one's conduct from its regular social norms. These regular norms have become established in the experience of living up to the present—and they both guide the movement toward the future and simultaneously operate as constraints (*Gegenstand*) that make such move difficult. For general psychology, the normative nature of human living needs to be seen in the perspective of the whole life course—where opening up new ways of being are linked with denial or rejection of previous ones. Norms for moral conduct are created to guide the whole of human being

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[12] On 11th February 1535, a small group of Anabaptists were so inspired by their religious fervent so as to burn their clothes and run naked in the streets of Amsterdam calling for all to follow their search for "naked truth" (Waite, 2019, p. 103). The exceptionality of such effort to locate truth specifies that whatever human beings have decided to consider "the truth" is a version of our masked selves—truth can never remain naked in human society.

[13] In the region of Senegambia, the particular kind of mask (*ejumba*) was to be worn only by individuals who had demonstrated their powers of locating and neutralizing witches in the community. The masks played crucial role in maintaining village harmony and were hence kept secret from outsiders (Mark, 1987, p. 638).

Fig. 7.6 Buga mask to be worn on top of head (97 cm high)—(Aleksandrov, 2010, p. 32)

toward personally and socially acceptable ways of conduct—as well as toward transformation of these very norms when the settings make it necessary. When in peacetime, we adhere to the "you *should not* kill!" moral imperative then with the advent of war, it becomes transformed to its opposite—"you *must kil*l some kind of Others at some time." How can such transformations happen?

Moving Through One's Life: Self-Guided Moral Normativity

Why would all these complex cultural inventions—cosmetics, masks, gardens, fashions—matter in the lives of ordinary human beings? If we accept the premise that human development in one's life course entails constant creation of the sublime out of the mundane—and its subsequent incorporation into the next mundane state—then all these cultural inventions are crucial for human personal lives. Without such inventions, the thrills of living forward would be limited.

The fascination with masking entails the play of the Self-as-Self and Self-as-Other. Any tension in this relationship can lead to development via its overcoming. Efforts toward some set goals lead to self-inflicted hardships which acquire the personal meaning by way of overcoming such hardships. Human beings climb high mountains, take sea voyages toward the infinity of finding an India (Christopher

Columbus), or setting one's foot on the surface of another ground (Neil Armstrong). Pilgrimages are a historical example of such self-set goals. We are all pilgrims on our life courses.

Life as Pilgrimage

Human life course involves setting life goals and striving toward those. In this general sense, it could be compared with a pilgrimage. What that comparison allows us to understand is the currently idealized nature of the desired future state of affairs—working toward getting a degree or toward getting married are imagined states here-and-now that guide our movement toward some horizons. The pilgrim's predicament is similar:

> The efficacy of self-transformation, insight, and increased faith for the pilgrim is bound up with their encounters with material and symbolic objects, other people, and far-away places, *which could be called the pilgrimage field*. Material cultural artifacts are crucial components in the pilgrimage experience and sacred viewings of these objects are emotionally charged. However, for pilgrims these objects do not stand alone once they are embedded in rich, liminal environments. (Beckstead, 2012, p. 727, added emphasis)

Holistic organization plus semiotic guidance → crossing boundary from ordinary life events here-and-now to the imagined values of the future makes the life course into a pilgrimage trail.

Furthermore, we mutually coordinate individual pilgrimage pathways with those of others. The Camino de Santiago or Mecca are large social occasions with many participants on the same trail at the same time. The individual life courses of family members are linked—the parents set up the starting I-positions for their children ("You as my son/daughter") from which the offspring cannot escape. These I-positions are the starting ground for lifelong weaving together the tapestry of a person's life course.

Collective Movements in the Public Domain

Human beings have created many specifically human activities that have no analogues in the lives of other animals. No chimpanzee can be imagined to go on a pilgrimage to visit the places of origins of their departing paths with *Homo sapien*s in Africa or to book a holiday hotel for some time in French Riviera. Human beings do all of that—and more. Activities in which the acting out itself is a goal, or movement from one place has a function not for getting to the other place but the inherent value of that movement in itself—are specifically human inventions. These can be solitary (a person retiring to live in a cave as a "desert father" in the history of Christian religion) or the opposite—exposure of one's movement in the open domain to large numbers of others involved in the same activity. The latter amounts

to collective processions—religious, political, or sportive. The movement of hordes of football clubs' supporters to the stadium to cheer for "their" team is out contemporary public procession that has predecessors in religious processions of carrying a remnant of a saint around in a city and returning it back to its location or, in the political domain, the traditions of *omnegang* (procession of all in a town) when a king or emperor arrives in the city. Large-scale public rituals are social means for coordinating the personal religious and political ideologies of ordinary people—participating in the activities of crowds creates an affective atmosphere which operates as a social catalyst for deeply personal feelings. Already back in 1733—giving advice for proper ways of conduct to the upper classes—Julius von Rohr noted that "pleasures and diversions" are important to guide the conduct of people as public festivities would capture the senses of the persons. He listed carnival, masquerade, opera, ballet, other forms of theater, and processions (von Rohr, 1733). Theatralization of the public life—including carnival-type temporary reversals of social order instituted by the real order itself—supported the existing status quo of the societal hierarchical organization of power. It is not surprising that different forms of dance in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries had forms analogical to those by which gardens were designed (Nevile, 1999). A courtier—whether dancing indoors or walking in the garden of the palace was subjected to movement patterns that accentuated his or her status within the social hierarchy of the court.

Societies all over the world use the format of public processions for uniting the perspectives of different persons in the context of a crowd that is expected to act in specific ways. The Chariot Festival in Puri, Odisha (Orissa) in India (*Ratha Jatra*), is an annual festival that involves building large wooden chariots for the three deities (representing Jagannatha, his sister Subhadra, and Lord Balabhadra) and then pulling the chariots with their images over the 3-kilometer distance to a neighboring Gundicha Mata temple ("summer house of the deities") for a "visit" of 9 days—after which the chariots are pulled back to their original resting place—the Jagannatha Temple. The physical contact with the chariots—pulling them or just touching them—is a luck charm for the devotees participating in the event (Fig. 7.7). The participation in the Ratha Jatra every year is massive—thousands of pilgrims gather to the small town for the time, increasing its 200 thousand inhabitants fivefold.

The chariots are fully decorated in accordance with the meaning systems of the three deities. The whole festival stands for religious unity, cultural and racial synthesis, and calls for egalitarian society (Patnaik, 1994, p. 115). The local rulers clean the road in front of the moving chariots—hence specifying their carnival-kind lowly status for the time of the festival. In carnivals, the social power roles are temporarily reversed—the king becomes the sweeping servant for the deities.

The Ratha Jatra festival is known in Hindu literary sources at least since twelfth century A.D. (with even some traces found in RgVeda), with first European descriptions becoming available in the seventeenth century. The Jagannatha Temple in Puri has been a target of attacks and looting for numerous occasions by various invaders, but the symbolic relics have survived such attacks.

Fig. 7.7 The three chariots being pulled on the street in Puri during Ratha Jatra

Fig. 7.8 The three chariots in Puri in the process of being built for Ratha Jatra—not yet decorated

Preparations for the Ratha Jatra take long time—3 months—and involve the construction of new chariots every time (Fig. 7.8). These 15-meter high constructions are made of local wood that is being gathered by priests at auspicious times and cut into specific number of auspicious pieces to build the vehicles. All aspects of the

construction of the chariots are meticulously controlled by the auspiciousness of the parts, the time of their making, and their number. The focus on local lumber is symbolically crucial—it fortifies the meaning link of the act of touching or pulling the chariot with the feeling into the macrocosmus of nature and feeding forward into the personal microcosmus of living-in-being.

While the pulling of the chariots in Puri is a remarkable massive festival of moving around in the town, it is by no means unique. Almost any society has developed occasions for public processions—individuals of various backgrounds joining in some collectively meaningful sequence of movements. What is the psychological function of such macro-social events?

Psychology of Processions: Promoting Constructive Internalization via Normatively Prescribed Externalization

Ritual processions of deities are known all over the world and its main religions. In addition to participating in the "walking around" of the religious images, the traditions of pilgrimage entail "walking to" the location of these images.[14] The persons who participate in these events do it purposefully in the *effort toward meaning*—trying to consolidate some hyper-generalized sign field.

The cultural-psychological mechanism of how this process works is very simple. First, the participants need to be ready for the experience of participation—affectively drawn to the experience. This is in deep contrast to the role of tourists—ready to observe the events with peripheral distanced participation (e.g., taking "selfies" to mar "I was there!"), rather than subjectively *work through* the participation experience—by way of strainful walking on a pilgrimage trail, pulling or touching the chariot, or self-flagellation (Valsiner, 2018).

Secondly, the willfully participating person is guided to act in a particular way. This amounts to *guided externalization* of the internalized meaning systems of the Self (Fig. 7.9).

Guided externalization is a meta-level (meta-communicational—Branco et al., 2004) set of social suggestions encoded into the given setting via field-like signs that are expected to catalyze the person's experiencing the given setting. These are likely to converge with the main direction of the experience—a religious ceremony may be flavored by the smell of incense or by music in line with the affective tone of the field of the event. (convergent suggestion in Fig. 7.9). Alternatively, the guidance of externalization can work with direction different from the main communicative message, neutralizing or at least complicating the impacts of the event (divergent

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[14] This includes movement from home to the local church, mosque, or temple, to longer-term pilgrimages to symbolic places of Mecca, Santiago de Compostela, and many other symbolically important places of pilgrimage. Moving out (of ordinary environment) toward moving in (to the symbolic Umwelt) is a psychological tool used by all religious systems as support for individual personal feelings within the world (Beckstead, 2012).

AFFECTIVE IMPACT OF THE EVENT

CONVERGENT SUGGESTION

LAYER I

LAYER II

LAYER III

DIVERGENT SUGGESTION

MEDIATED EXTERNALIZATION

DIRECT EXTERNALIZATION

IMMERSION IN THE FLOW OF THE EVENT

suggestion in Fig. 7.9). A military parade observed by a pacifist is unlikely to suc-
ceed in triggering a patriotic fervent in the participants—instead, it can lead to
superficial display of agreement (layer II phenomenon) that does not touch the core
of the Self (layer III). Or, in other terms—Layer III phenomena (values) neutralize
the expected impact of the setting.

The actual participation in the event—immersing oneself with the ongoing flow
of the event—can be enforced centrally from Layer III (immediate participation).
The person gets a glimpse of the setting, becomes affectively overwhelmed (Layer
III) which removes all border blocks (Layer III to Layer II, Layer II to Layer I). This
is the kind of involvement in the setting—affective and automatic—is the ideal goal
toward which product advertisers are striving. This is the "soul-jerk" (in analogy to
"knee-jerk") response to a new object for sale—immediate passion to buy it and
action to do so. Given the natural resistance of human beings to social suggestions,
this goal is rarely, if ever, reached. Instead, human beings mediate their participation
(in Layer II) with argumentation about whether and how to participate in the setting.

Finally, the results of the constructive externalization need to become internal-
ized anew. This happens in the aftermath of the event. An example is the act of
lighting a candle in memory of a deceased person in a church. The production of
this act is itself a constructive externalization by the willing and goal-oriented per-
son ("I want to light a candle in memory of my mother! And I will!") catalyzed by
the feeling field generated by the architectural environment of the church. A similar
desire would not be supported in another setting—a shopping mall, for instance
(where the mother's memory may catalyze some purchase, but not lead to lighting
of a candle). Internalized and hyper-generalized feeling fields ("values"—see Chap.

3) are the domain where human conduct becomes decided. The deeply desired and inherently motivated actions in religious, social, and political (see Chap. 9) contexts are mediated by hyper-generalized sign fields within the psyche.

An example of clash of world views: Moral decision-making based on hyper-generalized values. The particular case I use here—in details described in Shweder and Much (1987)—is an example of steadfast refusal by a Hindu informant to accept the premises of meanings in Occidental psychological moral reasoning dilemma (Kohlberg's "Heinz Dilemma"). The Occidental premises involve issues of stealing and ownership, while the Hindu premises involve notions of sin and collective agency of family.

The traditional dilemma—created by Lawrence Kohlberg to determine the levels of moral reasoning—was adjusted by Shweder to the Indian context:

> A woman suffered from a fatal disease. To cure her, doctors prescribed a medicine. That particular medicine was only available in one medicine shop. The pharmacist demanded ten times the real cost of the medicine. The sick woman's husband, Ashok, could not afford it. He went to everyone he knew to borrow money. But he was able to borrow only half of the price. He asked the pharmacist to give him the medicine at half price or to give it to him on credit. But the pharmacist said, "No, I will sell it at any price I like. There are many persons who will purchase it." After trying so many legal ways to get the medicine, her desperate husband considered breaking into the shop and stealing the medicine. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 235)

The moral dilemma—TO STEAL OR NOT TO STEAL—is prepared here by covering all the economic alternative tactics (borrowing, negotiating price down to half, the seller insisting on his monopolistic price determination) after which stealing seems as the only possible way out. This would fit with the Occidental premises where stealing is assumed as possible—even if not accepted as morally appropriate. When the same border of moral transgression (stealing is not accepted in any society) is brought to Hindu discursive practice, it becomes fielded in a different meaning system:

> SHWEDER: Should Ashok steal the drug?
>   BABAJI: No. He is feeling desperate because his wife is going to die and that's why he is stealing the drug. But people *don't live forever and providing her the drug does not necessarily mean she will live long. How long you live is not in our hands but in God's hands.* And there are other ways to get money like selling his landed property or even he can sell himself to someone and can save his wife's life. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 235, added emphasis)

While accepting the goal of saving the wife's life, the respondent conditionalizes the life <> non-life scenario by counter-positioning a drug to the overarching principle of "God's Will." He also widens the range of mundane economic solutions including in the suggestion of selling his property the notion of *selling himself.* Here the Occidental range of possibilities is transcended, while the notion of "property" is widened to cover the agent himself.

The above argumentation is followed by both parties restating their positions—agreeing that stealing is bad, but disagreeing in the issue that the articular drug would be the only way to solve the problem. Babaji emphasizes that "there is no

way within Hindu dharma to steal even if the man is going to die." Stealing is considered *sin*—a meaning field that is hyper-generalized to include many forbidden acts. An interesting widening of the argument followed:

SHWEDER: But doesn't Hindu dharma prescribe that you try to save a person's life?
    BABAJI: Yes. And for that you can sacrifice your blood or sell yourself, but you cannot steal.
    SHWEDER: Why doesn't Hindu dharma permit stealing?
    BABAJI: If he steals it is a sin—so what virtue is there in saving a life. Hindu dharma keeps man from sinning. (Shweder & Much, 1987, pp. 235–236, emphasis added)

The hierarchy of sign fields (my) SINNING dominating SAVING LIVES (of others) blocks the possibility of stealing, while alternatives of non-Occidental kind (selling oneself) recur. *Sacrifice* is the general meaning that captures many actions possible for non-sinful solution as an alternative to stealing. Shweder continues to probe into the meaning system that defends the impossibility to steal:

SHWEDER: But if he doesn't provide the medicine to his wife she will die. Wouldn't it be a sin to let her die?
    BABAJI: That's why, according to the capabilities and powers which God has given him, he should try to *give her shamanistic instructions and advice*. Then she can be cured.
    SHWEDER: But that particular medicine is the only way out.
    BABAJI: There is no reason to necessarily think that that particular drug will save her life. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 236, added emphases)

The negotiation of the premises here ends in a stalemate (the only drug … not necessarily it saves the life). The widening of the action repertoire to include shamanistic treatment—an option outside of the Occidental set of options—supports the stealing-as-sin fixed position. The above dialogue is followed by reference to negative outcomes if the wife would die—which Babaji refuses as adequate:

SHWEDER: Won't he face lots of difficulties if his wife dies?
    BABAJI: No.
    SHWEDER: But his family will break up.
    BABAJI: He can marry other women. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 236)

The contrast between family that breaks up at a nuclear family case at death is rejected as the marriage is not a union of two persons but a complex field within wider kinship network with multiple compensatory possibilities for everyday tasks of food preparation, house cleaning, child minding, and gossiping. Shweder tries to build on the discrepancy in Babaji's answer (marrying needs money but Ashok has little):

SHWEDER: But he has no money. How can he remarry?
    BABAJI: Do you think he should steal? If he steals, he will go to jail. Then what's the use of saving her life to keep the family together. She has enjoyed the days destined to her. But stealing is bad. *Our sacred scriptures tell that sometimes stealing is an act of dharma. If by stealing for you I can save your life; then it is an act of dharma. But one cannot steal for his wife or his offspring or for himself*. If he does that this is simply stealing.

SHWEDER: If I steal for myself then it's a sin
BABAJI: Yes
SHWEDER: But in this case I am stealing for my wife, not for me
BABAJI: But *your wife is yours*. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 236, added emphases)

The sudden revelation that stealing for another is allowed leads to the issue of border of how far beyond the person the unity of the "mine" is extended. In the Occidental mindset, the members of the family are autonomous actors who come together (and move apart) on their own will. This is not so in the Hindu conceptualization where the life is God-given and family members belong to one another. The borders of the whole of the "I" are drawn differently—leading to opposite moral implications.

The effort to probe into the moral normativity superimposed upon Ashok continued:

SHWEDER: Doesn't Ashok have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
  BABAJI: He may not get the medicine by stealing. He may sell himself. He may sell himself to someone for say 500 rupees for 6 month or 1 year.
  SHWEDER: Does it make a difference whether or not he loves his wife?
  BABAJI: So what if he loves his wife? When the husband dies, the wife does not die for him or vice versa. We come into this world and we will leave it alone. Nobody will accompany us when we leave this world. It may be a son or it may be a wife. No one will go with us. (Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 236)

Again the solution of selling oneself to temporary slavery is suggested—even up to a suggested price tag. Interestingly, the unity of the family becomes differentiated at the time of death. My wife, children, and others are part of me until I die—but that moment I differentiate from them. The borders of the whole ("who is in my family") are dynamically movable—yet under no circumstances is the sinful act of stealing accepted as an option.

What the story of resistance to an ordinary Occidental diagnostic dilemma[15] allows us to see is the structured field of meanings that constitute the field for the particular act (Fig. 7.10).

The dialogue that Shweder had with Babaji included an interesting "nepotism check"—that of the closeness to the Self of the person who was to be helped. Stealing for the sake of family member was ruled out, but not for saving the life of an outsider. This contrasts with the reoccupation of Occidental organizations where also public resources must not be used on persons within the family and kin group relations.

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[15]When Shweder asked Kohlberg to analyze Babaji's answers from his stage theories perspective, the latter had to confess it is not codable in his system. By constant reference to norms, it could be at Level 2 (conventional morality), but by the higher religious-moral base, it belongs to post-conventional level (Level 3) The realities of religious guidance of human moral reasoning were not included in Kohlberg's rationality-oriented method built on Piaget's stage account of cognitive development.

Fig. 7.10 The fight of
faith with rationality:
Babaji case generalized

Conclusion: How Theatricality Works?

Life is a generalized form of theater. It is an ongoing theatrical performance where
we all are simultaneously actors, directors, and the audience. This simultaneous
multiplicity of roles allows us flexible innovation in our life course through micro-
level acts (Fig. 7.1 above). The continuous entering into social roles—built on the
normative nature of human acting and transcending such normativity in actions—
build up the heterogeneous dynamic structure of the Self. Self is dialogical—and
hence needs a theatrical ambience to negotiate the multiplicity of dialogues of itself
and of the environment.

The two theoretical systems used in this chapter—those of George Herbert Mead
(developed in the first three decades of the twentieth century) and Hubert Hermans
(developed from the 1990s to our present time) can be constructively combined to
make sense of *how* the theatrical nature of human living makes it possible. The DST
provides the dynamic structure for Mead's ME component of the Self—the various
I-positions are located within it while coordinating themselves in back-referencing
with the I and forward-acting toward the outside world of assuming a particular
role. The dynamics of the tensions between I-positions—in constant dialogue—at
times reaches a breaking point (dialectical synthesis of a new I-position) that finds
its place in the heterogeneous system of the dialogical self. The dance of the whole
texture of the I-positions goes on—a carnivalesque masquerade that is so typical of
human ways of living.

Questions for Further Thinking
1. Explain George Herbert Mead's system of Self in its dynamic transformation.
2. Explain Dialogical Self Theory of Hubert Hermans.
3. How do persons participate in society?
4. Describe the social role of gardens.
5. How is dance political activity?
6. What is the function of luxury in society?
7. How does fashion feed into the Self of persons?
8. Discuss opera as a societal memory and action tool.
9. What makes puppet theatres psychologically salient?
10. The role of masks in human lives.
11. Discuss the role of pilgrimage in human lives.
12. What is the function of public processions?
13. How are moral decisions set up on the basis of hyper-generalized values?

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Chapter 8
Monuments and Memory: Imagination Amplified and Objectified

The World's tallest (33 m) monument to Jesus Christ
Swiebodzin, Poland

Contents

Memory is evasive. Human beings spend much energy to memorize something they want or are expected to and in the end delegate it to technological devices the passwords for which they need to remember but most likely forget. At the same time they try to forget many experiences that their lives have given them—no technological devices available here—with little success. For the whole society the ones in political power erect monuments—memorials for real and imaginary past agents—and fight about their symbolic relevance. Once a political fight ends in defeat—a previous particular promotion of memory becomes personally or politically undesired—they destroy the monuments, sometimes with displays of anger and determination[1] that rival that of a religious fanatic who cannot tolerate an alternative world concepts. Memories are killed before their carriers—and they are maintained through a socially selective sieve of retaining and amplification.

Memory as a Process

We often glorify memory. It seems good to remember—and bad to forget. Yet this is not a simple opposition. At times it works the other way—it is good to forget and bad to remember. The particular preference is due to the values applied.

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[1] After World War II it was the prison building of a peripheral suburb of Berlin—Spandau—where the Nazi prisoners who were committed to prison terms in the Nürnberg trials were housed under Allied changing guards. When the last prisoner—Rudolf Hess—committed suicide un 1987, the whole building of the prison (originally built in 1876) was not only demolished to the ground but even the bricks of the building were crushed to and which was buried in the North Sea. The fear of the prison or even its bricks becoming ideological symbols for neo-Nazi ideologies was sufficient to invest in the complete eradication of a building which—other than by the post-WW II administrative decision—had no guilt in the making of potential memory devices. The location was first used to build a British department store, after its failure—a parking lot. The fear of the paraphernalia from the prison building to become symbolic relics was substantiated by the long history of relic-making in European history (Geary, 1986) and elaborated further with the concrete sequence of events in Hess' reburial in family site and final (2011) burning of the remains and distributing the ashes in the sea. The political fear of establishing remaining signs of martyrdom was socially justified (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hess).

The general process of the dynamic links *between* remembering and forgetting involves constant coordination of the imaginary future ("how would it all be then?") and coordinating it ("I need to remember x, but how to bring x back from memory?") with the past (Fig. 8.1).

These links—between future imagination and past memory—are made a necessity since all the remembering process that is oriented to future takes place in the present.

The reverse symbolic act—threatening memory of the reverse organization of history— can be found in the efforts by the town of Oswiecim to build a disco on the outskirts of the Auschwitz concentration camp (Andriani & Manning, 2010). The moral outcry against such invasion of entertainment industry to the sacred grounds of the former camp led to the abandonment of the plan.

Imagination in Memory

As Fig. 8.1. specifies, it is imagination of the future that guides the remembering and forgetting processes. The forward-backward looping process is built on two kinds of imagination—that oriented to the future and the other—towards the past. Memory is thus a special form of imagination—oriented from present towards the past. This is built on three basic conditions.

Memory necessarily operates in irreversible time. This focus is based on the *irreversible time phenomenology*—in terms of psychological (subjective) reality the only "directly perceivable" aspect of the psyche is that of more or less extended present. The past does not phenomenologically exist any longer in the present— hence its back-referencing requires imagination mechanism that is set to work on materials of the past.

Memory is based on meaning-making. While in the case of lower psychological functions it is possible to conceptualize memory processes without taking the

Fig. 8.1 Theoretical pathway in the memory process between future and past

REMEMBERING<>FORGETTING   IMAGINARY FUTURE

PAST   PRESENT   FUTURE

meanings of the memorizable materials into account,[2] then in the coverage of the counterpart of memory in terms of remembering and forgetting processes, such ignoring of the meaning is not possible. Remembering (and forgetting) in the human case is a crucial part of the meaning-making process that takes place in the life course and involves constant *striving for meaning* as Frederic Bartlett was emphasizing in the beginning of his long research career of the study of folklore and remembering.[3] Human beings are constant meaning-makers.

Imagination processes are in the core. This striving for meaning—happening in irreversible time—entails imagination processes as their core.[4] Hence the act of remembering (and forgetting) is *constructive*—it uses materials retrieved from the past through imagination for the future. This imagination is structured by the goals of the person in the given setting that entails "vectors" of direction of the imagination process (see Fig. 8.2.)

The intentional modulation of the directions in future- and past-oriented imagination is the mechanism through which both remembering and forgetting work. Figure 8.2 is an expanded version of Fig. 4.2 (Chap. 4)—the Looping Model is here enriched with the meaning of connecting future and past imaginary constructions in the middle of the present rupture.

Figure 8.2 includes two imagination loops—introduced by Tania Zittoun (Zittoun & Chercia, 2013, p. 314)—oriented to the future and to the past ("memory"). The meeting point of the two loops leads to affective generalization that can explode into hyper-generalized affective fields. The present affective rupture creates temporary subjective breaks in the irreversible time ("time stops" may be the subjective feeling). Such explosions provide hyper-generalized affective fields that set the catalytic context for some life events in the unknown future. Thus, we need memory to set up the future without knowing ahead what that future might actually be like.

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[2] The research area of memory was an early hostage to the invasion of the methods of experimental psychology and their constituent reduction of complexity into elements. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1885) introduced the "nonsense syllables" stimuli as "freed from meaning" materials—as an effort to "purify" the memory study from the "contamination" with pre-established meanings He did not realize that this is a hopeless task human beings in every instant enter into construction of meaning out of any previously meaningless material.

[3] Frederic C Bartlett (1886–1969) was a Cambridge (UK) experimental psychologist whose early work (1917, 1920, 1924) was dedicated to the study of genesis of folklore through the question. Later he became known in psychology for his work on memory (in usual classification of mental functions in psychology). His contributions were of course wider all over his academic life (Wagoner, 2017) involving the feed-in into the cognitive science and theory of social representation.

[4] In our contemporary cultural psychology, the focus on processes of imagination is increasingly under investigation (Tateo, 2016, 2018; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). The crucial innovation in this field is the recognition of its central importance in the whole of functioning of the psyche. Imagination is a necessary basic process for all higher psychological functions.

Fig. 8.2 Directionality of life goals guiding affective exploration of future and past

Directions in Forward-Oriented Remembering

Figure 8.2 (in contrast to Fig. 8.1) includes goals-orientations in terms of *directionality vectors*—A (oriented to future) and B (oriented towards the past). The number of these vectors can vary from 0 (affective outburst here and now, without any imagination—e.g., a panic attack) to large N (full uncertainty between past and future). There is possibility of variation of the number and location of direction vectors at any moment of remembering (and forgetting) that can happen in the present.

First, let us consider Fig. 8.2 without any direction vectors oriented to the future. This leads to the dis-activation of the future imagination loop—with the result that all remembering becomes oriented to the present feelings about the past. The remembering person may become indulged in the reimagination of some particular moments in one's past that may trigger an explosion of hyper-generalized nostalgia in the present. The direction vector towards the past leads to imaginative reconfabulations of ever more stories from the pat that feed forward to further nostalgic feelings. The person literally "lives in the past" in the present.

Second—consider the version of Fig. 8.2 with only direction vectors oriented towards the future. The person creates imaginary futures—positive or negative ("doomsday" inventions) without any use or recognition of the imagined past. We have the case of a visionary, or a builder of a "new society",[5] or a fatalist with

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[5] Widespread focus on the future in the 1920s Soviet Union and in the case of any other utopian constructions. Likewise person's beliefs after remarriage that they can build new marital relations without the previous (now divorced) relationship is such utopia at the personal level.

gloomy future constructions. For these constructions no material from the past is used—the past imagination loop is idle.

Finally—consider the version of Fig. 8.2. where *both* future and past directed are non-active and the only vector left is in the present—oriented to the affective explosion here and now. The person seeks affective excesses here and now—without any consideration of the personal past or future. This scenario is cleverly captured by the entertainment industry that produces highly affectivating movies, video games, and talk shows that trigger affective escalations beyond any bounds—and leave the person or community with no impact for its future—other than search for the next entertainment opportunity. It also renders both memory and imagination irrelevant for the human mind—by emphasizing co-affectivation with the present entertainment event. Complete immersion in the entertainment activity is the goal—with the result of no distancing by the participants from what they do. Entertainment is thus the secret assassin of the human mind.

Reproduction as Production

The reality of human beings living in irreversible time renders each phenomenon of the mind unique. Consequently any effort to reproduce some feature from the past (or imagine some in the future) is an act of production in the present. Each of these acts involves construction of a new version of the imagined past (or future)—hence remembering is a re*constructive* process.

It is Frederic Bartlett's tradition in the investigation into remembering that made the reconstructive nature of memory. His original research question was how folklore was possible—how, in the oral transfer of myth stories from generation to generation takes place. The variety of versions of folklore texts tells us the story of constant creativity—yet all these versions come to the range dominated by some conventionalized versions. Not surprisingly Bartlett studied the transfer processes of texts as these were retold between persons (serial reproduction) or within persons (repeated reproduction). In both cases he could observe the transformation and conventionalization of the texts. For psychology it is only the repeated reproduction techniques that provide us with relevant information.[6]

Repeated reproduction—microgenetic construction. Bartlett experimented with various kinds of reproductive genres—asking the same person to reproduce the

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[6] Bartlett's serial reproduction technique—persons retelling the stories to one another in a sequence—fits the folklore study task and may give evidence of conventionalization in social groups, but it does not provide adequate data for reconstructive memory process as it equates inter-individual variability (differences between persons in story telling) with intraindividual variability. Psychological phenomena are non-ergodic (Molenaar et al., 2002) which renders such equality theoretically impossible. This has major consequences on the interpretations made of development (diachronic process) based on inter-individual variation (synchronic nature of cross-sectional data).

once heard story (from few times to around 20 times), asking the next person who hears the story to the next one, and so on. His interest in the ways in which folklore was created in oral literature made these different form equal. In contrast, for psychology as a science of human meaning construction it is only one—the repeated reproduction—that fits the realities of personological meaning construction. The *Aktualgenese* of meaning involves subjective imagination in the movement to the future. In Bartlett's repeated reproduction revealed definite widespread tendencies toward change. Bartlett pointed out:

> In repeated reproduction a subject's own earlier versions gain an increasingly important influence as time elapses. Upon its first presentation a story or picture is considered from a certain point of view, or under the influence of a certain attitude. This attitude not only, persists, but usually plays a greater part with the lapse of time. To this, no doubt, is due the fact that inventions and transformations, once introduced, show great tenacity, and tend to be formed into related series. In a similar manner, *an invention once introduced may easily bring about changes in materia*l which has, up to this point, been correctly reported. (Bartlett, 1920, p. 33 added emphasis)

Visual imagery was found to become more active the longer the interval preceding reproduction, and, at least in the case of stories containing the report of a number of incidents, increased visualization provides conditions which favor transformation. What for Bartlett was a peripheral feature—invented confabulations in the retelling of a story—are of central relevance for the meaning-making human beings. Bartlett was not concerned with the realities of irreversible time which is the axiomatic core of our new general psychology. In the practice of remembering in the real time, it is the imagination process that leads the "filling in" of gaps through confabulations

Extremely Rapid Confabulations: Remembering and Recalling

In the history of humankind the functions of memorizing were by far more prominent and complex that in our age of Internet, large data banks, and easy finger movements on screens that save or delete information at an instance. Remembering a message to be delivered to the leaders of a neighboring tribe after a day or more of the messenger's journey required elaboration of sophisticated memorial devices to help to code the message and similar tools for retrieving it. Furthermore, many messages to be remembered and retrieved were long and complex texts. It is precisely in the historical period when *Homo sapiens* emerged and transcended the biological evolution that organized human memory functions to their maximum. In contrast, in the twenty-first century we can observe gradual decline of the human memory functions due to their more powerful substitutes (data banks and Google spying and recording our Internet actions)

How is it possible to memorize long complex texts—poems, theater scripts, and songs—and recall then with full accuracy? This becomes possible through high-speed networking of various natural confabulatory processes. Alexander Luria's

analysis of a special case—a man with very powerful memory (Luria, 1968)—gives us a glimpse of how such networking of the memorization tools can be taken to high-speed solution of the memorizing problem. The solution "Mr. S." had developed for himself entailed eradication of borders between different sensory systems and very rapid navigation between them:

> … I recognize a word not only by the images it evokes but *by the whole complex of feelings that image arouses*. It is hard to express… it's not the matter of vision or hearing but *some over-all sense* I get. Usually I experience *a word's taste and weight*, and I don't have to make an effort to remember it—*the word seems to recall itself*. But it is difficult to describe. What I sense is something oily slipping through my hand… or I *am aware of a slight tickling in my left hand caused by a mass of tiny, lightweight points*. When that happens I simply remember, without having to make an attempt…. (Luria, 1968, p. 28, added emphases)

A number of important features are evident in this self-reflection. First, the highly efficient technique that "S" had developed for remembering and recalling is outside of the verbal expression possibility. Second, it involves *sensual aboutness* involved in the act ("overall sense," "word seems to recall itself," "tickling"). Lastly, it is an example of overall synesthesia that is taken to function at very high speed in irreversible time. In sum, the act of remembering and recalling is not a mechanical act of bringing existing facts out of the "memory storage" space, but instead a constantly moving reconstructive process in the mind where support from imaginary components plays a central part in the accurate reproduction of the past experiences. These links are made a necessity since all the remembering process that is oriented to the future takes place in the present. What Luria's patient who demonstrated high memory capacities (Luria, 1968) did at high speed and capacity is the exaggerated version of the ordinary use of confabulation in the repeated remembering tasks that Bartlett documented in his studies.

Confabulation as Constructive Microgenesis

The process is negotiated between the person and the societal expectations for what to remember (and forget), how to remember (and forget), and how to use the remembered (or forgotten) material in the construction of one's life course. The central phenomenon of the remembering and forgetting process is confabulation—creation of new meanings that may enhance remembering and forgetting as it is needed.

Confabulation is the necessary solution for the remembering and forgetting process to operate in irreversible time. In terms of *Aktualgenese*[7] this process of confabulation entails various versions of pre-gestalts (*Vorgestalten*) out of which the particular imaginary result from the past becomes established.

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[7] The tradition of looking at the process of Gestalt formation is covered by the notion of *Aktualgenese* (emergence of actuality) that comes from the Second Leipzig School (Felix Krueger and Friedrich Sander) in the German psychology of the 1920s. A century later this tradition finds its expression in the focus on *microgenetic* methodology (Wagoner, 2009).

There is an interesting asymmetry between goals of remembering and forgetting—the latter is more complicated to accomplish by will than the former. A description of the difficulties the same hyper-memorizing case ("S") described by Alexander Luria (1968, pp. 66–73) in purposeful forgetting are a key example in the limits that semiotic mediation has on a basic higher mental process—non-maintaining unwanted memories. The key in this process was in the affective dissociation from the established hyper-speedy connections in the while that assisted "S" in his phenomenal remembering. While remembering can be improved by establishing new wholistic memorizing strategies, purposeful forgetting requires the demolishing of these strategies.

The act of remembering is a process that includes microgenesis of the event that has taken place in the past. This entails the production of imaginary samples of the past event (analysis into parts)—that are *Vorgestalten* (pre-gestalts) for the final recollected form. Into that process of restructuring of the imagined past event, different confabulation-directing social representations may enter. These lead the establishment of the final form that adds to the previous event (A-B-C) a part (D) together with a complete reordering of the parts in the whole (A-D-C-B). The memory process is thus open to introduction of novel material exactly in the period of move from analysis of the imagined event and its reformatting into the final form. Recalling of the past is thus a constructive act—based on imagination and operating under the influence of the social representations that lead to confabulative inserts into the final form.

The presence of constant relating with the imaginary future makes confabulation inevitable. Our remembering is *creatively inaccurate* which makes it functional for the future. It is a case where lack of accuracy opens the possibility for innovation—given the demands of the new demands of the settings. These latter demands are societally prescriptive—always to reconstruct the advertised glory of the current power figures while letting the societally foreign or dangerous material vanish into the oblivion of forgetting.

Between the Personal and Societal in Constructing Memory

As is obvious from Figs. 8.1 to 8.3, our memories are constructed in irreversible time imaginatively referencing both past and expected future. This process is guided by societal demands upon that imagination. The two levels—societal and personal—operate in a mutually interdependent way.

Fig. 8.3 Confabulation in the remembering process

Forgetting as Humiliated Silence: A Societal Reconstruction Tool

Paul Connerton (2008) has pointed out the unity of blocking the past while focusing in the future direction vector (cf. Fig. 8.2) in cases of societal reconstruction after a hegemonic societal power has captured its opponent. The blocking of the past direction vector happens through its silencing under the campaign of collective guilt proliferation and internalization of the humiliation. The case of post-World War II Germany is a case in point:

> Consider, for instance, the destruction of German cities by bombing in the Second World War. This left some 130 cities and towns in ruins; about 600,000 civilians killed; 3.5 million homes destroyed; and 7.5 million homeless at the end of the war. Members of the occupying powers report seeing millions of homeless and utterly lethargic people wandering about amidst the ruins. *From the war years there survive a few accounts in which German citizens wrote of their stunned bewilderment on seeing for the first time the appearance of their ravaged cities.* Yet throughout the more than 50 years following the war, the horrors of the air bombardment and its long-term repercussions have not been brought to public attention either in historical investigations or in literary accounts. German historians have not produced an exploratory, still less an exhaustive, study of the subject. (Connerton, 2008, pp. 67–68)

Construction of the collective guilt by the losers who were lucky to stay alive after the war would render the reconstruction of the wartime atrocities to become a "taboo zone" in terms of the Semiotic Demand Setting (Fig. 8.4). Public revelations are not merely socially forbidden, but affectively humiliating. Both the conformity control of the silence "zone" and the personal humiliation feeling would provide a double (personal and social) block of the "silence zone."

Fig. 8.4 Semiotic Demand
Setting

Together with the enforcement of the "taboo zone" of historical reconstruction—fortified by the hyper-generalized field of humiliation—the "zone of promoted talk" entails the future oriented vector. Enforced social dismissal of the past[8] is similar to the demand for social remembering—both erecting monuments and their devastation are parts of the same process of negotiating remembering and forgetting. In the most visible case this negotiation can be explicated in the case of making—and breaking—public monuments.

Monuments: Social Guidance of Remembering and Forgetting

Monuments are large-size meaning support devices. They are set up with purpose:

> …for human beings, monuments do not have an a priori nature or status but rather are imbued with significance by meaning-making agents *in coordination* with wider social processes. (Beckstead et al., 2011, p. 197)

Monuments are specially constructed objects—they first of all stand out in their different sizes in contrast to the people who may pay attention to them. Some are miniatures—small objects that fit into personal interior spaces. Others are decidedly macroscopic—impress the passersby by their very large size. The function of which is to be external memory aids for people, which have special characteristics:

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[8] The Ancient Greeks were "acutely aware of the dangers intrinsic to remembering past wrongs because they well knew the endless chains of vendetta revenge to which this so often led. And since the memory of past misdeeds threatened to sow division in the whole community and could lead to civil war, they saw that not only those who were directly threatened by motives of revenge but all those who wanted to live peacefully together in the polis had a stake in not remembering" (Connerton, 2008, p. 61).

1. They are external to the person's mind (but are erected to guide internalization of values) and to the person's home space. They are equivalent to personal shrines in their expected function of promoting particular hyper-generalized meanings—yet in the public space.
2. They carry institutional memory guidance. They represent some institutional-local community to political organization to governments and emperors—guidance to what is to be memorized and with what affective marking.
3. They afford viewing from multiple sides (from limited to 360°) and carry with them specific constraints on how they can be related with (acts of "vandalism" in contrast to "remembrance" via ritualistic honoring by specific donations—flower decorations, bringing donations of food, etc.).

Monuments are an attempt to unite the past, present, and future in one place over variable (life) times. Politically erected monuments designate positively valued events (happenings, persons, etc.); thus they are examples of purposeful social efforts to guide the process of *dialogical monologization.* This process includes a relationship between parts of a dialogical system (A in dialogue with non-A) that leads to the suppression of the other part (non-A) and the complete monological dominance of the one part (A). Such monologization eliminates doubt—given A there is no doubt possible about it. The overly large-size monuments to kings, emperors, military leaders, and important businessmen erected in an urban environment are not meant to promote contemplation about their power roles (dialogue— "was Napoleon a social innovator for Europe, or a war criminal ?" or "was Stalin a dictator or the beloved Father of the Nation?"). Instead their function is to peripherally suggest that no dialogue is possible ("Napoleon was an innovator!" and "Stalin was the Beloved Father!").

The important feature in this suggestion for monologization (*eliminating in principle* the opposite perspective—if a monument is erected for this important person, that person *must be* important!) is the peripheral nature of such setup of social suggestions. A monument is put in a particular location—and people who live near that location regularly pass by not paying attention to the monument as it is part of their ordinary lives. Yet with each passing it is the peripheral exposure that maintains the tacit belief system of the affective field that "this warlord I pass by every day must have done something good to us"—not knowing what that figure originally did (or did not do). Furthermore, hordes of tourists may be transported to the monument to see it and take photographs or selfies with it (Fig. 8.4) with the double public message. For the tourists guided to the spot, the message is explicit ("this is an important monument we must see during our brief visit!"[9]), while for the local dwellers the message is implicit ("since all these busloads of tourists come to see our monument it must be important").

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[9] Alex Gillespie (2006) has demonstrated how the "must see" social suggestions are socially prefabricated even halfway around the world. British tourists travel long way to Ladakh in North India to see the specific sights their tourist brochures back in the United Kingdom prescribe as a "must see."

Fig. 8.5 A monument to the soldier of People's Liberation Army of Chinese People's Republic at the Western Lake (Hangzhou, China)

Figure 8.5 illustrates the peripherally central positioning of a politically relevant monument. The Western Lake is an important and beloved holiday making area for the increasingly well-to-do Chinese who like to take walks on the lakeside and can be lured to the European luxury boutiques on the other side of the road that circles the lake. The statue emphasizing the military might is situated in the pedestrian zone at the lakeside. Most of the walkers just pass by; some can be observed to take the photo of themselves with the monument. The social guidance of the monument is left to the co-constructive *Einfühlung* by the passersby. Yet until the political atmosphere were to change the silent message is in its given location as the trigger of trust in the might of the People's Army and by extension of the Chinese social power in general.

Communicating the social power images by monuments is a recurrent feature. The monuments are meant to guide the ordinary people and special role players

("tourists!" and "tourist guides") in the direction of tacit acceptance of the social power. Specific features of the monuments—like the explicit display of bombs in Fig. 8.5 or the raised front feet of the horse on which the important leader or war general is depicted to ride (Fig. 8.6)—indicate the dominance power.

Importance for the person or event presented through the monument can be communicated by other architectural features—by making the depicted figure oversized (cf the opening figure of this Chapter of the 33-meter high Swiebodzin Christ) or

Fig. 8.6 The horse is important—giving value to the rider

putting a sculpture of a relevant person on an impossibly tall pedestal where the details of the figure are not observable—yet an effort to do so requires a viewer to bend one's head towards the sky ("heaven") thus entering into a subservient bodily position in relation to the symbolic figure (Fig. 8.7)

The most notable example of a pattern seen in Fig. 8.7 is the Nelson's Column in the middle of the Trafalgar Square in London. The column is 51.6 m high and

Fig. 8.7 The enforced
viewing position

→ Creating viewing angle to LOOK UP

→ Reducing viewing angle by physical distance

visible from all sides of the large square. Yet the statue of Admiral Nelson is not visible given the distance—but his importance for the British Royalty is—through the height of the whole monument. Although nominally it is the monument to Admiral Nelson who was a battle-winning admiral and lover of Lady Hamilton, in reality its function is to amplify the symbolic power of the British *Reich*—which at that time emerged as the overwhelming naval and therefore economic power in the world and presented itself as such.

Monuments Erected by Winners for Themselves

If Nelson's Column in London took over two decades to be constructed, other commemorations of human dramas lead to rapid construction of monuments after the depicted event. The Soviet Army captured Vienna in 1945—and the monument to the Soviet soldiers who participated (and 17000 died) in the campaign was erected with speed that would astonish even the most effective capitalist producer—started in May 1945 it was officially opened on August 18, 1945. The rapidity of constructing this symbolic scene was assisted by using the labor of prisoners of war. The basic meaning of "liberation" which was insisted upon Austrians was of high political urgency—as the latter may have seen the 1938 Anschluss to Germany as such and preferred to call the 1945 takeover as "occupation." The monument (Figs. 8.8 and 8.9) is a grandiose architectural unit with the focus on the Soviet soldier—also raised high above the ground.

Like in the case of Nelson's Column, the specific detail of the statue on the high column (20 m) on top of which is a 12-meter soldier figure.[10] Details (e.g., his machine gun) are not visible from the distance.

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[10] Marschik and Spitaler, 2005, p. 17

Fig. 8.8 Soviet Army liberation war memorial in Vienna, at Schwarzenbergplatz

Vandalism is the social action pattern that reverses the monologization efforts of the social powers that set up the monument. It is an act of *counter-monologization*. At different times after its erection, different actors—usually remaining anonymous—have violated the given monument, often evoking religious or political voices. After various attacks on the Vienna monument since 1945,[11] in the twenty-first century, it has been vandalized four times until the writing of the present book. In April 2012 somebody threw red paint over one part of the memorial. In May 2014 colors of the Ukrainian flag were used in the violation of the original structure to mark the Russian activities in Donbass. In 2015 the words of Stalin congratulating his troops for conquering Vienna in the monument were covered in black paint, and in January 2017 red paint was used again on the monument. The monument has not been a monologically silent ideological marker of the political takeover in 1945 but is episodically drawn into contemporary political dialogues as the social life proceeds.

To summarize, a monument is erected for the purpose of monological marking of a symbolic figure (e.g., "Napoleon as a war hero," "Lenin as the founder of the Russian revolution," "Edward Colston[12] as a benefactor") to block the possibility of dialogical investigation (e.g., "Napoleon as a war hero" <relating with> "Napoleon

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[11] Described by Jeranek (2005)

[12] Edward Colston (1636–1721) was an English tradesman who among other trades was involved in African slave trade in the 1680s. As a benefactor to the city of Bristol, a monument to him was erected in 1895 and taken down by protesters in 2020.

Fig. 8.9 The central figure of the Viennese war memorial

as a war criminal"). The iconoclastic countermove—often leading to vandalism of the monument or its demolishing—reverses the monologization focus of the monument. An act of demolishing the monuments supports the counter-monological nature of the opposite—keeping the suppression of dialogicality. Both the erectors and the demolishers of monuments are similar in their hegemonic dominance fights that render any dialogicality with suspicion and reject it.

Monuments as Targets: Iconoclasms as Symbolic "Revolutions"

Monuments often are taken out of their peripheral status and made into targets of affectively exaggerated political actions in a given society—even after a "dormant" period of long time. The Civil War in the United States (1861–1865) left the country with political unity and deep psychological wounds of social class clashes that resurfaced in the US history in the decades that followed.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is the oldest state-run university in the United States, established by the Society of Freemasons in 1787. Given this ideologically based beginning, the university for a long time lived up to the promise of providing free of charge higher education. Even at our time the university has relatively low tuition fees. Students of the university were participants in the Civil War on the Southern (Confederate) side. In 1907 the United Daughters of the Confederacy—a women's organization—initiated the plan to build a memorial to the students of the university who perished in the war. The monument was funded by the university alumni and carried out by the Canadian sculptor John Wilson in 1913 (Fig. 8.10) based on the general genre of "silent monuments" of soldier images with rifles depicted without ammunition. The model used for the figure was a northerner—so the monument was not meant specifically to glorify the Southern cause in the Civil War. Rather, it triggered the maintenance of the memory of the tragedy of fratricidal wars.

Like most of similar monuments in the Southern states of the United States, this monument was erected in the beginning of the twentieth century, organized by the social organization of the Daughters of the Confederacy in memory of the soldiers who died in the US Civil War half a century before. It carried a general patriotic and moralistic message on its side panel—"duty is the subtlest word in the English language." Even if erected to commemorate the fallen soldiers on one (Southern Confederacy) side—the losers in the Civil War—it actually commemorates moral values that could be relevant for all political ideologies anywhere in the world.

The rape of the "Silent Sam." The silently standing monument to the university students who lost their lives in the Civil War—promoting the universal value of duty—ended its existence a hundred years later. Militant activism against the honoring of the Confederate soldiers killed in the war was growing in the US society in the early twenty-first century. The issue of symbolic icons of the South—regularly presented as places where racial hatred still prevails—became pawns in the social power struggles within the US society in the twenty-first century. Like in many other Southern US towns, this statue became the victim to twenty-first-century iconoclasm.

For a century the students passed by "Silent Sam" (the name invented in 1954) with the joke that he fires his gun when a virgin passes by. No shots were heard in a hundred years—which is a triumph for the survival of an urban legend and not a descriptor of the sexual mores of young North Carolina students.

Since 2010 various public denunciation efforts of the presence of the monuments began. Its focus was to extend the meaning of the particular war memorial to the

Fig. 8.10 The "Silent Sam"—a monument to the students who died in the Civil War

wider historical issue of inter-racial relations in the US history. The claim that the monument represents "racist tendencies" that should be eradicated from the US society in the twenty-first century was forcefully—both by guided transformation of the local public opinions and by coercive threats (and acts)—against the statue and towards the opponents of the iconoclastic action plans. Finally, in 2018 the university leadership itself moved the statue to an internal location "for protection" (and in the faint hope to diffuse the aggressive confrontation). It devised a compromise—creating an extra building plan for the in-house enclosure (preserving the historical monument). The budget for that new building was immediately attacked by the iconoclasts—the monument had already acquitted a hyper-generalized meaning of "racist object" that had no place in the US society in the twenty-first century.

The original tribute to the fallen soldiers in the Civil War was superseded by the currently growing importance of the "Black Lives Matter" movement that reached its peak in 2020. Ongoing legal struggles around the adequacy versus non-adequacy of the removal of the monument centered on the dialogicality of "racist symbol" versus "historical memorial of the dead." By bringing the issue of the monument and its location out from its silent monologicality to the contemporary political fight in the contemporary US society is an example of how otherwise "silent" monuments can be the object of society-wide ideological screaming. Such functional transformations of the role of monuments occur episodically in any society in the world. Any publicly displayed monument is a potential target of such iconoclastic clash—independent of which ideology is used for problematizing its place in the history of the given society.

Changing Times, Changing Meanings: Ambivalence in Action

Monuments are fixed encodings of fluid meanings. The statues to present dictators and utopian politicians are still in place when their societies begin to change. The post-change iconoclasm has been observed in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, creating huge depositories for the fallen monuments of the discredited leaders with one pole suppressed (the Budapest Statue Park Museum—James, 1999). The directionality vector in the East European societies had changed, and the previously erected monuments needed to be silenced by their removal—and concentration of them in a setting of grotesque presentation of the failed socialist past.

A special case of continuous ambivalence of monuments can be observed in the case of monuments erected for the deserters. Deserting soldiers are of course no war heroes to commemorate—unless the side they were supposed to fight for (and did not) ends up defeated in the war. The winning side can elevate the deserters from the army of the losing side to a status of honor—"conscientious objection" assumed to be in their minds while deserting made them collaborators to the winners. In post-World War II Western Germany, such monuments were constructed—but often

ambivalently displayed[13]—recognizing the social complexity of change in the political domains.

Monuments for Hyper-Generalized Ideas

The target for a monument can be a hyper-generalized idea—without any personification in sight. The Monument of the Book (Fig. 8.11) was created in 1994 by Barcelona sculptor at the request of secondhand booksellers guild of Catalonia, by Joan Brossa (1919–1999)—a Catalan literary personage who connected poetry, theater, cinema, visual poetry, objects, posters, and installations in his work. Situated in the middle of the city (at Ramblas), the Monument of the Book may end up

Fig. 8.11 *Monumento al Libro* (Barcelona, Paseo de Gracia and Gran Via). Author's photo

[13] The German-Kurdish sculptor Mehmet Akca was invited to create a deserter monument for the city of Bonn. After its completion it was actually set up in the city of Potsdam. The circumstances of the transfer are interesting: The monument was first exhibited on anti-war day on the Friedensplatz in 1989. After just 10 h on public display, the monument was ordered to be removed. City officials in Bonn refused to approve a public site for the monument, and in September 1991, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was relocated to Potsdam where it is located at Platz der Einheit (Welch, 2012, p. 386). Political ambivalence takes notable forms in administrative decisions.

becoming a historical memory device in the time when people forget how to read from sources other than the small screens of cellular telephones.

Such value-suggestive monuments set up an affectivating context in the public space. Any passerby experiences the value of the oversized object as an episode of the sublime. A similar trigger of value triggering can be accomplished on the other side of the size spectrum—in the case of miniature objects that may be acquired in the public space but then transported to and maintained in the private domains. These are "mini-monuments" that differ from their oversize counterparts by their focus on specific values they promote.

From Huge to Tiny: Figurines in Personal Life Spaces

Monuments are large—fitting into public spaces rather than into private worlds. Their counterparts are tiny figurines that are expected to bring a particular meaning to the core of personal lives. A very small figure of some symbolic or iconic form of some relevant image can be transported from public to private world and bring into the latter the social suggestions from a given power holder in a society.

The psychological mechanism of the power of small images begins with the construction of any meaningful object out of a neutral one. The making of a souvenir illustrates the rapidity and power of affectivating[14] objects by a person. You walk on a beach and pick up a random stone that looks interesting. You carry it home—and it begins to signify to you the trip to that beach that day—resulting in the simple stone becoming a souvenir that operates as memory device.

Pieces of symbolic wholes can carry further the symbolic meaning when made small and presented as gifts. The Medieval exchange of relics—pieces of the skeletons of saints (Geary, 1986)—included the transfer of the subjective beliefs of the magical power of the saints from the donor to the recipient. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, small pieces of it—de facto pieces of German socialist concrete—became circulating as souvenirs of the political change in Germany.[15] A stone—big or small—can be made into a symbol.

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[14] The notion of affectivating (Cornejo et al., 2018) entails the creating the meaning of an object starting from the initial feeling towards it—I feel into the particular object, a flower, and arrive at the meaning "beautiful flower."

[15] The authenticity of such souvenirs—body parts of saints or pieces of the Berlin Wall—can always be disputed—yet these disputes do not diminish the functional role of these objects in the role of *as if* the carriers of the symbolic meaning.

The Clay That Was Made to Speak: Porcelain Figurines

The making of special pottery—porcelain—was introduced in China over two millenia and reached to Europe through the Silk Road, constituting for Europeans high luxury items wanted by aristocracies. In English porcelain is referred to as "china" thus indicating the origin of the "white gold" as it was considered to be. The secrets of its manufacturing were kept by the Chinese for a long time, and European efforts to start producing their own failed until 1708 when Tschirnhaus and Böttger—in the service of the ruler of Saxony—mastered a way to create what became Meissen porcelain—mixture of kaolin and alabaster treated by high temperature.

The "white gold" was valuable. Over the eighteenth century, different factories were established in Saxony (Meissen), Prussia, Italy, and France (Sevres).[16] Its qualities—durability and usability in household functions of serving meals and decorations—made it widely used and much desired by the higher social classes. The eighteenth century was the high time of the rococo and baroque styles in construction in architecture and clothing, and the possibilities of using porcelain objects in the designed environments made it attractive in the innovations of designs.

Thanks to the properties of porcelain, different cultural meanings could be encoded right into the center of relevant human activities. Food serving plates made of porcelain included painted scenes of various kinds as decorations. Decorative plates on the wall (majolica) would carry meanings of various life scenes. Porcelain tableware became an arena of clandestine moral socialization of the users of the plates, vases, and drinking vessels.

Furthermore the technological solutions for porcelain making in the eighteenth century made it possible for proliferation of the making of small-size figurines—kind of monuments in the miniature. These could be brought into living spaces and could operate as meaning carriers. In contrast to self-made souvenirs—such as a pebble from a beach or a flock of hair of the beloved in the medallion attached to the necklace—these porcelain figurines carried externally made social suggestions into the personal worlds of the people who brought them into their private spheres as decorations. These were small-size (around 25 cm high or less) figures that depicted some scenes of human lives with particular suggestions for how people could—or should—live.

An example of such figurines carrying social suggestions is given in Fig. 8.12—a "happy family." The ordinariness of family life of the obviously well-to-do parents oriented to their infant child indicates the joint care.

The thematic range of topics covered by the mass production of porcelain figurines in the eighteenth century was wide—yet it excluded the themes that were usual in the huge monuments in public spaces (images of war glory, hero honoring images, etc.). The medium of porcelain figurines was used as insert devices of moral messages into the personal lives. The reverse—for instance, imagining the figurine in Fig. 8.12 not as 25 cm in height but 25 m and located in a main square of a

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[16] On history of porcelain in Europe: Heuser (1922), Scherer (1909), Schnorr von Carolsfeld (1912)

Fig. 8.12 The Happy Family. (Meissen porcelain, around 1780, author M. V. Acier—from Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1912, p. 90)

city—would lead to a grotesque public image that would accomplish the reverse insertion—of intimacy to the public domain (e.g., compare with Fig. 8.5).

Themes of polite aristocratic etiquette (Fig. 8.13) and public participatory performances (Fig. 8.14) abounded among the porcelain figurines. Notably these social suggestion domains were limited to aristocratic and other affluent social strata—who of course would buy and display these figurines in their home environments. The societal guidance of the mores of the rich was socially important in the eighteenth-century Europe. The figurines were not meant for the peasants and their morality was not of societal concern.

The social lives in the eighteenth-century Europe included deeply amorous experiences—the century is at times called in general as "the Century of Love." This was reflected also in the realms of porcelain figurines—the theme of Bacchus and their following (Fig. 8.15) was reflecting the ambivalence of the social mores towards the mythological ceremonies that look in the figurines as ordinary love scenes.

Love scenes were polyphonic. Figure 8.16 illustrates a rare example from a porcelain factory at a small German village of Veilsdorf pointing to the turmoils that falling in love can bring into human lives.

The porcelain objects starting from the eighteenth century illustrate the processes of social penetration of values onto objects of everyday use. By inserting images into the middle of everyday life experiences in private spaces, the same peripheral

Fig. 8.13 The hand kiss. (Biscuit porcelain group from Vienna around 1785. Author Anton Grassi. From Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1912, p. 113)

Fig. 8.14 The dance. (Ludwigsburg porcelain, around 1760. Author Anton Postelli. Height 16 centimeters. From Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1912, p. 195)

role of monuments in public spaces is replicated—albeit in the form of cute small-ness of the images and values these suggest. The social suggestion framework works at the intersection of the sublime—reached by exaggerated large or small size of the objects—and everyday life meaning systems. Memories of the past are thus imagi-nation as supported by objects set up in strategically relevant places—city squares and bedside tables.

Conclusions: Amplified and Attenuated Imagination

Memory is basic. And it is also dangerous—we may firmly believe our imagination
of the past is "true." Given the central role of imagination in both future-oriented
and past-oriented meaning construction, such expectation is likely to be an illusion.
Illusions are functionally important for human psychological functioning since—
from the point of view of the reality of the present moment (which is the ultimate
constraint introduced by the irreversibility of time), the positioning of the person is
completely set up by the oppositely oriented and coordinated imagination (see
Figs. 8.1 and 8.2).

The presence of directionality vector in the human meaning-making processes
(Fig. 8.2) leads to the question of person-society relationship—how are these *direc-
tionality vectors* set? This can happen by general directed suggestions—by saturat-
ing the human environment with different meaning carriers. These may be of
exaggerated sizes (monuments) or miniaturized objects (figurines). They may carry
monological values (e.g., a monument to a "war hero" under whole leadership in
many thousands of fighters lost their lives for the sake of a temporary or insignifi-
cant victory) or trigger dominance fights between values (iconoclasms). The setup

Fig. 8.16 The rattling effect of Amor (from porcelain factory of Kloster Veilsdorf, 1770s. Author unknown. Height 13 centimeters. From Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1912, p. 229)

of monuments is at times oriented to maintenance of field-like affective sentiments to remember the horrors not through facts but via feelings.[17]

Further Questions for Thinking

1. Discuss the role of imagination in memory.
2. Explain the role of intentionality and modulation of direction vectors in the memory processes.
3. Explain Bartlett's method of repeated reproduction.
4. Describe how rapid confabulations operate as memory techniques.

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[17] For example, various memorials to the horrible events in the past of the given society—guiding the persons who explore them to work through their grief for the sake of societal futures (Bresco & Wagoner, 2019)

5. How is forgetting humiliated silence?
6. Explain Semiotic Demand Setting.
7. Explain how monuments operate in memory.
8. Ambivalence in monuments.
9. Explain the role of small porcelain figurines in memory guidance.
10. How is imagination amplified and attenuated in memory processes.

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Chapter 9
Political Capture of the Human Minds: Escalations and Resistances

Contents

Albrecht Dürer (1494) *Death of Orpheus*

Politics is a dangerous game. It leads to a special modus of operation of the human mind—the person becomes a kind of a "political animal" with the exaggeration some and attenuation of other features of their personal humanity.

Politics sets up people against people, leading to wars, revolutions, and economic excesses. It makes it possible to kill and humiliate other human beings in the name of gains in power and economic success. The story of the end of the life of the proverbial musical genius—Orpheus—in the hands of *maenads*[1] who could not or would not hear the beauty of his lyra. The politically aggravated and directed feelings of anger about others(s)' different ways of seeing the world often escalate to irrational collective actions of stigmatization, street fights, building and attacking barricades, and mass murders and genocides. Political participation in society is potentially traumatic to the ordinary human beings.

My goal in this chapter is to analyze the intricate connections of persons and the political systems of society. This entails the focus on asymmetric social power relations between concrete agentive actors (persons) and vague field-like atmospheric meaning systems ("political sentiments") that are put into societal practices by other actors who assume power roles. In this chapter I want to analyze the personological psychological processes that are involved in human beings' entering and living in the political social dramas of a society. These processes involve deep personal feelings that are socially guided by "social others" who promote general ideologies—usually intensified by the constructive internalization processes of the ordinary persons themselves.

In its immediate form the relations are between an ordinary person (who has full agency over one's life) and other—extraordinary—person whose dominance over the first is given by the assumed political roles. Thus, a policeman, prison guard, the priest, and the president are all persons whose assuming their political role allows them to act in ways that limit the conduct of the ordinary persons. The latter may be arrested, demanded to confess their sins, and persuaded to vote for a person who

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[1] *Maenads* were devotees to Dionysius who participated in the frenzied dances of the god which are direct manifestations of euphoric possession and that these worshipers, sometimes by eating the flesh of a man or animal who has temporarily incarnated the God, come to partake of his divinity. Their anger could lead them to homicides.

wants to come to political power. In this sense—political *inter*personal relations are power-asymmetric *institutional* relations between persons. Human beings in any society are constantly relating with the social institutional power structures. Politics—big and small—is everywhere, and its impact on human lives is persistently episodic.

Politics as a Cultural Invention

Politics is one of the major inventions of the human species—societies take on various organizational forms, and the management of these forms is the main role of the political action systems of individuals (kings or queens, presidents, ministers) or collective institutions (parliaments, municipalities, political parties, bands of underground revolutionaries, etc.). Political actions are not only goals-*oriented* (as all human conduct is) but goals-*directed* by collective intentional pursuits of the goals. It is a complex calculated hypergame.[2] Politics leads to the transition from war to peace and vice versa—setting the stage for destruction, stalemates (negotiations), and construction.

Where does politics begin?[3] It starts from the need to coordinate human relations in goals-directed manner, making coalitions and eliminating opponents—both physically and through "character assassination." In our contemporary times, it often involves handshakes in front of TV cameras, followed by throwing bombs on one to the other's country or sending snipers to assassinate her or him. Turns from one to the other side of an opposite is the rule rather than an exception in the running of political affairs. Politics is a form of institutionally demanded and personally internalized societal actions with ideological directions. It entails various forms of cooperation and negotiation about social conflicts within and between societies, referring to maintenance, construction, and redistribution of economic and semiotic resources.[4] The negotiations between various institutions—including political parties fighting for power—constitute the meso-political level.

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[2] *Hypergames* are games where the full set of tactics by all players is not known to one another and where the values of application of these tactics alter dependent on changing circumstances (Richer & Valsiner, 2007). There are no single or fixed solutions to hypergame problems, but constant search for satisficing solutions.

[3] The notion of *politics* stems from the Ancient Greek notion of *polis*, which in direct translation can mean "city," yet it had a wider meaning in the time of Aristotle (fourth century BC)—taking the form of population sharing common borders of a territory (within which a city could dominate). Athens as a city state was a good example of such *polis*—based economically on slavery (obtained from surrenderers in military conflicts). The notion of citizenship became linked with the membership in the polis—the citizens had rights to participate while slaves were without such rights. When viewed from an anthropological standpoint, the notion of slavery is situated in the power relations between kinship and non-kinship lineages (Miers & Kopytoff, 1977).

[4] Tania Zittoun (2007, 2018) has explained how semiotic resources are turned into personal symbolic resources in the settings of everyday actions. Extrapolating from these to the actions of politi-

The central issue in the human beings turning into political actors is the negotiation of social power. The minimal case of political action could be a challenge from Person A to Person B that A has the right to set up particular social norms about which B has no chance of changing. This is the level of micro-politics. Micro-politics begins in family—negotiations about relationships, bedtimes of children, and whom the children can or should not go out to cinema are all micro-political issues. Yet at the same time these extend to the local communities.[5] The relationships between people in local communities make up the meso-political level of human action, while governmental and national political actions belong to the domain of macro-politics. Here the role of a particular individual becomes embedded in the various hierarchical social institutional structures. In these, the dramatic externalizations by persons in top political positions may leave the impression of personal dedicated credos—only to be carefully socially coordinated and written up by selected "ghostwriters."

The Core of Politics: Social Power and Its Use for Domination

Politics is all about power—that some social groupings or individuals establish over other groups of individuals for their own benefit. What counts as such benefit may vary—gaining territory, or monetary resources, a marital partner, or freedom for the particular social class—but the goal for power is the starting point of any understanding of the political systems. That understanding is usually carefully camouflaged by the social systems themselves presenting their agendas in terms that fit their political goals.

Social power is an ephemeral concept—its realities are notable only in the products of social actions within societies. It is a mythical concept—the narratives about political power are often interspersed with various myths of deities. As Maurice Godelier emphasized:

> Political power mingled with religious power, in the persons of human beings who were close to the gods or descendants of gods, if not gods themselves, is one of the ways of legitimizing the various forms of sovereignity exercised over humans and over the natural environment. Such a *fusion of powers* characterizes the earliest appearances of the state in Sumer and in Egypt, as well as the first Chinese kingdoms that preceded the establishment of the empire. (Godelier, 2020, p. 96, added emphasis)

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cians at different levels of political dramas, from local to national levels (Mølholm & Horsbøl, 2021), Sergio Salvatore's notion of *semiotic capital* and routes of access to it is useful to understand the political process (Salvatore et al., 2019). Like its monetary counterpart, semiotic capital makes it possible to organize the political system of a society in different ways of relating it to the personal cultures of individuals.

[5] Sudhir Kakar (1995) illustrates the religious tension between Hindu and Muslim local peer groups about inter-religious joint going to movies.

The mechanism of *fusion of imaginary powers* by the earthly rulers with those of some deities is a vehicle for gaining or maintaining the power relation as it involves a shared hyper-generalized affective sign field since both the king and his subjects share the same religious system, making it easy to fuse the actions of the power holder (king) with those of the deities. When a social power holder becomes uncertain about his following he is likely to initiate a religious ritual that should fortify his earthly powers. Likewise many subdominant social groups striving for power find the unifying "glue" to bring persons together for an abstract imaginary ascension course would make use of religious sentiments.[6] Or—as in the history of the Roman Empire in the second to fourth century AD—the reversal of the religious systems gives evidence of dominance reversal. The previously persecuted Christianity was set up as the state religion—and was used to persecute the previous "pagan" belief system. The power roles were exchanged—the subdominant and persecuted religious system became dominant and began persecuting their previous persecutors. The relationship of dominance did not change.

Transitions Between Conflict and Coordination

Desire for peace in the middle of wars is to be viewed as humanly natural—and rarely obtainable. Wartime and peacetime transform into each other with some periodicity, challenging both ordinary people and persons in political roles with ever-changing demands for control over resources and public orders after lawless times of devastations and resistances to new orders. Any society is a dynamic system where new internal (intra-society) and external (inter-societies) tensions emerge, are contained, erupt into conflicts, and become resolved.

Georg Simmel understood the societal dynamic of the conflict and non-conflict with a clear systemic developmental perspective:

> …in every peaceful situation the conditions for future conflict, and in every struggle the conditions for future peace, are developing. (Simmel, 1904, p. 799)

Here is thus the key for guaranteeing peace—intervention during peacetime that would block the emergence of the war-oriented tendencies at the outset. Establishment of the European Steel and Coal Union in 1951—that has led to the establishment of the current European Union—was explicitly set up to make war between Germany and France not only unthinkable but materially and economically impossible. Robert Schuman—the main political architect of the Treaty of Paris of 1951—could understand the need of unification of economic interests to grant

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[6] Different hybrid religious systems emerge in these functions. In late 1980s the new religious movement in Uganda—led by Alice Lakwena—synthesized Christian and traditional spirit beliefs into a peace-oriented religious system, the army of which went onto military offensive against the government (Behrend, 1999). Religious systems can be created so as to facilitate war and peace simultaneously.

political stability. What was done in post-World War II Europe was to create the systemic unity between countries in economic ties thus blocking the emergence of animosities based on economic inequalities. The subsequent emergence and growth of the European Union on the one hand fortified this systemic prosperity—but on the other hand has led to internal oppositions and even one exit (Brexit).

Simmel understood that the two transition processes—from peace to war and from war to peace—are of different nature. Which the loss of peace into an outbreak of a war is a result of societal dynamics of escalating tensions, and then the end of war and move to peace is quite different. It includes either victory or conciliation (peace agreement) or the "underground simmering" of the continuous tensions.

Victory as a Declarative State and as a Relationship

Many political events include declarations of victory. The winners of wars, elections, and football matches go out of their ways to share their jubilation with all who cares to appreciate it. Yet—if we go beyond these declarations—the state of victory is a multi-sided temporary state of affairs that is ephemeral in its nature. As Georg Simmel noted:

> Victory is a mere watershed between war and peace; when considered absolutely , only an ideal structure which extends itself over no considerable time. For so long as struggle endures there is no definitive victor, and when peace exists a victory has been gained, but the act of victory is no longer in continuance…. (Simmel, 1904, p. 802)

Victory needs its counterpart—the losers (non-victors)—who need to participate in the establishment of a relationship with the victors. This entails conciliation of the previous opposition into a coordinated systemic relation where the losers accept the subdominant position of the victors. That acceptance of subservience by the losers is the only way how the victory's self promotion can ensue.[7]

It is interesting to look at the political efforts to prolong the state of victory in the ongoing societal narratives. We can observe lavish celebrations of the victory in World War II, but rarely is the peace after World War I emphasized. Monuments (see Chap. 8) are set up to maintain the image of the victories of the past—with assumption of the need for victories in the future. Conciliation is central for maintenance of peace if failure would lead to tendencies towards revenge. Hence the conciliation after victory with the non-victorious side requires a new form of dialogical

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[7] The acceptance of the victor and non-victor new relationship is the basis for slavery—as it has been usual in the wars since the Ancient World to accept captured warriors of the losing side as slaves and the latter, following their defeat, *accepting that subservient role*. As Simmel (1904, p, 803) noted, "A certain ascetic tendency may also enter in as a purely individual factor, the tendency to self-humiliation and to self-sacrifice, not strong enough to surrender one's self from the start without a struggle, but emerging as soon as the consciousness of being vanquished begins to take possession of the soul."

relationship where the social power inequality (introduced by the victory) is presented as if not being in place.

Human Desires for Peace, Not War… and Wars Still Emerging

The irony of human desires in history is the longing for peace while undergoing war.

Antwerpen—the major economic center in Europe in the fifteenth to sixteenth century—went through a complex sequences of war over the sixteenth century: the sack of 1576 by unpaid Spanish soldiers that was a major act of devastation in Europe and the siege of 1585–1586 that brought the town back from the Protestant to Catholic rule. The city council in 1614 displayed the painting by Adriaan Janssen's *Peace and Plenty* (Fig. 9.1) into its Council room—after the end of Twelve-Year War (1609) but not yet knowing that a worst war (Thirty-Year War) was to ravage Europe from 1618 onward. The painting would communicate the desire of Antwerpeners for return to the prosperous peacetimes that were lost during the century before as the war between Protestant and Catholic interest groups in conjunction with efforts to get independent from Spain devastated the Low Countries. In the painting the sheaf of arrows signifies the many people united through the bond of love and honesty. The Triumph of Peace is signified in the picture by the flying putto bearing the wreath. Janssen's allegory is closely based on a description of how the benefits and blessings of peace are fittingly depicted in the seventeenth-century iconic image domain that was the basis for most social commentaries upon the society in these days.

Fig. 9.1 The Triumph of Peace and Plenty (A. Janssen, 1614)

Yet the peacetimes in the centuries past were ephemeral. Life conditions are tumultuous even in peacetimes. There need not have been wars—but there were robberies on roads and periodic sieges of towns by military forces the only reason for which was to compensate the mercenary soldiers through the receipts of the looting—or from the ransom the cities paid to be left un-massacred.[8] Life and death were—and always are—present side by side during these times of uncertainties of lives between peace and war.

Human beings are political actors in society—their everyday activities are oriented by the local political expectations. Yet the political participation in society merely starts at the local level—it proceeds to the meso and macro levels.

The Macro Level of Politics: Forms of Governance

It is fashionable for political scientist to trace the origins of forms of governance to the review that Aristotle provided at the times of fourth century BC. Aristotle's narration of the issues of political actions in society was deeply embedded in the moral framework of "goodness for all"—while the "all" would first of all be the citizens of the various Greek *polis*es. These Ancient Greek city states were based on the economics of slave labor that allowed their citizens to develop new forms of political organization.

Aristotle's coverage included three forms of civil government: *monarchy*, *aristocracy,* and *timocracy*. Each of the forms could turn into an extreme form. The contrast of monarchy on that extreme was with tyranny:

> The deflection from monarchy is tyranny; for both are monarchies but there is the greatest difference between them; for the tyrant looks to his own benefit , the king to that of his subjects; for he is not a king who is not independent and who does not abound in all goods; but such an one as this wants nothing else; and consequently he would not be considering what is beneficial for himself, but to his subjects; for he that does not act so, must be a mere king chosen by lot. (Aristotle, 1895, p 221)

Aristotle had no example in his time of the attenuated versions of monarchy—the kinds of constitutional monarchies that emerged in Europe since the nineteenth century. The move from monarchy to tyranny was clearly disapproved by Aristotle—yet its description remains adequate also two millenia later. Kings had social obligations to their subjects—tyrants had none. Social power is appealing to many to try to gain it into one's own possession and using it not only indiscriminately but

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[8] The use of massacres of captured towns and looting of the valuables was developed into an established economic realization chain for the goods, where the actual looter (soldier) received a certain percentage of the value as it was sold on through the chain organized by the officers (who took their % of the proceeds) (Kunzle, 2002, chapter 10). The most well-known sacks of major European cities for the sole purpose of looting were the sacking of Rome (in 1527) and Antwerpen (1576), but on smaller scale such economic actions that entailed massacres happened in the regular contexts of warfare.

often in ways that would eliminate any possible overthrowing of tyrannical political regimes. The cruelty of tyrannies has its own societal logic as the rulers from Diocletian[9] to Saddam Hussein[10] have amply demonstrated.

Aristocracy easily leads to the transition to oligarchy—a pathological state from Aristotle's viewpoint:

> The transition from aristocracy is to oligarchy, through the wickedness of those in power, who distribute the offices of the state without reference to merit, give all or most good things to themselves, and the offices of the state consistently to the same people, setting the highest value upon wealth: consequently a few only are in power, and the bad instead of the best. (ibid., p. 221)

Timocracy to democracy transition entails the dilution of social power between citizens. It is important that the societies in Aristotle's times were economically based on slave labor—hence the democratic governance was carefully guarded against the possible power of non-citizens (slaves):

> …timocracy naturally inclines to be in the hands of the multitude, and all who are in the same class as to property are equal. But democracy is the least vicious, for its constitutional principles are but slightly changed. (ibid, p. 222)

Aristotle was probably right in considering democracy to be the "least vicious" of all the forms. Yet it would mean that all of them are in one or another form vicious towards ordinary human beings. The French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville travelling in the United States in the nineteenth century perceptively called democracy to be the "tyranny of the majority over the minority" that operates through the irresistible acceptance of the "public opinion." The "tyranny" enters when the public opinion has reached its majority verdict.[11] It is further amplified by the vast proliferation

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[9] Christians suffered from various waves of persecution from 64 AD until 311 AD. The main emperor under whom the Great Persecution (303–311 AD) took place was Diocletian. By that time the estimated distribution of Christianity in the empire was 10% of the population. In the first 15 years of his rule, Diocletian purged the Roman army of Christians, condemned many of them to death or dismissed from the army, and surrounded himself with public opponents of Christianity. Yet the purge was not free from ambivalence—which was overcome by consulting the "listening to the voice" of oracles. Diocletian's preference for activist government, combined with his self-image as a restorer of past Roman glory, led to the most bureaucratic regime in the empire, foreboded the most pervasive persecution in Roman history. In the winter of 302, Galerius urged Diocletian to begin a general persecution of the Christians. Diocletian started a general persecution on February 24, 303 AD that lasted until its reversal in 311 by Germanus. From 324 AD Constantine reversed the power and gave Christianity the leading role in the empire.

[10] Saddam Hussein was the political leader—president who came to power by takeover—in Iraq, 1979–2003 who was known by his ruthless promotion of inter-group rivalry in his entourage to consolidate his power.

[11] De Tocqueville's own observation is reflective here: "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America…. As long as the majority is still undecided, discussion is carried on; but as soon as its decision is irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent, and the friends as well as the opponents of the measure unite in assenting to its propriety" (p. De Tocqueville, 1888, pp. 275–6 vol 2). In this respect democracy is a form of aristocracy where the ruler (law giver) role is replaced by that of public majority. As De Tocqueville noted, "This notion was highly favorable to habits of obedience; and it enabled the subject to

of the communication media of today—where Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter can very quickly mobilize the crowds in superficially defined but highly dramatized social actions.

The Universal Political Governing System: Bureaucracy

All three forms of governance that Aristotle outlined and their corresponding aberrations are dependent upon the universal yet often hidden carrier power of them all—the bureaucracy. This form emerges in all societies due to the need for administrative order—and as the result the real political power is delegated to the middlepersons between the top of the power (but incapable of organizing local ways of living) and the subservient populace (that needs to be pacified and exploited for the benefit of all functionaries above them). This layer of protection and exploitation exists in all societies beyond the hunter-gatherer tribes. Once in place it proliferates its own importance as necessary to organize the society.[12]

While the social class of functionaries—agent in-between the top and the bottom of the societal hierarchy (the *bureaucrats*)—exists all over human history, the term "bureaucracy" was invented only in the middle of the eighteenth-century France.[13] It referenced the group of appointed government administrators of very various backgrounds—based not only on their competences but also other factors. The attitude towards that social caste was from the outset and until the early twentieth century deeply ambivalent—they were feared and ridiculed at the same time.[14]

The pubic attitude towards bureaucracy was rehabilitated by Max Weber in the beginning of the twentieth century as he set up the societal value of bureaucracy as a good—machinelike—operation of the societal systems. The field of *public administration* has maintained the positive image of its role in societies—where now the

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complain of the law without ceasing to love and honor the law giver" (De Tocqueville, 1841, p 277). The psychological dynamics of accepting the majority is hence crucial for democracy—if eroded would lead to anarchy where no reverence is granted to the lawgivers.

[12] Moghaddam (2018b) pp. 134–136

[13] Economist Jacques de Gournay (1712–1759) introduced the word in the mid-eighteenth-century France. For him it was linked with the notions of "monarchy," "aristocracy," and "democracy." In each instance the intended reference was to a type of polity according to its ruling elements: a king, an élite class, the masses, or public officials. The introduction of the term coincided in France with rapid development of both bureaucratic institutions at all levels together with the strict hierarchical order of absolute monarchy that was already showing signs of cracking (de Tocqueville, 1888). In English *bureaucracy* appeared first in 1818 as a term to refer to the British administrative system trying to force the Irish to surrender.

[14] In 1836 Honore de Balzac wrote a whole novel *The Bureaucrats* (1836) as well as *The Physiology of the Employee (1841/2012)* where he was not very complimentary towards the administrative bureaucracy: "Bureaucracy, the giant power wielded by pygmies ... a natural kindness for mediocrity, a predilection for categorical statements and reports ... as fussy and meddlesome, in short, as a small shopkeeper's wife."

bureaucrats enjoy the status of governmental employees. Their "trained incapacity" and "over conformity" (in Robert Merton's expression) guarantee their role as buffer between governmental policy making and its local implementation.

Thus, bureaucracy is an inherently paradoxical form of governance where the highest possible organizational capacities are directly related with the highest forms of structural incompetencies of their implementation. The latter may be intentional. Bureaucracy creates a total minimal buffer against social change—including changes that are unwanted by the ruling agents on the top. By its demands for lawful and orderly running of the local affairs, the bureaucratic institutions act as inhibitors of the breakdown of social order. A spontaneous street demonstration can easily erupt to violence, while one petitioned to and (after a time) approved by the lowest local bureaucratic office grants it peaceful and orderly expression of the protesting voice of the given group of people.

Bureaucracy is made possible by introducing minimal social power differences into the roles of people and setting up rules for implementing those. By elevating the local bureaucratic institutions slightly above the rest of the populace in social power and giving them the halo effect of "serving law and order" enables the role players in such institutions to legitimately invent different demands on the applicants for particular desired innovations in their lives and local living conditions. The power of the social control exerted by a bureaucratic institution takes the form of slowdown of requests by demanding a series of proofs of coordination (e.g., approval signatures by select offices) to decide upon the legitimacy of the request. The result is slowdown of the application process—a tool for social organization that is perfectly camouflaged by the legal requirements of the work of the institution.

All forms of governance set up macro-social conditions for the psychological side of living for ordinary human beings. A bureaucratic institution depends on the trust and loyalty of its clients to the particular social system. The core of these conditions was the socialization for *absolute and unquestionable loyalty* to the particular rulers. No doubt in the wisdom of the rulers' decisions or intentions was allowable.

Loyalty *a Hyper-Generalized State of the Human* Psyche

Loyalty is a state of well-maintained hyper-generalized state of the fullness of the personal mind. It has been crucial for all political frameworks in human history—without it dominating the human actions no politics would be possible, no wars could be fought, and trading in commodities and stock markets would be impossible. If loyalty were to be a temporary state of affairs—say, lasting 1 day—the society would be completely anarchical and non-organizable.

As a deeply personal state of affairs, loyalty cannot be produced by decrees and verbal demands by the political or ideological power holders. It is a phenomenon of Layer III in the self structure (Fig. 9.2) that requires the person's active affective hyper-generalization of the loyalty within the depth of the self. Layer III that

Fig. 9.2 The structure of the self in the building of loyalty

includes the hyper-generalized value fields dominates the rational argumentation in Layer II, while Layer I (immediate reflections of lived-through events) is strictly bordered. The loyal person moves ahead in the middle of the daily flow of events by paying scant notice to them while being overly occupied by rationalization of the goodness of the loyalty object—whose status is affectively fixed (by Layer III affective fields). The externalization of the intra-psychological processes that go on between Layers II and III take the form of acts of submissiveness to the loyalty object—be it a king, a deity, or one's own spouse. Ritualistic acts of symbolic honoring or bringing flowers to a monument or food to the statue of a deity are all acts of constructive externalization that—by subsequent internalization—feed forward to the further maintenance of loyalty and its further externalization. It is important for the Loyal Self to demonstrate that externally—in specific perceivable form (special clothing, participation in processions, religious services, family gathering, etc.). The French revolutionaries in 1790 who would stop passersby to demand their wearing of the "liberty cap" and giving oaths to the revolution were working on maintenance of their own loyalty to the new regime.

The defining feature of highly developed loyalty includes efforts of its sharing with others who do not follow the same idols. Such striving towards missionary efforts follows from the sociocultural nature of the self—in its self, validating through the externalization-internalization cycles the effort of converting others (not to speak of its success) is relevant for the converting self itself. We persuade others about the righteousness of our faith in order to maintain that faith. This makes encounters with active proselytizers very difficult for the non-motivated partners.

The task of social persuasion would lead to the transformation of Layer III of the self system. In socialization for loyalty to the Hindu God Ganesa, the instruction is towards deep internalization of the feeling of belonging:

> You must actually take refuge in the overpowering feeling of Ganesa's presence as you visualize His murti or form. You must also be able to *awaken to the higher emotional realms, to rise to a devotional mood* as you are singing to the Gods, a mood that *itself carries* you into Ganesa's protective refuse, a mood that awakens you to the presence of Ganesa's love and compassion. (Subramuniyaswami, 1996, pp. 366–367, added emphasis)

Instructional suggestions for how to feel into a deity can be found in any religious or ideological system. Here it is the unity of the direction of action (singing) and intra-subjective action of feeling into the mood. The demand for the internal "surrender" to the "devotional mood" calls for subjective cooperation with the externally superimposed direction of feeling. All societal institutions lead to the co-construction of loyalty through enforcing some bodily action routine (singing, chanting, marching, dancing, etc.) interspersing it with demand for internally directed subjective feeling effort towards some field-like goal state ("presence of love" by a deity, a political leader, or a subjective fascination with a brand-name consumer product). The intentionality of the person—readiness to go along with the affective surrender or resistance to it—is the issue at stake.

Devotees often demonstrate deep subjective need for bodily interpenetration with the substances close to the idols. Thus, at gravesites of Sufi saints:

> The dirt surrounding the graves of the saint is regarded as blessed by the followers and is eaten by some devotees. The old dirt, having dried out, is attested to have absorbed the blessedness of the saint. The wash water from cleansing the coffin of the saint is also considered blessed and may be consumed. (Kurin, 1983, p. 317)

Bodily acts in relation to symbolic materials are the most powerful vehicles to lead to loyalty. Thus submerging oneself in the Ganges or reverence to the Catholic relics in the form of body parts of the saints is an act of the person who enters into contact with the sacred substances that are believed to perform personally relevant actions upon the person. The politics of lives in societies is being prepared by the politics of the symbolic objects—and the personal subservience to those via meaningful actions.

Trying to Do the Impossible: Controlling the Uncontrollable

Figure 9.2 indicates the centrality of the subjective core in the act of "belonging to the Other"—a loyalty figure. In the societal practices by these various Others who all compete for the establishment of loyalty of the persons, a difficult task ensues: the Loyal Self develops by its own construction processes in Layer III, via the internalization and externalization processes. Enforcing that growth from outside—and all others who may become loyalty object are in relation to the person "outsiders"— is therefore not possible. Social "control" of the self by an other is only possible by the active co-construction of such control within the self (Layers II and III in Fig. 9.2). Thus, direct actions towards forming the loyalty cannot work—the resistances to accepting the societal demands need to be reduced or bypassed. This is done by creating a strong boundary between Layer I and II + III (Fig. 9.2)—most of the everyday societal demands are ruled out as objects for cognitive investigation (Layer II), while all the "rational" thinking in Layer II happens under the immediate guidance of the affective fields in Layer III. "Rationality" is here regulated by one's own internally constructed feelings of higher kind. People thinking in terms of

seemingly rational arguments (e.g., "how can I contribute to the well-being of my fatherland?"—Layer II question) are guided by the implicit assumption (Layer III) that the premises ("contribution is good and needed") are undoubtedly accepted—beyond any disconfirmation that the immediate experiences (Layer I) could modify.

Promotion of Political Loyalties: From Guidance to Discipline

Loyalty is always a hyper-generalized sign field. It is a necessary state of affairs linking the personal cultures with societal social role expectations. Yet—as is the case of all Layer III self structure phenomena—the emergence of such hyper-generalized state of the person cannot be determined by social order. It can be cultivated by societal institutions by a combination of enforcement of action patterns paired with various persuasion techniques. Yet even the most elaborate loyalty promotion techniques—that fully cover the whole field of communicational encounter—can fail due to the resistance by the object of such persuasions.

Meso-Level Catalytic Forms: Political Clubs and Parties

In between the personal self and societal expectations are various forms of peer groups, the presence of which may set the stage—but not cause—the establishment of the Loyal Self. The emergence of women's societies during the French Revolution—both in favor of the Revolution and against it—is symptomatic for the social support for entrance of persons without political roles (such as French women had no rights to vote in 1789) onto the political arena. The establishment of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women in May 1793 was set up to aggressively support the revolution (having the goal "to deliberate on the means of frustrating the projects of the enemies of the Republic").

As long as the new political activities—from the March to Versailles in 1789 to the Society in 1793—were working for the goals of the revolutionary government, it operated as a vehicle for loyalty promotion. After the government passed the cockade law in September 1793, the Revolutionary Republican Women demanded vigorous enforcement of the symbolic clothing law together with price controls on bread. Yet they had also organized women's counterforces—their demand was countered by market women, former servants, and religious women who adamantly opposed price controls (which would drive them out of business) and resented attacks on the aristocracy and on religion. Traditionally homebound half of the populace—women—was now entering the political fights on all sides. By the end of 1793 women's political societies were outlawed.

Public Promotions of Loyalty: Entrances and Processions

Human beings inhabit architecturally structured umwelts that introduce the contrast between inside and outside by borders in between. These borders—walls—include apertures that are meaningfully regulating who can, or is invited to, enter and through what kind of aperture. It is the doors and gates (rather than windows, etc.) through which social relationships are regulated. Who can—and who should—enter a space under what circumstances is a constant target of institutional regulation as the history of keys, gate guards, passwords, and barbed-wired fences indicates in human history.

The opposite act of movement to enter a space is to exit a space and move towards another location to enter another place. This move into the public space can be organized by ordinary work tasks or by specific societal rituals where one's participation is expected or even required. The latter are dramatized events with strong promotion of loyalties—to religions or to ideologies or to the rulers. Religious processions across the city environment (see Chap. 7) can be regular and involve symbolic objects such as images of deities or relics[15] carried around. Crowds would follow the carriers of the relic in specific order of importance of the social status of the participants. The events—*ommegang*—would be a dramatic public processions in which the social hierarchy of politicians and clergy were displayed together with the whole populace. Making people purposefully move to follow the symbolic and political power agents mobilizes them in the direction of establishing loyalty. Such processions occupy a middle ground between military marches (drills for absolute loyalty to the commanders) and religious sermons in confined sacred spaces—mosques, temples, and churches—where the social promotion of loyalty is performed by stationary persons who may go through sequences of standing-sitting-kneeling down and reciting-singing-remaining silent. The public processions add to their in-between status the moment of carnivalization that is a hedonic moment in the conduct of the participants.

People ordinarily go around in their environment, enter and exit cities without much public ado. The entrances into city are also political power affairs—the warlord whose siege of the city has been resolved by a ransom and power transfer, the ruling king, or the emperor visiting the city would turn the town's regular public processions into events that are supposed to show and further generate the social power.

Thus, local ritual processions that were widespread in Catholic Europe in the eleventh to sixteenth century became targets for marking the power positions of the rulers who take over the control of the given town or who are "star visitors" of notable kind. Thus the Holy Roman Emperor Karl V entered into Rome in 1530 (3 years after the "Sack of Rome") with a lavish entrance to city ceremony. The rule

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[15] For example, the oldest religious procession in Antwerpen from twelfth century onward (until 1496) involved the carrying around the town the relic of Christ's foreskin—a rare relic supposedly extracted at his circumcision (Meadow, 1999, p. 7).

in these ceremonies was that all notables of the town meet the visiting political leader at the gate and give him or her the symbolic keys of the city, and the entourage moves through the city in a form of a *ommegang*. In Fig. 9.3 the arrival of Francois, the Duke of Anjou, into Antwerpen in 1582 is presented by an artwork. The city built for this occasion a special Triumphal Arc that was a temporary stage decoration for the special occasion, and he was coronated in front of the Antwerpen City Hall 3 days later as the sovereign of the Northern Netherlands.[16]

The Triumphal Entry pageants of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries became political currency building occasions for the political leaders—the lavish entrances into towns in which they would not live (but possibly govern) were built on the Roman historical traditions of welcoming the Emperor to the city. Psychologically such ceremonies—emphasizing the superior symbolic status of the person who enters into the town with his or her entourage—fortify the social distance between the social classes. A lower-class participating observer in the entrance palagan gets the clear and internalizing message of the superiority of the hero figure and the

Fig. 9.3 Joyous entry of François, Duke of Anjou, into Antwerpen on 19th February 1582, with a Triumphal Arch on St. Jan's Bridge https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/SK-A-4867

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[16] The history of the honoring Duke of Anjou in Antwerpen is a good example of the efforts of a politician not sure of his appeal to try to promote it via entrance ritual. The history of his relations with such palagans started in 1582 by the "joyful entry" and was deeply ambivalent—trusting a Catholic aristocrat by Antwerpeners after the Spanish Fury of 1575 as head of the Protestant breakaway provinces was questionable from the outset. A year later when Francois requested a similar honor of "joyous entry," it turned into a clever ambush—known as "French Fury" in which his French troops were surrounded and killed by Antwerpen residents, with Francois barely escaping. Yet in 1585 the control over Antwerpen returned to the Spanish crown and Catholic dominance.

corresponding inferiority of oneself—hence feeding into the further buildup of loyalty ("I am nobody but the subject to the king"). This is a social setting on the other extreme from the popular gatherings of discontent where different orators try to will the following of the agitated audiences. Here there is high uncertainty as to what power relations may emerge, while in the town entrance ceremonies everything was pre-scripted for a monumental show with human participants.

However, the administrative realities of the staging of such entrance rituals were as complicated as it would be to organize public events today. First of all each of the components of the general scene—first of all building of the temporary arch with all of its symbolic decorations—was an expensive enterprise for the city's budget.[17] Plans were made—and abandoned Second, the specific art commissioned for such occasions was likewise expensive—even if its value transcended the event and later turned into museum art. Even if such "joyous entrances" were not very frequent events in the lives of the cities, they were expensive ones.

Political Mass Processions

Different political leaders in history have built their efforts to grant mass following to themselves by organizing large massive marches interspersed with political ritual actions (singing while marching, hearing prescribed music, listening to political speeches, etc.). Adolf Hitler's organization of large marches carrying torches in the 1930s even required the building of a huge marching grounds in Nürnberg (MacDonald, 2006).

A remarkable example of loyalty promotion efforts that involve multigenerational intra-family loyalties utilized as the vehicle for political loyalty promotion is the Russian invention of the *bessmertny polk* (immortal army). It was invented to celebrate 70 years from the end of World War II in 2015 uniting the transgenerational family loyalties with the moment of the past glory of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II and the current affective relation to the homeland. The participants were expected to bring a photograph or portrait of a relative who had died in World War II or—because of it—after the war. They were also expected to narrate a story about the deceased relative—a war hero. When gathered together for the celebratory march—next to the military parade—all the young relatives would carry the portraits and photographs moving on as a one collective column of a mass of people. This hands-on (and legs-on-march) task of movement in a huge collective

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[17] The specific planning of such entrance event by the city councils has rarely been analyzed. When archduke Leopold William of Austria was appointed to be the governor of Southern Netherlands in 1647, the city of Antwerpen had to prepare the entrance ritual that took place on March 27, 1648. The city budget did not afford to build the triumphal arch (even as elaborate sketches for it were made), but the paintings depicting the glory of Leopold William's forefathers in the fight with the Ottomans were commissioned, as well as his leadership roles (Vlieghe, 1976). Pleasing the new governor was simultaneously marking the town's loyalty to the regime.

and on a patriotic occasion is expected to keep the younger relatives firmly within the affective field of loyalty to the fatherland and to its current regime. Linking the personal (family) feelings of the past reconstructed in terms of war heroism, with the future loyalty to the country through the present physical act (marching holding the family relic in front as a public display). The memories of the deceased family members become utilized in the social construction of readiness for patriotic action in the future.

Being in the Crowd: Political Recruitment Within Differentiating Field

Crowds are dangerous—and politicians are aware of that. Crowds left without organizing guidance can easily lead to toppling the political power system. On the other side, careful manipulation of the ideological orientations within the crowds can lead to achieving various political goals.

It is most remarkable that psychology of crowds—started in late nineteenth century by Gustave Le Bon in his French context—has not been advanced over the twentieth century. We continue to refer back to Le Bon's classic book *The Crowd* (Le Bon, 1896) despite the many crowd phenomena that the twentieth century has provided us with to understand: election rallies, political demonstrations, riots, fan gatherings at football stadiums, and in shopping sprees. Le Bon had a number of rather ordinary yet important insights into the organization of crowds. From the psychological point of view, the conduct of a crowd:

> Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The *sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction*, and their conscious personality vanishes. (Le Bon, 1896, p. 2, added emphasis)

In terms of the cultural-personological theory, it is the focus on coordinated direction of the new collective whole agent (crowd as a goal-directed wholistic agent) that is relevant for societal order. Political actions in any society are about the ways of coordinating the direction of action of any collective newly formed whole (collective *Ganzheit*).

That coordination of actions may lead to establishment of various in-group and *out-group relations that further feed into differentiation of the crowd. Extreme cases of of such groups become homogeneous and move from goal orientation to specific* goal direction.[18] These are the political action groups that conform one another and

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[18]Drury and Reicher (2018) have outlined Elaborated Social Identity Model which illustrates under which conditions the establishment of homogenized in-group and its opposition to selected out-groups may lead to further development of the groups. "Outgroup actions which are perceived as treating all crowd members alike serve to extend the boundaries of the collective self (versus other) within the crowd, thus transforming relatively heterogeneous crowd into a homogeneous one" (p 17). The clash of homogeneously organized groups—all considering their goal directions

any opponents they so designate.[19] Others remain approximate and identify them-selves with vague general goal orientations.

The distinction of crowd versus group is never clear since the contrast depends on the diffusion (crowd) versus organization (group). Le Bon's typology (Table 9.1) illustrates the gradient of organizational form in the differentiation of anonymous crowds (where its organizational form is beginning to differentiate) to different organized forms (sects) to hyper-generalized feeling-based belonging to a crowd (e.g., "I belong to the middle class" assumed by analogy of my characteristics of X, Y, and Z but without any entrance membership tasks, e.g., "sign up for being middle class" and—of course—"create a password." The belonging to the "invisible crowd" of the "super-rich" (Moghaddam, 2018a) is even more nontransparent. Crowds of different states of differentiation are simultaneously of different transparency of social visibility (e.g., "middle class" in contrast to the crowd of *bessmertniy polk*—Fig. 9.4).

Escalating the Public Conduct to Revolt Crowds are complex social organisms where individual human beings become parts of a complex system. In the context of public events, the atmosphere among the order regulators—guards, policemen, and soldiers—turns out to be of crucial relevance. Thus in the context of sixteenth-century Low Countries—involved in moral combat between Catholic and Protestant ideologies—the social order of public theaters (executions) could change by very

Table 9.1 Le Bon's typology of crowds (Le Bon, 1896, pp. 165–166)

A. Heterogeneous crowds.	1. Anonymous crowds (street crowds, for example).
	2. Crowds not anonymous (juries, parliamentary assemblies, &c.).
B. Homogeneous crowds.	1. Sects (political sects, religious sects, &c.).
	2. Castes (the military caste, the priestly caste, the working caste, &c.).
	3. Classes (the middle classes, the peasant classes, &c.).

legitimate—guarantees societal conflict, the overcoming of which includes re-heterogenization of the groups. The power holders need the confrontation with rebellious crowds—whom they sup-press—for their own identity maintenance like the rioters need it for heirs.

[19] The guidance of crowds towards differentiation of their goal orientations into goal directions that in the nineteenth century happened via rhetoric appeals of emerging leaders in the crowd is by our time delegated into the arena of social networking (Wagoner, 2018). The result is a globalized pos-sibility of mobilizing large numbers of central and peripheral participants in societal actions together with politicians' efforts to guide the crowd feelings in their directions (e.g., using Twitter) with wide use of social representations in ideological war of mutual stigmatization. The "crowd feelings" in the twenty-first century reach everybody via their Facebooks and cellphones in any location in the world—with the consequences of confusions and efforts to find some organizational framework for the personal self, without being out with the real crowd.

Fig. 9.4 *Bessmertnyi polk*, Moscow (author's photo)

tiny symbolic triggers. On April 27, 1562—execution of Calvinists was planned in Valenciennes—two Calvinists, Fauveau and Maillart, were condemned to death as they *apparently* studied in Geneva. The reasons for such verdict were as coincidental as those of executing the two Anabaptist women (Chap. 1). Yet the social inherent atmosphere was different. This became clear as the magistrates set up guard of duty for the execution procedure:

> A sure sign of the city's dided religious loyalties was that *half of those mustered by the magistrates were known Calvinists*. The noble governor of Valenciennes, Jean de Glymes, the Marquis de Berghes, was no friend of the heresy placards, and made sure to absent himself, although he did leave behind his lieutenant and few more men *who indifferently assisted in manning the execution scene*. At 5 a.m. the stakes were ready for their victims, and although the *magistrates had hoped the early morning time would discourage onlookers*, a sizable crowd of men and women *agitated beyond the barricade* created to seal off the execution site. The magistrates appeared on the balcony of the town hall, and their clerk read aloud the death sentence, off-loading responsibility onto the royal placards enforced by Phillip II and regent Margaret of Parma. (Arnade, 2008, p. 73 added emphases)

A number of features of the social context set up for the theatrical set of execution are important here. The townspeople were already religiously divided—yet not (yet) in conflict. They half-heartedly obeyed the orders, and in an agitated (rather than subservient) manner, the collective group came out at 5 a.m. to be part of the execution performance.

As part of the execution script, the convicted were moved to the execution place while they were supposed to sing psalms on the way—the idea of which was to evoke God's salvation. One of the convicted—Fauveau—deviated from the script and sung a different psalm:

> Faveau defiantly sang the ninety-fourth, *a stinging indictment of the proud and an affirmation of godly wrath*:
>
> Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth.
> God to whom vengeance belongeth, show thyself.
> *Lift up thyself, thou judge of the earth;*
>
> > *Render a reward to the proud*
> > The crowd erupted. A *woman threw a shoe at the magistrates*, a reference perhaps to the fact that one of the condemned was a cobbler and sock maker. This act introduced an artisanal symbol into the sacred drama, and the crowd responded with a hail of rocks thrown at the men guarding the execution site. Sensing the riot underway, authorities quickly whisked the men back to the prison, while onlookers rushed the barricades and destroyed the stakes and wood piles. (Arnade, 2008, p 73, added emphasis)

The authorities attempted to carry out the execution in prison, but the crowds interfered and liberated the prisoners. The guards—who had *lukewarmly* manned the execution site—equally *lukewarmly* failed to take action against the rioters.

The "lukewarmness" in this example is a critical feature of the field of social atmosphere that is crucial for enabling societal breakthroughs. The individuals who are assigned to play their social roles in strict adherence to the rules switch to relaxed, delayed, and pro forma performances. This affective nature of the setting feeds into the opponents' actions who can test the borders of the existing norm system. The perception of the reluctance to act by the police or the military sent out to the streets can enable the courage of political protests.

Birth of Revolutions

Revolutions are chaotic emergents. From amidst the disequilibrated social situations, different social action streams emerge. Some of these escalate to the point of trying to force the current political system to change—often with temporary outcomes that lead to reversal of the new order to a version of a previous one. Sometimes a new version of political order emerges in the result of the bloody turmoils of lootings, killings, and economic disasters.

The history of the French Revolution of 1789 is considered by historians to be the first—and the prototypical model—of later similar transitions of political power. The histories of revolutions are usually written from political, economic, or military perspectives. Yet the most crucial angle upon revolutions would be the human, personal experience. This varies by the social position of the given person in the bigger social framework of the action fields in the turmoils—who lead the crowds into

action, who defends against these actions, and who is the bystander as the society is undergoing radical change.[20]

The French Revolution started on July 14, 1789 by taking over the prison of Bastille—an event that plays a central role in the stories about the French Revolution. Yet the roots of the societal turmoil that escalated to the dramatic takeover of the old regime were in the decades before 1789. All abrupt transformations of a society are clandestinely prepared by the undercurrents of the political processes that come to the fore at the relevant breakthrough moment.[21]

For the fate of the French Revolution, it was the bread that was crucial. There was already social unrest in the population when the rising of bread prices triggered the collective outcry of women. This led to crowd action—on October 5, 1789, women on a Parisian market were frustrated by the unavailability and rising costs of bread. Their crowd moved to take over weapons and marched as a crowd towards Versailles (Fig. 9.5. where the King—Louis XVI—was residing. From among the agitated crowd, different leaders emerged who pointed to the direction to go to Versailles. A spontaneous move by the agitated crowd to protest and at the same time show loyalty to the crown invigorated the march. The absolute monarchy had established its loyal following—albeit it was reaching its breaking point when the bread was no longer available.

In the armed crowd of women, the main issue was economic—to grant bread in sufficient quantity and price to the wide populace. Yet this trigger of the crowd march led by women—carrying weapons and riding on cannons (Fig. 9.5)—was embedded in the wider political context of the time. The humorous depiction of the event in the figure adequately captures the mood of the crowd—determined to make a difference, still deeply devoted to the king as the "father figure" yet at the same time. Yet the mood was clearly anti-aristocratic and militant—a displacement figure was the queen (Marie Antoinette) against whom most of the aggression—that still stopped from being physical—was directed. At the same time the power of the crowd invigorated women to stand out for their rights as citizens—the right they had never had before. So, in sum, the crusade to Versailles—triggered by market escalation—entered into the political spectrum of the emerging revolution in multiple ways.

Crowd events that seem spontaneous rarely are so. They may be set up by some triggering event planted into the collective texture of activities, or the opportunities for giving a crowd a direction might emerge simultaneously with the riot. The revolutionaries who were instigating the women's march by giving the crowd suggestions was to bring the king and his court back to Paris to reside among the

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[20] Differences between personal life courses are described in depth in the study of the Czech "velvet revolution" (Zittoun, 2018, 2019). The personal realities of the transforming societies are always personal dramas that may be only indirectly linked with the political processes. Social psychological processes involved in the revolution are analyzed by Moghaddam (2018a, 2018b).

[21] Juneja (1996) has shown how the political and personal imageries merged in the creation of new social representations. Women's images were widely used to encode the new general ideas of *liberty*—often depicted through a female image. The French Revolution "…not only abolished the monarchy, but also left a void in the system of representation" (Juneja, 1996, p, 5).

Départ des femmes pour Versailles.

Fig. 9.5 French women moving to Versailles to protest to the king about food prices (Challamel, 1842, p. 111)

people—which meant de facto house arrest while externally the king was nominally honored. The plan appealed to all segments of the gathered crowd. Even those who were innocently supportive of the monarchy (and there were many among the women) found it a comforting plan. Yet the notion of "bringing the king to the people" was already a step towards the further escalation of the revolution that ended up with the use of guillotine on the royal couple 4 years later.

Symbolism in clothing became crucial in these uncertain days of mob governance of the French political scene. The king was given the "red cap of liberty" that he did use to appease the public (Harris, 1981)—a step back from the privileges of the crown. The everyday life in Paris became an arena for displaying the "revolutionary clothing" (and checking upon others about their social class background)—up to the point that a governmental declaration of "freedom to wear whatever one wants" was formally passed (Hunt, 1990)—yet it made no difference in the mob activities of detecting "us" from "them." The terror of the revolutionary actions had not yet begun—but the elevation of politics to be present in each and every daily act was in place.

From 1789 onward until 1793, women's revolutionary and counter-revolutionary[22] activism played a crucial role in the French Revolution. The political processes of

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[22] Women were active on both sides—republican and monarchist—of the conflict, which was further made extreme by the revolutionary fight against the Catholic religion in the political domain.

the revolution made use of the women's activism without giving it political power. Then, on October 30, 1793, the political organizations of women were banned, and women were expected to return to their family roles.

Collective Escalations of Intolerance and Its Impacts

Revolutions flourish through massively escalated personal intolerance of the other in different social groups. This is the human cost for societal change. The move to such intolerance entails turning existing opinions of the people to take the role of absolute truth. Human thinking ends at the machining of an opinion and maintaining it as fixed. This sets up the rigidity of boundaries in human mentality and social norm system. Another escalatory move—turning a strong maintained opinion into an absolute truth—makes it possible to change societies.

Adhering to the deep belief in a particular absolute truth makes persons escalate their distinctions with others—with basic outcomes. As Le Bon indicated:

> By the very fact that is regarded as absolute *truth a belief necessarily becomes intolerant.* This explains the violence, hatred and persecution which were the habitual accompaniments of the great political and religious revolutions, notably of the Reformation and the French Revolution. (Le Bon, 2001/1913, p,13, added emphasis)

The transformation of a belief into an absolute truth and its functioning as the basis for violence is the general rule of all revolutions. Coordinating crowds leads them to positions of intolerance of the opposition and as internalized into the loyal following (Fig. 9.2) leads to violence against the other with no remorse and in all feeling of the "revolutionary justice." Genocides are revolutions against particular ethnic groups rather than opposing political organizations. The history of massacres of innocent people—bystanders in political events or designated victims after victorious sieges of towns—reminds us of the historical recurrence of such episodic tragedies. The irony of human history is that despite artistic outcries against massacres of innocent people and legal actions against the culprits who have led or triggered such massacres, the possibility of their recurrence is not reduced in our globalizing age.

After the War

How can escalation into violence be prevented? Once it is released—based on the fixed opinions turned into absolute truths—blocking the actions by deadly force can

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Yet in the personal domains, it led to opposite psychological adaptations by the women whose roles in families were closely linked with their spirituality. In various localities this entailed the quest on of availability of church access. Thus the extreme groups of anti-clerical women clashed with pro-clerical and pro-monarchist opposite groups of women (Desan, 1989).

only be a similarly deadly counterforce. Documented histories of gang warfare and military conflicts give ample evidence of the aggressive mutual escalations that may become long-term conflicts that may linger on over generations. Reconciliation after prolonged violent conflict is a very complex and risky effort—desired, tried, but often failing.

After War or Revolution Ends: What Next?

Reconciliation after a conflict is crucial for constructive moving ahead of social life. Yet it is a very complicated task—as Georg Simmel already understood a century ago:

> The state of conciliation … is in itself the reason why the quarrel and the pain which the one party has occasioned for the other mounts no longer into consciousness. In a corresponding way, essential irreconcilability by no means consists of the fact that consciousness does not extend beyond the past conflict. The fact is rather that the *soul has through the conflict undergone some sort of modification in itself, which cannot be recalled*, even though it leaves a scar, but rather to a lost member. (Simmel, 1904, pp, 809–810, added emphasis)

That *re*conciliation cannot be a return to the previous state of affairs is clear from the confabulational nature of human constructive memory (Chap. 8). Its complications can be supported by catalytic factors:

> It becomes an additional problem when, as in the case of conciliatory attitude, it presents itself as a formal sociological factor. In this case it requires, to be sure, *a purely external situation in which to actualize itself*, but, this being given, it proceeds quite spontaneously and not merely as the consequence of further mediating emotions. (Simmel, 1904, p. 809, added emphasis)

*Re*conciliation is necessarily *pre*-conciliation—a new construction of unity based on the recognition of the past conflict while *negating its relevance for the future.*[23] This allows the British veteran pilots who threw bombs on Dresden to visit the city after its rebuilding and former German pilots to visit Coventry decades after their reciprocal massacres.

Prevention: Semiotic Blocking of the Emerging Intolerance

Can cultural psychology offer solutions to the perennial problem of creating peace in our desires—and ending up in wars? There may be a particular opportunity made possible by the psychologically universal meaning construction in leading to violent

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[23] This is an example of double negation that plays a central role in the dialectical logic of human development (Mihalits & Valsiner, 2020).

action. As I have pointed to the meaning construction sequence that leads to violence:

THINKING ➔ OPINION ➔ fixing OPINION ➔ transferring to ABSOLUTE TRUTH

It is precisely in this sequence of meaning-making where the blocking of the violence before it has a chance to emerge becomes possible. It takes the introduction of inhibiting sign complex in a precise location in this sequence (Fig. 9.6).

The key idea is in the blocking of the *emergence* of the notion that some opinion—that has reached its fixed and immutable state—might take on the form of "absolute truth." This can be done by (a) a redundant multilevel complex of signs (including a hyper-generalized sign field as a generic frame, elaborated abstract notions, and concrete imagery of the implications of the actions based on "absolute truth"). Redundancy within the sign complex is crucial for it to have the abortive success upon the transformation. Consider the following sign hierarchy used for stopping a hypothetical person ideologically committed to act in genocidal manner against "out-group" members gathered in a church:

> High-level **hyper-generalized sign field**:
>   *"killing the believers in a church is sinful"*
>   linked with **general sign field**
>   *"they have the right to live as you do"*
>   linked **with concrete imagery**
>   *"imagine if somebody wanted to kill your wife believing you are bad"*

The unity of SINFUL-RIGHTS-IMAGERY is expected to make our hypothetical person at least to delay or abort the planned action. The fixed opinion still remains. The genocidal act may be postponed—but there is no guarantee that it would not happen.

Fig. 9.6 Prevention of the roots for violence: redirection of discourse

The important intervention tool is *relativizing the process* of move between fixed and non-fixed opinions (the cycle of UNFIXING-REFIXING the opinions). The meaning-making process needs to be inflicted with self-doubt. Such self-doubt should stabilize the person in a recurrent loop of ruins of opinions. Of course ideally the meaning-making process needs to return from the graveyard of opinions and move forward to involve flexible thinking.

Since the state of intolerance towards a social other is socially constructed, it can be also defused—even if the particular opinion becomes fixed as opinion (and not as truth). People can live with discriminating and negative opinions about members of some out-group without it necessarily leading to violence against the latter. Simple circumvented recognition ("*I am sure people X are bad **but they have their RIGHT TO LIVE as they please**"*) may maintain value-laden relation without escalation into violence. Relativizing the fixed opinions can prevent these from being turned into absolute truths. Furthermore, making and maintaining opinions is itself not accessible to the intervening societal agents—these belong to the intimacy of the personal culture (Fig. 9.7).

The notion of *Gegenstand* as a structure of the self-regulating process entails the construction of "meaning block" that is based on the goal-oriented imagery of the other, despite all the social suggestions from the surrounding society that stigmatize the other. Resistance based on individual meaning-making is the root for non-action as well as defiant actions in relation to social suggestions.

Fig. 9.7 The *Gegenstand* of nonviolence

Paradoxes of Equality: Increasing Equality Leads to Inequality

Political meanings are directionally value loaded—something deemed good implies that some action in gaining that or protesting for that is appropriate. Yet that meaning designation depends upon the field of comparisons of the meaning-makers.

Alexis de Tocqueville's comparative observations of the British and US societies in the 1830s led to an observation that later has been labeled as a paradox or effect. The *Tocqueville effect* is the phenomenon in which as social conditions and opportunities improve, social frustration about these opportunities grows as well (Finkel & Gehlbach, 2018). This explanation is slightly inadequate extension from de Tocqueville's observation of difference between American and British societies—from comparison of two societies extrapolating the developmental pattern that applies to history of any society may be tricky. Yet the argument of de Tocqueville deserves merit.

In a strictly social class segregated society (such as England), the distanced social roles—of an aristocrat and a servant as an example—would not lead to frustrations about these objectively very big economic life conditions:

> When standards are very far from equal and the inequalities are permanent, individuals gradually become so dissimilar that one can almost talk of as many types of humanity as there are classes. Attention is never fixed on more than one of these at the same time, and losing sight of the connecting thread which links them all within the vast horizon of mankind, it is invariably not man but certain men who are observed. (de Tocqueville, 1969/1835, p. 438)

As de Tocqueville pointed out that aristocrats never generalize about themselves, Ancient Greek philosophers did not raise the issue of slave labor even as they otherwise may discuss social justice. The use of slavery did not come to the realm of justice in the democratic *polise*s of Ancient Greece. Slavery was a given form of economic operation—hence justified and not made into a target of philosophical moral soul-searching. Not so—as de Tocqueville observed—for people in the United States with the assumption of democratic equality, the generalized ideological status of the "slave others" was a puzzling moral issue already before abolition of slavery. In de Tocqueville's words:

> …the democratic citizen sees nothing but people more or less like himself around him, and so he cannot think about one branch of mankind without widening his view until it includes the whole. Truth applicable to himself seem equally applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to his fellow citizens and to all men. Having acquired a taste for generalization in the matters which most closely take up his attention and touch his interests, he carries it with him when dealing with everything else. Hence it becomes an ardent and often blind passion of the human spirit to discover common rules for everything, to include a great number of objects under the same umbrella, and to explain a group of facts by one sole cause. (de Tocqueville, 1969/1835, p. 438)

So, by emphasizing equality the equality gives rise to new non-equality. In the capitalist society it leads to competition with the goal of "doing better" than the others—hence creating a new form of non-equality. In moral domains it leads to export of one's own way of being to other people of very different historical backgrounds.

The American style of democracy has been suggested to many societies in the world to adopt. In all cases but one—the case of Liberia established by freed slaves from North America—it has led to hybridization with local democratic organization or rejected if the local basis for democratic governance was absent. Or, the notion of basic human rights—an invention of Occidental societies—becomes suggested to various political regimes around the world.

General Conclusion: Dürer's Quest

Our treatment of political sentiments in the minds and societies concentrates on the role of amplified intolerance that participation in society entails. Politics works on the basis of escalation (and de-escalation) of human personal and collective intolerance of other human beings in their economic, social, and personal freedom domains. Politically enhanced hatred can be further amplified when escalated by rigid affective loyalty to moral norms. The art of politicians is to make their agendas surf on the waves of moral indignations and fortitudes.

Why would fellow human beings kill a singer whose lyra was said to bring harmony to the whole world. Albrecht Dürer in the engraving on the Death of Orpheus (see epigraph above) elected to use a non-canonic mythical version of the Death of Orpheus. The key to his fight for the justice in the society of his time may be found in the trees (Fig. 9.8).

Albrecht Dürer was 23 years old and in the beginning of his to-become-classic life course as an artist. The motive of women beating a man to death recurs in his engravings of the last decade of the fifteenth century. In Fig. 9.8 the key to the understanding of Dürer's moral commentary on society is in the verbal insert "*Orpheus—the first pederast*" (putzan). All over history it is the personal decision of human beings to decide in favor of non-heterosexual personal ties that has triggered anger and aggression in fellow citizens and has led to codification of

Fig. 9.8 A fragment of Dürer's *Death of Orpheus* (1494)

homosexuality as punishable by death in many societies.[24] The last execution in the United Kingdom for the offense of homosexuality took place in 1835, while the legal practice of the British Crown kept that on books from 1563 to 1861. Mob killings based on hatred towards homosexuality have been reported in the last decade in a number of African countries.

Politics is dangerous—because of human psychological readiness to participate in it and unreflexively merge one's personal cultural melody of living[25] with the tumultuous battles of societal transformations. Yet at the same time, politics is natural for human living in societies. Its dramas and tragedies continue as the human lives endure—and the psychological involvement in political affairs of common social existence will bring with them pleasures, miseries, and mundane ways of being in public.

Questions for Further Thought

1. Explain the hypergame nature of politics.
2. Describe the mechanism of fusion of imaginary powers.
3. Describe conflict and its resolution.
4. What is *victory*?
5. Explain the unity of all various governance forms—in bureaucracy.
6. What *is corruption*?
7. Explain what introduction of *minimal social power difference*s does in a society?
8. Analyze structure of loyalty.
9. Analyze the psychological functions of public processions.
10. Analyze the psychological basis for the *bessmertnyi polk*.
11. Typology of crowds.
12. Psychological starting points of revolutions.
13. Analyze prevention of roots of violence.
14. Analyze the relations of inequality and equality.

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[24] As of July 2020 eight countries in the world are reported to legally require or allow capital punishment for gay or lesbian relationships. Actual uses of thee laws have not been reported in recent decades. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_punishment_for_homosexuality#In_current_state_laws. However non-legal hatred-based actions against persons of homosexual lifestyle preferences have been reported.

[25] On the life course construction of the self as a melody, see Zittoun et al. (2013). Using the melody metaphor allows our thinking of the dynamics of the multiple dialogical threads woven together.

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Part IV
Person in the Mirror of Oneself: Qualitative Structures in Dynamic Transformations

Chapter 10
Desires for Beauty: The Making and Maintaining Affective Fields

Carl Gustav Carus

Landschaft im Vorfrühling 1823

Contents

An artist captures affective meaning in everything—an occasional glimpse of a landscape, a naked body that becomes a nude presentation, and in the spur of moment in its musicality. Human beings turn perceived moments immediately into affectivated ones—they fill in the current moment of *Einfühlung* with affective meanings that go beyond the present setting. From the Introduction to this book, the theme of primacy of affective relating with the world is paramount. The New General Psychology expands William Stern's personology by decisive turn to the affective origins of mental functions of higher order.

Human *psyche* is an open system. All human experiencing is context-bound—occurs in the particular setting of here and now. The setting is saturated with semiotically saturated objects and persons—meeting personal affectivation with heteroregulation.[1] The result is co-construction of meaningful existence of the experiencing person. The willful person (see Chap. 12) is the actor who co-creates one's experience through the affectively set structure of *umwelt*.

The process of affectivation involves generalization during the ongoing experience beyond the immediate feeling (*Gefühlston*) that is characteristic of lower psychological functions. After the cessation of a stimulus (Fig. 10.1), the *Gefühlston* lingers on and crosses the semiotic threshold (in the CROSSING ZONE), evoking the construction of lower levels of meaning (Meaning 1 in Fig. 10.1—Level 1 and Level 2 in the meaning levels system—refer back to Chap. 2 Fig. 2.12)

Fig. 10.1 Process of affective meaning generalization

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
[1] Steven Larocco (2018) has elaborated the active counter-field of personal affectivation process that entails meaningful nodes of the umwelt providing suggestive structure for feeling-into the environment. Such nodes carry affective meanings across time—a photo framed on the wall in one's bedroom or public place calling out for personal or political deep feelings of loyalty and love and hyper-tall church towers or minarets calling out for religious sentiments are all such nodes. Our twenty-first century fascination with classical music—e.g., J. S. Bach's or L. van Beethoven's music—constitutes a set of heteroregulatory nodes from two or three centuries past for listeners today (Rojas, 2018). The putting of teddy bears into incubators of premature babies (Abbey, 2018, p. 179) by mothers is a node meant to guide the newborn to the future encounters with the world of cuteness of stuffed objects.

Meaning 1 leads to further generalization (Meaning 2—Level 3), ending up in the hyper-generalized sign fields. Thus the selectivity of feeling moving (or not moving) into the affective generalization trajectory takes place within the escalating *Gefühlston* at the meaning threshold border.

Following Fig. 10.1, it becomes clear why dramatization of events in human lives is necessary—this is the way of actions that assist the emerging feelings not to vanish (as regular feelings do, after the event- stimulus- ends) but **escalate beyond the meaning threshold**. It is a "push"—created by the person oneself or by others demanding from the person dramatic actions, small or big—that would take the lingering *Gefühlston* beyond the meaning threshold in the crossing zone and let it escalate into the hierarchical meaning-making system. The result is hyper-generalized affective meaning field that carries forward towards the future.

The need for crossing the meaning construction border leads to the human invention of all kinds of dramatisms—ranging from very small to very big. A simple effort to create a sign to regulate an ordinary life event (something to remind oneself of some mundane action) to exaggerated dramas of life and death (e.g., the euphoric feeling that led thousands of young men to volunteer to go to war in 1914). In general the large created dramas that reorganize life course are of dire consequences. The ELDs (Existential Life Dramatizations—which were introduced in Chap. 1— are the "building blocks" of the human life course continuity. Dramatization leads into sign formation—the willful person acts, fees in through acting, and creates the hierarchy of meanings (as was described in Chap. 2 and will in Chap. 11).

Affectivation is thus central for higher psychological processes—and this means that in the parallel work of the schematization and pleromatization channels of generalization (refer back to Fig. 2.9 in Chap. 2), it is the pleromatic channel that has the leading role. Human *psyche* is affectively vague in its reaching the level of strongly in place hyper-generalized meaning systems that give order to the *unitas multiplex* that was emphasized by William Stern. The unity in the multiplicity is in the cloud-like order of higher kind that can swiftly reorganize the lower-level components within the whole. Vagueness here is an asset for dynamic rapid pre-adaptation to new unexpected conditions.

Affectivation in Its Context

Even as the origin of this neologism is traced to have originated two decades ago,[2] its real elaboration has occurred in the 2013–2018 range. The term *affectivation:*

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[2] In Valsiner (1999) the phenomenon of a therapy client who created one's own external controller (deity) and then followed its demands is the starting point for the idea of affectivation. The control function is moved by the person to "the other" to operate within oneself.

…indicates that affect can and should be considered in relation to the actions that the affected organism establishes with its environments. Thus, instead of being a passive happening into the individual organism, affect is tightly bonded with the actions the same organism performs in relation to others. In the case of humans, affectivating reveals the two-sided (Person ➔ Environment and Environment ➔ Person) process of relating—treating that relating as primarily an affective (and secondarily cognitive) process. *A person is affected by aspects of their environments that previously have been made meaningful and therefore salient by that very person*. So, people actively make certain aspects of their environment become affectively significant for them, and that significance feeds forward to their further relating with their Umwelts. (Cornejo, Marsico, and Valsiner, 2018, p. 2, added emphasis)

The innovative feature of affectivation is precisely in its overcoming the static nature of Person and Environment relationship and emphasizes its generative feed-forward role in their constant interchange. Figure 10.2 illustrates the major change this concept change entails.

The static concept of Person-Environment relationship is in Fig. 10.2 elaborated into the unity of outward (FEELING IN) and inward (FEELING THROUGH) complementary processes. A person affectively acts upon a selective part of the environment, changes it by such action, and through feeling through such encounter with the environment—feed forward in one's own personal development. While feeling in is based on imagination and is an apperceptive move, feeling through is the result of experience. This ongoing *process of affectively relating to oneself through acting affectively through the environment* is the basis for emergence and proliferation of all higher psychological functions.

Reflexivity about hyper-generalization of feelings needs temporary distancing from the generalizing process:

Semiotic interruption is an essential aspect of affectivation. *We need to be interrupted not just in order to know ourselves in a reflective and reflexive manner but also in order to be forced to engage or attend to something that breaks the frame(s) in which we are located* or, moreover, make us aware in a more effective fashion of just what they are or entail. It is the role of the great "meaning-makers", the creators of "prime symbols", to give rise to those

Fig. 10.2 The move from relationship to affectivation

sign configurations that most clearly make visible the operative logic of affectivating signs. (Innis, 2018, p. 54, added emphasis)

Interruptions create Gegenstands that guide us to self-reflexivity. We are temporarily distanced from the meaning construction and then move further into it.

Affectivating happens by anything that we feel as it *emotionally touches* us—involving the affective processes of all body. The origin of such feeling is in the physical bodily intimacy that starts from early infancy and continues in regulating affective relations all through life. In the hyper-generalized form, this feeling of being touched takes the form of feeling of companionship with others. Aesthetic feelings are central for creating such feeling of companionship.

The Role of the Aesthetic Ambience: Direct Feeling into the Whole

Human beings create hyper-generalized feelings of beauty for themselves wherever they are. The overwhelming colors of autumn, the whiteness of snow, and the beauty of sunrise or sunset are all within the person who talks about these natural phenomena in subjective terms. At the level of hyper-generalized meaning systems, there is a possibility to directly feel in from the wholistic meaning field of interior infinity to a corresponding external perceivable whole in the environment. The overwhelming views of oceans, mountain ranges, or storms that are affectively relating with the person indicate that. Real scenes or painted scenes—such as ordinary landscape paintings that relate to the creator and viewers in terms of the ephemeral meaning of "mood" (refer back to Fig. 2.7)—feed into the meeting of wholistic sentiments between persons. A painting filled with concrete objects—such as Pieter Bruegel's Gloomy Day (Fig. 10.3. —creates a hyper-generalized field that makes it possible for any viewer in any time to share the feeling about the world from sometime in the winters of 1560s.

Both art and music cross their communicative potentials over borders of historical time. By appreciating the feelings encoded into the paintings as a whole or performances of classical music from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries in ours, we are involved in affective sharing of field-like meanings over centuries. Art and music cover the affective fields across all the wars, famines, and miseries to new generations maintaining the higher levels of human psychological living.

The image of gloomy day in Bruegel's painting is fully set on the pleromatic hyper-generalization—the concrete details in the painting work towards synthesis of the wholistic feeling. Similar direct "pipelines" into the wholistic mind are well worked in music—as was described in Chap. 4 and elaborated in the description of the history of opera in Chap. 7.

Most importantly, the wholistic *feeling in* is intricately linked to its opposite—*feeling out*. The latter is a deep feeling—yet with an interesting moment of border

Fig. 10.3   The Gloomy Day. (P. Bruegel d.A. 1565)

in the inward direction of the feeling. Feeling in creates a border—allowing for the intricate border describable as disinterested interest—to become established.

The Highest Form of Relating with the World: Disinterested Interest

The notion of disinterested interest makes it possible to separate *objects* of aesthetic fascination from utilitarian objects—but not *persons* who experience such fascination. The latter find the aesthetic act to be of multiple uses in the organization of society—starting from turning art objects into financial investment objects (e.g., determining prices for the priceless art on art auctions) to making of social class distinctions[3] to merely decorating homes and coffee cups with images of paintings of the Great Masters. Art museums sell numerous objects of the latter kind as souvenirs in the difficult fight to keep the temples of art appreciation alive.

The synthetic notion of disinterested interest is also an example of the transformation of concepts—meanings that are under ordinary circumstances treated as

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[3] Much of the artists' success in the Renaissance depended on the organized system of lovers of art. The city of Antwerpen was famous for organized clubs of art lovers (*Liefhebbers;* Filipczak, 1987) who also served as the economic basis for art as sponsors of artists and art buyers (Peeters, 2009).

linear opposites (e.g., love *versus* hate)—into structures of mutual binding that unify the opposites (e.g., love *which is simultaneously* hate). It is not a "mixture" of opposite meanings but a new dialectically synthesized quality (Fig. 10.4).

Figure 10.4 takes as its base a classic painting by Gustave Courbet—The Origin of the World (1866)—which has been shocking the French public over a century. While at first hidden in the private collection of the Turkish diplomat Khalil-Bey who ordered it, its public appearances (rare) at first evoked negative reactions as "pornographic" or at least otherwise immoral for public display. Even its latest private owner of three decades—the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan—felt he could not display it in his country house and ordered a special cabinet to hide it in. Now the painting is on public display at Galerie d'Orsay in Paris since 1995.

Fig. 10.4 Curvilineari-zation (The dynamics of linearization and curvilinearization opposition has been elaborated in *Ornamented Lives* (Valsiner, 2018). The normal state of oppositions is some version of curvilinearity. Under instructions (such as psychology questionnaire instructions), linearity is artificially inserted for the sake of the method demand (e.g., linearity of rating scales)) of linear opposites: arrival at aesthetics

How does an iconic sign—a drawing or painting with the exposed genitals—that crosses the borders of moral judgment at the first encounter with it in lay terms become a revered art classic that impresses the audience by its beauty and bearing no negative evaluation on moral ground. The psychological process of aesthetization involves overcoming of the linear binary opposition ("shameful" vs. "non-shameful") into a system of tension of unified opposites ("shamefully non-shameful") in **the zone of the sublime**.[4] This zone—where the psychological system is moved to the liminal state of slight disequilibrium—is the location of escalating tension between opposite affects united within the same whole. This tension—when undergoing a dialectical leap to new quality of aesthetic synthesis—leads to the new hyper-generalized meaning of the very same depiction of the human body. Yet now the depiction is viewed through the lens of beauty—of the body—of the philosophical idea that all our existence depends on the fertility of the female body and that this is beautiful in itself. The "shamefulness" of the genital's exposure in the painting is replaced by the feeling of philosophical beauty of human existence. The image itself remains precisely the same—in its upper and lower inserts in Fig. 10.4, but due to the meaning-making processes, the ways of relating to it have undergone a drastic innovation. The body has become affectivated through the synthesis of disinterested interest: no longer is the display of genitals feeding into the sensual-sexual interest domain and its borders (which are indicated by the quick "shameful" verdict), but the new interest is distanced beyond the border of disinterest—hence the beauty of the body that gives life to all of us can be fully and safely explored. There is no invented shame in the new look at Courbet's painting—only the fascination with its beauty.

Encounter with Beauty: The Process of Beauty Making. Vernon Lee (1856–1935)—a notable theorist of semiotics and recognized fiction writer (under her real name of Violet Paget)—has left us a remarkable diary of encounters with different paintings in various European museums (Lee & Anstruther-Thomson, 1912). In this treatise at the borderland of art theory of aesthetics and psychological theorizing of Einfühlung by Theodor Lipps, the introspective encounters with paintings allow us an almost[5] direct access to the introspective processes on the border of the sublime and the aesthetic (Fig. 10.4). That introspective experiencing included her internal experience of music—she reports Beethoven's and Mozart's tunes playing in her head as she visits the galleries. At times such intra-psychological musical accompaniment starts to annoy her in her encounter with paintings, at others—give it a meaningful frame.

The painting she keeps returning in her visits of the Florence Uffizi Gallery is that of Tizian's Flora (Fig. 10.5) that had been in that gallery a century (since 1793) before Lee's visits. In the painting a young woman emerges from the brown

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[4] Full coverage of the role of the sublime in the human *psyche* is given in Valsiner (2020). It fits the central relevance of disequilibration (e.g., Jean Piaget's *equilibration majorante*) in human development. When a system is "pushed"—by itself or by circumstances—"off" its current balance, it can either restore the balance or establish a new one. The latter is development.

[5] "almost"= reliance here on immediate post-experience written record after the gallery visits.

Fig. 10.5 Tizian's *Flora*. (1517, in Uffizi Gallery in Florence) (Joachim van Sandrart in 1635 identified the painting as Flora—the nymph bride of Zephyr—from Ovid's literary heritage. It became seen as the ideal image of feminine beauty—combining modesty and voluptuousness—that started to be of interest to artists from the beginning of the sixteenth-century Europe.)

background of the painting, holding out a bouquet of spring flowers, consisting of violets, rosebuds, and jasmine. Tizian has dressed her in ancient style, with a bright white robe that slides down over her right shoulder, offering a glimpse of her breast, while her head gently rests on her left shoulder as she gazes outside of the frame of the painting. Her face, with its delicate features, fits the accepted meaning of a sixteenth-century Renaissance beauty: luminous pale skin, pink cheeks, and a face framed by loose long, copper blonde hair.

During the first encounter with Flora as depicted by Vernon Lee (on December 12, 1902), she describes her feelings:

> Tizian's Flora takes me. Her glance, gesture, drapery, all *drags one in*. I have *no desire to stroke, touch, or kiss*, but *there is a delight of life, of clean, warm life*, such as one *wishes for oneself in her flesh*. Somehow she is physically attractive—no, if her head were tilted she wouldn't be. The previous Beethoven or Mozart phrase interrupts her. Why have I the same pleasure, as just now looking into the river? She attracts me like that water. (Lee in Lee & Anstruther-Thomson, 1912, p. 289, added emphases)

Here the internal music is reported to be an obstacle to the feeling into the painting—yet at the same time hyper-generalizing the feeling into that of the context of looking into the water of a river. Most importantly we observe here direct tension between the lower (stroke, touch, kiss) and higher (delight of life, clean warm life—aesthetic feelings) with a glimpse of return to the personal embodiment (wishes for

one's own flesh)—yet "jumping" to the hyper-generalized feeling of the world of feeling into waters.[6]

Lee's second reported encounter took place a year later (January 7, 1904) and was described as:

> Tizian's Flora. I *try to go in by pleasure—tactile, thermic—at her flesh and skin*, and the vague *likeness to a friend* I am very fond of. I get to like her—the silky fur quality of her hair, and her brows. I wish her eyes were deeper and am annoyed by lack of modelling of her cheeks. *The insufficiency of her <u>humanity</u> seems to bore me*. It isn't enough to be such an animal or fruit. But there is an interesting synthesis of form and subject; specially in the sense of bodily *cleanness, soundness, and healthy fresh warmth*. Yet *I do not feel any particular desire to touch or squeeze her*; she is still a picture, a goddess, not a cat or baby…
>
>   The trivial tune has subsided. If I keep it up, I have to slacken it greatly. This is the day of trivial tunes—a Spanish one comes up. She looks calmly, decidedly, <u>away</u> from it. (Lee in Lee & Anstruther-Thomson, 1912, p. 308, added emphases and underlined parts of original emphasis)

The encounter here is reported to start intentionally from the lower-level affective *Einfühlung* into the resemblance of a close woman friend. The feeling-into physiognomic body details give rise—a sudden leap—to the meanings of humanity, healthy warmth, and the identity as goddess in the picture.

This example is an illustration of the presentational self in the silent introspective action—self presenting to oneself. The dialogue with oneself (I want vs. I do not want to do X—"squeeze," "touch," etc.) involves the border of the sublime and the aesthetic within the internal infinity of the gallery visitor. The function of art is for the enrichment of the domain of the life dramatisms in the life course. Concrete objects—framed as art—are the socially set "nodes" (in Larocco, 2018 terms) to support the affectivation of one's self.

The social environment—on the basis of which the personal umwelts are created—is structured by social suggestions for meanings ("here you should feel X"—"here in other location you should feel Y"). Internalization of such suggestions by the person makes the social world co-regulator of the personal *Einfühlung*:

> Working dialogically and, at times, dialectically, semiotic media frame and fashion social macrocosms and microcosms that are structured not by markers construed predominantly according to biologically motivated salience, but rather *by multiple strata of signs producing a world, or perhaps, better, contextual zones*, of variegated, multi-leveled cultural directives and significance. It is crucial to note that these media do not only structure or enframe the cognitive; they also participate in affectively loading and apportioning the social environment in both its human and non-human dimensions. For example, the feeling of wonder that one may feel at seeing Michelangelo's Pieta or Bernini's Ecstasy of St. Theresa *derives from a particular semiotic construction of aesthetic feeling, one that can find deep pleasure in the representation of sacred trauma,* turning carved stone into a bearer of the sublime. (Larocco, 2018, p. 18, added emphasis)

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[6] This can be compared with the hyper-generalized feeling into the world that the poetic ending of a short story or a poem triggers. Lev Vygotsky's analysis of the last sentence in Ivan Bunin's short story *The Gentle Breath* shows how such hyper-generalization happens (Valsiner, 2015).

The experiences of trauma in the aesthetic generalization become ambivalent and at times cross the threshold to aesthetic state where pain becomes celebrated as a special divine feeling of pleasure. Human living entails constant modulation of the curvilinearity of the affective relations between parts in the whole.

Making of the Sublime: Imagination as Essential

The sublime—feeling of disequilibration in current relation with the environment—is extended in two directions. First it is perceptually triggered—the traditional example of such trigger is Immanuel Kant's example of the feeling of awe that one experiences entering a building of huge proportions (St. Peter's in Rome—which Kant himself never entered[7]) or of literary characters of unusual proportions (lilliputs or giants) or of supernatural power holders ("superman" or regular policeman aspiring to the former).

Second the sublime is triggered by the processes of generalization that transcend to hyper-generalization. The anticipation of various mysteries, miracles, end of the world, resurrections, etc. are all psychological ways of creating the affective state of the sublime. The two kinds of sublime are intricately interwoven—special extreme physical settings—churches, mosques, football stadiums, shopping centers, etc.—are erected to set the stage for the mysteries of religious, political, or commercial kinds to be evoked in the ordinary people.

So, human experiencing of the world entails a simple generalizing process moving from the ordinary (mundane) life events to specially dramatized (sublime) moments that may re-equilibrate to a new mundaneness (e.g., a birthday party with excessive celebration followed by ordinary living or harvest ritual the drunkenness of which would soon become replaced by mundane work in the fields) or lead to a qualitatively new state—aesthetic appreciation of art, or conversion into one or another religious of political systems of mystery, or becoming a dedicated fan of Harry Potter stories.

In all of the versions of the construction of the sublime, it is the processes of imagination that play a central role. Without imagination no sublime moments could happen in human experiencing. Cognitive heuristics cannot be used to create the feeling of the sublime.

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[7] Valsiner (2020) Chap. 1 includes the history of European thinkers' coming to conceptualize the sublime. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the feeling of sublime has been emphasized as a state of feelings from which aesthetic feelings could arise. Yet aesthetic relating to the world is not reducible to the sublime states that emerge from ordinary lives.

Conclusion: From Affective Synthesis to Intentional Action

Beauty is important for ordinary living. It creates a contrast to the mundane ways of relating with environment as it constitutes an emergent synthesis of the affective fields—the state of disinterested interest. *Einfühlung* leads to abstractive hyper-generalization that projects beauty onto the world while using the sentiment for one's own psychological organization.

The importance of *wholistic hyper-generalization* becomes evident in this chapter. Human beings invent their subjective worlds—inner infinities in terms of William Stern—through the use of field-like signs that give rise to the dialectical leap to the affective state of beauty. Like in the case of real-life distancing—through ascetic seclusions or pilgrimages—the affective distancing of feelings of beauty from the use of the beautiful for practical purposes.

The world of personally relevant beauty is maintained as a special subfield of the inner infinity that is bordered off from the mundane daily activities. Yet markers of the field are inserted into the latter—decorated locations, enjoyable moments of setting up the atmospheres (candle lights, musical atmospheres, personal body decorations, etc.), etc. The border of disinterested interest keeps the beautiful objects in reverence without the need for their possession—in contrast to the opposite—deep desires to possess an object. The processes of such possession are our target in the next chapter.

Questions for Further Thought
1. Describe the process of meaning generalization out of feeling tone (*Gefühlston*).
2. Explain the curvilinearization of affective internal relations.

Explain the notion of the sublime.

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Chapter 11
From Wanting to Acting: Pathways to Personal Desire

G. Bernini *Abduction of Proserpina*

Contents

Desire is crucial in human lives. It comes in a huge variety of forms—some prohibited socially, others facilitated. Advertising consumer products by lucrative price reductions is an act of seduction—perfectly fitting into our increasingly consumerist world. We are seduced by our suddenly discovered need for the given object "on sale" and may move ahead to demand the satisfaction of that need. A similar need "discovered" Pluto in his deep underground self that led him to abduct Proserpina with all her charms as goddess of fertility to provide her with all the living conditions as his non-legally captured wife. Yet their needs did not mutually coincide—at least not at the moment of abduction in the old times and in the mind of Gian Lorenzo Bernini in the seventeenth century.

Higher psychological functions break out of the confines of "prediction and control" (of "behavior") that for a century has been consensually seen as the material psychology studies. Instead, psychology as science needs to operate in the realm of what-is-not-yet and under conditions of personally set goals of obtaining that. How do we *want* something? What is the psychological system that makes wanting in different forms an act of change of the present *status quo*? Why do we all not become thieves or road robbers when overwhelmed with the feeling "I want THAT" (what another person or society has). Our internalized social norm system makes such act impossible. Yet the norms are different in a war context—a victorious army becomes into a band of looters taking everything they want from the captured cities. Interestingly there is a time—it happens over 2 days, after which the regular military discipline is restored (Chap. 5).

Thus, the acts of personal wanting are redundantly covered by social norms of how wanting can lead to obtaining the wanted, as well as regulating what objects are not to be wanted. The societal norm system frames the personal motivational process of moving from "I detect X" to "I want X" to "I need X!". My goal in this chapter is to elaborate how these processes work.

Societal Pathways to the Personal Want (and Will)

People resist. The societal goals in getting them to act overcoming resistances can happen in two ways—by way of either explicit conformity (enforced subservience) or persuasion of such conformity—together with maintenance of social norms, in guided internalization-externalization process. Consider two abstract scenarios of society and person negotiation:

SCENARIO 1
Society: You MUST do X.
Person: Why must I do X (protest).
Society: YOU must do X as it IS THE LAW (this is my ORDER and your DUTY).
Person: I must do X…I can do X…but…I do NOT WANT to do X (resistance)
      I WILL NOT do X (society has failed).

In which ways can this scenario of successful resistance to societal needs be turned into a **personally willful** acceptance? This is an end result where the person not only conforms to a societal demand, but does that as if by one's own desire (wanting) and determination (willing) leading to expected act not by conformity to it but with full assuredness of it "being right" in the personal belief system. So the scenario we need to consider is:

SCEANARIO 2
Society: You MUST do X.
Person: Why must I do X? (protest).
Society: YOU must do X as it IS either A or B or C (this is your OPPORTUNITY).
Person: I have the opportunity to do X…I can do X…but…I do NOT WANT to do X (resistance).

TRANSITION POINT 1: Here the scenario reaches the critical transition point from RESISTANCE to ACCEPTANCE and takes place.

Society: It is in YOUR BEST INTERESTS to do X! (transfer of control to person **without relinquishing** social power).
Person (version 1). YOU cannot determine what MY interests are➜ I WILL NOT do X (society has failed).
Person (version 2). I CONSIDER…B is important for me…I WILL do X (society has succeeded by insisting upon conformity).

TRANSITION POINT 2: From WILLING to WANTING

Society: X is needed and an opportunity for you.
Person: I am WILLING and **I WANT TO** do X. I **do X on MY OWN** free will. And it is my RIGHT to do X!

The end result of the second scenario is the transfer from societal expectations to the internalized willful action together with the emerging subjective organizing hyper-generalized meaning field of wanting.

A very important transformation has happened in the example—the object as a "thing" (X) has been made into a *Gegenstand* (➜X)—something towards which an action is undertaken. "Things" are ontologically neutral—they just exist. *Gegenstand* is non-neutral from the perspective of an actor—it "calls for" acting towards it. This transition is crucial for the volitional processes of the *psyche*—the world we live in becomes *desirable*. We start to *want something*—and the *Gegenstand* that structures that desire becomes interpreted by ourselves as "I want X." We have created a structured relationship with X and interpreted it as if the acting towards it is triggered by our own intentions.

The basis for such internalization of desire into our personal will is the use of signs (as described in Chap. 2). Furthermore, the internalization process is societally guided—the roots of the personal wanting in the societal conditional framework. Linked to "I want X" come various social suggestions: "you COULD want X" or "you SHOULD want X" (and of course the opposite "you MUST NOT want X"). So via social suggestions to us we set into action an amplification and attenuation system of normative kind. From the deeply personal construction "I want X," we move to considering "X is an opportunity for me" and "I have the duty to want X" and finally to the "right" to the object. The latter is internalized as "my right"—made personal through the social suggestion system.

Obviously the scenario of creating the person's opportunities, duties, and rights for the Object in the *Gegenstand* is an interpretational illusion. Such "social amnesia" is crucial in all societies—to set up persons ready to act in societally expected directions *believing they do it on their own free will.* Furthermore it is a basis for *willful blindness*—failing to see and understand the realistically obvious aspects of social life.

The making of an object into a *Gegenstand* can be formally described by unbalancing the original structure of an object by inserting intentionality into it (Fig. 11.1). From equal possibilities for the object to "move" in any direction (left side of the figure), we arrive at the determining tendency to strive towards some—rather than another—direction as the object has turned into a *Gegenstand* (right-hand side)

The object—that includes no direction in its state of being—turns into an object with inherent direction, *Gegenstand.* The intentionality of the *Gegenstand* is crucial for the higher psychological functions.

The Overwhelming Nature of Inherent Intentionality

The objects—in the form of *Gegenstand*—are intentional in themselves. This is an exemplification of the claim by Franz Brentano—the presence of *inherent* intentionality. This potential intentionality is turned into an actual field force[1] through this transition of the object into *Gegenstand.* The structure of the *Gegenstand* (➜‖) entails the directional component (➜) that carries with it *inherent intentionality* of the given structure. The contrast with ordinary objects (Fig. 11.1 left side) *Gegenstand* is inherently directional which makes it the primary form of intentionality-in-the-structure. This intentionality-in-the-structure is further canalized by societal norm structure.

Fig. 11.1 The making of a Gegenstand

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[1] In the sense of Kurt Lewin who introduced a dynamic system of field forces operating on existential field structures (Lewin, 1933, 1936). These topological structures included directional vectors that encoded the notion of forces onto the topological maps.

Franz Brentano is known to be the major theorist in recent two centuries of psychology to emphasize the contrast between an object and a *Gegenstand*. The latter is characterized by *in-existing* intentionality (*Intentionale inexistenz*[2]). Intentionality is the inherent property of all psychological processes of human beings—as they are constant and compulsive meaning constructors.

It is at this junction of theory construction where semiotics joins psychology in the exploration of the human *psyche*. Intentionality is made possible in the case of *Homo sapiens* through the species-specific capability of sign construction and use. The construction of ➔‖ involves opposition between the direction and the border that resists—which is only possible if the two components are conceptualized within the same whole.

Let us look at two examples on weather:

The weather is so bad in recent times,,, the climate is bad.

This is "object-talk"—ontological statement with generalization (weather ➔ climate). In contrast, consider:

The weather is so bad in recent times,,, the climate is changing… we should do something about it.

This is an example of "Gegenstand-talk"—directionality of climate change is set to be confronted with generic notion of acting against it. In both cases it is only talk—yet talk that implies possible action. That action is complicated as the structure of the *Gegenstand* in the case of the climate change is set up in hyper-generalized semiotic fields. The desire to improve the climate is evident—but the actions to try to stop the climate change need to be concrete actions. A teenager's decision to cross the ocean on a sailboat to avoid doing damage to the climate and followed by a passionate call to all elderly diplomats of the world to "save the planet" are concrete acts with clear directions within the same hyper-generalized field. Yet its actual impact upon the climate change may remain indeterminate. Intentionality and action may be present—but the border in the ➔‖ can be ephemeral. The border remains functional even if it is of that kind.

The Semiotic View on Wanting and Willing

Human beings create their wanting through hyper-generalized signs. In Fig. 11.2, the transition from the acceptance of societal suggestions (entering into the three-layer internalizing-externalizing self system via Layers I and II and eventually penetrating Layer III) is depicted in introducing the direction of the orientation of the field.

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[2] Brentano, 1874, p. 127. This is "a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar" (Brentano, 1995, p. 102). Mental phenomena are available only in the internal perception (*innere Wahrnehmung*) and thus differ from objects "out there."

Figure 11.2 is an extension of the previous depiction of the open-systemic nature of the self—its dependence on constant exchange relations with the umwelt through *Einfühlung* and the feed-forward inputs that the internalization system constantly provides. As the internalization process is constructive, it entails transformation of the incoming semiotic material differentially in each of the layers. In Layer I that material becomes maintained and handles in the trivial social interchanges (Externalization 1). If the material is let into Layer II, it becomes the input for intra-self rational dialogues that are brought to the social domains as such (Externalization 2) and become further inputs for further internalization.

The novelty that Fig. 11.2 introduces is in the *monologization* of the externalization under the conditions of the emergence of personal intentional actions (Externalization 3). While the dialogical self externalizing itself from Layer II remains manifestly dialogical, the growth of hyper-generalized meaning systems in Layer III results in hegemonic insertion (I WANT!) from Layer III into the dialogical Layer II. It is Layer II where the dialogue "I want X!" with "I know I should not want X" but "I want X anyway" goes on. Moral dilemmas are disputed in that layer—where both doubts and self-assuredness would surface.

Fig. 11.2 The construction of personal WANTING, WILLING, and ACTING in the three-layer self system

If not modulated by dialogical doubt ("but" in Layer II in the Figure), that can lead into the closed circle ("I WANT!!! ➔ but ➔ I WANT!!! ➔…") between Layer II and Layer III, never arriving in Externalization 3—the "outburst" from I WANT➔I WILL results in powerful Externalization 3 in the form of monologically determined act of some kind. There are many examples of the latter subsumed under societally valued ("patriotism," "devotion") or opposed ("insurgence," "criminality") kinds of varieties of acts.

How is the border between Layer II and Layer I in the trajectory to Externalization 3 organized? How would I WANT transform into I WILL? Figure 11.3 describes the sign-regulation process that goes on here.

Figure 11.3 is a version of a standard exposition of the ways in which dynamic sign hierarchies are viewed to function within the cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics (Valsiner, 2007, 2014). The key feature is the rapid emergence and temporary nature of such regulation hierarchy that can be demolished at any moment ("All this is nonsense!"). The important social control feature is the NORM INSERT—the person oneself brings in a particular understanding of the inhibitory norm after the sign "I want X" has emerged. This self-imposed normative control could stop further transition of the WANT to WILL (as the "but" in Fig. 11.2). But if the sign hierarchy grows further into the next hierarchical level ("I WANT to WANT!"), the inhibitory function of that control level blocks the norm-based inhibition of the first level of sign mediation—and the WANT to WILL transition is enabled. An alternative in this growth of the sign hierarchy is the dismissal of the whole constructed desire by relegating it to "nonsense" (the work of an emerging demolishing sign).

Acting without sign hierarchy: absence of inhibition. The scheme in Fig. 11.3 can take many forms—starting from the absence of the hierarchy itself. What would a person do if the hierarchy fails to grow, but the object X remains in the field of action. Without interference of doubt ("do I need it?"), the I WANT becomes easily transformed into I WILL followed by the corresponding action. The elimination of doubt is the goal for all commercial advertisement where the ideal buyer of their products is one who follows the dramatic positive suggestions of advertising gimmicks.

Fig. 11.3 Sign regulation process on the border of Layer 2 and Layer 1 in the move from I WANT to I WILL

Absence of doubt is visible in pathological cases. Pierre Janet (1925) described psychiatric patients whose impulse was to act upon the detection of the meaning of a particular situation, without consideration of the conditions of one's relations with it. A particular patient walking past a hat shop recognizing that as such ("this is a hat shop") entered and bought herself a new hat although she had no need for one, nor had she planned to do so. Another patient of Janet's passed by the Gare de Lyon in Paris recognizing "this is a railway station" and found himself halfway on a train to Marseille before realizing what he was doing. He had bought the ticket to Marseille and entered the right train to that far-off city in the South—without any plan to travel anywhere. These examples indicate cases of action set into place simply on the basis of the immediate meaning-making act of some aspect picked out from the whole structure of the environment. The sign-making is aligned with I WILL orientation—I recognize "this cup in front of you is that of coffee" and drink the coffee the waiter has brought for you. The hierarchy of signs from the normative insert upward has not been constructed.

While obviously clumsy in social relationships or pathological in the sense of psychiatric worldview, such immediate perception-action linkages fit very well what James J. Gibson designated as *affordances*[3]. An object exists—or is made to exist—to afford particular sets of actions upon objects as an implement. A cup affords drinking (coffee or anything else) from it, while a stone in nature affords a chimpanzee knocking nuts. Yet the same object with primary affordances for one action may be creatively utilized for another—a coffee cup may be used, rather clumsily, to knack nuts and a stone for throwing at the police during a protest demonstration (obviously one not organized by chimpanzees).

Alternative states of hierarchy: blocking the normative insert. What happens when the normative insert described in Fig. 11.3 is failing or is absent? This is the case when I see an object X, like it, and take it to be my own. In the societal system of classifying pathological conditions, this is depicted as the symptom complex of kleptomania. While stealing from places products were sold—markets and shops— as known for centuries, the specific psychological phenomenon of *kleptomania* emerged in the nineteenth-century Europe and the United States. This new phenomenon involved the social stratum that could afford to purchase the objects but stole them instead. Sociologically it was:

> … a form of deviant behavior by group, the middle class, and its locale was that new commercial situation, the department store. Such shoplifting emerged from intersection of new manufacturing capacity and new forms of merchandising in the context of burgeoning consumer capitalism. Moreover, it was linked to a rigid division of gender roles that assigned consumption activities to women, and, under the rubric "kleptomania," it was used to define gender- as well as class-based notions theft. (Abelson, 1983, p. 123)

The new form of selling—the department store—included new forms of unmediated contact between the object that could be obtained and the potential obtainer.

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[3] Gibson's concept is functionally close to the notion of *demand character* (*Aufforderungscharakter*— Lewin, 1926, p 351), yet it did not directly originate in the latter.

Without such direct contact—with the seller demonstrating the objects to the buyer—the act of stealing *on the impulse of wanting it* (and bypassing the purchase) was logistically impossible. The seductive display of desirable-to-be objects in a shop without the seller's direct mediation made the stealing logistically possible. Yet that did not become overwhelming (as would be in the case of looting a store by a mob—nobody assumes they need to pay for the looted objects). Succumbing to displayed objects was linked with the corresponding personal WANTING-WILLING-ACTING system where the ACTING component took on a new form—taking the object, concealing it, and leaving the department store without paying for it.

The intra-psychological view on the act of stealing is interesting here. When caught, the kleptomaniac stealers confessed with comments on their acting like "it (the object) was stronger than I" (see Fig. 11.3), "I didn't know what I was doing," or "I lost my head" (O'Brien, 1983, p. 67). More importantly, they were persons who turned the act of stealing objects that they could purchase into a habit[4]—creating remarkable collections of stolen objects among which they felt good in their personal secret collection[5]. The habit of collecting stolen objects is supported by the surplus value the successful act of impulse stealing as a self-constructed adventure adds to it.

How Human Beings Strive: Gaps in Understanding Motivation

Understanding of the processes by which human beings strive towards different objectives—in immediate action contexts or over lifetime—has been hindered by the various restrictions by "psychological science" of the given time[6]. Any answer to that basic question requires a careful look at person and environment relationships—a task that has been complicated at the intersection of self-observational psychology (from the Würzburg school efforts to their demise in the hands of the behaviorist rage) and cognitive psychology of the late twentieth century (building on the use of the white rat as the model for human motivated mentality). The result

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[4] There are two distinguishing features of kleptomania—the act of stealing as a special thrill, often nonconscious, and the making of collections of the stolen objects that are personally valued. Shop-stealing for existing material need is not included in kleptomania.

[5] The social class specificity of the stealing act became recognized in the United States even as legitimate for law: "Stores lost merchandise from many sources-professional thieves, clerks, delivery men, and others-but only the middle-class female shoplifter was thought to be acting out of a medical disability. A large proportion of these women were excused either in the store or in the courtroom because they claimed to be kleptomaniacs or because they cited general malaise and physical debility" (Abelson, 1983, p. 140). These claims were successful in their defense as they reclassified the shoplifting from crime to medically inevitable condition.

[6] The dispute around what is scientific in psychology has been going on for two centuries, and it misses the point—instead of phenomena-relevant approaches (consider the methodology in Chap. 12), psychologists dispute the labeling of what they do as "science" (Valsiner, 2012).

is an overwhelming focus on behavior and concrete tangible outcomes, rather than on the subjective personal construction of the WANT-WILL-ACT systems—much of which never results in tangible outcomes. The abandoned acts due to the processes in Layer II (Fig. 11.2) would never be visible socially but will remain in the memory system of the person.

Looking at human striving for something only from the perspective of behavioral acts that are observable overlooks the subjective starting points of the intentional acts. Thus the earlier—introspection based—perspectives of Narziss Ach, Kurt Lewin, and others that have been largely overlooked in the 1970s are crucial for adequate understanding. These were overlooked when the interest in motivation started slowly to reappear in psychology in the 1970s—now with a distinct behavioral focus. The result was focus on the use of outcomes of motivated acts to infer backward to the origins of these acts—If a person acted in way X, the person must have had intention to act in way X. This kind of "automatic" diagnosis of intentionality would overlook the generative processes (Fig. 11.2). Such backward projection—based on abduction—does not guarantee access to the *Aktualgenese* of the intentional acts. That access can be guaranteed only in prospective microgenetic studies that unite the subjective emerging intentionality with its translation into goal-directed purposeful acts.

From Goal *Orientation* to *Teleogenesis*

Any focus on goal-oriented psychological action—in the internal subjective infinity or in the reachable external infinity—assumes the insertion of directionality into the psychological phenomena on the way of creation of a *Gegenstand* (Fig. 11.1). "I am here" is turned into "I could be there"—a dialogical contrast of the AS-IS stand with AS-IF domain emphasized by Hans Vaihinger. The directionality sets up a field for possible goal orientations to become considered, leading to the construction of goal presentation (*Zielvorstellung* in Ach, 1905, 1928, 1935). The process that emerges in the process of self-observation that is directed towards the goal creates the determining tendency that activates the action towards the goal. That tendency becomes functional only at the level of human orientation to the future mediated by determined feeling forward towards the appealing future.

Determined abstraction (*Determinierte Abstraktion*—Ach, 1905, p, 239) is a central feature of the determining tendency that Ach used as part of his theoretical explanation. Coming from the "Würzburg tradition" of introspective investigations into the realization of psychological functions in the human psyche, he elaborated beyond the previously established SELF-PERCEPTION ➜ SELF-OBSERVATION perspective (the innovation that the "Würzburg School" brought into psychological science) to include SELF-INITIATED INTERNAL ACTION. Not only does a person observe one's inner thinking processes but in this observation the direction of WANTING emerges—and becomes the determining tendency for further striving. It is though the determined abstraction that goal presentation and its resulting striving

towards it becomes possible. The goal orientation is necessarily part of the imagined future—and hence available only through abstraction.

In this abstraction process it is not merely the creating of the goals through imagination processes, but constructing specific bonds to these goals—making them "my own" (rather than "likely" or "possibly" attainable). This amounts to formation of new Gestalts—of present SELF-BINDING (the established goal becomes a means for self-satisfaction in the present) and GOAL-BINDING (linking the self across the present-to-future boundary line—"that goal X out *there is mine*!" but "I *am still her*e"—yet "I *will get there*"). This goal-binding—creating a Gestalt that extends beyond the PRESENT time border (Fig. 11.4)—is the basis for intrinsic motivation as it mobilizes the self towards goal achievement, creating the "attractor state" for the future.

The study of mechanisms of such Gestalt building is in the core of our contemporary research efforts by Gabriele Oettingen and Peter Gollwitzer[7] who build upon the German traditions of the Würzburg tradition and Kurt Lewin's ideas (Gollwitzer, 2003) as well as based on the classic need for achievement work of Heinz Heckhausen. The establishment of goal-binding Gestalts in the flow of human striving is similar to Christian von Ehrenfels' use of melody—another time-transcending Gestalt—in his theory of Gestalt quality. It is here where the imaginative processes become central for not only goal-creating (teleogenesis) but its binding to the deep subjective self of the person. If the imagination processes direct the goal constructor towards the imagery of future scenario of arriving at the goal, the Gestalt binding is complete.

Fig. 11.4 The construction of GOAL-BINDING and SELF-BINDING as a result of teleogenesis

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
[7] Their research—carried out in American context—has not used the single-subject-based introspective techniques, but rather varies the conditions for goal-binding through experimental manipulations of situations (see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2019). Despite this limitation the impacts of goal binding have been so strong as to show up even in traditional experimental studies using correlational and group comparison tactics. Final proof of these effects requires within-subject microgenetic study (Molenaar, 2004, Wagoner, 2009).

In contrast to imagination feeding further into the present experiencing of the future potential goal regions that Gestalt completion fails, the person is involved in local cycle of SELF-BINDING that turns the set goal from being a goal to functioning as a means for satisfying a different goal—one's well-feeling in the present. This goal-to-means transformation is the psychological basis of entertainment that fill the present action space of a person with intense activity but that has no implications for moving towards the future. A person may watch one movie after another, getting much self-satisfaction from them in the present—without any transition towards the future to become present. The process of such SELF-BINDING results in "empty but well entertained mind" and promotes consumerist orientations in the societal domain. This contrast—between orientation to production and orientation to consumption—is the main societal opposition in our contemporary societies, differentiating the "haves" (of new knowledge or of economic resources) from "have nots" (of using standard consumer products with limited economic resources for ever-expanding constructed needs for entertainment).

Structuring Goal-Directed Action: Person in the Field

Kurt Lewin's contributions to psychology have situated the motivated actions by a person within the structured environment. Lewin's observations are based on careful observing what happens when persons relate with environment—rather than any direct effort to penetrate the subjective processes in the "infinite infinity" of the mind. Some externally observable events—like conflict between differently oriented field forces—can be observed to correspond various dynamic actions with internal counterparts (conflict, frustration, etc.), yet his phenomenological evidence is centered on the relationship in the field.

Lewin's schemes unified structure of the field and locomotion directions within it, bringing notions of basic mathematics—topological field structures together with the notions of vectors (which have direction and extent). This created in the 1930s a new tendency towards new qualitative mathematical thinking in psychology. By his own confession:

> … history of psychology seems to show that it is impossible to represent psychological causal interconnections without making the use of concept of direction. It is presupposed in the concept of "direction of a movement" as well as in the concepts of "tendency" or "force". The concept of "difference of direction" or of "opposing direction" can hardly be avoided, for instance in the theory of conflict. (Lewin, 1936, p. 36)

Lewin's extrapolations about goal-oriented person and environment encounters were inductive qualitative generalizations (Fig. 11.5) The Person (C) is oriented towards a desired (´+ valence) goal (G), but reaching the goal is prevented by a barrier.

Lewin's use of mathematical terms was quasi-theoretical—the notions fitted the various everyday observations captured by eye and film. The similarity of his

Fig. 11.5 The basic structure of striving towards a goal (Lewin, 1933, p. 606)

scheme with the deductively introduced general abstraction (➔‖) of *Gegenstand* (Fig. 11.1) is notable here. Whether inductively or deductively introduced, the basic generic idea is clear—the units of analysis of human higher psychological processes need to cover structural conditions that are "biased" in the created direction of locomotion or its intention. It is this creation and following of "biases" that makes human conduct different from machines—and allows for creation of the latter.

The crucial feature of conduct in the field is the tension between acting within the field and exiting from it—into another (outer or inner) field:

> A complete description of the psychological environment must always set forth the structure not only of the level of reality but also that of the levels of unreality. If conditions on the plane of reality become too disagreeable for any reason, e.g. as a result of too high tension, there arises a strong tendency to go out of the level of reality into one of unreality (flight into a dream, into phantasy). (Lewin, 1933, p. 617)

Thus, the opposite for goal-striving action in human conduct is the leaving of the current field—externally or internally. Since the former is socially preventable by building walls, locking doors, and introducing legal restrictions against the exit, the way of leaving the current setting is only that of distancing oneself into personal internal infinity. That distancing takes the form of *subjective participation* in the here-and-now action field.

From Needs to Quasi-Needs

A critically relevant concept coming to psychology from Kurt Lewin's research program in Berlin in the 1920s is the notion of quasi-need (*Quasibedürfnis*—Lewin, 1926, p. 355). The quasi-need is a condition needed for the person to reach the set goal which is blocked by a barrier, but the latter can be overcome if the conditions are satisfied. Quasi-needs are needs for implements to reach the goals—they are based on the real need (to reach the goal) and arise as a need for a way to reach the goal. Need for money (see Chap. 3) is a universal tool that has historically emerged on the basis of quasi-needs.

Societies specialize in blocking persons' access to set goals by various barriers, guiding the goal seekers to obtain the necessary tools to satisfy the quasi-needs. Money and bureaucratic permissions are utmost objects to satisfy the quasi-needs. They suggest the goals and insist that these goals satisfy some basic needs

(medicine that could cure a disease that needs curing and then introduce the barrier on the way towards reaching the goal (this medicine is only available with doctor's permission) leading to the quasi-need to get such permission or obtaining money to buy it on free ("black") market. The multitude of possible pathways to the desired goals is societally set after establishment of barriers to it.

Can a person avoid the capture of the psyche by the emerging flow of quasi-needs? We may encounter many complaints in many countries about the various features of commercialized television—yet the simple solution to avoid these (giving up television viewing) would be rejected ("we need to be in touch"). The making of quasi-needs becomes turned into a basic need for quasi-needs—keeping the television on in one's daily life becomes a basic need similar to drinking diet Coca-Cola. So in most general terms, we can observe a continuous tension between one's established needs and societal suggestions. The ultimate freedom of a person is in the escape from the external action field into the intra-psychological domain and block all suggested needs to the maximum of realistic possibilities.

There is a societal demand setting for expanding quasi-needs. Any societal system works contrary to the possibilities of self-enclosing since the sociopolitical and economic well-being is dependent in the extension of the range of quasi-needs and creating new tools to fit their function. The consumerist society is one based on the proliferation of quasi-needs. New technological everyday life devices become needs for self-satisfaction and subjective necessity. That subjective necessity becomes an input into the intrapersonal motivational system.

Intrinsic Motivation as an Internalized Value

The distinction of externally triggered (extrinsic) and internally maintained (intrinsic) forms of motivation has found its way into psychological discourses of the late twentieth century[8]. The distinction bears all the fruits of the artificial separation of psychological investigations between the subjective-humanistic and behavioral-cognitive lines of meaning construction. The latter builds on the legacy of various perspectives on reinforcement as an extension of the behavioral science credos. The epistemic context within which the issues of intrinsic motivation came to be investigated over the twentieth century was that of societal system of rewards and punishments—the societal moral framework of Protestantism-based societies, fortified by half a century of laboratory experimentation on conditioning. What emerged from the first doubting of the functional value of the social reward systems[9] in education has led to half a century development of Self-Determination Theory of Edward Deci

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[8] Most elaborated by the "Rochester School" of motivation studies (Deci, 1975, Ryan, 2019).
[9] Deci (1971).

and Richard Ryan[10]. Here the focus on move from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation is theoretically central:

> Intrinsic motivation involves doing an activity because it is *interesting* and *enjoyable*. It is often said that when people are intrinsically motivated the activity in which they are engaged is *its own reward*. Yet, the inherent satisfactions associated with intrinsic motivation derive primarily from experiences of *competence, autonomy*, and, in some cases, *relatedness*. (p. 91, added emphases)

Old illusions vanish slowly. Belief in the "objectivity" of observable "behavior" has held psychology back for a century. The tentative efforts to make sense of the intrinsic motivation after a long tradition of thinking in terms of external "rewards" or of being "punished" reduce the complexity of human meaningful goal-making, striving, and further inquiry to the level of a laboratory rat or a primitive bureaucrat in a big system of social government machine or corporation. Starting from the perspective of the person—from one's ego involvement and goal setting leading to personal valuation of the ongoing activity—is a difficult theoretical step for research to take[11].

Would the increasingly relevant focus on artificial intelligence help us out in our theoretical endeavors? In terms of our contemporary robotic psychology—psychology needed for construction of new intelligent devices capable of innovation—intrinsic motivation is to search for unusual, surprising situations (exploration), in contrast to a typical extrinsic motivation such as search for specific criteria-defined "optimal solutions" (homeostasis). Yet the focus of robotic or behavioral psychology is not sufficient for new general psychology. We need to get to the birth place of I WANT based on the myriad of messages coming in—of the YOU CAN, YOU SHOULD, YOU COULD varieties.

The study of intrinsic motivation in psychology found its rebirth in the 1950s with some psychologists explaining exploration through drives to manipulate and explore; however, this homeostatic view became understood to be inadequate. The focus on search for novelty was introduced in 1960 by Daniel Berlyne in his book *Conflict, Arousal and Curiosity* (Berlyne, 1960). It grew out of the cognitive revolution since 1955 that brought back to psychology the interests that German psychologists in the first three decades of the twentieth century had developed.

The tension between personal control over the given acts and that of external control over these acts is in the center of elaborating the notion of intrinsic motivation:

> Events that decrease *perceived self-determination* (i.e., that lead to a more external perceived locus of causality) will undermine intrinsic motivation, whereas those that increase *perceived locus of causality*) will enhance intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, events that increase perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation so long as they are accom-

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[10] Deci and Ryan, 1980, 2014, Ryan et al., 2019.

[11] When that step is taken—as in the Self-Determination Theory of motivation (Ryan et al, 2019, p. 92, Fig. 6.1)—one can observe the increasing undifferentiated nature of phenomena when the description of the motivation processes moves from extrinsic towards the internalized (intrinsic) side.

panied by *perceived* self-determination.. and those that decrease *perceived* competence will diminish intrinsic motivation. (Deci et al., 2001, p. 3, emphases added)

The concept of self-determination is situated on the border of the "internal infinity" (in terms of William Stern) of the person where the subjective perception of control becomes situated. Proportionally with this perception—encoded in the subjective notion of competence—becomes an organizer of the internal infinity in terms of its autonomous actions (intrinsic motivation) in contrast to its acceptance (or rejection) of the external demand systems. Self-determination is situated in the social setting. Within that:

Intrinsic motivation provides the needed *energy* for decision making and for managing motives. Intrinsic motivation is based in a primary organismic need for *competent, self-determined interactions with the environment*. (Deci & Ryan, 1980, p. 35, added emphasis)

The highlighted parts of this summary are the key to understanding Social Determination Theory. It is based axiomatically on the notion of *energy* that is metaphorically carried over from physics to psychology[12]. Secondly it equates *competence* with *self-determination* of actions. Both terms—energy and competence—are here (as well in the whole rest of psychology) imaginary constructs similar to other non-existing (but subsisting[13]) objects. Initiative in acting towards the environment is the arena where the self-started actions proceed—in dialogue or contradiction with the external demands. These dialogues are dynamic, take place at multiple levels of person-society relationship (Bisgaard, 2021), and give the notion of intrinsic motivation depth in the subjective agency that the person deserves.

Conclusions: The Making of Personal Desires

Our highest human self-organizing system is that of I-WANT-(predicate) that is bound to the predicate-less original existential primitive I-AM (Fig. 11.6). The I-AM cycle itself carries no predicates but is open to binding those.

The socialization system in society can be seen in its most abstract level as a field of tension between socially suggested possible repertoire of YOU-ARE-X to add the X to the I-AM cycle—or reject such suggestion. In that tension new predicates emerge ("you are X"—"NO I am not X, but I am Y"). The implications of that tension and the emergence of new predicates (Y) are in their transfer to the I-WANT and I-WILL system (see how utilization of predicates goes through a personal moral sieve in Fig. 11.6). Socially guided intentionality is the cornerstone of human higher psychological functions.

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[12] In line with the general energetistic philosophy propagated by Wilhelm Ostwald from the beginning of the twentieth century (Hakfoort, 1992, Ostwald, 1908).

[13] In the sense of Alexius Meinong and the "Graz School" (Albertazzi et al., 2001). Such subsisting notions of no material existence ("love","justice," etc.) are central for human psychological functioning while remaining unspecifiable.

Fig. 11.6 The basic structure of binding predicates

For Further Thought
1. Describe the emergence of Gegenstand
2. How do you understand the intentionality of psychological functions?
3. Describe the semiotic dynamics of I WANT ➜ I WILL
4. Contrast goals-binding and self-binding.
5. What is a quasi-need?
6. What is extrinsic motivation?
7. What is intrinsic motivation?

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Part V
Synthesis of Cultural Personology

Chapter 12
How to Investigate Complex Personological Processes?

Cornelis van Haarlem (1591)

Een monnik en een begijn

Contents

Investigations are always interesting. The opening image for this chapter that comes to us from over 400 years of European history is *not* a sexual harassment scene. Neither is it an example of how experiments on interpersonal relations might have been conducted in the sixteenth century. Instead, it is an illustration of the socio-moral context. The painting was ordered by Haarlem City Council in 1590 to illustrate and laugh upon in public about the double-standard mores of Catholic monks and the free conduct of non-monastic nuns (beguines). The painting was displayed prominently for some years in the main city council meeting room, reminding to the council members (Protestants) how immoral and opportunistic are their Catholic counterparts. This public display would set up the particular negative image of "the Other" and consolidate the explicit socio-moral ideological belonging of the in-group (we have no proof of any imageries of the members of that in-group based on the painting in their private quarters).

What this event—use of art (more elaborate coverage in Chap. 10) in banal inter-group relationship making—leads to the relevance of the primary axiomatic stance of any investigation of human phenomena. The research act is a meaning-making relationship between the one who tries to know (researcher) and the other who allows the first to do it. Research is in this sense at least an act of courtship and at most one of mental violence. By its intervention into the phenomena that changes the latter, it is an act of encounter—and the impacts of such encounter at times are crucial in the researchee's life course.

The intricate relationship between the researcher and the researched has been of concern in the general history of methodology. Back in the 1890s, Conwy Lloyd Morgan in his pathfinding *Introduction to Comparative Psychology* introduced his notion of two inductions that are the necessary parts of the research process (Fig. 12.1).

Morgan was writing about gaining knowledge of the ways of being of animals—first of all those who live in close functional relationships with human beings: pets, domestic animals of continuous use (cows, horses, etc), and others raised to be consumed (chicken, pigs, etc.). The particular human relationship with different animals sets up the framework for understanding that leads to the subjective induction in the ways the knowledge maker looks at the animals. These forms of subjective relating to the animals can (and does) take many forms. Animals can be seen as "dull" or "intelligent" or just "adjusted to their environments." All these

Fig. 12.1 Two inductions
(Morgan, 1896, p. 48)

perspectives are those of the human observer—projecting one's desired meaning onto the object.

Thus, *my* dog is viewed as highly intelligent (as she is *my dog*) but the mink I raise with great care for selling its fur for the making of fancy overcoats for other human narcissists is rather stupid an animal. Of course there is astute and detailed observation of the behavior of the other (objective induction), but the subjective induction sets the stage for the axiomatic stance the researcher assumes as to the other under study.

Researcher's Relationships with the Research Object

The subjective induction by a researcher is a complex process of personal adaptation to the research-relevant tasks and general orientation towards the phenomena (see Fig. 12.5 on the researcher's educated intuition). This focus on the phenomena is what turns an ordinary person—with all of one's prejudices and attitudes present in one's society—into a seeker of knowledge who transcends one's prejudices. Research (for the researcher) is lifelong self-education process.

Taking on the social role as a researcher creates a certain secure base from which to approach phenomena that otherwise in everyday life could be objectionable or feared. The "objective status" researchers often use to avoid intervening in the situation where research is going on is a convenient ego-defense device of socially acceptable kind. Yet the researcher cannot escape from one's own internal fears when encountering phenomena, the research of which is existentially

threatening—the role of the researcher may alleviate but not eliminate such feelings. George Devereux reports a case where:

> Two anthropologists experienced "no anxiety" while observing, recording and photographing an African female circumcision in the field. However, when they later on saw the film 'Karamoja' – which showed the identical female circumcision rites of another tribe—they experienced 'excruciating anxiety', simply because their passive spectator role did not afford them, this time, an opportunity for abreacting anxiety through activity. (Case 42 in Devereux, 1967, p. 85).

The researcher remains a deeply subjective person even when taking on the social role of researcher—and all the subjective sides of the encounter with the phenomena need to be accommodated both before, during, and after a particular research encounter. It is usually the psychological well-being of the research participants that is highlighted by social institutions under the various schemes of "ethical research" practices. Similar needs for researchers usually do not get similar attention.

Researcher's understanding of the phenomena grows with the inclusion of the field where the phenomena are. This process is inevitably psychologically complicated. Thus, George Devereux himself—an anthropologist of psychoanalytic background—confesses:

> After I was adopted by the Sedang, my self-definition as a scientist enabled me to sacrifice a pig by clubbing it on the head. What matters here is that, by using a *huge* club, I killed the small pig *with a single blow*, whereas a Sedang substitute, using a stick, would have *slowly beaten it to death* (Case 36). The fact that I could *force* myself to do this at all shows the effectiveness of the 'I am a scientist' self-definition. The fact that *I took pains* not to kill the pig slowly and lackadaisically, like a real Sadang, proves that it was a sublimation, and not a neurotic 'acting out' which would take advantage of a legitimate-seeming excuse to express latent sadism. (Case 59- Devereux, 1967, p. 101)

Compare to other social roles in a society—like those of a policeman, soldier, lawyer, or politician—the researcher's role may be more flexible in terms of societal imperatives. The fieldwork of anthropologists is by far more a target of social demands for participation than psychologists' roles hidden in their clinical consulting rooms or research laboratories.

Meaningfulness of Research

Each and every event observable in human contexts is guided by some general atmosphere of culturally set hyper-generalized meaning field(s). These meaning fields provide implicit and undoubted direction for the investigation. Such hyper-generalized atmospheric direction is embedded—sometimes directly, but at other times clandestinely in the environment. They have their counterpart—the investigator's internalized axiomatic belief systems.

Internalized intuitive belief systems are central for the beginning of the research process, but need to be elaborated systematically in the preparation of the actual research efforts (see Fig. 12.6). If not, these belief systems easily lead to research

that is *pseudo-empirical*[1] in its nature. To demonstrate empirically that some internalized axiomatic belief is true (e.g., "men are masculine" or "popes are unmarried") adds no new knowledge as that knowledge was there prior to the start of the empirical inquiry.

The primary internalized belief system in psychology is that psychological functions can be scientifically investigated by way of attributing real numbers to them. Attributing numbers—like any attribution of labels—is an act of sign construction in the semiotic sense. Hence the act of quantification needs to be understood from the general perspective of meaning construction as a semiotic—sign-making—process.

Quantification and Science

Psychology in the last century has been made into a field where the act of attaching real numbers to imaginary properties of the psyche was supposed to make the so-called "soft" science into a "hard" one.[2] Thus, creating science became a symbol attachment task in which one kind of symbols (real numbers) was attached to the phenomena which were large in scope, existential in their nature, and socially appealing.

The simplest example of that process is that of a rating scale. If one—madly in love with one's boyfriend—is asked to rate her love for her boyfriend on a 7-point scale, the maximum ("7") is likely to be her assignment. Yet it is obvious that this—even maximal allowed number—would adequately represent her love.[3] But as recorded the "7" enters as "the data" into psychology's further analysis of the phenomena of love in general. The act of rating has—from the very first act of attaching a real number—created a non-real representation of the original phenomenon. Phenomena like "love" cannot be "measured"—or if they are, it is not the phenomenon but its substitute that is turned into a substitute sign.

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[1] Jan Smedslund (1995, 1997—also Lindstad et al. 2020) introduced this notion to illustrate the kind of empirical research that proves previously known implicit axioms of a society empirically—while their axiomatic status would need no empirical proof.

[2] Overview of these efforts is given in Toomela and Valsiner (2010) and the proof of limitations of the practice in Michell (1999). Psychologists project the result of their measured psychological qualities into the person and give them causal role—*your introversion score is X—high— which means your shyness in public is caused by your introversion.*

[3] The respondent at this junction would be either demanding to change the upper limit of the scale to another number than "7," for example, "999," and the rating might be made close to it—"997"— the rest "2" representing her doubts about the relationship. Or—more appropriately—she would refuse to give a rating at all, considering her love to her boyfriend as sacred as it would be a question one could ask a Catholic real estate dealer "how much would I have to pay if I wanted to purchase Saint Peter's Cathedral to have my stake in the Vatican real estate market?" Some objects—love and a cathedral—might not be on sale or determinable by ratings. The rating scale is a projective drawing task (Rosenbaum and Valsiner, 2011) and thus belongs to the class of qualitative methods.

It becomes clear from these examples why quantification does not constitute the essence of a science. James Mark Baldwin recognized that at the end of his life in psychology when he claimed:

> The ... quantitative method, brought over into psychology from the exact sciences, physics and chemistry, must be discarded; for its ideal consisted in reducing the more complex to the more simple, the whole into its parts, the later-evolved to the earlier-existent, *thus denying or eliminating just the factor which constituted or revealed what was truly genetic*. Newer modes of manifestation cannot be stated in atomic terms without doing violence to the more synthetic modes which observation reveals. (Baldwin, 1930, p. 7, added emphasis)

Baldwin's concern was with issues of development that the by then (1920s) growing fashion of assignment of numbers would overlook. Yet his idea can be seen more generally as a misfit of number assignment in psychology with the Gestalt nature of psychological phenomena (structure) and the dynamics of its transformations.

Need for Imagination in Psychology: Potential of Complex Numbers

Psychology's limited uses of mathematical number systems has been a surprise for mathematicians (Rudolph, 2013)—why would psychology operates only with one of the alternatives, real numbers, and assign these numbers to non-real phenomena. All psychological phenomena that depend upon semiotic mediation are non-real in their nature—they are central for human psychological organization, but they cannot be located anywhere in the real three-dimensional world. Locating climate, justice, special power, love, etc. in human experiential world is not possible—while these concepts play central role in human psychology.

Nevertheless the issue of mathematics in purifying a science has been on the agenda over centuries. Immanuel Kant's curse from the 1780s for psychology's future as never becoming science since it cannot be mathematized seems to be proven true by the very selective borrowing of mathematics by psychology over the twentieth century. Statistical philosophies are being developed—while most of the progress of mathematics over the twentieth century has been overlooked. It may be a different issue that not all deductive mathematical systems might not fit complex psychological realities other than superficially[4]—yet the reliance on the real number

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[4] Kurt Lewin's efforts to use topology in the 1930s to capture the field-like organization of human phenomena have been criticized as mere metaphoric extension. Rene Thom's "catastrophe theory" (Thom, 1975)—mapping nonlinear geometric forms onto real dynamics of natural or social turmoils—can be critiqued from the other end of overlooking the realities of these turmoils. The difficulty in both cases is in the non-fit of inductive (Lewin) and deductive (Thom) modelling perspectives on phenomena that operate for researchers as abductive reasoning tasks.

system and its treatment with statistical knowledge-making philosophies could hold back the development of the whole field.

Moving to the Use of Alternative Number Systems   What would be the advantages for psychology if it were to move from real to complex number system. Such extension does not deny the value of real numbers, but widens it by adding greater interpretive potential to it. The real numbers are part of the complex numbers:

$$Z = X + iY$$

where X is the real number and iY the imaginary component. In graphic terms the complex number is presented in Fig. 12.2.

The structure of the complex number seems to eliminate the "direct interpretive value" of the use of real numbers. We are used to simple claims that if a particular real number ("7") is compared with another ("5"), we can safely say that "7 > 5." In the case of complex numbers, this kind of comparison is not possible:

Z1 = 7 + (−2) = a case of "negative imagination" that equates real "7" with "5".
Z2 = 5 + (+2) = a case of "positive imagination" that equates real "5" with "7".

So in this example it is the imaginary component that reverses the picture created by the real number. A student gets the highest possible test result and does not care. Another student gets a lower result but is eager to study more. The test results (encoded by assigning real numbers) are poor indicators of the motivation that stays behind the results.

However, for the use of developmental models, the complex number (as all other mathematical notions) is free of irreversible time. This is a major disadvantage, since the past (reconstructive memory) and future (imaginary scenario of what might be) are not symmetric across the present time moment. This would add a third dimension (past-future) to a diagram in Fig. 12.2. This addition would turn the diagram not into a sphere but into a unity of two conic figures meeting in their tops (as both the future and the past are open ended). In formal terms it entails:

$$Z = X + iY + jP$$

where jP is the value of backward imagination—reconstructive memory. The imaginary component of the future is not isomorphic to that of the past—which is one of the supportive moments for non-ergodicity[5] of developmental processes which leads to the imperative of generalization from individual cases (Molenaar, 2004). Since all psychological phenomena of higher order are developmental in their nature, this separation of the two imaginations—to future and to past—is necessary,

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[5] Non-ergodicity of psychological characteristics makes it logically impossible to consider synchronic and diacrhronic empirical evidences as isomorphic (Molenaar et al., 2002).

Fig. 12.2 The complex number

Where Is Complex Number Used?

The basic idea of the complex number is behind the Trajectory Equifinality Approach (Sato et al. 2016) where the investigation of the present psychological states of affairs includes inquiry into one real life course trajectory (A) which is in dialogue with three (B, C, D) imaginary components (Fig. 12.3).

The TEA structure—used for interview or questionnaire—requires focus on past (A-B) and future (C-D) relationships between real (A) and possible (B,C,D) trajectories of a developmental event evaluated in the present (red oval) The past and future tensions are being coordinated in the present (green arrow):

$$Z = A + (A <> B, C <> D, \text{green arrrow})i$$

It becomes obvious that the particular imaginary phenomena attached to "I" are complex by themselves and are not summative (+). The complex number here needs to become built on *oppositions between* imaginary components. The complex number can be transferred into the real number. It becomes clear that if the imaginary component (iY) is absent (i = 0), the complex number becomes a real number.[6] Conversely, if the real number component is absent (x = 0), we are left with the completely imaginary number. The power of complex numbers is the possibility to derive both real and imaginary components within unified framework.

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[6] What we have here under the label "number" is not number in its ordinary (real) sense, but rather a minimal mathematical whole (abstract Gestalt) that allows our abstract thinking to keep uniting different aspects (e.g., the imaginary and the real) which otherwise would be subjected to exclusive separation. Inclusion of the imaginary together with the real is needed in psychology of higher psychological functions.

Fig. 12.3 Trajectory equifinality approach

Beyond Complex Numbers: Dialectics Brought into Mathematics

Mathematics itself is filled with the products of imagination—yet it is rare when in it attempts are made to formalize its own innovation process—the dialectical course of human reasoning. The Turkish philosopher and mathematician Ozan Oktar (2015) has elaborated the complex number theory to arrive at the inclusion of dialectics. His dialectical numbers take the form:

$$S = a + ib + mc + fd$$

where S is a dialectic number

a and b are real numbers,
i is the imaginary unit, with the property $i^2 = -1$
m is the declivity unit, with the property $m^2 = -1$
f is dialectic unit, with the property $f^2 = -1$

This new mathematical number theory includes the "dialectic unit" as one of the four dimensions. Yet it is not clear how it works as the fourth dimension of the complex number and to what aspects of imaginative reality this four-dimensional number is applicable. Mathematical abstractions need re-contextualization.

Curvilinearization and Explosion Leading to Affective Synthesis

In psychology concepts do not cry, scream, or beat one another up. This is what people do in their ordinary lives, but when it comes to description of these passionate acts, science responds with rational schemes implying an energy reservoir

metaphors. So, a crying person is presented as "filled with sadness" (rather than encountering a sad imaginary scenario), while a person beating up another, "overload of aggressivity" (rather than act of patriotism). The dynamic dramatic phenomena are qualitatively structured—even if transitory—and their systemic organization needs to be preserved in the data.

Fig. 12.4 illustrates the basic processes in systemic psychological oppositions—moving from binary oppositions (1 versus 0 or A versus non-A), which are linear in nature in an ordinary (common sense) presentation, to curvilinear systemic tension where the versus connector is replaced with that of *tension* between. The relation of tension can lead to a breakthrough point at which the relation is equilibrated into its ordinary binary oppositional state, or a new tension (B versus non-B) is synthesized via a dialectical leap.

Figure 12.4 is based on the basic assumption of the ***normative curvilinearity*** of psychological functions. The normal state of these functions is some form of systemic organization within which the parts of the whole are in a functional relationship with one another that is open to transformation under conditions of catalytic kinds.[7] The state of binary oppositions of linear kind (left side of Fig. 12.4) is a special case of the nonlinear systemic relations.

As an example, consider an adolescent girl drawn romantically towards a young man who does not give her clear indications about his feelings towards her. In her mind she goes constantly between binary decision sequences ("he loves me," "he does not love me") without clear resolution (left side of Fig. 12.4). Here the amorous relation between the two is only contemplated by the girl desiring to establish systemic romantic ties with the man, but the formation of the system has not happened. The girl's contemplation of it moves along the lines of binary oppositions (either 1 or 0).

Consider the change when such love relationship becomes established. The binary relationship becomes changed to that of tension (*he says he loves me but I am not sure he really does*). The tension escalates either into a breakdown (and return to the state of binary opposition with clear dominance of non-A ("he never really loved me"). Alternatively, the tension may transform into a lifelong established marital relation (new system) within which other tensions may emerge and be resolved (either by equilibration that preserves the marriage system or by break into divorce).

Fig. 12.4 The basic dynamics of linked (systemic) oppositions

[7] The notion of catalysis—relevance of factors to be present but not directly participating in a reaction—has been central for chemistry for over a century. In psychology it has only recently been introduced (Cabell and Valsiner, 2014) but has not entered into its theoretical core.

This focus on constant self-organization of nonlinear dynamic relationships has profound implications for the methodology of general psychology. In its past history since the invention of the correlation technology by Charles Spearman and Karl Pearson at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, the normative focus has been on *the linear formal relationships* among non-systemically co-present variables.[8] In the New General Psychology, the focus is on specification of the nature and transformation of curvilinear relations between parts within the systems. The generic notion of tension is posited to be present in these relations that could be restored to a non-tension state (binary opposition) or can lead to rupture that results in new organizational form of the system (development). Some (but not all) of these take place via dialectical transformations.

The primacy of the nonlinear nature of psychological phenomena specifies the primacy of the quality over quantity in methodological constructions. Quantity is a special feature of some forms of quality. Attaching a real number (e.g., "7") to some psychological phenomenon is built on the presupposition that this phenomenon exists. This presumption—without extra checks—has generated very large databases of non-real data. How can New General Psychology treat methodology without the danger of accumulation of artifactual data?

Three Kinds of Methodological Orientations

In psychology we can distinguish three general methodological orientations to revealing psychological functions.

The most usual and widely developed methodological orientation I call FLAT METHODOLOGY—the researcher and the researchee are involved in communication using minimally invasive messages that would not surprise or upset the researchee, and leads to the using the responses as givens. The social contract implicit in such research is that of mutual "no upset" and direct interpretability of the revealed evidence. Let us consider examples from a hypothetical interview sequence that illustrates the flat methodological orientation:

Interviewer: "What do you think of X?"
Interviewee: "I think Y about X."
Interviewer interpretation: "Respondent thinks Y about X."

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[8] Some conceptual systems in psychology have managed to not come under the influence of the twentieth-century acceptance of the General Linear Model. All psychodynamic approaches have treated the human psyche in systemic terms (even before the General System Theory was formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1930s–1960s). The developmental science tradition starting from embryology of Karl Ernst von Baer (early nineteenth century) to Hans Driesch (Valsiner, 2017) to biosemiotics (Hoffmeyer, 1998) and biological and psychological field theories (Beloussov, 1998, Lewin, 1936) have also bypassed the treatment of their phenomena by linearity presuming models. The interesting paradoxical case is the work of William Stern—on the one hand he is the personological forefather of the present New General Psychology (with the *unitas multiplex* notion in the center of his schemes), while on the other hand he was instrumental in the establishment of the linear models use (psychometrics).

In this excerpt both partners act as if accepting each other's meanings (X,Y) and by implicit contract do not let each other to penetrate the elaborate meanings used in this communication act. All surveys, rating scales, and personality questionnaires are built on this social contract. There is no doubt in either side about meanings used, and no emotional challenge leads to upsets on either side. The flat orientation to methodology fulfills the requirement of the institutional self-protection units ("human ethics committees") that operate as the watchdog over the non-conflictual well-being of all the participants in the research acts.

The orientation of EXPLOSIVE METHODOLOGY entails purposeful disequilibration of the researchee with the goal of gaining an access to the emotionally relevant and complex phenomena. To continue the hypothetical example:

Interviewer: "What do you think of X?"
Interviewee: "How *can you dare* to ask me about X?"
Interviewer: "You are upset about X. Why? Explain your feelings about X."
Interviewee: "That <unrepeatable words> X is Y!!"
Interviewer interpretation: "Respondent got upset and thinks Y about X" *and that feeling needs to be studied,*

Obviously this orientation requires careful selection of the desired "shock values" of X and final debriefing and counseling of the researchee. The scientific value of such "psychological injections" can be justified in the name of discovering the affective underpinnings of the surface façade meanings that are used in the encounter. For discovery of what really personally matters, the explosive direction is useful.

Finally, the orientation of DEEP METHODOLOGY involves subliminal triggering of the affective disequilibration that is the reverse of the explosive version:

Interviewer: "What do you think of X?"
Interviewee: "I think Y about X."
(interview proceeds)
Week later interviewer contacts the interviewee.
Interviewer: "What do you remember from our discussions week ago?"
Interviewee: "Not much but you asked me about X and I said Y but this has been in my mind over the whole week."
Interviewer: "Tell me more about thoughts."
Interviewee: "X,Y, Z, …."
Interviewer interpretation: "Respondent considers Y about X as an affectively loaded issue."

The use of deep methodology relies on the confabulation-based nature of the human *psyche*. The question asked in the explicit research encounter binds itself to some affective meaning site of the mind and reverberates as an unsolved problem. Returning to the topics in a re-constructive memory[9] after the first encounter proves

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[9] Deep methodology is based on Frederic Bartlett's research tradition in transfer of oral memory in societal settings (Wagoner 2018). Yet this tradition needs to be modified to focus it on the emergence of new meanings in the confabulations about the past.

that the particular issue is psychologically salient so that it has become internalized—to become externalized at the second encounter. It makes the *shadows of prevailing experience* into research topics. The detection of such shadows in the mind is a proof of the validity of the materials—if a topic introduced by a casual encounter—and any research encounter is just that—triggers an intra-mental process that keeps reverberating over time, it is of personal relevance.

The three directions of methodology illustrate the difficulty of access to higher psychological functions. These functions are rapidly internalized and go through deep hierarchical meaning construction with primacy of affect, and their externalization is overprotected by social presentation norms. Hence it is the most frequent methodological orientation—the flat methodology—that is the least potent for investigation of these processes. The other two are interventionist and hence risky. The researcher needs to know why a particular orientation is taken.

Systematic Look at Methodology

Methodology is not method, but a generative scheme to create phenomena-adequate methods. Such methods are not parts of a "toolbox" from which a researcher chooses some by some criteria, but mind-made to fit the purposes of a particular research question to be answered. The whole methodological cycle (Fig. 12.5) needs to be considered.

Fig. 12.5 Generic scheme of methodology (after Branco and Valsiner, 1997)

The Methodology Cycle is an organizational scheme that guides the researcher to the construction of fitting empirical methods. How to construct such methods? A counterclockwise move through the cycle starting from the researcher's intuitive understanding of one's goals and of the target phenomena (Fig. 12.6).

The investigative move from the designated phenomena to the assumptions involves soul searching by the researcher along the lines *are my assumptions adequate?* and are my assumptions sufficiently general? The latter question is the key to generalizability of whatever the research would bring.

An Example of a Narrow Assumption: Gender Differences It is usual for psychologists to look for gender differences in different functions. All this search is predicated upon the assumption that genders—male and female—exist as discrete categories, into which each specimen of the phenomena—a concrete person—has to be forced to fit. This assumption makes the researcher intellectually blind for persons of intersexual birth conditions and transexual life course desires. It also blocks the building of theories that treat the two opposites—masculinity and femininity—as mutually connected parts of the same system (androgynous person). As the result of this axiomatic refusal to treat gender as a system of mutually linked opposites, the whole spectrum of theories of universal gender are blocked from being developed. The resulting empirical research can only ad nauseam find gender differences in ever new parameters—yet fail to explain gender.

An Example of an Assumption of Highest Generalizability: Static Versus Dynamic View Any phenomenon can be viewed ontologically (as it is) or developmentally

Fig. 12.6 Step 1: from phenomena to axioms in methodological exploration

Fig. 12.7 Axioms of
stability and development

IN THE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT THE CRISIS OF
PSYCHOLOGY STARTS PRECISELY
HERE

Transition state
no longer A not
yet B

State A

State B

PRESENT TIME

The EDUCATION EFFORT works precisely on the locus
of transition

(as it has emerged and as it is likely to transform in the future). This is the most
general axiomatic differentiation in psychology. The ontological axiom (if accepted)
would lead to theories that guide the method construction towards the study of the
person as s/he is. From the here and now, recording of the parameters of the phe-
nomena using "standardized methods" of "high validity" is then empirically
recorded. No change in the phenomena—not to speak of development—is assumed
to take place under the general ontological assumption. If change or development is
detected by chance, it is treated as "error." In terms of the phenomenon moving from
state A to state B (Fig. 12.7), the ontological axiom prescribes detecting states A and
B as separate states of affair, not paying any attention to the fuzzy processes in
between.

Figure 12.7 is presenting the view of a developmental assumption. From that
axiomatic standpoint, it is exactly the fuzzy state in between (no longer A… not yet
B) that is to be investigated. Interestingly here the research focus of developmental
science and the applied focus of education and psychotherapy coincide. The devel-
opmental axiomatic stand leads to the creation of theories of transformation (from
one state to another) and construction of process-focused methods.

Step 2: From Axioms to Theory Constructions

After the basic axioms on which the given research project is based are explicated,
the next step (2) involves the construction of theories that could be used to guide the
setup of research questions—in the form of propositions or hypotheses. Figure 12.8
represents that step.

What becomes crucial in step 2 is consistency in the link PHENOMENA-
METACODE-THEORY. If the axiom is developmental in its nature, then any theory
devised on its grounds must be focused on the processes of transformation from one

state to another. To continue the example of Fig. 12.7, three competing theories can
be posited:

1. Transition A to B takes place by *monotonic* decline of A with simultaneous
   monotonic appearance of B.
2. Transition from A to B takes place via *increasing tension* of the vanishing A and
   appearing B that leads to *rupture* and arrival at B.
3. Transition from A to B involves breakdown of A into its components and binding
   of some of them by components of B (recombination of elements).

Theories 1 and 2 emphasize the transforming whole, while Theory 3 implies
recombination of elements without the concern of the whole (and—as a conse-
quence—or parts-whole relationships). If we continue here the example of Fig. 12.7,
then Theory 3 does not fit with the axioms of development and can be eliminated.
Of the remaining two theories, Theory 2 coordinates better with the phenomena
(human psyche develops in ways filled with ruptures and their repairs). Hence it is
Theory 2 that in this example we use to proceed further to step 3.

In order to get to step 3, the research question needs to be specified. Coming
from the developmental axioms elaborated into Theory 2 in this example, the
research question entails specific questions about how the theoretically posited
mechanisms of transition operate in reality. In our example the research question
can be—*how does tension increases in the developmental process and how does it
reach the breaking point* (rupture)(A)? Alternatively, a reasonable research question
can be: once a rupture has happened, *how does the process readjust itself at a new
developmental level?*(B).

Step 3: Constructing Methods

After the THEORIES and research questions are set, the crucial task of constructing methods starts. It is usual in psychology to select methods from a "toolbox" of methods that have been made already before, which are socially accepted ("standardized," "validity," and "reliability" established). This practice is questionable from the perspective of the Methodology Cycle since the "toolbox" choice idea does not fit with the careful analysis of the PHENOMENA-ASSUMPTIONS-THEORIES axis. To be more specific, the selection of some existing method is possible only and only if it is the best choice given the analysis done with the counterclockwise move on the Methodology Cycle, arriving at step 3. More likely in such selection the construction of new methods that adequately coordinate the PHENOMENA (directly) with the research question (developed from the PHENOMENA-AXIOMS-THEORIES route) would be preferable to any pre-existing methods from the "toolbox."\.

The triangular coordination starts from THEORY addressing the PHENOMENA—is the research question as set up fitting with the phenomena? Would answering it give the researcher new knowledge not known before and that is not pseudo-empirical? If the answers to these questions are positive, the effort—based on the adequacy of the research questions—moves on to METHOD construction. In the example above, *how does tension increases in the developmental process and how does it reach the breaking point* (rupture)—the methods to be created would entail observing the movement towards a naturally occurring rupture (e.g., menarche in adolescent girls) from the perspective of some dynamic aspect of their lives (e.g., their performance in figure skating). The rupture of performance quality in figure skating at menarche does not need empirical proof (this is granted by biological changes), but the psychological tension about it and efforts to cope with this are not. Possible methods to document such tension buildup need to be short-term longitudinal and individual case based. Once the method drafts are created, the triangular coordination goes from METHOD to THEORY for verification if the devised method adequately answer the research question. In the case of our example, would the method set up to detect the dynamics of tensions also adequately record the event of rupture. If not, moving another time via the triangle the method needs updating the method should "fine-tune" it to the answering of the research question and not violating the nature of the phenomena in the domain where the research question is being asked. Simultaneously the research dismisses all other aspects of the phenomena. The method is the specific tool to find out from the phenomena the answers to research questions in accordance with the underlying meta-code (Fig. 12.9).

Careful work on the triangular coordination is crucial to avoid the derivation of data from the phenomena that are accumulated in socially accepted but theoretically blind ways. Many initially promising research programs in psychology over the twentieth century have become mute this way—more accumulated data serve as a guarantee for such fate. Often this happens through the "sliding" of the axiomatic

Fig. 12.9 Step 3: constructing methods

base from one set of presuppositions (developmental) to another (ontological). The example of the implicit change of the meta-code in the history of attachment theory is a good example.

Example: How Attachment Research Violates Its Own Bases

Attachment theory created by the British psychoanalyst and social worker John Bowlby (1907–1990) in the 1950s had by the 1990s become one of the few notions in psychology which all (at least American) psychology undergraduate students were supposed to know. In the 1950s and 1960s, the theory was developed by Bowlby as a systemic account of the phenomenon of infants' bonding to their mothers, unifying the backgrounds of psychoanalysis and ethology.[10] The phenomenon—infants developing bonding relations with their mothers—was evident in all fields involved—clinical pediatrics, education, ethology, and

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[10] Van der Horst (2011) gives the best existing social history of Bowlby's creation of the attachment theory. Theories have biographies that become alienated from their original authors. The whole story of attachment research in its history is told by Duschinsky (2020).

psychoanalysis. It was clear to all who intuitively looked at such bonding examples that the phenomenon is that of *dynamic relationship between* the partners (infant and mother).

From the 1970s onward, the investigation of attachment became based on a method—the Strange Situation procedure. It is a sequence of short-term enactments in a laboratory situation with different persons—mother and a stranger leaving the child playing and returning—with the focus on how the child would act at the periods of departures and returns of the attachment figure (mother) and a comparison figure (unknown adult). The *process focus was replaced by the diagnostic labeling* of the child's attachment into one of the three types (A,B,C). The research field of "attachment research" replaced the initial (Bowlby's) general assumptions (systemic relation, dynamic process of bonding) and his theory by the ontological assumptions (it is the child who possesses a characteristic; the characteristic— attachment—is a trait; it can be typified in a standardized laboratory setting). The large accumulations of empirical data in the field since the 1970s no longer illuminate the process of bonding but treat attachment as an ontological property of the child. The systemic and processual features of the phenomena are eliminated from focus and replaced by "measurement" of the assumed "property" ("attachment") in the child.

General Conclusion: How We Study the *Unitas Multiplex* Is Determined by the Methodology Cycle

Approaching serious research in psychology is by far more rigorous than the efforts by a Catholic priest to investigate the state of affairs of the consenting beguine. The Methodology Cycle sets up very strict rules for how research can proceed—starting from its intuitive basis of curiosity. Development of educated intuition is the goal of preparation of any researcher who has the chance to introduce new knowledge to science. In this, artists and scientists are similar. The similarity ends with the guidance of the Methodology Cycle for the scientists—while artists have no such normative system for thinking.

In this chapter I outlined the Methodology Cycle in general and the ways how one can use it—in counterclockwise move starting from phenomena. The phenomena in general psychology—old and new—are the person in all of its complexity of unitas multiplex. Linking William Stern's personology with the new version of general psychology—look at the higher psychological functions—leads to the general assumption (meta-code) of all higher psychological functions being (a) *systemically organized* (b), *dynamic,* and (c) *meaningful*. In the case of higher psychological functions, we also need the *assumption of intentionality* for our look at the phenomena. Based on these axioms the person is to be studied as an intentional self-organizing system where the personal will to set up goals and invent means to try to reach these is central. Striving towards such personally set but societally guarded

goals is a lifelong personal project. Hence the New General Psychology of higher psychological functions is a Life Course Developmental Psychology where the centrality of the life course creator—the person—is the main actor.

Material for Further Thinking

1. Differences between methods and methodology.
2. Role of quantification in science.
3. Difference between axioma (mata-codes) and dogmas.
4. How are hypotheses set up in methodology cycle?
5. Coordination of theory and phenomena in method construction.

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Chapter 13
Final Conclusions: General Principles of Cultural Personology

Check for updates

Contents

> *A psychological phenomenon is that which is given directly to my self-observation. Phenomenological psychology holds itself to the word 'given', but what happens when we focus on the words 'self-observation'?. Something given in itself is unthinkable. The given must be given to someone. And this someone knows about the given, and only grasps it through self-observation, that is, through an act which is directed to the given.*
> (Stern, 1917, p. 15–16 translated.
> in Lamiell & Deutsch, 2000, p. 721,
> emphasis added).

What have we learned by thinking through human complexity of the *psyche* in this book? Why do we need New General Psychology? The answer to this question is simple—**personology cannot be understood without its social self-making through semiosis, and semiosis cannot be understood without clear focus on the agency of the person**. Psychology and semiotics are united in New General Psychology.[1] Building further from William Stern's personological system of

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[1] Building this synthesis is the result of my three decades of theoretical construction efforts. On that journey a few mindmarks need to be considered. Valsiner (1987) started from the efforts to understand the concrete relevance of the signified objects in child development (mealtimes). This was followed by the effort to make sense of the mind as a dynamic sign-maker and user (Valsiner, 1998) with further focus on its direct societal embeddedness (Valsiner, 2007) and looking at the insertion of meaningful forms into the texture of life environments (Valsiner, 2018). The core of

General Psychology which recognized the active role of the "Gestalt maker" in this book, the cultural-psychological focus on the semiotic nature of higher psychological functions is added. While Stern looked at the person in terms of dynamic complexity, here in this book we can observe how such complexity emerges, maintains itself, and at times vanishes—all through the human active use of signs to create one's own dialogical self in the relations with constantly changing and meaningfully transformed environments. The notion—human beings are open systems—is not a sophisticated philosophical nicety, but the very basis for human beings to turn themselves into agentive creators of the structured forms of one's lives.

William Stern pointedly moved away from Wilhelm Wundt's credo of distrusting the act of self-observation as basis for psychology. Yet the step he did not take was to see the self-observation process as that of *construction* of the self through signs. This latter move is made in this book—the active subject creates one's self through semiotic mediation which allows one to *present* the self-observation to oneself.[2] The latter part is crucial—signs can be seen to emerge in regulating the conduct of various species, but the reflexivity upon that in self-observation remains a strictly human achievement. Higher primates can be observed and guided to use signs mediating their actions, but they are not reflecting upon that practice and have yet to be observed to communicate their self-observations to the ape-fascinated researcher in the form of a narrative.

Going beyond the sign-mediated self-reflexivity, semiotic mediation makes the mastery of *intentional actions* possible—by enhancing the constructive externalization processes in specific directions in the context of *Gegenstand*. New General Psychology treats this minimal Gestalt—the *Gegenstand* ($\rightarrow \|$), in contrast to all point-like ontological presentations of phenomena (quantitative or qualitative), as the structural units that unite intention with meaning. The latter is a result of our imagination processes. Semiotic mediation makes all imagination-dependent processes in principle possible; if we did not use signs there would be no psychological distancing from the self possible. Such distancing—constant modulation of one's being and imaginative non-being in a particular setting—makes it possible to feel and think, to go "beyond the information given" in various senses of that established cliché.

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human psychological functioning at the highest level is affective (Valsiner, 2020) and involves semiotic fields in the process of affective generalization culminating in hyper-generalized meaning systems that are the basis for human deeply affective ongoing relating with one's world (Valsiner, 2021).

[2] Contemporary cultural psychology involves a number of examples of creative synthesis in this direction. Alberto Rosa's actant-based semiosis, Tania Zittoun's and Luca Tateo's theoretical elaborations of imagination processes, Olga Lehmann's theorizing about silence, Giuseppina Marsico's guiding psychology to look at "border zones," Nandita Chaudhary's relentless reminding us about limitations of Occidental cultural contexts, Lado Gamsakhurdia's proculturation theory, and Enno Freiherr von Fircks' new synthesis of *Daseinssemiosis* are all innovations that have occurred in the last three decades in the new framework of cultural psychology.

Unitas Multiplex in Semiotic Perspective

Aside from being a theoretician and philosopher, William Stern and together with his wife Clara were ardent observers of children. By his own admonishing the general idea of unity in multiplicity came to him observing his own children[3]—which has been historically the usual way of gaining access to the phenomena of human development. It is the parents who share the life spaces of the developing children every day and night and whose observations of their children forever give them pleasures and worries. The ordinary heroism of parents enjoying the handling of children despite the needs of diaper changes and worrying about adolescents' uncontrollable party-going goes usually unnoticed in between their silences and societal normative child-rearing texts. The full field of *feeling as a parent*—a hyper-generalized central meaning of the "inner infinity"—is made socially normative by the avalanche of various advices given to the parents. Deep personal affectivity can get lost in amidst such marketplace of social suggestions.

Dynamic Complexity of Human *Being*

Being a parent—like being any deeply involved agent in human living—is dynamically complex. Yet realizing that dynamic complexity of the phenomena does not amount to the understanding of its basic principles of organization. The task here is very complicated—to find the abstract form for hyperdynamic and seemingly formless phenomena. To create the abstract form of the formless is a task for generalizing science. Various concrete solutions are possible here. Yet one feature is shared by all efforts of this kind—that of wholistic hierarchical order (*Ganzheit)* as the kind of general models. Reduction of the whole to its components and treating those as independent elements that can be counted and assembled into nonstructured accumulations[4] is not allowed as this eliminates precisely the qualities of the phenomena that need to be investigated.

The focus on multiplicity has been in the core of the theory built in this book. From Introduction onward, the notion that the person is *unitas multiplex* has recurrently surfaced in our text. Let us look at it again:

> This must be taken literally. All the multiplicity included in the person, the hegemony of elements, events, phases, strata, is *integral* to the totality and not just superficially cemented to it or supported and conditioned by it; it is the *consonance* of multiplicity with the per-

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[3] "I observed psychological life concretely, and in this way I was protected from those ivory tower schemes and abstractions that we all too often encounter in the name of psychology. It was through this work that I came to understand the person as the center of a unitas multiplex" (Stern, 1927, p. 145—in Lamiell & Deutsch, 2000).

[4] The examples of such accumulations are scales of measurement of various kinds (intelligence, personality, etc.) where complex meaningful materials (items) are thrown together in a nonstructured artificial whole (a "score").

sonal whole and the person with the world, that makes the human life possible (Stern, 1938, p. 73)[5]

The *personal whole* makes *human* life possible—and the hierarchical integration of the whole happens through semiotic mediation. Stern's use of "*zusammenklinge*n" in the original ("sound together" translated as *consonance*) keeps the act of integration processes better in focus as it references the unity of sounds in music that enables the making of a melody. A self-reflexive person is a choir singing a polyphonic tune within oneself. One can abstract from this specific nuance the general notion of human life as a melody of living.[6] In the composing of this melody—the Personal Life Philosophy of one's personal living—it is the *process of introception*[7] that for Stern does the job of integrating the hierarchy of the complex personal whole.

Hierarchical Integration of Heterogeneity

Developmental structure of the whole has been captured by Heinz Werner's Orthogenetic Principle (Chap. 1). While Werner maintained that principle as a general axiomatic basis for all developmental science, for understanding the ways in which human beings are consistently non-consistent requires further differentiation of the structure of hierarchically integrated form of the *Ganzheit* structure of the person. This was depicted in the right-hand side of Fig. 1.7 and here becomes re-emphasized in Fig. 13.1 where the notion of hierarchical integration takes a new form (the right-hand side of Fig. 13.1).

The hyper-generalized integrated system in Fig. 13.1 seems at first glance to be an example of de-differentiation in relation to the highest level of hierarchical integration (left-hand side, from Fig. 1.7). Seemingly the hierarchical control loop between A and the cycle P-Q-S has disappeared, and it seems as if the order revers to that of mere articulation in Heinz Werner's terms. This is not true—the hyper-generalized A has proliferated to the whole field, and each and every event in the P-Q-S cycle is now unescapable controlled by A. The extension of A to cover the whole field in the system equals the setup of the atmosphere for the functioning of the P-Q-S cycle. Here we see the importance of expansion of a point-like sign into a field-like sign with the latter assuming the control over the whole field.

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[5] German original in Stern (1935, p,. 102): *Person ist Ganzheit, d.h. nicht Einfachheit, ondern unitas <u>multiplex</u>. Das ist durchaus wörtlich zu nehmen. All das Viele, das in der Person enthalten ist, an ihr ständen, Geschehnissen, Teilen, Phasen, Schichten, gehört zur Ganzheit, ist ihr nicht nur äusserlich angeklebt, stützt oder bedingt sich gegenseitig; dieses <u>Zusammenklingen</u> der Vielen zum personale Ganzen, und der Person mit dem Werte macht das menschliche Leben möglich*

[6] As it was done in Zittoun et al. (2013)

[7] Forms of **introception**—*loving, understanding, creating, and consecrating* (Stern, 1938, p. 73)—require the notion of consciousness in enacting intentions. On the basis of self-observation (introspection) grows the self-orientation to the personal feeling in oneself and its intentional guidance.

Fig. 13.1 From generalization to hyper-generalization in hierarchical integration

Such "whole field" takeovers by affective hyper-generalized sign fields are deeply existential for human lives. The existential concerns over the fluctuating cruelty and benevolence of human societies introduced in Chap. 1—moving from deconstructive looting of captured towns to economic and psychological reconstruction after traumatic events—find a simple explanation here. In the process of articulation and hierarchical integration (Werner's orthogenetic process), the generalization process proceeds beyond the maximum categorical organization to the extra step of atmosphere's "takeover" of the whole system. This extension of the point-like sign to the maximally field-like sign—a meaning extension that "captures" the whole of the *psyche*—guarantees the maximum hierarchical integration of the human psychological system.

The second new feature in the hyper-generalized integrated system is the focus on production of externalized side "products" (a, b, c) that become externalized into the atmosphere of the system. Their function in the further development of the system—be it further hyper-generalized atmosphere change or return to the generalized integrated system state (strictly organized hierarchical integration)—is the open end of the highest level of systemic integration.[8] In this sense, the highest level of hierarchical integration is actually quasi-integrated—some parts of the system are left unbound to others to create the possibility for further reorganization.

The implications of the quasi-integrated hierarchical order—a step beyond the Wernerian highest level of hierarchical integration—are profound. **This highest organization level is in itself heterogeneous**—which makes it open for further

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[8] Here we can think of Georg Simmel's insistence that wars are being prepared in peacetime, and peace efforts are being created at wartimes.

development. This can be exemplified by a new look at traditionally categorically given notion of identity:

> Ego identity no longer consists in being one thing, such as being Irish or Norwegian, but in creating an individually unique composition of heterogeneous elements, including foreign elements, which are compatible with one's own epistemological type (Maruyama, 1999, p. 59)

This open-ended organizational view becomes exemplified in Lado Gamsakhurdia's theory of *proculturation*[9] that emphasizes the integration of migrating persons to the new societal context in ways that goes *beyond* that context. This is the basic feature of all developmental phenomena—introduced in the 1890s by James Mark Baldwin (1892) in the form of persistent imitation (trying and trying again—beyond the given criteria).

Tension Between Homogeneity to Heterogeneity

Open systems produce abundance—and abundance includes single innovative shifts that lead to the reorganization of the whole. These are singular breakthroughs in the developmental life course—moments of emergence of novelty. These moments are *necessarily single* events—by definition something new cannot have been observed before it emerges.[10] The important feature is generativity of the self—not considered in the framework of classical cybernetics (Maruyama, 1992).

A good universal example of the basic abstraction from empirical evidence—the Gaussian "normal distribution" curve—can be conceptualized (Fig. 13.2). In its practical usage it summarized and smoothens the observed distribution of observations, under the deductive pretext that the "natural order" guides the distributions to take the form of "normal distribution." Such reference to the "natural order" makes corrections to the observed distributions—transforming non-normal empirical distributions to their "normal" form—legitimate for research.

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[9] Gamsakhurdia (2019, 2021) extends the basic developmental perspective—creation of novelty— to the movement of people across societies. Hence the common sense and politically bound assumption that people who migrate from society A have to become assimilated in society B that accepts them overlooks the relevance of such migration for society B that benefits from the migration flow.

[10] Hence the centrality of idiographic science in the study of development (Molenaar, 2004; Salvatore, 2016; Salvatore et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Lamiell, 1998). All human development— from birth to death—is that of individual persons who internalize different aspects of their societal inputs in personally unique ways,

Fig. 13.2 Two interpretations of the "normal distribution"

The Normal Nature of Non-normality: Beyond the Gaussian Curve

From the ontological perspective of traditional psychology, the whole reality of variability is an epistemological obstacle. It does not easily allow the reduction of the variability to a particular "pure type" to which the classical logic of "all S are P" can be easily applied. To accomplish this the operations of averaging and prototyping are regularly used, leaving the rest of the normal distribution behind.[11] The data in the "normal distribution"—smoothed and fit to the distribution—are let to themselves to tell the story of what is needed given the epistemological imperative, the static average or prototype with no variability left in place.

The radical move in treatment of the "normal distribution" comes with the shift from ontological to heterogeneistic general perspective of "second cyberneics" of Magoroh Maruyama (Maruyama, 1963). Here what is considered "natural" is not the constriction of the distribution ("strive" towards the average—Fig. 13.2) but just the opposite—the proliferation of variability. Amplification of variability is the norm, while the information included in any average is of either no use or of background descriptive value.

This emphasis on variability expansion (Fig. 13.2 green arrows) entails the theoretical notion of natural emergence of new versions of the previously observed phenomena. Thus the critically relevant part of the "normal distribution" is not its center ("average") but its peripheries on both sides ("zone of innovation"). Novelty offers first in one single instance—supported by the semiotic support (Rodriguez Higuera, 2016).

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[11] Valsiner (1984) demonstrated the conceptual myopia of that move and outlined the cognitive processes that made it possible (Valsiner, 1986)—the unity of the generic and concrete forms of words.

Figure 13.2 displays the two opposite perspectives on the abundance of psychological phenomena—the "traditional" ontological perspective that relies upon the observed phenomena and generalizes through the homogenization of the variability based on averages. This epistemological orientation involves the generalizing constriction of the variance towards the average—taking the average as a representation of the "pure" form of the phenomenon.

From Non-normality to Bifurcation Tensions   The perspective taken on the distributions here assumes the normal nature of heterogeneity—and as a result the focus of epistemology is that of transformation of the different components of variance into new forms. The inquiry here is on the transformability of the parts of the distribution into new forms (bifurcation conditions A+ and A-) that have not yet been observed. The focus here is on expansion of the observed distribution conditions (specified by the "normal curve") into a structural curvilinear whole where the (seeming) opposites come together in a tension-filled ambivalences (Chap. 10) which at times "leap" dialectically to new forms. Behind the observable "normal distribution" is the myriad of possible links between parts of that distribution between themselves and with imaginary extended oppositional forms (A- and A+ in Fig. 13.2).

This present perspective is built on the innovations to science that stem from the "second cybernetics" (Maruyama, 1963). The implications are profound—they result in a complete turn away from traditional (Boolean) logic in favor of logic of heterogeneity:

> The new logic is heterogenistic and nonhierarchical. Reciprocal causal processes can generate differentiation, heterogeneity, and interaction patterns among heterogeneous elements, raise the level of sophistication of the system, and increase the amount of information. *The universe tends to heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is no longer errors, abnormalities, or chance deviations from the average, but the very basis of biological, social, and even some physical processes*. (Maruyama, 1978, p. 454, added emphasis)

While the reversal of the focus on variability—heterogeneity—is a major starting point for this breakthrough, the perspective on heterogeneity developed in New General Psychology does not eliminate hierarchical relations between parts in the whole of complex heterogeneous systems. Furthermore, "reciprocal causal processes" become viewed as catalyzed—rather than causal. Heterogeneity of the biological, psychological, and social systems includes both active—multiply interconnected and hierarchically integrated parts—and inactive (at the moment) components.[12] The latter can be integrated into the organized system—thus serving as the resource for handling a large range of potential challenges.

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[12] As a biological example by now well known—80% of the genome of human beings are not specifiable as functional currently in any state.

Axiomatic Bases for Maintenance and Innovation

All perspectives on complexity follow one of the three possible relational forms. One of them—that of classical Aristotelian or Booleian logic—is well known and recognized in the history of sciences. It fits well with the non-organic phenomena of static states of being. Its basic organizational structure is that of transitivity:

If A > B and B > C then A > C (trajectory X in Fig. 13.3).

Transitivity generates linear hierarchies (A > B > C) but is foreign to organic phenomena that exist through processes of self-maintenance cycles. Here the relationship of intransitivity reigns:

If A > B and B > C then C > A (trajectory Y in Fig. 13.3).

Intransitivity has been rarely utilized in sciences,[13] except for biological models of cyclical nature where it is an axiomatic given at our time.[14] Biological, psychological, and social systems require such intransitivity cycles for granting their self-maintenance.

Fig. 13.3 Three basic forms of organizing wholes: transitive, intransitive, and post-intransitive cycles

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
[13] Poddiakov and Valsiner (2013) emphasized the centrality of intransitive cycles in biological systems.

[14] This was not so in the middle of the twentieth century. It took Hans Krebs and his team 14 years to realize that the basic biochemical energy chain—now called "Krebs' cycle"—was of cyclical form (Krebs, 1953).

Possibility for Development: The Post-Intransitive Condition

For the main feature of New General Psychology—focusing on development of the person—intransitive relations are not enough. While intransitivity relations give us a tool to conceptualize dynamic maintenance processes, they are completely "blind" to any aspect of development. No innovation is possible in intransitivity cycles— while the whole natural and social world is filled with phenomena of innovation. It is the post-intransitivity process that allows for the emergence of new trajectories (Fig. 13.3). Neither the Trajectory X (fixed hierarchy A > B > C) nor Trajectory Y (perpetual repetitive process in the cycle) breaks the existing system to become reconstituted in a new systemic order.

   To summarize, the transition from logic of maintenance of open systems and logic of development is precisely in the move from the intransitive loop (Y) to the post-intransitive open-ended loop (Z). Here is the critical starting point of all developmental science perspectives in biology, psychology, and sociology. **The developmental logic is the post-intransitive logic**—a perspective that has not been developed over a century.[15] The absence of post-intransitive models in science has made searching for the organizing principles of innovation and development impossible.

   The locus of rupture in Fig. 13.3 can happen in any location of the cycle, and its happening (and non-happening) depends on the coordination of two kinds of catalysts—by-products of the cycle itself (autocatalyst A) and from input from the environment (allocatalyst B). The theoretical task is to figure out how the "bystanding parts" (catalysts) operate in the guidance of the system P-Q-S into trajectory Z—the creation of the new part of the system. The maintenance function of Trajectory Y is the basis for "breaking out" of the maintained status quo under the presence of the catalysts.

   Let us consider a hypothetical example of a young person who—against all the social suggestions not to do it—travels to another geographical region to join an extremist military group that commits atrocities against local people and cultural treasures. The young person is constantly bored by the uneventful maintenance of the everyday life at home and its social confines and as a contrarian ideation creates an imagination of the self-as-hero fighting for some socially relevant cause. Which cause it is immaterial—the goals of the extremist group he or she is going to join are not known nor even needed for the emerged self-need to be a hero. The young person seeks out the contrarian propaganda for the "social values" of the extremist group (allocatalyst B in Fig. 13.3), silencing the Trajectory Y-supported alternative allocatalysts that present the extremist group as a "dangerous" or in any other

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[15]The only thinker in the twentieth century who consistently tried—yet failed—to develop this kind of general logic was James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934). His genetic logic was the antecedent for various empirical research programs—those of Jean Piaget's developmental investigations (Valsiner, 1996, 2001) and the aesthetic synthesis focus of Lev Vygotsky—but his theoretical quest remained without follow-ups (Valsiner, 2009, 2010). It remains to be remedied in the twenty-first century.

non-appreciative way—which would only support the subjective appreciation of the appeal of the extremist group's propaganda efforts.

The person travels and joins the extremist group. Note that the causality in her or his actions is within one's own self—the WANT and WILL (Chap. 11 above) to which DUTY or RIGHT can be added are the signs the person uses to cause one's own action. The emerged need for personal heroism (autocatalyst A) and the luring propaganda from the extremist group (allocatalyst B) set the stage for the personal action. Examples of such personal decisions abound in any wars—the young men of Europe rushed to join the armies in 1914 to fight the "Glorious War" that made many of them handicapped and large numbers dead. Rationality vanishes when the atmosphere of peacetime turns into that of war.

The death-and-life dance of humanity proceeds—wars come and are replaced by peace, until the next war comes. Children are born, raised, and go to war—perish or survive there or in the more mundane survival on the motorways of our modern lives. The survivors create new weapons—and laws to limit their uses. Psychology as human science is a generalizing field that looks at the interface of the heterogeneous person with deep variability of societal demands and supports.

New General Psychology: Semiotic Intentionality of the Gestalt Maker

What was done in this book is elaboration of the multiplicity of the *unitas multiplex* in its societal contexts. This *unitas multiplex* begins from the most general feature of being human, use of signs in the hierarchical integration of the self. This entails the unity of construction and destruction as basic in human lives.

Any field of science faces its historically formed challenges. It took astronomy long time to accept the counterintuitive truth of the heliocentric orbit of the Earth. It was simply too obvious for the common observations of the sun arising and setting every day to consider the possibility that which of the celestial objects moves around the other is not immediately evident to the naked eye. A similar situation has characterized psychology as science for a long time. The thinking of psychologists—in research and practice—has been focused on finding the static states of affairs of the minds of the human beings whose souls and bodies are characterized by perpetual movement and unstoppable production of signs and cultural artifacts. The result has been a reverse-side-out view on the human *psyche*—seeing it as if it is passive, reactive to environment, predictable, and controllable. Without these assumptions psychology as a science seemed impossible.[16]

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[16] Constructive theorizing that leads to new ideas is a necessity imperative in contemporary psychology (Teo, 2020) in order to give form to the rapidly expanding flow of empirical investigations. This is particularly important as psychology in its history has been the "hostage" of the ideological "war" between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Valsiner, 2012) which has obscured the investigation into its Renaissance cultural-historical roots (Klempe, 2020).

The present book has been an example of how a serious science can be built on the alternative axiomatic basis. Human beings are meaning-makers who act in their environments intentionally and purposefully—modifying these environments and themselves. The unpredictability of the human conduct is not an error but a strength of pre-adaptation to possible impending conditions.

The New General Psychology outlined in this book reverses the focus of psychology as science from static categories to dynamic variability fields of the *psyche* that are guided by the normative nature of societal expectations. The latter—needed for social life—are blinders for general science. Science is an aesthetic activity that transcends the common sense while taking its permanent presence into account.

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